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ABSTRACT
The study explores the nexus between illicit economies and military conflicts. It
investigates when and how access by belligerents to the production and trafficking of
illicit substances affects the strength of belligerents and governments. Although narcotics
trafficking is often treated as sui generis, the study situates the drug trade within the
larger class of markets for illicit products and services. The study presents a general
theory of the relationship between illicit markets and military conflict - the political
capital of illicit economies -- and contrasts it with conventional wisdom on connections
between drug trafficking and military conflict.
The political capital of illicit economies argues that belligerents derive much
more than simply large financial profits from their sponsorship of illicit economies. They
also obtain freedom of action and, crucially, legitimacy and support from the local
population, called political capital. If belligerents choose to become negatively involved
in the illicit economy (attempt to destroy it), they not only fail to increase their military
capabilities, but also suffer costs in terms of political capital. The extent and scope of
belligerents' gains/ losses from their involvement in the illicit economy depend on four
factors: the state of the overall economy; the character of the illicit economy; the
presence of traffickers; and the government response to the illicit economy. These
factors reflect both structural conditions outside of the immediate control of the
belligerents and the government and strategic policy choices available to either the
belligerents or the government.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom about narcotics and military conflict,
eradication of narcotics cultivation has dubious effects on the capabilities of the
belligerents and is extremely unlikely to severely weaken them. However, it alienates the
local population from the government and results in the population's unwillingness to
provide intelligence on the belligerents - a crucial requirement for success against the
belligerents. Thus, eradication of illicit crops increases the political capital of the
belligerents without significantly weakening their military capabilities.
The primary cases explored in the study are Peru, Colombia, and Afghanistan.
Additional evidence is drawn from the cases of Burma, Northern Ireland, Turkey, and
India.
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CHAPTER ONE - Introduction
I. Introduction: Situating the Study
In the spring of 2006, resurgent and increasing lethal Taliban insurgents
hammered posters around Afghanistan's rural south, offering villagers to protect their
opium fields against government eradication sponsored by the United States and the
United Kingdom. The Taliban left a cell phone number to be called if the villagers faced
the destruction of their opium crop. In one village near Kandahar,' the villagers caught on
to a counternarcotics sting operation in which an agent posed as an opium trader. After
his visits to the village to buy opium were followed with raids on the villagers' opium
crops, the villagers phoned the Taliban. The Taliban instructed them to invite the
suspected informant back, captured him, and forced him to call in police. When the
police arrived in the village, the Taliban ambushed them, killing several policemen,
including the police chief. The villagers were grateful, and the Taliban obtained
important information and scored a success against the government, limiting state
presence in the area. Most importantly, the relationship between the local population and
the Taliban was fortified, even though until then, the village residents had no pro-Taliban
feelings.
Meanwhile as the year's opium harvest reached a staggering 6,100 metric tons,
the head of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Antonio Maria Costa called
for robust military action by NATO to destroy the opium industry in southern
I am grateful to Sarah Chayes, an aid worker in Kandahar, for the information on the sting operation in
the Kandahar village. Because of the possible threats to local Afghans, both the names of the village and its
inhabitants are not used. For further information on the relationship between the population and the Taliban
near Kandahar, see, Sarah Chayes, The Punishment of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan After Taliban (New York:
Penguin Press, 2006).
Afghanistan: "In the turbulent southern region, counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics
efforts must reinforce each other so as to stop the vicious circle of drugs funding
terrorists and the terrorists protecting the drug traffickers." 2
The Taliban is just one example of many belligerent groups - be they terrorists,
insurgents, paramilitaries, or local warlords - that have penetrated the international drug
trade and other illicit economies. With a growing realization that belligerent groups
derive large financial resources from such illicit economies, governments have
increasingly turned to suppressing illicit economies not only as a way to curtail criminal
activity, but also as a strategy to defeat the belligerents. Yet government efforts at
suppressing the illicit economy often not only fail to eliminate or significantly weaken
the belligerent group, but are frequently counterproductive to the
counterinsurgency/counterterrorism effort.
This study explores the relationship between illicit economies and military
conflict, offering a different analysis of both the scope and nature of the phenomenon and
of appropriate ways of dealing with it than the conventional view does. The production
and trafficking of narcotics is the most prominent illicit economy in terms of profits as
well as public and government attention. Although it is the dominant focus of the study,
the drug trade is not treated as sui generis; rather, it is situated here within the larger class
of markets for illicit products and services.
The study specifically focuses on illicit markets, not markets and resources in
general. As distinct from licit markets, illicit markets have several crucial characteristics:
they raise profits to very high levels; governments and legitimate businesses cannot
2 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "UN Drugs Chief Calls for Extra Resources to Help NATO
Target Afghan Opium," Press Release, http://www.unodc.org/en/press_release_2006_09_12.html,
downloaded September 09, 2006.
openly participate in them; and hence outside-the-law actors, such as belligerent groups,
can capture a large market share of the illicit economy. Crucially, governments frequently
consider it imperative to destroy the illicit economy. But such a policy allows the
belligerents to offer themselves as protectors of the illicit economy and obtain support
from the local population that depends on the illicit economy for basic livelihood. The
forms of military conflict examined in the study range from civil war, insurgency,
terrorism, and occupation to warlordism.
The study investigates when and how access by belligerents to the production and
trafficking of illicit commodities affects the strength of belligerents and governments.
The principal questions are:
* Through what processes does access to illicit economies affect the strength of
belligerent groups?
* What conditions influence the size and scope of the benefits (and costs)
belligerent groups derive (and incur) from their interaction will illicit economies?
* How do government policies toward the illicit economy affect the strength of
belligerents and, ultimately, limit, contain, or exacerbate military conflicts?
The rest of the introduction proceeds as follows. First, I explain both the academic
and the policy significance of the study. I then discuss the parameters of the nexus
between illicit economies and military conflict and its framing in the study. Third, I
outline the two different views that are examined and tested in the rest of the study: the
dominant conventional view and my theory of political capital of illicit economies.
Fourth, I sketch the various impacts of illicit economies outside of military conflict, a
subject matter not covered by the study. Finally, I briefly describe the cases analyzed in
the study and provide a roadmap to the rest of the study.
II. The Significance of the Study
The conventional view of the nexus between illicit economies and military
conflict, adopted by both the U.S. government and much of the academic literature and
reflected in the "narcoguerrilla and nacroterrorism theory, ignores important aspects of
the dynamic interaction between armed groups and illicit economies. The mechanisms by
which armed groups gain strength by exploiting illicit economies and the conditions that
influence the size and scope of the belligerents' gains from such economies are
frequently ignored and mispecified, thus leading to ineffective policy prescriptions.
Scholarly Contribution
The academic and think tank literature (reviewed in detail in the following
chapter) is still in an initial phase of developing an understanding of the relationships
between illicit economies and violent conflict. Most of the literature emphasizes that
drugs, and other illicit economies, help finance terrorism, insurgencies, and civil wars. 3
Little distinction is made between licit or illicit exploitable resources. Exploitable
resources - whether licit or illicit - are seen as financial resources for the belligerents.
Either the desire for these financial resources is seen as the cause of the military conflict
Prominent examples of the economics and/or narcoguerrilla arguments include Gabriela Tarazona-
Sevillano, with John B. Reuter, Sendero Luminoso and the Threat ofNarcoterrorism (Washington, DC:
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1990); Douglas J. Davids, Narco-terrorism (Ardsley:
Transnational Publishers, 2002); James Adams, The Financing of Terror (London: New English Library,
1986); Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars," October 21, 2001,
http://econ.worldbank.org/files/12205_greedgrievance 23oct.pdf, downloaded April 16, 2003; and Karen
Ballentine and Jake Sherman, eds., The Political Economy ofArmed Conflict: Beyond Greed and
Grievance (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003).
or such financial resources are viewed as a means to prolonging the military conflict.
The dominant policy recommendation derived from such analysis is to suppress the illicit
economies, e.g. by eradicating the illicit crops, in order to deprive the belligerents of
resources. To the extent that the belligerents' political gains are mentioned at all, they
appear in country-specific critiques of the war on drugs,4 with little or no effort at
offering a systematic general theory of the scope, size, and character of political gains
belligerent groups derive from their participation in illicit economies.
The study fills this analytical void by showing how such access by belligerents
earns them not only financial gains that enhance their physical capabilities, as most of the
literature stresses, but also freedom of action -- an important component of military
capabilities -- and, crucially, political gains. The belligerents obtain these political gains
-- or what I call political capital (legitimacy and support from the local population) -
through the provision of several functions. They protect a reliable and lucrative source of
livelihood for the local population participating in the illicit economy against government
efforts to repress the illicit economy. They protect the producers/peasants from brutal and
unreliable traffickers. And with the financial profits from the illicit economy, they
4 Cynthia McClintock, "The War on Drugs: The Peruvian Case," Journal oflnteramerican Studies and
World Affairs, 30 (2 and 3), Summer/ Fall 1988: 127-142; Richard Clutterbuck, Drugs, Crime, and
Corruption (New York: New York University Press, 1995); Adam Isacson, "Was Failure Avoidable?
Learning From Colombia's 1998-2002 Peace Process," The Dante B. Fascell North-South Center Working
Paper Series, Paper No. 14, March 2003,
shttp://www.miami.edu/nsc/publications/NSCPublicationslndex.html#WP;
http://www.fpif.org/briefs/vol3/v3n29coca_body.html; Nazih Richani, Systems of Violence (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 2002); Gustavo Gorriti, The Shining Path: A History of the Millenarian War
in Peru, Robin Kirk, trans., (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999); Jose E. Gonzales,
"Guerrillas and Coca in the Upper Huallaga Valley," in Palmer, David Scott, ed. Shining Path ofPeru,(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994): 123-144; Romin D. Ortiz, "Insurgent Strategies in the Post-Cold
War: The Case of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 25,
2002: 127-143; Francisco Gutierrez Sanin, "Criminal Rebels? A Discussion of Civil War and Criminality
from the Colombian Experience," Politics and Society, 32 (2),
June 2004: 257-285; and Renssellaer Lee III., The White Labyrinth (New Brunswick: Transaction
Publishers, 1989) and his subsequent work with Patrick L. Clawson, The Andean Cocaine Industry (New
York: St. Martin's Griffin, 1996).
provide otherwise absent social services to the local population. Moreover, the study
specifies a set of structural and policy variables that influence the size and scope of the
belligerents' gains - both military and political - from their involvement in illicit
economies. The study reveals the unique properties of the illicitness of the discussed
economies in generating both political capital and high profits for the belligerent groups
that exploit them. It thus contributes a new dimension to the analysis of the role of
markets in violence and the costs and benefits of specific regulations, thus providing new
questions for analysis in the field of international political economy.5
The study also highlights the role of illicit economies and criminal actors for the
field of security studies. Although the United States has waged a war on drugs for thirty
years, and although this war has numerous times intersected with civil wars,
counterinsurgency, and even intrastate conflict, there is a glaring paucity of attention to
this nexus by security studies scholars. The study advances theory-building about
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, freshly elucidating the importance and ways of
depriving the belligerents of popular support. It shows how governments can increase the
population's support for the state - including, in terms of intelligence provision. In doing
so, the study joins the continuing debate about the appropriate means of defeating
insurgencies and terrorist groups: whether to attempt to limit the belligerents' physical
resources or to give importance to winning the hearts and minds of the population.6 The
S For a seminal debate on the costs and benefits of international regimes and the political effects of market
regulation in the international arena, see Robert Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton: Princeton University
Press: 1994), and Kenneth A. Oye, Economic Discrimination and Political Exchange (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1993).
6 Georges Bonnet, Les guerres insurrectionnelles et revolutionnaires (Paris: Payot, 1958); Roger Trinquier,
Modern Warfare (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964); Walter Laquer, The Age of Terrorism (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1987); Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf Jr., Rebellion andAuthority: An Analytical Essay on
Insurgent Conflicts (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970); John J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-
revolutionary Warfare (London: Farber and Farber, 1966); Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist
study shows the extraordinary difficulties and low rates of success in depriving
belligerents of resources through efforts to suppress illicit economies and reveals the host
of adaptations available to the belligerents, the producers of the illicit commodity, and the
traffickers. Instead of succeeding in bankrupting the belligerents, suppression efforts
most often fail to make a significant difference in the belligerents' physical capabilities,
while they definitely antagonize the population dependent on the existence of illicit
economy. The study thus provides a test of competing schools of counterinsurgency: the
French view of counterinsurgency (on occasion combined with applying conventional
warfare methods to counterinsurgency operations) versus the British or hearts and minds
school of counterinsurgency, showing the greater effectiveness of the latter. The study
distinguishes between the effects of various suppression methods and specifies under
what set of structural factors the tradeoff is starkest between the desire to limit the
resources of the belligerents and the desire to win support of the population for the
government.
The study also enlarges the understanding of the role of non-state (subnational
and transnational) actors in domestic conflict as well as world politics.7 It highlights the
processes by which non-state terrorists, criminal syndicates, and a varied array of local
belligerent groups have enhanced their power through the exploitation of illicit
economies. Crucially, it analyzes the relationship between criminal organizations
(traffickers) and belligerent groups in their exploitation of illicit economies and shows
Insurgency (London: Chatto and Windus, 1966); David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and
Practice (New York: Praeger, 1964); Bard E. O'Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to
Apocalypse (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005); and Martha Crenshaw, "Introduction," in Martha
Crenshaw, ed., Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power: The Consequences of Political Violence (Middletown:
Wesleyan University Press, 1983).
7 See, Seyom Brown, New Forces, Old Forces, and the Future of World Politics (Longman, 1995); and
Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders (Cornell University Press, 1998).
that the increasingly popular assumption of a unity of purpose, if not a unity of identity,8
between the traffickers and the belligerents is frequently misguided.
The study also connects with the literature on failed states,9 revealing how the
misallocation of resources by weak states in their counterdrug/ counterinsurgency efforts
leads to a further deterioration of their governance capacity. Moreover, as state presence
in the periphery regions where military conflict and illicit economies frequently interact
is usually confined to state efforts to destroy the illicit economy, governments not only
undermine their governing capacity, but also devalue - in the view of the local population
-- the very desirability of state presence. A richer understanding of the effects of
government responses to illicit economies, including in the context of military conflict,
can help in assessing strategies for stabilizing local governments, averting state failure,
and reducing the occurrence of violent conflicts.
Policy Significance
Much of U.S. anti-narcotics policy abroad, based on the assumption of symbiotic
relationships between drug producers, traffickers, insurgents, and terrorists, has been
organized around the premise that the suppression of drug production will service both
anti-drug and counterterrorist goals. The study challenges this "narcoguerrilla" premise
of U.S. policy. The analysis shows that, far from being complementary, U.S. anti-
narcotics and counterinsurgency policies are frequently at odds with one another. Given
S Louise Shelley, "The Nexus of Organized International Criminals and Terrorism," International Annals of
Criminology, 1 (2), 2002: 85-93; Rollie Lal, "South Asian Organized Crime and Terrorist Networks,"
Orbis, 49 (2), Spring 2005: 293-304; H. Richard Friman and Peter Andreas, "Introduction," in H. Richard
Friman and Peter Andreas, eds., The Illicit Global Economy and State Power (Lanham: Rowman and
Littlefield, 1999).
9 Robert I. Rotberg, ed., State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror (Brookings Institution Press,
2003); I. William Zartman, ed. Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate
Authority (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995); and Stephen D. Krasner and Carlos Pascual,
"Addressing State Failure," Foreign Affairs, 84 (4), July/August 2005: 153-163.
that warlords, terrorists, and insurgents gain vast financial resources from the illicit drug
economy, U.S. policymakers are tempted to rely heavily on crop eradication as a way to
end the military conflict in a particular country. Eradication, however, often fails to.
significantly diminish the physical capabilities of the belligerents and -
counterproductively-- enhances their legitimacy and increases the population's support
for the belligerents. The study identifies the factors that influence the magnitude of the
trade-off between the governments' (U.S. and local) desire to limit the belligerents'
physical resources and winning the hearts and minds of the population. It also provides
policy recommendations for a nuanced reformulation of this dimension of U.S. national
security policy. These recommendations should also be useful to foreign governments
dealing with the nexus between military conflict and illicit economies.
III. Framing the Issue: Definitions and Parameters
Parameters of the Issue
Illegal drugs, the predominant focus of the study, are one example of a larger
class of illicit substances, contraband, and economic activities. Depending on the time
period and locale, other illegal or semi-legal commodities include, for example: conflict
diamonds, special minerals, weapons, humans, alcohol, wildlife, human organs, toxic and
industrial waste, and components of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. 1 Other
illicit economies include gambling, prostitution, illicit smuggling with legal goods, illicit
10 Even prior to the surfacing of the A.Q. Khan smuggling network that distributed nuclear technology, a
number of scholars warned off organized crime and established smuggling networks as potential facilitators
and venues for the theft and smuggling of strategic weapons and their components and their possible links
to belligerent groups. See, for example, Rensselaer Lee III, Smuggling Armageddon (New York: St.
Martin's Griffin, 1998): 47-72; and Phil Williams and Paul Woessner, "Nuclear Material Trafficking: An
Interim Assessment," Transnational Organized Crime, 1 (2), Summer 1995: 206-238.
manufacture of passports, and even maritime fraud." Such illicit or semi-illicit
commodities also tend to be highly lucrative (at least partially due to their illicitness), and
their marketing is associated with high financial profits.
Illicit economies exist in some form virtually everywhere, both within and outside
the locale of militarized conflict. Even when focusing on the narrow scope of illegal
drugs, one finds that at least a part of the illegal drug economy is present in every country
- be it production, trafficking, or distribution for use. The principal drug-growing and
refining countries and regions are the Andean countries of Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia;
Mexico; Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia in the Golden Crescent;
Burma/Myanmar and Laos in the Golden Triangle; and Morocco. At various times in
history, other major producers of illicit crops and drugs included China and Thailand,
Jamaica, and Lebanon. This list does not include a host of crucial refining and
transshipment locales, such as Turkey and Hong Kong. In short, illicit economies,
including the illicit drug economy, are pervasive.
Military conflict is much less common than the existence of illicit economies.
Even when the existence of an illicit economy coincides geographically and in time with
military conflict, the two phenomena do not necessarily interact. The fact that prostitution
" A maritime fraud scheme in Lebanon during its civil war in the 1980s was one of the most complex and
sophisticated illicit economies penetrated by various belligerent groups, including the Lebanese forces. The
guerrillas arranged with Greek or Cypriot shipowners that ships heading through the Suez Canal further
into the Middle East or the Orient would be secretly unloaded in ports by the guerrillas and their cargo sold
in local markets. The ship, if old, would be destroyed; if new, would be reported lost at sea. The
shipowners would collect a portion of the guerrillas' profits from the sales of the cargo as well as insurance
money for lost or destroyed ships. Meanwhile, they would continue operating the unsunk new ships under a
different name. The guerrillas would make handsome financial profits and would have goods to distribute
among the population, an important source of the group's legitimacy as the legal economy was in shambles
and economic activity halted. See, for example, Barbara Conway, The Piracy Business (Feltham: Hamlyn,
1981) and Maritime Fraud (London: Lloyds of London Press, 1990). Overall, the Lebanese illicit economy
exploited by belligerent groups was among the most advanced: the belligerents charged a fee for the ports,
a visa fee at checkpoints, a user fee for public beaches, real estate taxes, private services, such as
restaurants, gasoline, and basic goods, such as food items, tobacco, and cooking oil. They also provided a
toxic waste disposal service.
and terrorism might both occur in Germany does not mean that the two activities are
necessarily linked. Only under some circumstances, illicit economies and military
conflict interact. The table below captures the possible situations, with a few (by no
means exhaustive) illustrations.
Table I: Possible Interactions of Illicit Economies with Military Conflict
Military Conflict No Military
Insurgency/ Terrorism International Conflict
Civil War Warfare
Indochina Uzbekistan Czech
Drugs Opium Wars Republic
Conflict Angola Sierra
Diamonds Leone
Alcohol (USA during
prohibition)*
Illicit Humans
(illegal Mexico Indonesia Ukraine
immigrants,
Substances, prostitution)
Weapons Colombia Kashmir Russia
Activities,
Special
and Minerals Colombia Afghanistan Afghanistan
Contraband Timber Afghanistan Peru
Contraband
Salt India
(1930s)
Wildlife Angola Philippines Brazil
Toxic Waste Lebanon
None
* High levels of violent criminal activity, but not organized violence with political goals.
Although the study focuses mainly on the interaction between the production
and trafficking of illicit drugs and military conflict, it also explores other forms of illicit
economy, such as illegal logging (Peru, Afghanistan, and Burma); extortion activities
(Colombia), and the illegal traffic with legal goods (Afghanistan). Drugs are the main
focus of the study because they best epitomize the crime-insurgency nexus, because
drugs are by far the most lucrative of all illicit economies, and because narcoterrorism,
rather than "wildlifeterrorism" dominates the attention of policymakers, with millions of
dollars spent every year on efforts to combat the phenomenon. Many organizations and
countries cite drug trafficking as the most significant illicit economy in their locale in
terms of annual profits. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
calculates that as much as $122 billion is spent every year in Europe and the United
States on heroin, cocaine, and marijuana. 12 Estimates of the value of global retail of illicit
narcotics reach around $300-500 billion annually. 13 The drug trade is where the money is
- both for belligerent groups who successfully exploit the illicit trade and for
12 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Financial Action Task Force on Money
Laundering, Report, Paris, February 7, 1990. Americans alone are estimated to spend $64 billion on illegal
narcotics annually (Steven W. Casteel, Assistant Administrator for Intelligence, Drug Enforcement
Administration, "Narco-Terrorism: International Drug Trafficking and Terrorism - a Dangerous Mix,"
Statement of Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, May 20, 2003,
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct052003p.html, downloaded August 22, 2005.
"3 United Nations International Drug Control Program, The Social and Economic Impact of Drug Abuse
and Control (Vienna: UNDCP, 1994): 29. When one of the analysts involved with producing the figure
was asked about its sources and validity, he replied that whatever its failings, it was a useful number of to
capture the attention of the public (author's interviews with former UNDCP and UNODC officials,
November 2005). Some current estimates put the size of the drug trade at $1 trillion. However, as will be
explained in the Research Design section of Chapter III, all such numbers are only broad guestimates. To
err on the conservative side, I prefer to use the lower estimates. Either way, however, the profits are very
large, and the actual size of the revenues from illicit economies does not make any practical difference for
the analysis.
governments who devote many billions of dollars annually to fight the trade, to reduce
consumption of drugs at home, and to deprive the belligerents off the profits.
Yet other illicit economies can also be highly lucrative and, like the drug trade,
can finance belligerent groups. Official estimates of illicit trafficking with humans put the
number of victims between 700,000 to 800,000, and unofficial estimates go as high as
four million. (Trafficking in persons encompasses two activities: the smuggling of illegal
migrants and trafficking of persons for the purposes of exploitation, such as slavery and
prostitution). The estimated revenues reach $7 billion per year.' 4 Although $7 billion is
only a small fraction of the $300-$500 billion spent on illicit drugs annually and although
belligerent groups do not capture the entire revenue from trafficking, illicit trafficking
with human beings can nonetheless solve financing problems for many belligerent
groups. Operational budgets of even major terrorist organizations and insurgencies are
frequently only in the tens of millions of dollars annually.
The existence of an illicit economy does not by itself cause the emergence of a
belligerent group and military conflict. Such an illicit economy will likely generate the
emergence of a criminal organization (unless the criminal syndicate organized the illicit
economy in the first place), but will not in itself give rise to terrorists, warlords, or
insurgents. Yet when belligerent groups penetrate existing illicit economies (or
successfully set up new illicit economies), the interaction of the two phenomena will have
a profound effect on the means and strategies of the belligerents and under some
circumstances also on the goals and identities of the belligerents. Examples of belligerent
groups profiting from the drug trade include: the Taliban and the Northern Alliance in
14 David Kyle and Rey Koslowski, "Introduction," in David Kyle and Rey Koslowski, eds., Global Human
Smuggling (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2001): 4.
Afghanistan; the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces Colombia), AUC (United Self-
Defense Forces of Colombia), and ELN (National Liberation Army) in Colombia, the
Shining Path and the MRTA (Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement) in Peru; the Real
IRA (Real 'Irish Republican Army) in Great Britain, the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army)
in Yugoslavia, the Hezbollah in Lebanon, the PKK (Kurdistan's Workers Party) in
Turkey, and the ETA (Basque Homeland and Freedom) in Spain. Appendix I provides a
more complete universe of cases.
It is important to recognize that even actors that the international community may
consider legitimate, or at least not fully illegitimate, also profit from the illicit economic
activities, including drug trade, and that the drug trade is not simply a domain of
illegitimate groups and rogue actors. Of course, an obvious interaction with the illicit
narcotics trade may undermine the legitimacy of the group over time. The Northern
Alliance in Afghanistan provides an example of a group that did not become a pariah,
although the Northern Alliance and the original mujahideen from which it emerged were
deeply involved in the narcotics trade in Afghanistan since the 1980s. The mujahideen
connection to the drug trade did not stop the United States from supporting them and
engaging with them as allies in the 1980s and after 9-11.15 Moreover, many governments
- not only rogue.actors, such as North Korea -- have also historically been connected to
the drug trade. In the 19th century, for example, the British government backed British
traders who, against the explicit legal prohibitions of the central Chinese government,
15 See, for example, Alfred McCoy's The Politics ofHeroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade
(New York: Lawrence Hill Books, 1991) and Steve-Coil, Ghost Wars (New York: The Penguin Press,
2004).
bought opium in India and smuggled it to China's addicts.16 Similarly, the French
colonial government in Indochina licensed opium cultivation as well as dens throughout
the country. The profits from opium covered fifty percent of the cost of the French
colonial government in Indochina. And after World War II, the French tolerated the
cultivation of opium by the hill tribes in order to obtain their allegiance and used the
profits to fight against the Communist insurgents.' 7
The difference in the character of the belligerent groups does have practical
implications for their ability to penetrate various illicit economies such as the drug trade.
Territory-based organizations such as the Taliban can control and tax the cultivation and
processing of illicit crops. But for a loose network without a substantial territorial base,
such as al Qaeda today, it is extraordinarily hard to profit from cultivation and
processing. It is much more likely that such groups will attempt to control some part of
the international smuggling routes or some aspect of money laundering.
Definition of Terms
Illicit commodities are defined in this study as materials and commodities fully or
partially outlawed by governments and/or international organizations. The illicitness can
apply to the production, trafficking, or use of such materials and commodities. In other
words, illicit commodities encompass commodities the production and marketing of
16 John M. Martin and Anne T. Romano, Multinational Crime: Terrorism, Espionage, Drugs andArms
Trafficking (Newbury Park: Sage, 1992); Jack Beeching, The Chinese Opium Wars (New York: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, 1975); Jean Chesneaux, Marianne Bastid and Marie-Claire Bergere, China: From the
Opium Wars to the 1911 Revolution. Translated by Anne Destenay (New York: Pantheon, 1976); and Peter
Ward Fay, The Opium War, 1840-1842 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998).
~7 William J. Chamblis, "State-organized Crime," Criminology, 27 (2): 183-208. Many colonial
governments set up legal licensed cultivation and processing of various drugs: The British encouraged and
regulated cultivation of opium in India as did the French in Indochina; the rulers of Morocco and Tunisia
taxed the cultivation of cannabis until the 1950s, and the king of Siam collected taxes on the cultivation and
distribution of opium until the early 20th century.
which are either completely prohibited by governments and/or international
organizations, or partially proscribed unless the production and marketing comply with
special licenses, certification, taxation, and other economic and political regulations.
Varying with locale, such illicit items typically include illegal drugs; diamonds and other
gems produced without proper certification; alcohol; weapons sold or transferred in
violation of national or international law; ivory produced without proper certification;
particular commodities produced, sold or transferred in violation of tariffs and other
taxes; human organs; and illegal immigrants and prostitutes.
Illegal drugs are consumable chemicals banned in the jurisdiction in question.
Depending on the way they are produced, illegal drugs can be divided into two
categories: cultigen-based drugs and synthetic drugs. Cultigen-based drugs are narcotics
derived from natural alkaloids found in plants, such as heroin, opium, cocaine, marijuana,
hashish, and mescaline, or from acids found in mushrooms, such as LSD and psylocibin.
Synthetic drugs are manufactured from existing chemicals without a plant or fungus
extract as a base. Examples of synthetic drugs include amphetamines, methamphetamines
(crystal and ice), MDMA/ecstasy, and other club drugs (ketamine, GHB, rohypnol).
Some narcotics derived from plants and mushrooms can also be produced purely
synthetically, such as LSD, psylocibin, and mescaline. In fact, synthetic production of
many of these drugs is now the predominant form of their production. Production of
synthetic drugs is considerably less labor-intensive than the cultivation and processing of
drugs based on natural alkaloids and acids, a characteristic that has important
implications for the interaction of drugs and military conflict. Based on their effect, drugs
of abuse fall into three categories: depressants (e.g. heroin, barbiturates), stimulants (e.g.
cocaine, crack, amphetamines), and hallucinogens (e.g. Ecstasy, LSD, marijuana). Illicit
crops are the outlawed plants necessary for the production of outlawed cultigen-based
narcotics. Such plants include coca, poppy, marijuana, and hemp.
Drug economy is a term used in this study to describe the production (cultivation
and processing) and trafficking of illegal narcotics. Other illicit economies include the
trafficking in human beings and contraband (gems, timber, ivory, archeological artifacts,
illegal arms, and body organs), the appropriation of customs revenues, illegal taxation,
forced labor, slavery, and forced land seizures.18 Some of the illicit economic activities
listed above -- trade with timber or gems, for example -- can be described also as
irregular economy since their production and transactions would be legal if laws,
licensing, and certifications were followed. 19 What is more important for the purposes of
the study than whether a certain economic activity is classified as irregular, extralegal,
informal, or illicit, is the extent to which belligerent groups can exploit this economy for
their purposes, and also the scope of strategies the government has available for dealing
with the economy. Although a terrorist group may derive as much money from extralegal
unregistered construction activities as from drugs, the options available to a particular
government to deal with each illicit-economy-terrorism nexus may be radically different.
While a government may choose not to prosecute extralegal economic activities, such as
[8 As H. Richard Friman and Peter Andreas ague, criminal economies arise in the space that exists between
state prohibitions and the state's inability or unwillingness to fully enforces its laws. See, H. Richard
Friman and Peter Andreas, "Introduction: International Relations and the Illicit Global Economy," in H.
Richard Friman and Peter Andreas, eds., The Illicit Global Economy and State Power (Lanham: Rowman
and Littlefield, 1999): 1-23. See also, Ethan A. Nadelmann, "Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of
Norms in International Society;" International Organization, 44 (4) Autumn 1990: 479-526.
'9 Together with extra-legal (economies that would be legal if registered, i.e. small shops, construction,
etc.) and in-kind (economies with no market transaction, such as subsistence agriculture) economies, the
irregular economy comprises the informal economy in a country. For details on the distinctions, see,
Manuel Castells and Alejandro Portes, "World Underneath: The Origins, Dynamics, and Effects of the
Informal Economy," in Alejandro Portes, Manuel Castells, and Lauren Bentons, eds., The Informal
Economy: Studies in Advances and Less Developed Countries (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1989): 14-
15.
unregistered construction companies, it will be considerably more constrained by
international norms and pressure against tolerating trafficking with women or legalizing
the cultivation of coca.
Military conflict is herein defined as organized violence with political goals - that
is, directed, intentional violence by belligerent groups with political goals. The political
goal can be merely holding onto a territory. Military conflict thus includes internal
organized violence such as low-intensity warfare, insurgency, terrorism, warlordism, and
civil war, as well as international military conflict, such as interstate war and
international terrorism. The term does not encompass apolitical criminal violent activity,
such as an exchange of fire between New York drug traffickers and the police.
The study purposefully uses the term military conflict, so as not to limit the
exploration to insurgency (as defined below). Although the impact of illicit substances
on military conflict has been seen most frequently in cases of insurgencies and terrorism,
the dynamics described here apply equally to non-insurgency situations, such as
international terrorism or even interstate warfare.
There is no generally accepted definition of the term insurgency in political
science. James Fearon and David Laitin define insurgency as "a technology of military
conflict characterized by small, lightly-armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from
rural based areas," thus reducing insurgency to a method of conflict, regardless of the
identities and goals of the belligerents.20 Ian Beckett defines insurgency as modem,
revolutionary guerrilla warfare using irregular military tactics, such as hit-and-run
20 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," American Political
Science Review, 97 (1), February 2003: 75-90.
tactics. 21 . In "Small Wars: Definitions and Dimensions," Roger Beaumont contends that
there are no exact established academic or military distinctions between guerrilla warfare,
insurgency, and low-intensity warfare.22 In the absence of a generally accepted definition,
I define insurgency as organized violent opposition to the institutions or policies of the
established government, usually with the goal of displacing the government from at least
a part of the country. Insurgency is thus a subset of civil war or civil strife. Because
insurgency frequently uses irregular military tactics, the term is used interchangeably
with guerrilla warfare in this study. Any such definitional distinctions between
insurgency, low-intensity warfare, and guerrilla warfare, however, bear no impact on the
analysis of the dynamics explored in this study.
Terrorism, another highly-contested term without any clear accepted definition in
political science, is used to refer both to the goals and the means of its perpetrators. For
the purposes of this study, I define terrorism as the deliberate targeting of noncombatant
civilians. Terrorist acts can be thus perpetrated by insurgents, other nongovernmental
belligerents, and the governments themselves. Again, the definition of the term has no
impact on the analysis of the dynamics studied in the study.
Drug traffickers are defined as individuals, cartels, or syndicates involved in the
marketing of drugs primarily for personal pecuniary profit and without larger political
goals, other than preserving their criminal activity and avoiding state prosecution. Cartels
and syndicates represent particular forms of organized criminal groups,2 3 defined by the
21 Ian F. W. Beckett, "Guerrilla Warfare: Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Since 1945," in Colin
McInnes and G.D. Sheffield, eds., Warfare in the Twentieth Century: Theory and Practice (London: Unwin
Hyman, 1988): 194-212.
22 Roger Beaumont, "Small Wars and Insurgencies," Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Sciences, 541 (8-178), September 1995: 20-35.
23 There is no one single accepted definition of organized crime. For example, the Task Force on
Organized Crime of the 1967 President's Commission provided the following definition: "The core of
December 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
(CTOC) as "a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and
acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offenses
established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a
financial or other material benefit."24
I refrain from using the terms, narcoterrorism, narcoinsurgency, narcoterrorists,
and narcoinsurgents even though they have become popular in the lexicon of U.S.
government officials, together with narcofarmers, narcostate, narcodemocracy,
narcomonarchy, and narcofundamentalism. 25 Adopted by scholars as well, such terms are
organized crime activity is the supplying of illegal goods and services." Quoted in Gianluca Fiorentini and
Sam Peltzman, "Introduction," in Gianluca Fiorentini and'Sam Peltzman, eds., The Economics of
Organized Crime (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995): 3. Schelling rejected the above
definition for ignoring the desire of organized crime to govern and control the whole economic structure of
the underworld. According to Schelling, the core goal of organized crime is to acquire a rule-making role in
a given area, necessarily through the use of violence. Schelling's idea of organized crime is thus very close
to the notion of a government. Thomas C. Schelling, "What is the Business of Organized Crime?" Journal
of Public Law, (20): 71-84, reprinted in Thomas C. Schelling, ed., Choice and Consequences (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1984). In his seminal Disorganized Crime, Peter Reuter offers a third definition,
explicitly rejecting the above two: "[O]rganized crime consists of organizations that have durability,
hierarchy, and involvement in amultiplicity of criminal activities." Peter Reuter, Disorganized Crime: The
Economics of the Visible Hand (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983): 175. Reuter rejects the 1967 President's
Task Force definition because it restricts the activity of organized crime to only illegal activities and that of
Schelling because it assumes a central control of the illegal market due to a monopoly of violence and
corruption. In fact, Reuter's central claim is that organized crime groups behave much more like ordinary
economic firms. R.T. Naylor rejects such. comparisons between organized crime and legal businesses,
arguing that they are "at best, a serious oversimplification, [and] at worst simply wrong," since unlike legal
businesses, criminal organizations are above all risk minimizers, not profit maximizers." R.T. Naylor,
Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance, and the Underworld Economy (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2002): 19-22.
24 United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly: United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2001, (A/Res/55/25): 4.
25 U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, Lewis Tambs, was among the first to use and popularize the terms
narcoinsurgency and narcoterrorism. The term narcostate is often used to denote a state whose government
and/or political elite is actively involved in the drug trade or the economy of which includes a significant
illicit drug component. Scott B. MacDonald, for example, defines as a narcomilitary state a state dominated
by a military that is actively involved in and promotes the drug trade (Scott B. MacDonald, Mountain High,
White Avalanche (New York: Praeger, 1989): 11. Although such terms sound seductively descriptive, the
actual definitions are rather porous. The term narcostate has been applied to Bolivia, Colombia, Peru,
Mexico, Panama, Afghanistan, and Burma, yet the actual characteristics of the interaction of the illicit
economy and the drug trade varied substantially among these countries, and drugs played a role in the
economy and politics of each country in quite different ways. The narco-definitions invariably fail to
specify what "an active involvement of the government or political elite with the drug trade means." Does
used to implicitly or explicitly imply any of the following: a) that the drug dealers and
guerrillas have similar, if not identical goals; b) that they have morphed into one
conglomerate actor,26 or c) that drugs have caused the military conflict -- thus begging
the questions this study seeks to analyze.
Douglas Davids pushes the use and definition of the terms farthest by arguing that
as long as drug dealers use violence they can be called narcoterrorists; and as long as
belligerents derive some benefits from drugs, they can be called narcoterrorists. 27 Such
slippery use is not helpful for analysis and policy prescriptions since a twelve-year-old
marijuana pusher in Anacostia, Washington, DC could also qualify as a narcoterrorist.
Davids builds upon, but goes beyond, the definitions used by the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), which defines a narcoterrorist organization as an organized group
that is complicit in the activities of drug trafficking to further, or fund, premeditated,
politically-motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets with the intent
to influence (that is, influence a government or group of people.) 28 The DEA brief asks
whether narcoterrorists are drug traffickers who use terrorism against civilians to advance
their agenda or whether they are first and foremost terrorists who use drug money to
further their cause, and concludes that perhaps the term can be applied to both types of
this imply that the presence of one government official implicated in the drug trade signifies the existence
of a narcostate? Or the presence of five high officials or more than fifty percent of the government
officials? Or if the definition of a narcostate is that drugs constitute a substantial component of the
country's GDP, what are the benchmarks? More than 3 percent of the GDP, more than 10% of the GDP,
more than 50%? At what point does a country become a narcostate?
26 For other analysts who equate drug dealers and guerrillas see, for example, Colombian Ambassador to
the Unites States, Luis Alberto Moreno, "Aiding Colombia's War on Terrorism," New York Times, May 3,
2002.
27 Davids.
28 U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, "Drugs and Terrorism: A New
Perspective," Drug Intelligence Brief, September 2002,
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/intel/02039/02039.html, downloaded August 18, 2004. See also, U.S.
Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, Target America: Traffickers, Terrorists and
Your Kids, A National Symposium on Narcoterrorism, DEA Headquarters, December 4, 2001, transcript,
(Washington, DC: Miller Reporting Co., Inc., 2001).
actors. As an example of a prototypical narcoterrorist, the DEA identifies Pablo Escobar,
the leader of the Colombian Medellin cartel in the 1980s and early 1990s, given that he
was an infamous brutal drug dealer and also had political aspirations. I prefer the term
drug-conflict nexus, by which I mean any and multiple connections and interactions
between the illicit drug economy and various forms of military conflict.29
I also prefer to use the phrase gains from illicit economies rather than the term
"profits" since the latter implies purely financial benefits. But, as will be elaborated
below, the gains belligerent groups derive from the control of drug production and
trafficking are much more multifaceted than simply financial profits. To conceptualize
the political "profits" of belligerents, I use the term political capital to denote their
relationship with the local population -- mainly the extent of support and/or tolerance by
the local population to the belligerent group. Political capital thus encompasses: a) the
legitimacy of the belligerent group, defined as perception in the population that the
actions of the belligerents are beneficial to the population and thus justified; and b)
support from the population, including denial of intelligence on belligerents to the
government and the provision of intelligence, safe-houses, and supplies to belligerent
groups that is voluntary and not extracted by brute force. 30
29 In a study of the Latin American drug trade, Scott B.MacDonald also uses the drug-insurgency nexus,
which he defines as the formation of political-military enclaves controlled by traffickers allied with leftist,
revolutionary groups MacDonald (1989): 12.. Unlike MacDonald, I do not restrict the term to the formation
of political-military enclaves or alliances between drugs and insurgents.
30 My concept of political capital is thus similar to, but slightly broader than, Elisabeth Wood's concept of
support for insurgency, which she defines as the provision to the insurgents of information and supplies
beyond the contribution necessary to remain in contested areas, and the refusal to give information and
supplies to the government forces beyond the necessary contribution. Elisabeth Jean Wood, Insurgent
Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). My
concept of political capital does encompasses what Bard E. O'Neill calls both passive support for
belligerents (individuals who quietly sympathize with the insurgents but are unwilling to provide material
IV. The Debate
The Conventional Narcoterrorism/Narcoinsurgency View
Widely accepted by both government officials and academic scholars alike, the
standard understanding of the relationship between illicit economies and military conflict
is based on the premise that belligerent groups derive large financial profits from illicit
economies. With these large financial profits, terrorists, warlords, and insurgents buy
weapons and hence expand conflict, while the government's relative capabilities vis-a-vis
the belligerents shrink. 31 A prototypical example of such an illicit economy is the drug
trade. As Attorney General John Ashcroft put it, "Terrorism and drugs go together like
rats and the bubonic plague. They thrive in the same conditions, support each other, and
feed off each other."32
Hence the belligerents are best defeated by eradicating the illicit economy.
Suppression of the illicit economy is necessary to defeat the belligerents and will result in
critical reduction of the belligerents' capabilities. In the case of cultigen-based narcotics,
eradication of the illicit crops is argued to be the optimal way to bankrupt the belligerents
assistance) and active support (those who are willing to make sacrifices and risk personal harm by either
joining the movement or providing the belligerents with concealment, shelter, food, medical assistance,
arms and equipment, and intelligence). See, Bard E. O'Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution
to Apocalypse (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005): 94-95. Similarly, Roger Petersen distinguishes
between three levels of support for insurgent forces: a first level of unarmed, unorganized opposition to the
regime, a second level of direct support of or participation in a local armed organization, and third level of
membership in a mobile armed group. See, Roger Petersen, Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from
Eastern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001): 8-15. When discussing the political
capital of belligerents, I focus mainly at the second level of support. Thus, my term political capital means
level of popular support, rather than political and civic engagement, social ties, and social trust termed
"social capital" by Robert Putnam. See, Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse andRevival of
American Community (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000).
31 Adams; Ehrenfeld (2005); Davids; Rand Beers, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs, "Narco-Terror: The Worldwide Connection Between Drugs and Terrorism," a
hearing before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and
Government Information," March 13, 2002; http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=196.
32 John Ashcroft, Attorney General, "Prepared Remarks," Drug Enforcement Agency/ Drug Enforcement
Rollout, Washington, DC, March 19, 2002, http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/02031903.htm, downloaded
May 23, 2004.
and also to reduce consumption, 33 thus accomplishing two goals with the same strategy.
The 2003 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, issued by the Department of
State, for example, states:
The closer we can attack to the source, the greater the likelihood of halting the
flow of drugs altogether. Crop control is by far the most cost-effective means of
cutting supply. If we destroy crops or force them to remain unharvested, no drug
will enter the system. .... Theoretically, with no drug crops to harvest, no cocaine
or heroin could enter the distribution chain; nor would there be any need for
costly enforcement and interdiction operations.34
President Alvaro Uribe of Colombia, a staunch supporter of eradication, seconded the
notion: "If Colombia would not have drugs, it would not have terrorists.""35 A corollary
proposition of the conventional view is that belligerents and criminals can no longer be
distinguished from each other and need to be fought as a joint enemy.
In sum, the conventional view makes three key arguments: 1) Belligerents make
money from illicit economies. 2) The destruction of the illicit economy is both necessary
33 In addition to eradication reducing consumption by eliminating supply of drugs, the consumption of
drugs is also expected to fall as a result of falling demand since the exposure of the narcoterrorism
phenomenon will motivate parents to more likely talk to their children about the evils of using drugs. In
turn, children will forgo using drugs more willingly since they will not want to be complicit in the
narcoterrorism specter threatening the country. See, Asa Hutchinson, "Remarks at Target America:
Traffickers, Terrorists, and Your Kids," A National Symposium on Narcoterrorism, Drug Enforcement
Administration, U.S. Department of Justice, December 4, 2001 (Washington, DC: Miller Reporting, Co.,
Inc: 2001). This new specter of drugs as.a weapon of terrorism is fortified by reports that jihadist groups
participate in the drug trade in order "to poison the West." The conventional narcoterrorism view, for
example, frequently quotes the following statement from Hezbollah: "We are making these drugs for Satan
- America and the Jews. If we cannot kill them with guns, so we will kill them with drugs." See, for
example, Joseph Bodansky, Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America (Roseville: Prima
Publishing/ Random House, 2001): 322. Such view of drugs as a "weapon of mass destruction" by jihadist
groups revives analogous arguments about the connection between leftist Marxist guerrillas and terrorists,
drug traffickers, and the Soviet Union in the 1980s. The spread of drugs then was seen by some as a ploy
by Communists to destroy the West. See, for example, Joseph D. Douglas, Jr., Red Cocaine - The Drugging
ofAmerica (Atlanta: Clarion House, 1990). Eradicating drugs today thus becomes not only an efficient
means of combating terrorists and other belligerents abroad, but also a necessary -component of defense
against such groups at home.
34 U.S. Department of State, The 2003 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report,
http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2003/voll/html/29828.htm, downloaded March 2, 2004.
35 From a speech to the Organization of American States Permanent Council, Washington, DC, March 25,
2004, cited in International Crisis Group, War and Drugs in Colombia, Latin America Report No. 11,
January 27, 2005: 9,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/latin_america/i 1_war_and_drugsincolombia.pdf,
downloaded February 10, 2005.
and optimal for defeating the belligerents because it will critically eliminate their
resources. 3) The belligerents who participate in the illicit economy can no longer be
treated as different from the criminals who also participate in the illicit economy.
The Political Capital of Illicit Economies
My theory, the political capital of illicit economies, argues that belligerents derive
much more than simply large financial profits from their sponsorship of illicit economies.
They also obtain freedom of action and, crucially, legitimacy and support from the local
population -- what I call political capital. Belligerents who are positively involved in
(sponsor) the illicit economy thus obtain two sets of gains: military capabilities (physical
resources and freedom of action) and political capital (legitimacy and support). If
belligerents choose to become negatively involved in the illicit economy (attempt to
destroy it), they not only fail to increase their military capability, but also suffer costs in
terms of political capital.
The extent and scope of belligerents' gains/ losses from the type of their
involvement in the illicit economy depend on four factors: the state of the overall
economy; the character of the illicit economy; the presence qf thuggish traffickers; and
the government response to the illicit economy. These factors reflect both structural
conditions outside of the immediate control of the belligerents and the government and
strategic policy choices available to either the belligerents or the government. The state of
the overall economy - poor or rich -- determines the availability of alternative sources of
income and the number of people in a particular locale dependent on the illicit economy
for basic livelihood. The character of the illicit economy - labor-intensive or not -
determines how the illicit economy satisfies the demand of the population for
employment. The presence of thuggish traffickers and the government response to the
illicit economy (which can range from suppression to laissez-faire to legalization)
determine to what extent the population is dependent on the belligerents for the
preservation of illicit economy and for better working conditions. Positive involvement in
the illicit economy thus allows belligerents to provide a host of protection and regulation
services to the population.
The state of the overall economy in the country/region and the character of the
illicit economy are the two most important factors in determining the extent of the
belligerents' political capital obtained from their participation in the illicit economy.
Within the subset of poor countries with large labor-intensive illicit crop cultivation -- i.e.
the most significant and prominent cases of the drug-conflict nexus -- government policy
toward the illicit economy has a very large effect on the extent of the belligerents'
political capital.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom about narcotics and military conflict, my
theory predicts that eradication of narcotics cultivation will have dubious effects on the
capabilities of the belligerents and is extremely unlikely to severely weaken them.
Belligerents (and traffickers and the population) have a large menu of adaptations at their
disposal that will very likely allow the belligerents to escape critical shortages of
resources as a result of eradication. However, eradication will alienate the local
population from the government and result in the population's unwillingness to provide
intelligence on the belligerents - a crucial requirement for success against the
belligerents. Thus, eradication of illicit crops increases the political capital of the
belligerents without accomplishing its promised goal of significantly weakening their
military capabilities. Tacit acquiescence, on the other hand, i.e., tolerating the cultivation
of illicit crops during conflict, will leave the belligerents' resources unaffected, but will
decrease their political capital. Interdiction - interception of illicit shipments, destruction
of labs, and capture of traffickers - will not only decrease the belligerents' political
capital since the population's livelihood is not threatened directly, but may also
somewhat decrease their financial resources. But, as in the case of eradication,
interdiction is extremely unlikely to bankrupt the belligerents to the point of defeating
them. When licensing of the illicit, economy is an option (such as the licensing of opium
poppy cultivation for the production of medical opiates), the political capital of the
belligerents will decrease as will their resources, while the political capital and the
physical resources of the government will increase. In the case of illicit economies where
licensing is not an option, governments thus face a basic trade-off between hoping to
curtail the belligerents' resources and winning the hearts and minds of the population.
A corollary proposition of my theory is that far from having morphed into an
identical actor with identical goals, the belligerents and the traffickers have many
competing interests and often physically fight each other.
In sum, my theory makes four key arguments: 1) Belligerents derive not only
physical resources from their positive involvement in the illicit economy, they also derive
political capital. 2) The extent and scope of the benefits they derive from the illicit
economy is determined by a set of four structural and policy factors: state of the overall
economy; character of the illicit economy; presence of traffickers; and government policy
toward the illicit economy. 3) In the case of labor-intensive illicit economies in poor
countries, such as in the case of illicit crop cultivation, eradication will very likely not
significantly diminish the physical resources of the belligerents, but will definitely
alienate the population and limit its cooperation with the government in the effort to
defeat the belligerents, hence hampering the overall effort against the belligerents.
4) Instead of having merged into an identical actor, belligerents and traffickers have
highly competing interests and frequently fight each other.
V. The Cases
My study investigates the posited processes and tests the two theories in detail in
three cases: Peru, Colombia, and Afghanistan. Several additional cases, Northern Ireland,
Burma, India, and Turkey, are brought in as extensions of the analysis in the concluding
chapter. Containing poor regions tornmby conflict, the three main countries have been for
over two decades some of the most significant locales of global efforts to combat
narcotics production. In these three countries where military conflict and an extensive
illicit narcotics economy interact, the government faces a particularly stark trade-off
between its desire to limit the belligerents' resources and its need to win the hearts and
minds of the population to successfully eliminate the belligerents. In rich countries where
belligerents are also involved in the narcotics trade, such as various republican and
loyalist belligerent groups in Northern Ireland and the ETA in Spain, the trade-off is
considerably smaller, and hence less interesting for analysis. Nonetheless, my principal
cases also contain an example of a rich region where belligerents interact with an illicit
economy -- namely, the participation of the Colombian M-19 in the drug trade in Bogota'
and other major Colombian cities. Bringing in the case of the M-19 allows me to evaluate
the effect of the factor "the state of the overall economy" on the political capital of the
belligerents.36 A detailed discussion of case selection is offered in the Research Design
and Methodology section of Chapter III.
In the empirical part of the study, I will show how all three principal cases clearly
support the validity of my theory of political capital of illicit economies and critically
undermine the validity of the conventional view. In Peru, until the mid-1990s the largest
producer of coca leaf in the world, the two leftist guerrilla groups, the Shining Path and
the MRTA, became involved in the illicit narcotics economy. In addition to obtaining
large financial profits from the illicit narcotics trade on the order of tens to hundreds of
millions of dollars a year, both groups derived considerable freedom of action and large-
scale political capital from their positive involvement in the illicit economy. In fact, when
at first the Shining Path sought to suppress the illicit economy, it encountered such large
resistance from the peasants that the military was able to push it out from the drug
regions. When the Shining Path switched its policy toward protecting the illicit economy,
it not only won the territory back and posed a significant threat to the military forces.and
the state, but also motivated the other leftist group, the MRTA to emulate its successful
policies. Contrary to the conventional view, the defeat: of the Shining Path took place
without eliminating the group's income source through eradication. Rather, the Shining
Path was defeated in the countryside because the military adopted a policy of tacit
acquiescence to the farmers' cultivation of coca. The population provided the military
with vital intelligence on the Shining Path and organized in self-defense groups to fight
against the Shining Path.
Although Colombia, the world's largest producer of cocaine, is the poster case for
the conventional view, detailed examination of the case once again undermines the
36 The effect of this factor is further explored in the case of Northern Ireland in the final chapter.
validity of the conventional view while supporting my theory. Even though the leftist
FARC and the rightist paramilitaries have profited from the drug trade, both groups have
also derived large political capital from protecting the illicit economy from government
eradication efforts. Until the mid/late 1990s, the paramilitaries' political capital obtained
from the illicit economy had been smaller than that of the FARC because the
paramilitaries were frequently indistinguishable from the traffickers, and the
paramilitaries did not provide the same level of protection and regulation services to the
population as did the FARC. However, when in the mid/late 1990s the FARC eliminated
the small and medium traffickers from the territories under its control, its political capital
declined. The leftist ELN was for a long time involved only in the labor-non-intensive
extortion of oil companies. Consequently, it obtained smaller political capital from its
participation in the: illicit economy than the FARC and subsequently failed to compete
with the FARC. The case of the M-19 shows the importance of factor "the state of the
overall economy": the M-19, operating in Bogota' and involved in a labor-non-intensive
aspect. of the drug trade, not only failed to obtain political capital with the local
population, but in fact antagonized it. Despite being the most intense and prolonged aerial
spraying in history, eradication adopted in the late 1990s in Colombia has failed to
bankrupt and significantly weaken the FARC, but has once again strengthened the
weakening bond between the population in the drug regions and the guerrillas.
Intelligence provision to the government in these areas remains notoriously poor.
The analysis of the Afghanistan case also supports my theory and undermines the
validity of.the convention view. In Afghanistan, a variety of belligerent groups have been
involved in several illicit economies, including the drug trade, since the late 19'h century.
Participation in the illicit narcotics economy greatly intensified during the 1980s and
early 1990s, and generated not only financial resources for the mujahideen, but also
political capital, greatly facilitating their intelligence-gathering. The Taliban's original
negative involvement in the opium economy, i.e., its eradication policy, generated large
losses of political capital, and the Taliban was unable to consolidate its power even over
the Pashtun south. Only when the Taliban reversed its negative involvement and came to
sponsor the opium economy in late 1995, was it able to enhance its staying power and
ultimately extend control throughout much of Afghanistan. Its prior positive involvement
in smuggling with licit goods generated financial resources on par with the drug trade,
but, because of the labor-non-intensive character of the illicit economy failed to
compensate for the losses of political capital due to opium eradication. Tacit
acquiescence toward the narcotics economy by the United States during the U.S.
intervention against the Taliban facilitated provision of information by the population
against the Taliban. The Taliban was on the run and largely displaced from the drug
trade. When eradication was undertaken by the Karzai government and the international
community (mainly the U.S. and the U.K.) from 2003 on, it antagonized the population
and allowed the Taliban to reinsert itself into the drug economy by providing protection
to both the traffickers and the peasants. Far from weakening the Taliban, eradication has
strengthened it politically while not hurting its financial resources.
In sum, all three principal cases (as well as the cases in the extended analysis in
the final chapter) clearly support the validity of my theory of political capital of illicit
economies and critically undermine the validity of the conventional view.
VI. Effects of Illicit Economies Outside of Military Conflict
Although this study is concerned primarily with the effect of illicit economies on
military conflict, it is important to recognize that burgeoning and unconstrained drug
production and other illicit economies also have other profound consequences for states,
apart from the military conflict context. A large-scale illicit economy threatens the state
politically by providing an avenue for criminal organizations and corrupt politicians to
enter the political space, undermining the democratic process. These actors, who enjoy
the financial resources and political capital generated by sponsoring the illicit economy,
frequently experience great success in the political process. They are able to secure
official positions of power as well as wield influence from behind the scenes.
Consequently, the legitimacy of the political process is subverted. The problem
perpetuates itself as successful politicians bankrolled with illicit money make it more
difficult for other actors to resist participating in the illicit economy, leading to endemic
corruption at both the local and national levels.
Large illicit economies with powerful traffickers also have a pernicious effect on
the judicial system of the country. First, as the extent of the illicit economy rises, the
investigative capacity of the law enforcement and judicial systems diminishes. Impunity
for criminal activity also increases, undermining the credibility and deterrence of the
judicial system and the authority of the government. Second, powerful traffickers
frequently turn to violent means to deter and avoid prosecution, killing off or bribing
prosecutors, judges, and witnesses.37 Of course, efforts to suppress the production of
illicit drugs sometimes also lead to an increase in government human rights abuses.38
Illicit economies also have large economic effects. Drug cultivation and
processing, for example, on the one hand generate employment for the poor rural
population, numbering frequently in the hundreds of thousands. Moreover, not only does
the drug economy allow the impoverished poor to make ends meet, it also facilitates
upward mobility for many participants.
But a burgeoning drug economy also contributes to inflation and can hence harm
legitimate, export-oriented, import-substituting industries. It encourages real estate
speculation and a rapid rise in real estate prices, and undermines currency stability. It also
displaces legitimate production. Since the drug economy is economically superior to
legitimate production not only in price profitability, but also requiring less developed
infrastructure and not imposing large sunk and transaction costs, the local population is
frequently uninterested in, or unable to, participate in a different form of economic
activity. The existence of a large illicit economy thus complicates efforts at local
development and crowds out legitimate economic activity. The illicit economy can thus
lead to the so-called Dutch disease where a boom in an isolated sector of the economy
causes or is accompanied by stagnation in other core sectors since it gives rise to
appreciation of land and labor costs. Finally, it appears that the small share of the final
profits that is captured by the country producing the illicit commodity is used mainly for
37 M6nica Serrano and Maria Celia Toro, "From Drug Trafficking to Transnational Organized Crime in
Latin America," in Transnational Organized Crime and International Security: Business as Usual? Mats
Berdal and Monica Serrano, eds. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002): 141-154; and Mauricio Rubio,
"Violence, Organized Crime, and the Criminal Justice System in Colombia," Journal of Economic Issues,
32 (2): 605-610.
38 See, for example, Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin, eds., Drugs and Democracy in Latin America
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005).
unproductive consumption by the traffickers, rather than productive economic
investment. 39 This economic effect, however, is not a hard universal rule. During my
research in Peru, for example, I encountered a village where the population was able to
invest the coca profits into a local school, medical facilities, electricity generator, and an
ecotourist lodge.40 Nonetheless, such instances may be a rare exception to the otherwise
unproductive use of illicit profits.
VII. What Follows
This chapter introduced the major questions explored in this study regarding the
nexus between illicit economies, such as drugs, and military conflict and set the
parameters of the issue. It located narcotics within the larger class of illicit economies. It
established the significance of the inquiry for policy and its academic contribution to
several fields of study, including international political economy and the role of regimes
and regulation; civil war and the role resources; security studies and counterinsurgency
policy; and failed states. It argued that the conventional view regarding the role of
narcotics in military conflict ignores important dynamics and recommends ineffective
and counterproductive policies. The chapter offered an alternative theory of the impact of
illicit markets on military conflict -- the political capital of illicit economies -- that
provides a richer analysis of the phenomenon and a different set of prescriptions. The
9 For details on the economic effects of illicit economies, see, for example, Francisco E. Thoumi, Illegal
Drugs, Economy, and Society in the Andes (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2004); Pranab
Bardhan, "Corruption and Development: A Review of the Issues," Journal of Economic Literature 35 (3),
1997: 1320-65; Peter Reuter, "The Mismeasurement of Illegal Drug Markets: The Implications of Its
Irrelevance," in Susan Pozo, ed. Exploring the Underground Economy (Kalamazoo: W.E. Upjohn Institute,
1996): 63-80; and Mauricio Reina, "Drug Trafficking and the National Economy," in Charles Berquist,
Ricardo Pefiaranda, and Gonzalo Sanchez G., eds., Violence in Colombia 1990-2000: Waging War and
Negotiating Peace (Wilmington: A Scholarly Resources Inc. Imprint, 2001).
40 In order not to generate negative repercussions for the village, I do not give its name.
chapter also previewed the empirical evidence. Finally, it briefly sketched the impact of
the production of narcotics on political and economic processes outside of military
conflict - a topic beyond the scope of the study.
The rest of the study proceeds as follows: The next chapter provides a detailed
literature review of the various intellectual sources of both the conventional view and my
theory, covering studies on resource wars, peasant rebellions, insurgency and
counterinsurgency, organized crime, narcotics, and state failure. The third chapter lays
out the theoretical apparatus of the study, detailing the two competing theories, as well as
describing the methodology and case selection. The following three chapters delve into
the empirical evidence for two competing theories. Chapter Four analyzes illicit
economies (drugs and illicit logging) and conflict in Peru since the 1970s. Chapter Five
explores the illicit-economies-conflict nexus in Colombia since the 1960s. And Chapter
Six does that for Afghanistan at the turn of the 20 t" century and again since 1979. Chapter
Seven provides a summary conclusion, showing how the cumulative evidence supports
the validity of my theory and undermines the validity of the conventional view. Finally,
Chapter Eight extends the analysis to several other cases, including Northern Ireland and
Burma, and explains the limits of on the ability of belligerents to exploit illicit
economies. It also teases out policy implications and provides a set of recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO: Literature Review - Theories, Assumptions, and
Worldviews Underlying the Controversy
I. Introduction
This chapter provides a review of the standard works that offer the conventional
narcoterrorism view and other relevant literature on drugs and counterdrug policies. In
order to comparatively contextualize the intellectual background and assumptions of the
standard view of narcoterrorism and my theory, "the political capital of illicit
economies," the chapter also reviews relevant works on the sources of insurgencies and
doctrines of counterinsurgency, sources of terrorism and counterterrorism policies,
peasant rebellions, the emerging literature on the criminal enterprises and illicit
economies in international politics, and the literature on failing and failed states.'
'A large and rich body of literature on drug production and the drug trade does not take directly address the
central issues that with by this study. Such works focus either on the histories of the drug trade and
counterdrug efforts or explore various forms of international police cooperation, and international anti-
narcotics regimes. I mine these works for data on specific cases. Among the key works in this category are
Scott B. MacDonald and Bruce Zagaris, International Handbook on Drug Control (Westport: Greenwood
Press, 1992); William McAllister, Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An international history
(New York: Routledge, 2000); Paul Gootenberg, ed., Cocaine: Global Histories (New York: Rutledge,
1999); Martin Booth, Opium: A History (New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 1996); Michael K. Steinberg,
Joseph J. Hobbs, and Kent Mathewson, eds., Dangerous Harvest: Drug Plants and the Transformation of
Indigenous Landscapes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Carl Trocki, Opium, Empire, and the
Global Political Economy (New York: Routledge, 1999); Bruce M. Bagley and William O. Walker, III,
eds., Drug Trafficking in the Americas (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1994); Curtis Marez,
Drug Wars: The Political Economy of Narcotics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004); and
David R. Mares, Drug Wars and Coffeehouses: The Political Economy of the International Drug Trade
(Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2006).
A second category of the drug literature tangently related to this study focuses on the bureaucratic
setting and making of U.S. drug policies and its implications for U.S. overall foreign policy or policy
toward specific countries. General significant works in the category of the making and implications of U.S.
international anti-narcotics policy include: Russell Crandall, Driven by Drugs: US Policy Toward
Colombia (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002); H. Richard Friman, NarcoDiplomacy: Exporting the U.S. War
on Drugs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); and Ron Chepesiuk, Hard Target: The United States
War Against International Drug Trafficking, 1982-1997 (Jefferson: McFarland, 1999). This category also
includes Jaime Malamud-Goti, Smoke and Mirrors: The Paradox of the Drug Wars (Boulder: Westview,
1992) and Michael Levine, Deep Cover (New York: Delacorte Press, 1990), both of which charge that the
war on drugs is being lost due to bureaucratic incompetence, half-hearted efforts, and turf controls among
II. The Conventional View of Narcoterrorism
Narcoterrorism Literature
The majority of the theoretical and empirical studies about the relationship
between drugs and military conflict focus mainly on the financial gains belligerent groups
derive from illicit substances. Among the early works on the topic, James Adams, for
example, identifies drugs as one source of terrorist financing.2 Similarly, Grant Wardlaw
in "Linkages between the Illegal Drugs Traffic and Terrorism" argues strongly against
the linkages between the drug dealers and the guerrillas being understood in political or
ideological terms, maintaining that they are simply financial. 3 Although Wardlaw is
correct in dismissing the ideological bonds between terrorism organizations and drug
trafficking, he too ignores the non-pecuniary gains terrorists derive from participation in
the illicit economy with respect their broader audience, the population. These early
authors have been joined by other prominent proponents of this narrow view of the
relationship between illicit economies and military conflict emphasizing simply the
financial benefits of belligerents and ignoring the political gains of belligerents from
the various agencies. In a similar vein, two key works on drugs, Alfred McCoy's The Politics ofHeroin:
CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade (New York: Lawrence Hill Books, 1991) and Jonathan
Marshall's Drug Wars: Corruption, Counterinsurgency and Covert Operations in the Third World
(Forestville: Eclipse Books, 1991) explore the inconsistent role of the CIA and other agencies in dealing
with drugs, sometimes cooperating with and aiding global criminal syndicates and drug traffickers and at
other times attempting to suppress the drug business. Both authors conclude that the war on drugs was lost
in the 1980s, by being subordinated to the global struggle against communism.
The view that US foreign policy priorities regarding the war on drugs and other objectives of US
foreign policy are ordered incorrectly is also shared by Rachel Ehrenfeld, Narcoterrorism (New York:
Basic Books, 1990) and Joseph Douglass, Jr. Red Cocaine - The Drugging ofAmerica (Atlanta: Clarion
House, 1990), both of whom believe that the international drug trade was a Communist conspiracy designed
to undermine the free world, sponsored by the Soviets and Castro. In their view, the war on drugs was thus
sacrificed to d6tente. Authors in this school of thought also frequently argue that since the end of the Cold
War the drug trade was captured by the jihadist terrorist groups.
2 James Adams, The Financing of Terror (London: New English Library, 1986). See also, Robert Cribb,
Opium and the Indonesian Revolution," Modern Asian Studies, 22 (4), December 1988: 701-22.
3 Grant Wardlaw in "Linkages between the Illegal Drugs Traffic and Terrorism," Conflict Quarterly,
Summer 1988: 5-26. See also, Merrill Collett, "The Myth of the Narco-Guerrilla," The Nation, August 13,
1988 and The Cocaine Connection (Ephrate: Science Press, 1989).
illicit economies, such as Rachel Ehrenfeld (2005), Douglas Davids (2002), and Stephan
Leader and David Wiencek (2000).4
Among the recent works on terrorist financing, Shelley and Picarelli review the
various criminal sources of terrorist funding, including narcotics, smuggling of human
beings, and smuggling of gems, again focusing on the pecuniary benefit to the terrorist
groups.5 Although they note that terrorists also derive logistical support from
participating in criminal activity, such as the acquisition of passports, the authors do not
consider the political capital that terrorists derive from certain criminal activity. In fact,
they argue that the participation of terrorist groups in drug smuggling compromises their
legitimacy with the local population since it leads to addiction and drug-related violence.6
Tarazona-Sevillano (1990) provides a highly detailed and nuanced view of the
relationship between the drug economy and insurgency.7 But although Tarazona-
Sevillano describes some of the political benefits that belligerent groups derive from the
drug trade, she fails to underscore the importance of this political capital for the
prosecution of the counterinsurgency effort. Instead, she focuses on the pecuniary
benefits, and seeing the traffickers and the belligerents as having synergistic tactics and
goals and morphing into a unified conglomerate actor, she advocates the need to treat the
two phenomena as one. According to her analysis, eradication becomes a crucial means
in the defeat of the belligerent groups.
4 Rachel Ehrenfeld, How Terrorism Is Financed and How to Stop It (Chicago: Bonus Books, 2005);
Douglas J. Davids, Narco-terrorism (Ardsley: Transnational Publishers, 2002); and Stefan Leader and
David Wiencek, "Drug Money: The Fuel for Global Terrorism," Jane's Intelligence Review, February
2000: 49-54.
s John T. Picarelli and Louise I. Shelley, "Organized Crime and Terrorism," Paper Presented at the Annual
APSA Conference 2005, September 2005.
6 Ibid., p. 14.
7 Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano with John B. Reuter, Sendero Luminoso and the Threat ofNarcoterrorism
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1990).
The dominant message of this literature, and the conventional wisdom among
government officials described in the following chapter, is thus one of focusing on the
financial profits belligerent groups derive from the illicit trade, ignoring the political
capital that also accrues to belligerents from sponsoring illicit economies, and
recommending that the illicit economy be eradicated in order to defeat the belligerent
groups.
Greed Versus Grievance and Resources Wars
The message of the narcoterrorism literature is consistent with the message of the
"greed versus grievance" literature. Although the scholars of the "greed versus
grievance" literature approach the problem through a different prism, they see the same
dynamics at work and arrive at same conclusions. The "greed versus grievance" scholars
pay particular attention to economic dimensions of wars, especially civil wars. In the
context of the end of the Cold War -- the drying up of physical resources for rebels from
the two superpowers and the rise of economic globalization -- the self-financing character
of many civil wars has been one of the main points of academic and policy focus.8 One of
the key contributions of the economic-analysis approach to civil wars is the
reconceptualization of civil war from a notion of a complete economic breakdown to an
understanding of civil war as a new system of profit and power.9 The "greed literature"
' Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1999) and Mark Duffield, Global Governance and New Wars: The Merging ofSecurity and
Development (London: Zed Books, 2001).
9 Among the seminal works of the economic-analysis approach are Mats Berdal and David Keen, "Violence
and Economic Agendas in Civil Wars: Some Policy Implications," Millennium: Journal ofInternational
Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3, 1997, pp. 795-818; Mats Berdal and David Malone eds., Greed and Grievance:
Economic Agendas in Civil War (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000); David Keen, The Economic Functions of
Violence in Civil Wars, Adelphi Paper No. 320 (Oxford: IISS/Oxford University Press, 1998); Paul Collier
and Anke Hoeffler, "On the Economic Causes of War," Oxford Economic Papers, 50 (4), October 1998:
563-573; Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars," October 21, 2001,
thus characterizes current civil wars as "parasitic" because they are dominated by rent-
seeking; "illicit" because they rely on gray or black markets; and "predatory" because the
belligerents use deliberate violence to acquire assets and extract rents.'0
Moreover, this economic-approach to civil war claims not only that civil wars
have a new character, but crucially, that they are driven by different causes than
previously assumed. In an influential statistical study of civil wars since 1965, Paul
Collier and his team argued that political grievances traditionally believed to be important
causes of civil wars, such as ethnic heterogeneity, regime type, economic
mismanagement, and the level of political rights had no statistical significance. Instead,
economic factors, mainly the presence of accessible natural resources and a mass of ill-
educated youth, accounted for the onset of civil wars."1 Collier et al posited that
economic motives - greed or loot-seeking - are the driver of civil wars. Following an
intense academic controversy, Collier and his team offered a weaker version of the greed
thesis, emphasizing the role of lucrative economic resources as a crucial opportunity for
organized violence. 12 Lootable resources, such as illicit narcotics and gems, are
http://econ.worldbank.org/files/12205_greedgrievance_23oct.pdf; Michael Klare, Resource Wars: The New
Landscape of Global Conflict (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2001).
10 Kaldor (1999): 11. This literature builds on Charles Tilly's work on state-making as organized crime and
on social movements. See, for example, Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Addison-Wesley:
1978) and Coercion, Capitalism, and European States, AD990 - 1990 (Blackwell Publishers, 1990).
" Paul Collier, "Doing Well Out of Civil War," in Mats Berdal and David Malone eds., Greed and
Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil War (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000): 90-111.
12 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (2001). For arguments on the other side of the debate, see, for example,
Cynthia J. Arnson and I. William Zartman, eds. Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection of
Need, Creed,, and Greed (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005). Arnson, Zartman, et al
argued that viewing war through the prism of rent-seeking is insufficient and that political grievances still
play a crucial role. They maintain, however, that as civil wars become a prolonged struggle and resources
become strained, the search for resources become increasingly important, if not dominant. As the original
goals of meeting the population's need and advancing one's creed show little chance of being attained,
tactics become orientated to the attainment of means, namely resources. In time, the tactical search for
means may even become transmuted into being an end in of itself. In essence, prolonged civil wars evolve
through three stages - need, creed, and finally greed, at which point such conflicts cannot be controlled
without the use of military force. Ross (2004) also maintains that although gemstones and narcotics are
linked to the duration of conflict, they are not linked to the initiation of the conflict, thus providing further
understood as strengthening the rebels by increasing their funding. The focus is almost
solely on pecuniary gains. To the extent that non-pecuniary effects of lootable resources
are considered at all, lootable resources are seen as undermining the social capital of
belligerent groups since they facilitate recruitment without indoctrination and attract
those who seek simply financial profits without commitment to the cause, thus
undermining cohesion.' 3
However, whether lootable natural resources are seen as the goal or the means or
both, the strong implication of the greed thesis is that efforts to end civil wars should
focus on reducing the economic opportunity for violence and targeting the finances of
rebel groups. Karen Ballentine summarizes the main findings of the greed-thesis
literature: "peace can be best achieved not by long and arduous efforts to negotiate a
political compromise, nor by the even more risky approach of direct intervention, but by
implementing technical measures that, in the short term, will reduce both the accessibility
and the profitability of lucrative economic resources to combatant groups."' 4 Thus, bans,
commodity embargoes, targeted sanctions, freezing of financial assets, and the
eradication and interdiction of illicit lootable goods are advocated as the appropriate and
evidence of Arnson's and Zartman's findings. See, Michael L. Ross, "What Do We Know About Natural
Resources and Civil War?" Journal of Peace Research, 31 (3) 2004: 337-356.
" Michael L. Ross, "Oil, Drugs, and Diamonds: The Varying Roles of Natural Resources in Civil Wars," in
Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, eds., The Political Economy ofArmed Conflict: Beyond Greed and
Grievance (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003): 47-72. Ross identifies the "lootability" of resources, i.e. the
ease with which they can be appropriated by unskilled individuals, as the determinant of the character of
civil war - protracted war over control of territory or separatism. However, his entire focus is on the
financial benefits such resources bring to the warring parties. For examples of work that argues that
lootable resources undermine the social capital of belligerent groups, see Alexandra Guiqueta, "The
Colombian Conflict: Political and Economic Dimensions," in Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, eds.,
The Political Economy ofArmed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003):
73-106; and Jake Sherman, eds., "Burma: Lessons from Cease-fire," in Karen Ballentine and Jake
Sherman, eds., (2003): 225-258.
"4 Karen Ballentine, "Beyond Greed and Grievance: Reconsidering the Economic Dynamics of Armed
Conflict," in Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, eds., (2003): 274. See also, Ian Bannon and Paul Collier,
eds., Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options andActions (Washington DC: The World Bank,
2003).
most effective means of ending civil wars. As one of the World Bank officials involved
in the study told me with reference to Colombia, "If we destroy the coca, there won't be
any more war in Colombia."' 5
In their statistical study of the causes of civil war, Fearon and Laitin (2003)
reaffirm Collier's finding that grievances, such as ethnic or religious differences, are not
statistically significant predictors of civil war.' 6 However, Fearon and Laitin downplay
the importance of lootable resources, either as motivations or enablers of the onset of
civil war. Instead, the authors argue that the two crucial predictors of civil war are the
weakness and capriciousness of the state (which they feel are different from grievances)
and conditions that favor insurgency, namely rough terrain, rebels with local knowledge
of the population superior to such knowledge of the government, and a large population.
Fearon and Laitin define insurgency as "a technology of military conflict characterized
by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas." 17 The
authors posit that superior knowledge of the local population allows the rebels to credibly
threaten retribution for informing on the rebels. Thus, although the authors stress the
importance of intelligence, they focus on the use of intelligence for the elimination of
informants as opposed to the winning of the hearts and minds of the population.
Moreover, their conclusion begs the question: How do rebels and governments acquire
such a good knowledge of the population? Like the greed-thesis proponents, they do not
explore the political benefits accruing to belligerents from an effective protection and
regulation of an illicit economy.
'~ Interviews with officials of the World Bank, Summer 2003.
16 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," American
Political Science Review, 97 (1), February 2003: 75-90.
17 Ibid.: 79.
"New" Transnational Crime
Another body of literature that directly informs the conventional wisdom about
the relationship between illicit economies and terrorism is the growing literature on the
connections between transnational crime and terrorism, or what I refer to as the "new
transnational crime" literature.' 8 Although much of this literature is relatively recent, it
fits directly into the "narcoterrorism" framework since it predominantly focuses on the
material aspects of the intersection of organized crime and terrorism, especially, and
frequently exclusively, on terrorist financing. Like the "greed literature," the "new
transnational crime" literature emphasizes that as the end of the Cold War resulted in
shrinking financial resources of terrorist groups, their need for finances drove them to
seek alternative funding from crime organizations. This move is facilitated by
globalization, simplifying communications and transportation.' 9 In analyzing the
1s This literature specifically focuses on terrorist exploitation of organized crime. It is tangent to the vast
literature on organized crime, including organized multinational crime. Unlike the literature on
multinational crime, which has struggled to parcel out various types and forms of organized crime, the
"new crime" literature focuses at its core on the symbiotic nature of terrorism and criminal activity. Key
typologies in the literature on organized crime include typologies based on varying degrees of
formalization and rationality, marked by the extent of the division of labor - see, Donald R. Cressey,
Criminal Organization: Its Elementary Forms (London: Harper Torchbooks, 1972); extent and intensity of
relations among members of the criminal organization - see, Joel Best and David F. Luckenbill,
Organizing Deviance (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1982); the character of the relationship between
organized crime groups and society - predatory-symbiotic and legitimate-illegitimate continuum - see,
Margaret Beare, Criminal Conspiracies: Organized Crime in Canada (Toronto: Nelson Canada, 1996).
Frank Hagan adds a third dimension to the structural and sociopolitical dimension, extent of violence - see,
Frank Hagan, Introduction to Criminology: Theories, Methods, and Criminal Behavior (Chicago: Nelson-
Hall, 1990). Finally, Klaus von Lampe stresses the criminal organization's capacity to harm as the key
organizing principle - see, Klaus Von Lampe, "Criminally Exploitable Ties: A Network Approach to
Organized Crime," in Emilio C. Viano, Jose Magallanes, and Laurent Bridel, Transnational Organized
Crime: Myth, Power, and Profit (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2003).
19 See, for example, Alain Labrousse, Geopolitique des Drogues (Pairs: Presses Universitaires de France,
2004); Barbara Harris-White, "Globalization, Insecurities, and Responses: An Introductory Essay," in
Barbara Harris-White, ed., Globalization and Insecurity: Political, Economic, and Physical Challenges
(New York: Palgrave 2002): 1-43; Tamara Makarenko "A Model of Terrorist-Criminal Relationships,"
Jane 's Intelligence Review, August 1, 2003, http://www.janes.com/jir, downloaded December 18, 2004;
relationship between organized crime and terrorism, Louise Shelley emphasizes the
following links between the two phenomena: 1) terrorists engage in criminal activity to
support themselves financially; 2) both terrorist and crime groups use network structures
that sometimes intersect; 3) they both engage in moneylaundering and corruption; and 4)
they both operate in areas of weak state presence. 20 This body of literature frequently
argues that since terrorists and criminals no longer fall into separate categories, the war
against terrorism can no longer be separated from the fight against transnational crime.2
As Shelley maintains, "the points of convergence of the two forms of transnational crime
make it impossible to address one without the other."22 Similarly, Rollie Lal insists that
"organized crime must be eradicated in order to deprive the terrorist groups of a source of
logistical support"-weaponry, financing, and personnel.23
In their exploration of the global illicit economy, H. Richard Friman and Peter
Andreas again focus predominantly on its impact on the physical capabilities of criminal
organizations. Successful exploitation of the illicit economy, the authors posit, allows
criminal organizations to threaten the state's authority over the use of violence and can
increase the level of violence within societies due to turf wars with rival organizations
and attacks on law enforcement agencies: "The linkage between the illicit global
economy and expanding violence lies in the potential for increased access by criminal
and Svante Cornell, "Crime Without Borders," Axess Magazine No. 6, 2004: 18-21,
http://www.silkroadstudies.org/pub/0408Axess EN.htm, downloaded January 8, 2005.
20 Louise Shelley "The Nexus of Organized International Criminals and Terrorism," International Annals of
Criminology, 1 (2), 2002: 85-93.
21 See, for example, Chris Dishman, "Terrorism, Crime, and Transformation," Studies in Conflict and
Terrorism 42 (1), 2001: 43-58; and Tamara Makarenko, "The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the
Interplay Between Transnational Crime and Terrorism," Global Crime 1 (1), 2004: 129-145.
22 Shelley (2002): 91. Shelley does recognize that criminal organizations may provide a variety of social
services to the wider population, and that consequently the state's actions against the criminal organizations
may alienate the population. Quoted in James Dao, "The War on Terrorism Takes Aim at Crime," New
York Times, April 07, 2002,
23 Rollie Lal, "South Asian Organized Crime and Terrorist Networks, " Orbis, 49 (2), Spring 2005: 293.
groups to money, and, in turn, firepower." 24 In short, the key concern of many of the
studies on transnational crime is its symbiotic relationship with terrorism, specifically the
ability of terrorist organizations to improve their physical resources through cooperation
with transnational crime organizations.
Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Theory: "Guerre Revolutionnaire" and Cost-
Benefit Analysis
Although the existing body of literature on insurgency, counterinsurgency, and
terrorism frequently does not directly address the question of the nexus between military
conflict and illicit economies, it nonetheless provides a rich and important intellectual
background for the study of the phenomenon. Key insurgency leaders and authors of
insurgency doctrines, such as Mao and Marighella, comment directly on issues of key
concern in my study, such as the importance of local support and ways to obtain it.
Similarly, key works in the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism literature grapple
with the government's need to balance the objective of depriving the belligerents of their
physical resources with the objective of obtaining intelligence and winning the hearts and
minds of the population. Their understandings and recommendations of how to balance
24 KH. Richard Friman and Peter Andreas, "Introduction," in H. Richard Friman and Peter Andreas, eds., The
Illicit Global Economy and State Power (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999): 13. For other works on
the interplay between globalization and the global illicit economy, see, Moises Naim, Illicit: How
Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats Are Hijacking the Global Economy ((New York: Doubleday, 2005);
Phil Williams, "Transnational Criminal Organizations and International Security," in Michael T. Klare and
Yogesh Chandrani, eds., World Security: Challenges for a New Century (New York: St. Martin's, 1998):
249-72; and Peter Andreas, "Transnational Crime and Economic Globalization," in Mats Berdal and
Monica Serrano, eds., Transnational Organized Crime and International Security: Business as Usual?
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002): 37-52. For a critique of the way that globalization supposedly enables
transnational crime and transforms it into a major threat to the nation state with powerful criminals
capturing states and influencing politics, see, R.T. Naylor, Wages ofCrime: Black Markets, Illegal
Finance, and the Underworld Economy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002).
these often-competing objectives directly feed the academic and government
understanding of how to deal with the illicit economy.
Before analyzing the counterinsurgency (COIN) theories that underlie both sides
of the debate, I will briefly describe the leading theories of guerrilla warfare.2 5
Counterinsurgency theory developed in reaction to the advent of modem revolutionary
guerrilla warfare, which in the twentieth century increasingly came to challenge the
colonial powers and the state.26 Many of the COIN theorists closely studied the guerrilla
warfare manuals and treaties put out by prominent revolutionaries and were writing not
only from personal experience in fighting insurgencies in the colonies, but also in
reaction to the insurgency disquisitions.
Among the early writings on insurgency were T. E. Lawrence's ("Lawrence of
Arabia") expositions of guerrilla warfare and its implications for Arab nationalism.2 7
25 1 am mainly concerned here with theories about how to conduct and prosecute guerrilla warfare and
terrorism and not really with theories about the causes of insurgency. The theories of causes and formation
of insurgent movements have stressed several variables as causes and enabling factors: a) existing social
networks that engage in top-down mobilization - see, Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998); Doug MacAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer M. Zald, eds.,
Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and
Cultural Framings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) ; William Gamson, The Strategy of
Social Protest (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishers, 1990); and Roger Petersen, Resistance and Rebellion:
Lessons from Eastern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); and b) the political
entrepreneurs that provide supporters with ideological coherence, overcome the freerider problem, and
provide an organization in order to effectively challenge existing authority - see, Youssef Cohen, Brian
Brown, and A.F.K. Organski, "The Paradoxical Nature of State Making: The Violence Creation of Order,"
American Political Science Review, 75 (4), Fall 1981: 901-910; and William Reno, "The Politics of
Insurgency in Collapsing States," Development and Change, 33 (5), July 2002: 837-58; c) fear, security
dilemma, and uncertainty - see, Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival, 35(1), Winter 1993: 27-47; Nelson Kasfir, "Domestic Anarchy, Security Dilemmas, and Violent Predation:
Causes of Failure," in Robert I. Rotberg, ed., When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2004): 53-76; James Fearon and David Laitin, "Violence and the Social
Construction of Ethnic Identity," International Organization, 54 (4), Fall 2000: 845-877; and Mark
Lichbach, The Rebel's Dilemma (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995); and d) greed motives
already described above.
26 For an excellent synopsis of guerrilla warfare and its main theorists, see Ian F.W. Beckett, "Guerrilla
Warfare: Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Since 1945," in Colin McInnes and G.D. Sheffield, eds.,
Warfare in the Twentieth Century: Theory and Practice (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988): 194-212.
27 T.E. Lawrence, Revolt in the Desert (London: Cape, 1927) and T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom
(London: Cape, 1935).
Lawrence prominently stressed the importance of secure base areas, the exploitation of
space by small, highly mobile forces, and good intelligence. But above all, Lawrence
highlighted the importance of popular support, claiming that victory can be achieved with
only two percent of active support among the population as long as the remaining 98
percent of the population sympathized or at least acquiesced to guerrilla activity.
Mao Zedong's "People's War," however, marked the real transition to modern
revolutionary warfare and served as reference for all counterinsurgency theorists. 28 Mao
envisioned insurgency as a protracted social and political revolution where guerrilla
warfare was the means to survive in the initial phases of the struggle before a regular
conventional army could be fielded and used to defeat the government.29
The process would take place in three phases. The goal of the first phase,
"strategic defensive," was to expand party organization and establish the infrastructure
necessary for further development of the revolution. Party workers were to generate
public support and infiltrate the state's political apparatus. The first period was
understood to be a long one, with only a limited resort to force to intimidate the
population and create a climate of dissent, civil disobedience, and economic unrest. Once
sufficient support or, at minimum, acquiescence among the population was achieved, the
second phase, "strategic stalemate" or "strategic equilibrium," was to be launched. In this
phase, the expansion of terrorism into guerrilla warfare would take place and
revolutionary administration - more capable than that of the government -- would be
established. Finally, in the third phase, "strategic offensive," the balance would have
z8 The Irish Revolution (1916-1921) antedates Mao's success, but its impact on theorists of revolutionary
warfare and COIN was far less pronounced than Mao's writings and victory.
29 Mao Zedong, Selected Military Writings (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1967) and Samuel Griffith,
ed., Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla War (New York: Anchor Press, 1978).
clearly swung in the direction of the revolutionary movement, regular units would be
introduced and engage in near conventional warfare. The marked feature of Mao's
concept was the emphasis on political and psychological elements as the key to victory,
not simply military factors.30
The "foco" theory of insurgency and revolutionary warfare developed as an
alternative rural guerrilla approach, inspired by the success of a relatively small number
of revolutionaries toppling the Batista regime in Cuba in 1959. It hoped to compress
protracted struggle envisioned by Mao into a swift victory. Among its most prominent
theorists were Ernesto "Che" Guevara and Regis Debray.3' In contrast to Mao, who
stressed the importance of political structures and in fact the dominance of the political,
Guevara and Debray argued that the guerrillas themselves were a fusion of the military
and political authority. Instead of a protracted struggle, they argued that a minimum level
of discontent with the government could be translated into conditions favorable to
revolution. By military action alone, a small armed group could provide the focal point,
or "foco," for the revolution. Inspired by the actions of the revolutionary elite and
alienated by the corruption and brutality of the state, progressively greater numbers of
sympathizers would attach themselves to the revolutionaries and rebel. They would thus
provoke an even more brutal reaction on the part of the government, which in turn would
alienate even more people.32
30 Mao's principles were applied in many insurgency and guerrilla struggles, and not simply by Communist
rebels, such as in Malaya (1948-60), the Philippines (1946-54), Algeria (1954-62), Angola (1962-74),
Rhodesia (1972-80), Oman (1965-75), and Peru (1980-1994).
31 Ernesto Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969); Regis Debray, Strategy for
Revolution (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973); and Regis Debray, Che's Guerrilla War (Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1975).
32 Althoughfoco was applied in Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, Guatemala, and Ecuador throughout the 1960s
and also 1980s, it proved a manifest failure.
The dismal record of thefoco theory contributed to the development of urban
guerrilla warfare in Latin America. Carlos Marighela was among its most influential
theorists.33 Like Guevara and Debray, Marighela rejected the need for prolonged
preparation for revolution. But instead of the countryside, Marighela situated the center
of the revolution back to the cities. The urban guerrillas would be a small band of highly
dedicated individuals, who through strategic attacks using parcel bombs and ambushes,
would provoke the authorities into overreaction. Through this overreaction, the state
would alienate the population and create the revolutionary situation. Actions were to be
spectacular and aimed at not just the government, but also foreign multinationals in order
to weaken the economy.34 Marighella also explicitly embraced the involvement of
guerrilla groups in illicit economies, arguing, for example, that bank robbery was the first
stage of revolutionary action.
The French counterinsurgency doctrine, guerre revolutionnaire,3 5 emerged as a
direct reaction to both the new guerrilla warfare manuals coming out, especially those of
Mao, and to the failure of the previous French doctrine, oil stain or tache d'huile, in
Indochina.36 Key theorists such as Georges Bonnet and Roger Trinquier created a
33 Carlos Marighella, For the Liberation of Brazil (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971). See also, Robert
Moss, Urban Guerrilla Warfare, Adelphi Paper No. 79 (London: IISS, 1971) and George Grivas, Guerrilla
Warfare (London: Longman, 1964).
34 The urban guerrilla approach has been applied, for example, the latter phases of the Sendero Luminoso
insurgency in Peru.
" Later on in the chapter, I will contrast the French approach to counterinsurgency with the British
approach. These two approaches are the two dominant theories of how to find counterinsurgency. A third
possible way is to treat insurgency as conventional, not asymmetrical warfare, and find the insurgents as
regular armies.
36 It is debatable whether the "oil stain" approach to counterinsurgency - a slow expansion of the
government/ colonial-power administration hand in hand with the expansion of military control pacifying
and engulfing the population like an oil stain - failed in Indochina because it was inherently flawed or
because it was not applied correctly. While the French military leadership decided that the strategy itself
was flawed, many authors of the British school of counterinsurgency embraced it and used the "oil stain"
approach as a foundation for their own counterinsurgency policy, described in detail below in the section
on British counterinsurgency.
counterinsurgency doctrine that sought to exploit the vulnerability of the initial phases of
the insurgency and essentially resolved the contradiction between focusing on the
physical resources of the belligerents and winning the hearts and minds in favor of
destroying the belligerents' physical resources. 37 Through the use of physical barriers,
such as fences, cordon sanitaire, and resettlement, the larger population was to be
separated from the insurgents. An intense psychological campaign, carried out by the
military in addition to the civilians, was to be directed at the population to dissuade it
from supporting the insurgents. As Trinquier argued, "The support of the population is
essential to the guerrilla. In particular, it prevents him from being taken by surprise, a
vital factor for success in combat. As long as this support is not withdrawn from him, we
cannot surprise him ...,,3 The provision of intelligence and material supplies by the
population to the guerrillas and the denial of intelligence was seen as the key element of
the success of the insurgency. Trinquier insisted that "anything that would facilitate the
existence of the guerrillas in any way, or which could conceivably be used by them -
depots, shelters, caches, food, crops, houses, etc. - must be systematically destroyed or
brought in.""39 Breaking this connection between the populations and the rebels, thus
became the crux of the counterinsurgency objective. The understanding was that once
the insurgents were separated from the population and denied supplies, they would be
critically weakened and defeated: "Deprived of supplies and information, they will no
longer be able to defend themselves when we finally decide to attack them. ' 4AO
37 Georges Bonnet, Les guerres insurrectionnelles et revoluionnaires (Paris: Payot, 1958), and Roger
Trinquier, Modern Warfare (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964). The French approach essentially replicated
British COIN strategies in the Boer Wars (1880-1881) and (1899-1902).
38 Trinquier (1964): 55.
39 Ibid.: 85.
40 Ibid.: 72.
In essence, the French thus identified the same crux of the problem as the British
- the connection between the population and the insurgents as the key sustaining
mechanism of the insurgency. And they arrived at the same answer - to separate the
population from the insurgents. However, there was a crucial difference in the means
chosen to separate the population from the insurgents. Although the French theorists at
least spoke of not alienating the population by excessive brutality and of mitigating the
hardships of forced relocation by providing social services, in practice, the policy evolved
into one of intimidation and unrestrained repression. Brutal interrogation techniques were
employed, collective punishment was meted out, and the psychological campaign
directed at the population became dominated by instilling fear of penalties for the
cooperation with the insurgents. Unlike the British relocations camps in Malaya, the
French ones in Algeria were poorly managed, lacking medical and social services,
leading to the death of thousands of Muslims.41 In balancing eliciting popular cooperation
with the governing authority through "winning the hearts and minds" or obtaining
cooperation through intimidation, the scale clearly tipped in the direction of the latter.
Although not explicitly endorsing repression en masse, some American theorists
of counterinsurgency also rejected the "hearts and minds" approach described in detail
below and focused on cutting off the provision of material supplies by the population to
the insurgents. The resource flow was to be cut off with force if necessary. Charles Wolf,
a leading author of what came to be known as the coercion theory or cost-benefit analysis
41 Leroy Thompson, The Counterinsurgency Manual (London: Greenhill Books, 2002). The Soviets
practiced a rather draconian alternative to resettlement in Afghanistan, by destroying the agriculture, food
crops, and infrastructure in the countryside with the hope that the population would leave and relocate into
the cities. Although a large part of the population did in fact leave, many stayed, and ironically, turned
toward growing poppy, thus paving the way for the development of the drug industry in Afghanistan. The
ones that left - mainly for Pakistan - also became a refugee base for the insurgents.
of counterinsurgency, for example, argued that popular support was not essential for
insurgents in developing countries. Rather what mattered was the acquisition of material
supplies by the insurgents from the population: "From an operation point of view, what
an insurgent movement requires for successful and expanding operations is not popular
support, in the sense of attitudes of identification and allegiance, but rather a supply of
certain inputs [...] at a reasonable cost, interpreting cost to include expenditure of
coercion as well as money."42
Wolf went on to argue that the desire to win the heats and minds of the population
by improving its standard of living missed the mark. In fact, instead of lessening the bond
between the population and the insurgents, the government would be shooting itself in the
foot and indirectly provide the insurgents with all the more supplies since the insurgents
could easily extract it from the population by force or persuasion. The rural population
was to be dissuaded from supporting the insurgents by careful calibration of punishments
and rewards, and economic aid was to be directed to cities that were under government
control.43 The people in the countryside would be more motivated to cooperate with the
government by seeing the rewards of cooperation, or move out to the cities. At a
fundamental level, the coercion theorists argued that what mattered was not the feelings
of the population, but its actions. And by coercion, its actions could be induced to support
the government.
42 Charles Wolf Jr., Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: New Myths and Old Realities, RAND Document,
No. P-3132-1 (Santa Monica: RAND, 1965): 5.
43 See, for example, Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf Jr., Rebellion and Authority: An Analytical Essay on
Insurgent Conflicts (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970).
The "Eradication" School of Counterterrorism
The school of thought that advocates the elimination of physical capabilities of
nonstate belligerents as the effective solution to the anti-state violence also has its
equivalent in the counterterrorism literature. Walter Laquer, for example, argues that
terrorism can be destroyed through repressive measures. Since the potential pool of
terrorists is not unlimited, the physical elimination of the majority of terrorists will reduce
the incidence of terrorism.44 Similarly, Neil Livingstone maintains that repression is the
enemy of terrorism and that terrorists cannot operate in repressive states.45 Laquer further
argues that social conditions have little impact on terrorism and hence addressing them is
immaterial. The more repressive a government becomes, the less terrorism it will suffer.46
The dominant message is once again: smash the terrorists and do not worry about the
attitude of the wider population toward the government.
MI. The Political Capital of Illicit Economies
The literature examined in this section contains critical ideas and analyses that
support and inform my theory, the political capital of illicit economies. These works
include critiques of existing drug policies, transnational crime literature that challenges
the conventional view of narcoterrorism, the British approach to counterinsurgency and
44 Walter Laquer, The Age of Terrorism (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987).
45 Neil C. Livingstone, "Death Squads," Journal of World Affairs, 4 (3), Winter 1983/84: 239-248. In a
classic empirical study of the effectiveness of repression, Christopher Hewitt demonstrated that although
state repression did in fact deter terrorism in the short term, as repressive measures continued, they had less
and less impact. Ultimately, repression did not provide a long-term solution. See, Christopher Hewitt, The
4Efectiveness ofAnti-Terrorist Policies (Landham: University Press of America, 1984).
Laquer (1987): 6. Yehezkel Dror also argues against the government focus on root causes: since they
cannot be definitely ascertained, they cannot be effectively addressed. Instead, the government should
focus on strengthening its capacity to govern. See, Yehezkel Dror, "Terrorism as a Challenge to the
Democratic Capacity to Govern," in Martha Crenshaw, ed., Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power: The
Consequences of Political Violence (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1983): 65-90.
the related "hearts and minds" literature, the legitimacy school of counterterrorism, and
the literature on peasant rebellions.
Critiques of Drug Policies
My theoretical and empirical understanding of the drug insurgency nexus mines
and builds upon rich analytical critiques of the war on drugs. These works can be divided
into three categories, based on the type of criticism they make.
The first critique is that the war against drugs is failing, that drugs today are
abundant as ever and cheaper than twenty years ago, and that supply-side efforts are
failing and bound to fail.4 7 These critiques make several arguments: A) The drug war
paradoxically stimulates the drug traffic: Its success in artificially raising prices - the so
called crime tax - also inflates profits. These high profits paradoxically provide a steady
incentive for drug suppliers to remain in the trade and for new suppliers to enter the trade
if there is a space in the market. This profit paradox also influences the actions of
governments and local populations in source countries with both actors frequently being
unable to resist the payments offered by traffickers.48 B) Supply of drugs is little affected
47 Reuter (2002); Robert MacCoun and Peter Reuter, Drug War Heresies (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001); Riley (1996); Eva Bertram, Morris Blachman, Kenneth Sharpe, and Peter Andreas,
Drug War Politics: The Price of Denial (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); Dirk C.
Eldredge, Ending the War on Drugs (Bridgehampton: Bridgeworks Publishing Company, 1998); Illegal
Drugs, Economy, and Society in the Andes (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2003).; C. Peter
Rydell and Susan S. Everingham, Controlling Cocaine: Supply Versus Demand Programs (Santa Monica:
RAND, 1994); Patrick L. Clawson and Rensselaer Lee III, The Andean Cocaine Industry (New York: St.
Martin's Griffin, 1996).Ted Galen Carpenter, Bad Neighbor Policy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2003).
48 Jonathan P. Caulkins, Mark A.R. Kleiman, and Peter Reuter, "Lessons of the 'War' on Drugs from the
'War' on Terrorism," in Arnold M. Howitt and Robyn L. Pangi, eds., Countering Terrorism: Dimensions of
Preparedness (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2003): 73-93; Mark A.R. Kleiman, "The Problem of
Replacement and the Logic of Drug Law Enforcement," Drug Policy Analysis Bulletin, (3), September
1997; Peter Reuter, Robert MacCoun, and Patrick Murphy, Money From Crime: A Study of the Economics
of Drug Dealing in Washington, D.C. (Santa Monica: RAND, 1990); and Reuter (2002); Mark A.R.
Kleiman, Against Excess: Drug Policy for Results (New York: Basic Books, 1992); and Ethan Nadelmann,
"Drug Prohibition in the United States: Costs, Consequences, and Alternatives," Science, (245), September
by incapacitation of traffickers because incarcerated offenders are easily replaced. Even
top drug dealers and entire cartels have proven to be replaceable, while their
incapacitation at most briefly interrupted supply. As long as there are buyers, the
financial rewards of supplying drugs will attract new traffickers and producers. The new
organizations may not be as efficient as the destroyed ones, but the effect in terms of
price and availability of drugs will be negligible. Moreover, success against some
traffickers will only guarantee a greater market share for others. C) Similarly, production
areas are hard to shut down and easy to replace, despite the hope of eradicating drugs at
the source. Even successful interdiction or eradication are undermined by the so-called
"balloon effect": production and trafficking simply shift to new areas and routes.49 D)
Policies oriented toward demand reduction are cheaper and more effective. E) Temporary
successes result in worse law enforcement problems. For example, the successes against
marijuana smuggling into the United States from Mexico resulted in the emergence of
much higher potency marijuana, and the 1980s crackdown on cocaine contributed to the
spread of crack. F) The domestic collateral effects of the war on drugs - spiraling levels
of crime and disease; the undermining of democratic values and processes; and the
reinforcement of divisions and discrimination along lines of race and class.50 Because of
the basic failure of the war on drugs and its large negative externalities, the critics
1989: 939-47 and Ethan Nadelmann, "Commonsense drug policy," Foreign Affairs, 77 (1), January-
February 1998: 111-26.
49 Paul B. Stares, Global Habit: the Drug Problem in a Borderless World (Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution Press, 1996).
50 Bertram, Blachman, Sharpe, and Andreas (1996); Eldredge (1998); and Dan Baum, Smoke and Mirrors:
The War on Drugs and the Politics of Failure (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1996).
advocate a basic change in counterdrug policies toward various demand reduction
schemes, decriminalization, or outright legalization.5 '
The second critique focuses on the impact of the war on drugs on the producing
countries. The arguments include: A) Eradication impoverishes and radicalizes local
populations. 52 And B) Source-country counterdrug approaches undermine democratic
processes and human rights in producing countries, radicalize poor populations, and
militarize domestic policies in these countries.5 3 They frequently recommend abandoning
source country policies or reorienting them toward alternative development. 54
The third critique argues that the U.S. war on drugs warps other, more important,
objectives of U.S. foreign policy, and is counterproductive to U.S. war against
insurgencies and terrorism. Many of these works are studies of a specific case that
mention that belligerents use the illicit economy to buy political support and argue that as
eradication alienates the local populations, it undermines the ability of the government to
51 For demand reduction approaches, see, for example, Rydel and Everingham (1994); for HARM reduction
approach, such as providing clean needles to addicts and safe injection sites and addressing environmental
factors, see Bertram, Blachman, Sharpe, and Andreas (1996); for decriminalization, see, Ronald Bayer and
Gerald M. Oppenheimer, eds, Confronting Drug Policy: Illicit Drugs in a Free Society (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993); MacCoun and Reuter (2001), and Ethan A. Nadelmann, "Thinking
Seriously About Alternatives to Drug Prohibition," Daedelus, 121 (3), Summer 1992: 85-132; for
legalization, see Eldredge (1998) and Ethan Nadelmann, "Legalization Is the Answer," Issues in Science
and Technology (6), Summer 1990: 43-46. For a critique of decriminalization and legalization, see, for
example, Jill Jones, Hep-Cats, Nacs, and Pipe Dreams: A History ofAmerica's Romance with Illegal
Drugs (New York: Scribner, 1996).
52 Edgardo Buscaglia and William Ratliff War and Lack of Governance in Colombia: Narcos, Guerrillas,
and U.S. Policy (Stanford: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 2001).
"3 See, for example, Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin, eds., Drugs and Democracy in Latin America
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005); Vanda Felbab-Brown, "Trouble Ahead: The Cocaleros of Peru," Current
History, 105 (688), February 2006: 79-83; and Carpenter (2003).
54 See, for example, Adam Isacson, "The Tragedy of Alternative Development in Colombia," December 3,
2001, http://www.colombiareport.org/colombia92.htm, downloaded May 05, 3003; and David Mansfield
and Adam Pain, "Alternative Livelihood: Substance or Slogan?" Afghanistan Research and Evaluation
Unit Briefing Paper, October 2005.
carry out the counterinsurgency campaign or peace negotiations."s These works,
however, do not elaborate how belligerents obtain political support nor do they elaborate
the conditions that influence the size and scope of the benefits.5 6 My dissertation thus
enlarges this body of work by detailing and specifying the processes and conditions that
influence the level of political capital belligerents are able to derive from the illicit
economies and the effects of various government policies toward the illicit economy on
conflict dynamics and conflict limitation.57
5s Cynthia McClintock, "The War on Drugs: The Peruvian Case," Journal oflnteramerican Studies and
World Affairs, 30 (2 and 3), Summer/ Fall 1988: 127-142; Richard Clutterbuck, Drugs, Crime, and
Corruption (New York: New York University Press, 1995); Adam Isacson, "Was Failure Avoidable?
Learning From Colombia's 1998-2002 Peace Process," The Dante B. Fascell North-South Center Working
Paper Series, Paper No. 14, March 2003,
shttp://www.miami,edu/nsc/publications/NSCPublicationsIndex.html#WP; Philip Coffin, "Coca
Eradication," Foreign Policy in Focus, 3 (29), October 1998,
http://www.fpif.org/briefs/vol3/v3n29cocabody.html, downloaded May 05, 2003; Buscaglia and Ratliff
(2001); Nazih Richani, Systems of Violence (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002); Ethan A.
Nadelmann, "International Drug Trafficking and U.S. Foreign Policy," Washington Quarterly, 8 (4) Fall
1985: 87-103; Naylor (2002); Gustavo Gorriti, The Shining Path: A History of the Millenarian War in
Peru, Robin Kirk, trans., (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999); Jose E. Gonzales,
"Guerrillas and Coca in the Upper Huallaga Valley," in Palmer, David Scott, ed. Shining Path of Peru,
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994): 123-144; Roman D. Ortiz, "Insurgent Strategies in the Post-Cold
War: The Case of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 25,
2002: 127-143; Francisco Guti6rrez Sanin, "Criminal Rebels? A Discussion of Civil War and Criminality
from the Colombian Experience," Politics and Society, 32 (2), June 2004: 257-285, and Vanda Felbab-
Brown, "Afghanistan: When Counternarcotics Undermine Counterterrorism," Washington Quarterly, 28
(4), Fall 2005: 55-72. My theoretical work also draws richly from Rensselaer W. Lee II.'s seminal and
lasting study of the relationship between peasants, traffickers, and government in the drug trade, The White
Labyrinth (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1989) and his subsequent work with Patrick L.
Clawson, The Andean Cocaine Industry (New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 1996). Although not directly
criticizing the war on drugs, Jake Sherman nonetheless points out in his study of the 1990s ceasefires in
Burma that the junta's granting of economic payoffs, including "licenses" for the trade with drugs, was
crucially instrumental in the ability of the junta to conclude these ceasefires. Although granting that these
ceasefires brought peace to the population after decades of conflict, Sherman criticizes the economically-
driven elites for betraying the goals of the population and allowing themselves to be coopted. See, "Burma:
Lessons from Cease-fires," in Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, The Political Economy ofArmed
Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003): 225-258.
56 R.T. Naylor argues that the belligerent group's choice of fund-raising technique depends on its
relationship to the broader society and its relative strength vis-a-vis the government. For belligerents
confined to a small territory, their criminal activities are essentially predatory, such as kidnapping and
bank-robbing. At a more advanced stage of the belligerency, criminal activity progresses to the parasitical,
such counterfeiting, insurance scams, and racketeering. Finally, at the most sophisticated stage, belligerent
groups and criminals transform their illicit economic activities into ones that are symbiotic with the state,
such as the sale of drugs and provision of gambling and prostitution services (Naylor 2002).
57 For a pr6cis of the arguments of this study, which details the dynamics and specifies the conditions, see,
Vanda Felbab-Brown, "The Intersection of Terrorism and the Drug Trade," in James J.F. Forest, ed., The
Exploring the drug-conflict nexus in the case of Colombia, the prominent and
highly influential Colombian Labyrinth by Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk (2001)ss also
noted the eradication increases the guerrillas' political support while it has failed to limit
the belligerents' resources. But unlike other critiques of U.S. eradication policies, it
called for rethinking the distinction between counternarcotics and counterinsurgency
operations and advocated that the U.S. helps build up Colombia's counterinsurgency
capabilities, instead of focusing solely on counternarcotics.
Transnational Crime II
Not all of the transnational crime literature assumes a full-fledged symbiosis
between criminal organizations and nonstate belligerent actors or among criminal
organizations themselves. In his work on the strategic alliances of transitional criminal
organizations, Phil Williams maintains that although increasing cooperation is taking
place among various criminal organizations (and among criminal organizations and
terrorist groups), such strategic alliances are frequently rather fragile. 59 He argues that
criminal organizations join in a strategic alliance in order to: 1) to reduce risk, such as in
circumventing law enforcement and national regulations and avoiding the seizure of their
products, profits, and personnel); 2) to take advantage of their partners' specialized
expertise; 3) to avoid mutual competition; and 4) to penetrate new markets. However,
Williams is careful to note that such strategic alliances are brittle and frequently fail. He
Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes, Vol. III: Root Causes (Westport: Praeger
Publishers, 2005): 172-188.
58 Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and
Its Implications for Regional Stability (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001).
59 Phil Williams, "Transnational Criminal Organizations: Strategic Alliances," The Washington Quarterly,
18 (1), Winter 1994: 57-72. For an excellent discussion of the problems of cooperation in cartels, see
Debora Spar, The Cooperative Edge: The Internal Politics of International Cartels (Ithaca: Cornel
University Press, 1994).
lists the following causes for failure: 1) different criminal cultures and codes of behavior;
2) a lack of trust;60 4) rivalries and resentment over relative gains; 4) the inability to
prevent independent actions by members of the criminal alliance. Williams thus
maintains that because of their fragile nature, strategic criminal alliances offer many
opportunities for law enforcement to exploit their weaknesses and turn the allied
organizations against one another.61
The British Approach to Counterinsurgency and "HAM"
My theory of the political capital of illicit economies has been informed by and
builds upon the intellectual foundation of the hearts and minds approach to
counterinsurgency. The British developed their counterinsurgency policy as a direct
response to Maoist conceptions of the revolutionary struggle. Seminal authors of the
British approach, such as Sir Robert Thompson, Frank Kitson, John S. Pustay, David
Galula, and John McCuen, spent a large part of their work analyzing Mao's concept,
before advancing their response. 62 McCuen, in particular, developed a theory of "counter-
revolution" that mirrored Maoist concepts and singled out five principles applicable to
60 A common basis of trust is frequently believed to be the foundation for any kind of cooperation,
including criminal. See, for example, Gambetta (1993); von Lampe (2003), James O. Finckenauer and Elin
J. Waring, Russian Mafia in America: Immigration, Culture, and Crime (Boston: Northeastern University
Press, 1998); Ko-Lin Chin, Chinese Subculture and Criminality: Non-traditional Crime Groups in America
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1990). Exploring whether reliance on trust among criminals could be
replaced by some another means, such as the threat or resort to violence, Peter Reuters argued that this may
be the case, but only at a high cost, far greater than would be incurred by trust or other "positive non-
economic ties," Peter Reuter, Disorganized Crime: Economics of the Visible Hand (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1983): 116.
61 Williams (1994): 70-1.
62 Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (London: Chatto and Windus, 1966) and Robert
Thompson, Revolutionary War in World Strategy, 1945-1969 (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1970); Frank
Kitson, Low Intensity Operations (London: Faber & Faber, 1971); John S. Pustay, Counterinsurgency
Warfare (New York: Free Press, 1965); David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice
(New York: Praeger, 1964); and John J. McCuen, The Art of Revolutionary Warfare (London: Faber and
Faber, 1966).
both the revolutionary and counterrevolutionary struggle: preserving oneself and
annihilating the enemy, establishing strategic bases, mobilizing the masses, seeking
outside support, and unifying the effort.63 Similarly, Thompson also identified five key
principles: 1) the government should have a clear political goal of defeating the
insurgency; 2) the government and its security forces must always act within the law; 3)
there should be an overall plan defining the responsibilities of all agencies involved in the
counterinsurgencies and intensive coordination among them; 4) priority should be given
to the defeat of political subversion rather than to military defeat of the guerrillas; and 5)
the government should ensure that its own bases are secure before mounting offensive
military campaigns. 64 A law-enforcement approach frequently was favored over a
military approach, especially in dealing with the local populations.
In operational terms, Thompson envisioned four stages of the counterinsurgency
effort: clearing an area of insurgent activity; holding the area for the government;
winning its inhabitants on the side of the government; and finally "moving" onto another
area. What was common to the analysts of the British school of counterinsurgency was
their emphasis on the political aspect of the insurgent struggle - gaining legitimacy in the
eyes of the population and depriving the government of its legitimacy -- and the
consequent need on the part of the government to make the political effort, the legitimacy
game, a similarly key aspect of counterinsurgency. Kitson, for example, stressed that "the
leaders of a subversive movement have two separate, but closely related jobs to do: they
must gain the support of a portion of the population, and they must impose their will on
63 McCuen (1966).
64 Thompson (1966) and Thompson (1970).
the government. 65" The leader of the British counterinsurgency effort in Malaya, Sir
Gerald Templer, was, in fact, the one who coined the term "winning the hearts and the
minds" (HAM).66
The "hearts and minds" school of thought became also prominent in the United
States. The American theorists of COIN became increasingly concerned with the inability
of governments to meet the needs and demands of their populations and keep pace with
the societal pressure that economic modernization and nationalism placed on them.67
Unable to provide for the needs of the population, the government would become
progressively weakened, isolated, and delegitimized. Meanwhile, the insurgents would
step into the lacuna of state power, and deliver what the government was unable or
unwilling to provide, such as social service, taxation, law, and administration. The
answer the HAM theorists proposed was to prevent the insurgents from winning the
legitimacy game by supplying the population with the needed goods, restoring the
65 Kitson (1971): 24-25.
66 It must be stressed that the French theorists of guerre revolutionare did not altogether ignore the
importance of winning the hearts and the minds, nor were the British counterinsurgency activities free of
brutality, forced population transfers, or repression designed to coerce the allegiance of the population. In
practice, the desire to deprive the insurgents of resources and gain the allegiance of the population resulted
in an inevitable tension between the two and undermined the guiding principles of the effort. Thus, in
practice, the British troops frequently deviated from theory and applied collective punishment, capital
punishment, curfews, and restrictions on movement. In Kenya, they alienated large segments of the
population by systematizing torture, inflicting heavy civilian casualties, and detaining 1.5 million Africans
believed to be sympathetic to the Mau Mau. See, for example, Caroline Elkins, "The Wrong Lesson,"
Atlantic Monthly, 296 (1), July/August 2005: 35-38. The crucial difference was one of emphasis. The
tendency of guerre revolutionare and the cost-benefit approach to mutate and become primarily, if not
exclusively, focused on altering the population's allegiance through the application of repression became
especially pronounced both in Algeria and in Vietnam.
Moreover, even the prominent authors of the British approach emphasized that simple persuasion
is not likely to win the hearts and minds of the population in the context of rebel intimidation and violence.
Persuasion needed to be coupled with the provision of security to those who cooperate with the government
or at least abstain from helping the insurgents against the reprisals of the insurgents. Police and military
presence thus became an important means of acquiring the allegiance of the population.
7 See, for example, Lucian Pye, Lessons from the Malayan Struggle Against Communism (Cambridge,
Center for International Studies, 1957), Riley Sutherland, Winning the Hearts and Minds of the People:
Malaya, 1948-1960, RAND Document No. RM-4174-ISA (Santa Monica: RAND, 1964), and Guy Parker,
Notes on Non-Military Measures in Control of Insurgency, RAND Document No, P-2642 (Santa Monica:
RAND, 1962).
government's capacity to provide them with basic services, improving standards of
living, and reducing government abuse, brutality, and corruption.
Force was thus to be applied selectively, with a strict adherence to minimizing
civilian casualties as a way of avoiding the trap of provoking even a more reinvigorated
insurgency reaction by repression en masse. As McCuen put it, "The military should be
very careful to avoid the shotgun approach: this is, accepting a few neutral civilian
casualties to get a few rebels. It does not work this way because the few neutral casualties
create ten-fold new rebels among the casualties' friends and relatives. The military
should also avoid indiscriminate bombing, shelling, or killing of any kind."68 Whether or
not McCuen got the numbers of alienated locals and potentially new rebels correct is less
important than his concern with the need to minimize civilian casualties in order to avoid
generating new rebels.
Thus the government had to demonstrate a concern for the social and economic
grievances underlying the insurgency or at least impinging upon the larger population.
And it had to deliver a tangible proof of being able to ameliorate these grievances.
McCuen, for example, maintained that "actions such as land reform, reduction of interest,
and removing of disliked officials ... should be accomplished to the extent necessary to
win popular support." Importantly, however, McCuen understood that in addition to
delivering a more just -- nationalist or democratic, for example -- concept of society,
what mattered most was the provision of basic goods to the population: "Actually, the
vast majority of the people are far more interested in these practical matters - plus the
security of their families and themselves - than the sophisticated questions of state. The
population will be lost or won depending on whether or not the governing power can
68 McCuen (1966): 61.
violent mobilization.76 Moral economists saw economic security, known as the "safety-
first principle," as key to the understanding of peasant mobilization since the poor
peasant was always close to the danger line and even a small drop in production could
threaten the survival of the household. Much of this literature and its follow-ups were
based on the assumption that the peasantry was initially not mobilized in any way.
Subsequent work by Samuel Popkin challenged the "moral economy" school,
arguing that threats to subsistence were not a sufficient explanation of peasants' violent
mobilization and that the risk to individual participants, combined with the role of
political entrepreneurs and their provision of "selective incentives," could better account
for their political mobilization.77 Popkin was thus extending Mancur Olson's collective
action theory to peasant mobilization. 7 In contrast to Popkin, some scholars emphasize
that insurgents often provide peasants with collective goods, thus taking on functions of
the state, rather than selective benefits. Guerrillas offer land and other subsistence goods
as an incentive for peasants to support the insurgency if not outright join the rebels. 79
76 Among seminal works of the moral economy school and the studies of peasant rebellion are James C.
Scott, The Moral Economy Peasant (New Haven: Yale University, 1976) and Eric Wolf, Peasant Wars of
the Twentieth Century (New York, Harper & Row, 1969). These works built on Barrington Moore's
depiction of agrarian wars as two-level conflicts that inevitable contain both small motives (such as the
peasant's hatred for the landowner) and large opportunities. See, Barrington Moore, Social Origins of
Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon, 1966).
77 Samuel L. Popkin, The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1979). See also, Mark Lichbach, "What Makes Rational Peasants
Revolutionary? Dilemma, Paradox, and Irony in Peasant Collective Action," World Politics, 46 (2), April
1994: 383-418; Jeffrey Berejikian, "Revolutionary Collective Action and the Agent-Structure Problem,"
American Political Science Review, 86 (3), September 1992: 647-657.
78 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1965). In the actual analysis, Popkin adopted an assurance game rather than a N-
person prisoners' dilemma as Olson. It is important to note, however, that Popkin also paid a close attention
to non-Olsonian motivations, such as the likely total benefit that will be derived from a collective effort.
79 Theda Skocpol, "What Makes Peasants Revolutionary?" Comparative Politics, 14 (3), April 1982: 351-
75; Timothy Wickham-Crowley, Exploring Revolution: Essays on Latin American Insurgency and
Revolutionary Theory (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1991); and Jeff Goodwin and Theda Skocpol, "Explaining
Revolutions in the Third World," Politics andSociety, 17 (4), 1989: 489-509. Others have emphasized the
provision of protection from government forces as a benefit extended by the insurgents. See, for example,
T. David Mason and Dale A. Krane, "The Political Economy of Death Squads: Toward a Theory of the
Consistent with the cost-benefit school of counterinsurgency, what these
numerous works have in common is the depiction of peasant (nonelite) behavior as
distinctly nonideological and determined more by a concern with short-term damage
limitation or benefit maximization than by preferences for any institutional or ideological
order that competing claimants to control over the state offer.so But crucially, and unlike
the cost-benefit authors, they emphasize the government threat to peasant subsistence and
security as an important source of alienation instead of an effective way to deprive
insurgents of resources.
Prominent recent works on peasant mobilization and rebellion reaffirm the
centrality of government repression for peasant mobilization.8' In Insurgent Collective
Action and Civil War in El Salvador, Elisabeth Wood shows how moral outrage at the
injustice of landlessness and brutal measures by the government fueled and sustained the
Impact of State-Sanctioned Terror," International Studies Quarterly, 33 (2), 1989: 175-98. In his recent
Caught in the Crossfire, T. David Mason argues that economic inequality by itself does not produce
revolution, but the shift from subsistence to export agriculture (under pressure from globalization) does.
The peasants then face the choice of nonviolent social mobilization or armed social strife. The key
determinant of the character of peasant opposition is government response. An indiscriminate resort to
violence on the part of the government winds up pushing peasants who would otherwise have been neutral
to join the rebels in self-defense, T. David Mason, Caught in the Crossfire: Revolutions, Repression, and
the Rational Peasant (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2004). For seminal studies on the
elites' decision to resort to violence, see James DeNardo, Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of
Protest and Rebellion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Mark Irving Lichbach, "Deterrence or
Escalation in Repression or Dissent," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 31 (2), June 1987: 266-297.
so Scott (1976), Popkin (1979), Benedict John Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolts in
the Philippines (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970); Joel S. Migdal, Peasants, Politics, and
Revolution: Pressures toward Political and Social Change in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1974); and Jeffrey M. Paige, Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export
Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World (New York: Free Press, 1975).
81 For the role of resentment in non-elite mobilization, and emotions in general, see Roger D. Petersen's
Understanding of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Although in his original work, Petersen applies to concept
of resentment to a predominantly political, not economic, sense of subordination, in a subsequent work
with Vanda Felbab-Brown, the authors extend the concept of resentment to situations of economic
deprivation resulting from government actions. See, Roger Petersen and Vanda Felbab-Brown, "La ciencia
social estadounidense y la politica de contrainsurgencia en Colombia," in Freddy Cante and Luisa Ortiz,
eds., A ccion Politica no-violenta, una opcion para Colombia (Bogota: Centro Editorial Universidad del
Rosario, 2005): 79-104.
insurgency in El Salvador. She also emphasizes that the participant motivations were not
simply material self-regarding benefits, but that participants referred irreducibly to the
well-being of others as well as to the "pleasure of agency," i.e. the ability to shape their
own destiny.82 Still, peasant alienation due to government repression looms large in her
account.
"Legitimacy" School of Counterterrorism
The issue of legitimacy as a crucial determinant of government's success against
terrorists is also prominently highlighted in the literature on counterterrorism. In their
seminal work on the relationship between terrorism, legitimacy, and power, Martha
Crenshaw and her co-authors argue that at the core of terrorists' power is their
legitimacy.8 3 As Conor Cruise O'Brien puts it, "the power of terrorism is through
political legitimacy, winning acceptance in the eyes of a significant population and
discrediting the government's legitimacy."8 4 Similarly, as Anthony Quainton maintains,
"the essence of the government problem is to maintain and strengthen its authority while
diminishing the legitimacy of the terrorists. Thus, the government faced with terrorism
must be concerned with both the effectiveness and the legitimacy of its policies."8 5
82 Wood (2003). See also, Roy Licklider, "Peasants, Choice, and Civil War," International Studies Review
7 (2), June 2005: 311-313.
83 Martha Crenshaw, ed., Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power: The Consequences of Political Violence
(Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1983).
84 Martha Crenshaw, "Introduction," in Martha Crenshaw, ed., Terrorism, Legitimacy, andPower: The
Consequences of Political Violence (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1983): 25. See also Conor
Cruise O'Brien, "Terrorism under Democratic Conditions," in Martha Crenshaw, ed., Terrorism,
Legitimacy, and Power: The Consequences of Political Violence (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press,
1983): 91-104.
85 Martha Crenshaw, "Introduction," (1983): 32. See also, Anthony C.E. Quainton, "Terrorism and Political
Violence: A Permanent Challenge to Governments," in Martha Crenshaw, ed., Terrorism, Legitimacy, and
Power: The Consequences of Political Violence (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1983): 52-64.
Consequently, the authors argue, the government cannot be oblivious to issues of
discrimination or deprivation.86 Crenshaw further maintains that intelligence is key for
the success of counterterrorism objectives. "In confronting terrorism," she argues, "the
nature of the grievance does matter, as does the nature of the organization that puts forth
the grievance. Intelligence is important not only to prevent terrorist attacks but also to
understand how the organization works and how its decision making processes can be
affected."8 7 My dissertation shows how the government response to the illicit economy
influences the willingness of the population to provide the government with intelligence
on the belligerent groups.
The debate about resources versus legitimacy also has its equivalent in the
counterterrorism literature. Following Claire Sterling's The Terror Network, which
attributed the terrorism of the 1970s and 1980s to an international terrorist network
financed by the Soviet Union, a school of thought emerged advocating that if the finances
and weapons supply could be stopped, terrorism would greatly diminish.88 Yet, Richard
Rubenstein argues:
People who want to make war on the state generally find the means to do so. At
the turn of the century, anarchists armed with little more than knives, pistols, and
homemade bombs terrorized Europe and North America quite effectively. [...]
86 Christopher Hewitt (1984) also maintains that by responding to causes such as poverty, suppression of
political expression, and lack of economic opportunity, governments may defuse potential sources of
violence, which is a long term solution to terrorism. For recent key works on terrorism, see Ian O. Lesser,
Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, Countering the New Terrorism (Santa
Monica: RAND, 1999). See also Adrian Gulke, The Age of Terrorism and the International Political
System (New York: I.B. Tauris/St. Martin's 1995); Charles W. Kegley, Jr., ed., International Terrorism:
Characteristics, Causes, and Controls (New York: St. Martin's 1990); Walter Reich, ed. Origins of
Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1990); Walter Laquer, A History of Terrorism (Piscataway: Transaction, 2001); Paul R. Pillar, Terrorism
and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001); Jessica Stern, The Ultimate
Terrorist (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000).
87 Martha Crenshaw and Maryann Cusimano Love, "Networked Terror," in Maryann Cusimano Love, ed.
Beyond Sovereignty: Issues for A Global Agenda (Toronto, Canada: Wadsworth, 2003): 138.
88 Claire Sterling, The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism (New York: Holt,
Rinehart, and Winson, 1981).
[T]he basic components of terrorist infrastructure - terrorists' sources of forged
papers, safehouses, transportation and communication links, personnel, and
money, as well as weapons - are in plentiful supply locally. It is a myth that
terrorist groups can be 'crushed in the egg' by cutting off their external sources of
supply. It is the local political base that makes the terrorist organization or breaks
it. Politically isolated groups turn to banditry or disappear because of political
weakness, not from a shortage of materiel.89
In short, the central claim of this strand of the counterterrorism literature is that
focusing on the terrorists' physical means is highly unreliable. The key to success is
drying up their political base.
IV. Beyond the Narcoterrorism Debate
Weak and Failed States
Beyond the debate about the impact of illicit economies on military conflict, the
dissertation also furthers the literature on failed states.90 This body of work has
concentrated mainly on identifying the causes and indicators of failure and measuring the
weakness of states.91 The ability to provide public goods, such as security, free
participation in the political process, and a variety of social services, is the key measure
of state strength. The works also stress that the inability to provide these essential public
89 Richard E. Rubenstein, "The Noncauses of Modern Terrorism," in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., ed.
International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, and Controls (New York: St. Martin's 1990): 130.
90 In "Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators," Robert I. Rotberg uses the
ability of states to provide public goods to people living with their borders as the measure of strength and
failure. According to Rotberg, failed states are states that are characterized by enduring violence since they
fail to provide the most important public good - physical security. Robert I. Rotberg, "Failed States,
Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators," in Robert I. Rotberg, ed., State Failure and State
Weakness in a Time of Terror (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003): 1-25. I. William
Zartman uses a similar definition of state failure: "Collapse means that the basic functions of the state are
no longer performed." I. William Zartman, "Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse," in I.
William Zartman, ed. Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995): 3. Rotberg distinguishes between failed and collapse states,
collapse being "a rare and extreme version of a failed state" where "political goods are obtained through
private or ad hoc means" (Rotberg, 2003): 9.In addition to the above, see also Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, "Saving Failed States,"
Foreign Policy, (89), Winter 1992-93: 3-20.
goods to citizens creates an opportunity for belligerent actors to take on such a role.
Moreover, this literature contends that state failure strengthens lawlessness, manifested
among others in arms and drug trafficking.
Similarly, in his landmark study, Robert Putnam explores the relationship
between organized crime and society, noting that civil society failed to develop in
southern Italy where four organized crime groups are present.92 Louise Shelley contends
that weak states have poorly formed civil society, which leads to a lack of trust in the
state and dependence on surrogate actors, such as organized crime groups, to provide
protection to resolve the lack of trust in society. 93 She argues that taking advantage of
globalization, transnational crime groups have coopted or displaced the state to the point
of establishing a nonstate form of authoritarianism. 94
My dissertation illuminates how elites in failing states can speed up the collapse
of their rule by attempting to suppress the illicit economy on which the local populations
are dependent. It also reveals how nonstate belligerent actors can enhance their own
legitimacy by providing an alternative source of essential public goods through exploiting
the illicit economy, thus further weakening government. Finally, the dissertation shows
which government responses toward the illicit economy strengthen the state and limit
violence, and which policies, paradoxically, hasten state failure.
92 Robert Putnam, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaela Nanetti, Making Democracy Work (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1993).
93 Louise Shelley, "Mafia and the Italian State: The Historical Routes of the Current Crisis," Sociological
Forum, 9 (4), 1994: 661-672. See also, Raimondo Catanzaro, Men ofRespect: A Social History of the
Sicilian Mafia (New York: The Free Press, 1992).
94 Louise I. Shelley, "Transnational Organized Crime: The New Authoritarianism," in H. Richard Friman
and Peter Andreas, eds., The Illicit Global Economy and State Power (Lantham: Rowman and Littlefield
Publishers, 1999): 25-52.
V. Conclusions
The literatures analyzed in this chapter included both the works that underlie the
conventional wisdom about narcoterrorism and narcoinsurgency and those that underlie
my theory. In addition to specific literature on narcoterrorism, studies of terrorist
financing, greed-driven conflict, and various works on transnational crime provide the
theoretical underpinning of the conventional view. The standard wisdom is also
consistent with the assumptions, views, and arguments presented in the dominant French
approach to counterinsurgency, its U.S. equivalent, the coercion school of COIN, and the
eradication approach to counterterrorism. What these works have in common is a desire
to limit the physical resources of belligerents by cutting them off from the population and
material supplies, by force if necessary. The desire to win the hearts and minds of the
population is either irrelevant, or a lost cause, or potentially counterproductive.
Moreover, as belligerents and criminals draw material support from similar sources, they
need to be fought jointly.
My theory, the political capital of illicit economies, draws from rich and diverse
critical analyses of counternarcotics policies and analyses of transnational crime that
diverge from those informing the conventional view. My theory also builds upon the
British approach to counterinsurgency and its U.S. equivalent, known as "hearts and
minds," the literature on peasant protests, and the legitimacy school of counterterrorism.
This literature resolves the tension between the desire to win the hearts and minds of the
population and the desire to cut them off from resources in the opposite way that the
literatures underlying the conventional view. It argues that the need to increase the
legitimacy of the government and the need to deprive the belligerents of legitimacy with
the local populations are the key defeating the belligerents. This literature also
emphasizes the fragility of the alliance between criminals and belligerents.
The following chapter lays out the theoretical framework of the dissertation. It
presents the conventional view of narcoterrorism and narcoguerrilla and contrasts it with
my theory of political capital of illicit economies. It also presents the methods and cases
used to test the validity of the two competing theories.

CHAPTER III - The Theoretical Framework and Methodology
I. Introduction
This chapter provides the questions, theoretical framework, and methods used in
this study on the links between illicit economies and military conflicts. Although
narcotics trafficking is often treated as sui generis, the drug trade is situated here within
the larger class of markets for illicit products and services. The study investigates when
and how access by belligerents to the production and trafficking of illicit commodities
affects the strength of belligerents and governments:
* Through what processes does access to illicit economies affect the strength of
belligerent groups?
* What conditions influence the size and scope of the benefits (and costs)
belligerent groups derive (and incur) from their interaction will illicit economies?
* How do governmental policies toward the illicit economies affect the strength
of belligerents and, ultimately, limit, contain, or exacerbate military conflicts?
The forms of military conflict examined range from civil war, insurgency, terrorism, and
occupation to warlordism.
The chapter presents a general theory of the relationship between illicit markets
and military conflict --political capital of illicit economies -- and contrasts it with
conventional wisdom on connections between drug trafficking and military conflict. To
set up the balance of this study, the chapter then compares observable implications of the
theory and several conventional alternatives and describes the methods and case studies
used.
The study specifically focuses on illicit markets, not markets and resources in
general. As distinct from licit markets, illicit markets have several crucial characteristics:
they raise profits to very high levels; governments and legitimate businesses cannot
openly participate in them, and hence outside-the-law actors, such as belligerent groups,
can capture a large market share of the illicit economy. Crucially, government frequently
feel obliged to destroy the illicit economy, thus allowing the belligerents to offer
themselves as its protectors and obtain support from the local population that depends on
the illicit economy.
The conventional narcoterrorism view agues that belligerents derive large
financial profits from their participation in the illicit economy. These profits increase
their military capabilities and allow them to escalate and prolong conflict. Consequently,
the government needs to eliminate the illicit economy in order to cut off the belligerents'
resources and limit conflict. The eradication of the illicit economy will result in critical
reduction of the belligerents' capabilities. A corollary proposition is that belligerents and
criminals can no longer be distinguished from each other and need to be fought as a joint
enemy.
My theory, the political capital of illicit economies, argues that belligerents derive
much more than simply large financial profits from their sponsorship of illicit economies.
They also obtain freedom of action and, crucially, legitimacy and support from the local
population -- what I call political capital. If belligerents choose to become negatively
involved in the illicit economy (attempt to destroy it), they not only fail to increase their
military capability, but also suffer costs in terms of political capital. The extent and scope
of belligerents' gains/ losses from their involvement in the illicit economy depend on four
factors: the state of the overall economy; the character of the illicit economy; the
presence of thuggish traffickers; and the government response to the illicit economy.
These factors reflect both structural conditions outside of the immediate control of the
belligerents and the government and strategic policy choices available to either the
belligerents or the government.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom about narcotics and military conflict, my
theory predicts that eradication of narcotics cultivation will have dubious effects on the
capabilities of the belligerents and is extremely unlikely to severely weaken them.
However, it will alienate the local population from the government and result in the
population's unwillingness to provide intelligence on the belligerents - a crucial
requirement for success against the belligerents. Thus, eradication of illicit crops
increases the political capital of the belligerents without significantly weakening their
military capabilities.
II. The Debate: The Conventional Narcoterrorism View versus the Political Capital
of Illicit Economies
II.A. The Conventional Narcoterrorism/Narcoinsurgency View
Widely accepted by both government officials and academic scholars alike, the
standard understanding of the relationship between illicit economies and military conflict
assumes that belligerent groups derive large financial profits from illicit economies;
hence the belligerents are best defeated by eradicating the illicit economy. With large
financial profits from the drug trade, terrorists, warlords, and insurgents buy weapons and
hence expand conflict, while the government's relative capabilities vis-i-vis the
belligerents shrink.'
The diagram below illustrates the posited relationship.
Diagram 1:
Belligerents' Exploitation Belligerents' Strength: T
of the Illicit Economy money, weapons, manpower
Moreover, the conventional view frequently maintains that whether or not the
belligerent groups ever had any ideological goals, once they interact with the illicit
economy, they lose all but pecuniary motivations. Profiting immensely from the illicit
economy, they have no interest to achieve a negotiated settlement with the government. 2
Thus, the appropriate government strategy for defeating the belligerents is to eradicate
the illicit economy.
The conventional view assumes that if the government eradicates the illicit
economy - sprays the coca fields, burns down the poppy - the resources of the insurgents
and the warlords will dry up. The belligerent groups will go bankrupt and will be
significantly weakened if not altogether defeated. One analyst succinctly captured the
essence of the conventional view when he argued: "we have more of a chance of winning
the war on terrorism by winning the war against drugs because it's, to a large degree,
'James Adams, The Financing of Terror (London: New English Library, 1986); Rachel Ehrenfeld, How
Terrorism Is Financed and How to Stop It (Chicago: Bonus Books, 2005); Douglas J. Davids, Narco-
terrorism (Ardsley: Transnational Publishers, 2002); Rand Beers, Assistant Secretary for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, "Narco-Terror: The Worldwide Connection Between Drugs and
Terrorism," a hearing before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Technology,
Terrorism, and Government Information," March 13, 2002; http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfin?id=196.
2 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "On the Economic Causes of War," Oxford Economic Papers, 50 (4),
October 1998: 563-573; Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars," October 21,
2001, http://econ.worldbank.org/files/12205_greedgrievance_23oct.pdf, downloaded May 18, 2003;
drug funding today that funds the terrorist organizations, and the terrorist organizations
cannot operate in today's world without funding."3 An additional claimed benefit of
eradication is that with these drugs no longer entering the global trade, consumption will
fall dramatically in consumer countries, such as the United States.
The diagram below illustrates the posited effect of eradication.
Diagram 2:
Belligerents' Exploitation , Belligerents' Strength: I
of the Illicit Economy money, weapons, manpower
Government Eradication of
Illicit Economy
The conventional view also holds that the interaction of belligerents with the
illicit economy transforms their identities and goals to such an extent that they are no
longer distinguishable from pure criminals. Since they both operate in a global
deregulated environment, it makes no sense to treat the terrorist groups and trafficking
criminal organizations as two separate and distinct phenomena. The new danger
threatening security and the quality of life in many countries is the specter of
narcoterrorism. 4 Some analysts of this persuasion see a "gray area where the two actors
3 Raphael Perl, "Remarks at Target America: Traffickers, Terrorists, and Your Kids," A National
Symposium on Narcoterrorism, Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Department of Justice, December
4, 2001 (Washington, DC: Miller Reporting, Co., Inc: 2001).
4 See, for example, Larry Johnson, "Remarks at Target America: Traffickers, Terrorists, and Your Kids," A
National Symposium on Narcoterrorism, Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Department of Justice,
December 4, 2001 (Washington, DC: Miller Reporting, Co., Inc: 2001).
are indistinguishable from one another."5 Included in this gray area are: traditional
criminal organizations that use terror tactics to eliminate their opponents; terrorist groups
who initially use criminal activities as a source of financing, but subsequently lose their
ideological beliefs and become motivated solely by financial profits; and finally civil war
factions who lose their ideological goals and become motivated solely by profit. Other
analysts contend that the belligerent groups form alliances with criminal organizations
and frequently merge with them.
Despite some variations, the prevailing conventional view is one of a new
conglomerate actor that has emerged out of two once separates types of actors,
belligerents and criminals, with virtually identical and unified set of goals and interests.
Consequently, the conventional view argues that the formerly separate actors need to be
fought jointly - i.e., the belligerent groups cannot be defeated in the absence of
eliminating the criminal organizations with whom they have merged and/or the illicit
economies from which they profit.6 Aggressive law enforcement against the criminals
and the illicit economy will undermine the alliance between the traffickers and the
belligerents and turn them against each other.7
The following section presents an alternative view of the nexus between illicit
economies and military conflict and explains dynamics ignored by the conventional view.
5 Tamara Makarenko, "Crime, Terror and the Central Asian Drug Trade," Harvard Asia Quarterly, 6 (3),
Summer 2002, http://www.asiaquarterly.com/content/view/l21/40/.
6 Rollie Lal, "South Asian Organized Crime and Terrorist Networks, " Orbis, 49 (2), Spring 2005: 293-304;
and Louise I. Shelley, "The Nexus of Organized International Criminals and Terrorism," International
Annals of Criminology, 1 (2), 2002: 85-93.
7 M6nica Serrano and Maria Celia Toro, "From Drug Trafficking to Transnational Organized Crime in
Latin America," in Transnational Organized Crime and International Security: Business as Usual? Mats
Berdal and Monica Serrano, eds. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002): 141-154.
II.B. The Political Capital of Illicit Economies
Belligerent groups exploiting illicit economies do in fact derive large financial
benefits from the illicit economies, and hence increase their strength. However, they
obtain much more than simply financial profits, and the increase in the strength is much
larger and more multifaceted than assumed in the conventional view. Their ability to
derive benefits from illicit economies is not uniform and is crucially influenced by the
character of the illicit economy as well as government policies. The conventional
narcoterrorism view fails to ascertain the factors that influence the size and scope of the
increase in the strength of the belligerent group, and it also mispecifies the mechanisms
and the dependent variable. The inadequate specification of the factors and causal
mechanisms and the effects thus produce policies counterproductive to the defeat of the
belligerent groups and conflict limitation.
My theory of political capital of illicit economies describes the strategic
interactions between belligerents, traffickers, the population, and the government in the
context of illicit economies. It explains how belligerents' involvement with the illicit
economy affects the strength of belligerents. It specifies a set of factors that affect the
size and scope of the gains belligerents derive from the illicit economy and that permit
them to act as protostates. I do not assume any particular motivation on the part of the
actors, beyond the elemental goals of the government to suppress the violent opposition,g
of the belligerents not to be defeated, and of the traffickers to profit from the illicit
economy. I offer a set of general rules that causally relate structural and policy variables
to outcomes.
' I am thus assuming that the local government is not only motivated to suppress the illicit economy (if at
all), but is also and primarily interested in eliminating the violent opposition.
II.B. 1. Synopsis of MY Theory
My theory, the political capital of illicit economies, holds that belligerents'
involvement in illicit economies affects the strength of belligerents, in both its military
and political components. The type of involvement, in other words the values the variable
can take on, can be positive involvement, negative involvement, and no involvement.
Positive involvement9 means that the belligerents sponsor the illicit economy. This
sponsorship includes simple protection of the illicit economy against other actors who are
attempting to destroy it as well as direct forms of belligerents' participation in the illicit
economy, such as direct trafficking. Negative involvement means efforts by the
belligerent group to destroy the illicit economy, such as prohibition or eradication. Non-
involvement, or neutrality, means that the belligerent group has a laissez-faire policy
toward the illicit economy. It does not sponsor in any way, including not providing
protection to the illicit economy, nor does it attempt to destroy the illicit economy.
The dependent variable "strength of belligerents" comprises two main
components: I. military capabilities and II. political capital, each of which comprises two
further subcomponents. The subcomponents of belligerents' military capabilities are: IA)
physical resources (money, weapons, and numbers of belligerents) and IB) freedom of
action (the ability to optimize tactics with strategy and the available scope of tactical and
strategic options). The subcomponents of political capital are: IIA) legitimacy (perception
in the population that the actions of the belligerents are beneficial to the population and
9 By using the terms positive and negative involvement, I am not making any judgment regarding the moral
desirability or policy appropriateness of the behavior. I only use the terms as descriptors of whether the
belligerents are embracing and exploiting the illicit economy or attempting to destroy it.
thus justified) and IIB) support from the population, crucially manifested in a willingness
to deny intelligence on belligerents to the government.'0
Belligerents' positive involvement in the illicit economy increases the strength of
belligerents. In fact, it increases all four elements of strength: physical resources, freedom
of action, legitimacy, and support. Belligerents' negative involvement in the illicit
economy decreases the strength of belligerents along these dimensions. Non-involvement
in the illicit economy on the part of the belligerents leaves their strength unaffected.
I recognize that the involvement (or non-involvement) by belligerents in illicit
economies is not the sole source of their strength or weakness. There are, to be sure, other
factors that affect the strength of belligerents, but this study is solely concerned with the
effects of illicit economies on the strength of belligerents and conflict dynamics.
Diagram I below illustrates the overarching posited relationship between belligerents'
access to illicit economies and the strength of belligerents:
Diagram 3:
Belligerents' Involvement
in Illicit Economy
'0 I recognize that there are interaction effects among the various components of strength. Greater political
capital derived from positive involvement in the illicit economy, with a larger segment of the population
more intensely supporting the belligerents, will of course also further increase the belligerents' freedom of
action since the belligerents need not fear that the population will provide intelligence on them to the
government. Similarly, greater military capabilities allow belligerents to protect a larger area of the illicit
economy and to protect it more effectively, thus further increasing their political capital.
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The magnitude and scope of the increase in strength of the belligerents resulting
from their positive involvement in the illicit economy frequently allow the belligerent
group to become entrenched. The group becomes difficult to defeat and gains the
potential to expand conflict. Exploitation of illicit economies thus vastly increases the
staying power of belligerent groups.
Four factors crucially influence the extent and scope of the change in belligerents'
strength as a result of their involvement in the illicit economy. These factors apply both
to belligerents' increase in strength resulting from their positive involvement in the illicit
economy, as well as to the decrease in their strength resulting from their negative
involvement inthe illicit economy. These factors are: a) the state of the overall economy
in the region; b) character of the illicit economy; c) the presence of thuggish traffickers;
and d) government response to the illicit economy. These factors function as amplifiers of
the overarching causal relationship, i.e. they determine the magnitude of increase (or
decrease) in the strength of belligerents. These factors are not on-and-off switches: the
posited relationship will take place no matter what value the factors take on, even though
under certain combinations of the factors, the increase or decrease in strength will be very
small.
The analysis below briefly describes the effect of each factor on the strength of
the belligerents. However, the total magnitude of the change in the strength of the
belligerents is the result of the interactive effects of the four factors, i.e. of the particular
combinations of the values the factors take on. The subsequent elaboration of the theory
will indicate what particular combinations of the values of these factors result in smaller
or greater changes in belligerents' strength.
The state of the overall economy in the region is a structural condition outside of
the immediate control of the government or the belligerents. It captures the level of
poverty in the region, the availability of alternative means of subsistence for the
population outside of the illicit economy, and the extent to which the local population is
dependent on the illicit economy for basic survival. If the economy is poor, a large
segment of the population is vitally dependent on the illicit economy, and hence the
belligerents derive large political capital from their sponsorship of the illicit economy. If
the economy is rich, the population has plentiful alternative means of subsistence, and the
belligerents derive only small political capital. Conversely, if the overall economy is poor
and belligerents attempt to destroy the illicit economy, they lose large political capital.
The second factor, the character of the illicit economy, indicates the extent to
which the illicit economy is or is not labor-intensive. This factor thus captures the extent
to which the illicit economy generates reliable livelihood for the local population. If the
illicit economy is labor-intensive, it satisfies the livelihood needs of a large segment of
the population, and hence generates large political capital for the belligerents. If the illicit
economy is not labor-intensive, it provides livelihood for only a small segment of the
population, and hence generates only small political capital for the belligerents.
Conversely, if the belligerents attempt to destroy a labor-intensive illicit economy, they
suffer large loses of political capital, while their negative involvement in labor-non-
intensive illicit economies will generate only small loses of political capital.
This factor is one over which the belligerents have a degree of control. Although
they cannot dictate whether a particular illicit economy is labor-intensive or not (a
structural condition), they can and will choose whether or not to participate in a particular
illicit economy. Thus, in deciding whether to sponsor (or destroy) a labor-intensive or a
labor-non-intensive illicit economy, the belligerents have some influence over the
political capital they will obtain.
The third factor, the presence of thuggish traffickers, influences the extent to
which the local population needs the protection of the belligerents against the traffickers.
If thuggish traffickers are present, belligerents can protect the population against the
abusive traffickers and thus increase their political capital. If thuggish traffickers are
absent, belligerents cannot function as an agent improving the conditions of the peasants,
and hence their political capital is relatively smaller. Similarly, if traffickers are present,
but are not thuggish, that is, they care about the peasants' well-being, do not abuse them,
and pay large compensation to the peasants, the belligerents cannot perform the
regulatory role and their political capital is relatively smaller.
Traffickers' presence or absence also partially influences the size of the
belligerents' financial benefits. If traffickers are absent, the belligerents take over the
lucrative role of the traffickers. If the belligerents perform the trafficking function well,
their financial profits increase substantially. If belligerents fail to perform the trafficking
tasks well, the illicit economy in the region could substantially decrease, and hence the
belligerents' financial profits will substantially plummet also.
Belligerents thus face a strategic choice of whether or not to eliminate the
traffickers from the regional illicit economy. This strategic choice involves a tradeoff
between the belligerents' political capital and financial profits. The elimination of
traffickers and the belligerents' subsequent takeover of the trafficking function may
increase the belligerents' financial profits, but will relatively decrease their political
capital because, obviously, they cannot provide regulatory services against themselves.
The fourth factor, government response to the illicit economy, represents a
strategic choice for the government. Actions by the government, both in deciding whether
an economy is licit or illicit and in adopting a particular policy toward the illicit
economy, determine how crucial a role the belligerent group plays in the illicit economy.
In other words, the government response to the illicit economy influences how critically
dependent the two other main actors in the illicit economy - the overall population and
the traffickers - are on the belligerent group for the preservation of the illicit economy.
Government actions thus increase or decrease the demand for belligerents' services to the
illicit economy and the value belligerents' services have for the population and the
traffickers.
If the government engages in suppression policies that threaten the illicit economy
(such as eradication), both the population and the traffickers become more dependent on
the belligerents for the preservation and protection of the illicit economy, and thus the
belligerents' political capital increases. Meanwhile, suppression policies have only
limited effects on the physical resources of the belligerents since in the absence of
reduction in demand for the illicit commodity (an exogenous variable), the belligerents
(and the traffickers and the population) can adapt in a variety of ways to counteract the
impact of the suppression policies.
If the government response to the illicit economy is one of laissez-faire or
legalization (tacit acquiescence, licensing, or full legalization), the traffickers' and
population's need for the belligerents' services decreases, and hence the political capital
of the belligerents is reduced.
The diagram below illustrates the posited influence of the factors described above
on the increase in the belligerents' strength. The specified factors (in the ovals) are
variable amplifiers of the effects of access by belligerents to the illicit economy.
Diagram 4:
The theory underlying the conventional wisdom is thus a small subset of my more
comprehensive theory. The difference between the conventional view and my theory is
analogous to the difference between the French school of counterinsurgency (and its U.S.
equivalent, the coercion school) and the British school of counterinsurgency and hearts
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and minds approach. The conventional view advocates policies that the government
hopes will eliminate the physical resources of the belligerents regardless of their impact
on the belligerents' political capital. My theory stresses the importance of the political
capital of the belligerents and implies a set of policies that take into account the effects on
the political capital of the belligerents.
The following section elaborates the posited effects of the variables of my
political capital of illicit economies theory and explains the mechanisms through which
the posited effects take place. Because the increase of belligerents' strength resulting
from their positive involvement in the illicit economy and ways to mitigate against it are
much more germane for policy (as well as more frequent than the belligerents'
undermining of their own power by attempting to destroy the illicit economy), the
subsequent analysis will focus mainly on belligerents' positive involvement and resulting
increases in belligerents' strength. I will first describe the effects of belligerents'
involvement in the illicit economy on the various components of the dependent variable,
strength of belligerents. Second, I will describe in detail the effect of the factors that
influence the size and scope of the posited change in strength.
II.B.2. Detailed Discussion of Strength of Belligerents Resulting from Their
Positive Involvement in the Illicit Economy
I. Military Capabilities
A. Physical Resources: Money, Weapons, and Numbers of Belligerents
The most obvious benefit belligerent groups derive from their positive
involvement in illicit economies, and the one that receives almost the entire attention of
policymakers and scholars, is indeed financial profits. The size of belligerents' financial
benefits from illicit economies is frequently in the tens to hundreds of millions of dollars
per year per group. The actual magnitude of the belligerents' financial profits depends on
the extent of their involvement with the illicit economy, the availability of competitors
for the provision of the belligerents' services to that economy, and international market
prices for the illicit commodities. International market prices for illicit commodities are a
function of the international demand for the commodity and their illicitness. I take the
existence of the international demand for the commodity as an exogenous variable. Given
the existence of this demand, the illicitness of the production of the commodity then
raises prices for the commodity to very high levels, and individuals or groups
participating in the production or trade with the illicit commodity can reap very high
profits. These profits increase as such actors participate further downstream from source-
country production and closer to demand-country distribution.
The extent of the belligerents' financial profits grows as they become more deeply
involved in various aspects of the illicit economy. Thus, in the case of drugs, their
financial profits grow as they move from simply taxing the producers (peasants) of the
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illicit substances, to providing protection and safe airstrips to the traffickers, to taxing
precursor agents, to getting involved with money exchange and laundering.
The greater the number of other actors in the conflict capable of providing the
services provided by the belligerents -- for example, the greater the number of belligerent
groups the traffickers can hire to provide protection -- the smaller the financial profits of
any one group. However, even in circumstances were several large belligerent groups
participate in the same illicit economy, each group can still make tens if not hundreds of
millions of dollars a year.
These profits are used to improve the belligerents' military capabilities by
facilitating procurement, including that of heavy weapons, planes, and helicopters;
allowing for greater salaries to be paid to soldiers; and improving logistics. The promise
of substantial salaries can also facilitate recruitment, and thus increase the number of
active belligerents. Such a recruitment process will likely be facilitated if the population
that represents the recruiting pool for the belligerents lives in dire economic conditions
with few survival alternatives. However, many other factors obviously also influence the
decision of individuals whether or not the risk their lives fighting the government
alongside the belligerent group, such as the ideology and brutality of the belligerents and
fear of retribution from belligerents, governments, and the community.
B. Freedom of Action
The facilitation of procurement and logistics by access to illicit economies allows
the belligerents to optimize their tactics and strategies for achieving their larger goals.
This freedom of action is a crucial component of military capabilities ignored by the
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conventional view. Prior to solving the procurement and logistics problems by accessing
the illicit economy, belligerent groups, for example, need to spend a lot of time attacking
isolated military outposts and police stations to obtain basic small arms and ammunition
and robbing banks and farms to obtain finances and food. Such activities are obviously
very time-consuming, deplete a lot of the energy of belligerent groups, divert them from
attacking more strategic targets with a greater political and military impact, and expose
them to dangers of potentially devastating detection and physical destruction in low-
impact operations. However, despite the small benefits and potentially large costs of
undertaking such activities, in the absence of a rich sponsor or access to an illicit
economy, belligerent groups will frequently have no choice but to undertake such
activities to obtain the essential money, food, and weapons.
Once belligerent groups solve their procurement and logistics problems by
tapping into the drug trade (or other illicit economies), they can choose to attack high-
impact, high-visibility targets that are more consistent with their grand strategy. Instead
of robbing farms, the belligerents, now better equipped and less taxed by mundane
activities, can take on larger military units or attack high-impact, high-visibility civilian
targets that do not bring them immediate material benefits, such as shopping malls. Or
they can continue with hit and run tactics against small military units, but without the
constant worry about supplies and without time-consuming activities such as attacking
military depots. Positive involvement in the illicit economy also allows belligerents to
build up their own weapons depots and stockpiles. Successful exploitation of illicit
economies thus greatly expands the array of tactics that belligerents have at their disposal
-- in other words, it increases their freedom of action. Access to the illicit economy that
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solves their procurement and logistics problems thus greatly speeds up the time it takes
for belligerents to transform themselves from a ragtag band of insurgents, hiding in caves
and trying to make Molotov cocktails, into a formidable force. Whether or not the
specific actions belligerents undertake are ultimately effective in attaining their goals is
less significant for the purposes of the analysis than the fact that successful exploitation
of illicit economies greatly expands the menu of tactical and strategic options available to
belligerent groups.
Participation in the illicit economy can also potentially limit the mobility and
freedom of action of belligerents if the belligerent group needs to defend the illicit
economy from governmental actions. The ability of the belligerent group to retreat from a
drug-cultivation territory, for example, can be compromised by the group's perceived
need to defend the coca fields from governmental spraying planes, in order to satisfy the
demands of the local population participating in the illicit economy. However, the
constraint on the ability to retreat is a matter of choice for the belligerent group, not a
matter of necessity. To the extent that the group does not retreat in order to protect the
fields, it does so because it chooses such a strategy, not because it does not have the
capacity to adopt another strategy. However, prior to solving their procurement and
logistics problems through the positive involvement in the illicit economy, belligerent
groups frequently are physically incapable of attacking certain targets, undertaking
certain operations, and adopting certain strategies. In this case, the constriction of tactical
and strategic options is driven by necessity, not by choice.
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II. Political Capital - The Centerpiece of My Theory
Most importantly, belligerents derive significant political capital from their
involvement with the drug economy - that is, IIA) political legitimacy and IIB) support
from the population. As defined earlier, legitimacy is the perception in the population that
the actions of the belligerents are beneficial to the population and thus justified. Support
from the population includes voluntary provision of supplies, shelter, and intelligence to
the belligerents. 1" One crucial manifestation of support is the willingness of the
population to deny intelligence on belligerents to the government.
Belligerents obtain this political capital by protecting the local population's
reliable and relatively lucrative source of livelihood (i.e. the illicit economy) from the
efforts of the government to repress the illicit economy. They also protect the peasants
from brutal and unreliable traffickers who frequently pay the local population for their
illicit products at one corner, but then rob them at another, and who frequently kill the
farmers who fail to deliver a promised amount of the illicit commodity even if this failure
resulted from government eradication program. Belligerents also bargain with traffickers
for better prices on behalf on the peasants. Similarly, if there are several belligerent
groups involved in the illicit economy, belligerents from one group protect the illicit
economy against other belligerents who seek to destroy the illicit economy or who are
less protective of the peasants' interests and more protective of the traffickers' interests.
In addition, with the large financial profits from illicit economies, belligerent
groups provide otherwise absent social services such as clinics and transportation
11 Similar to Roger Petersen, for example, I assume that the levels of cooperation from the local population
cover a spectrum of involvement, and the choice for the local population is much more varied than simply
to "rebel" or "not rebel." See, Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001): 8.
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infrastructure to the local population. Moreover, the belligerents no longer need to
sacrifice their political capital by extorting food and supplies from the local population as
they frequently do to solving their logistics and procurement problems. Finally, where a
foreign power also threatens the illicit economy, belligerent groups obtain nationalist
credit for serving as protectors and sponsors of the illicit economy. In short, belligerents
function as security providers and economic and political regulators. Successful positive
involvement in the illicit economy thus allows belligerents to act as protostates.
How many of the security and regulation functions belligerents actually provide is
determined both by factors partially outside the control of the belligerents, such as the
factor presence or absence of traffickers discussed in detail below, and partially by the
belligerents' choices and policies. A positive involvement with the illicit economy entails
at minimum the protection of the illicit economy against the government - in of itself an
initial choice on the part of the belligerents. Belligerents' provision of additional
regulatory and protection services results from their explicit choices or implicitly from
their behavior.
The difference in motivation of individuals seeking profit simply for its own sake
and those seeking profit to advance their political goals may well have implications for
the level of political capital belligerent groups can derive from their participation in the
illicit economy. For example, groups motivated purely by desire for economic profit may
not provide social services to the population and hence may derive smaller political
capital from the illicit economy than politically-motivated groups that also provide social
services.
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The political capital garnered from the belligerents' positive involvement in the
illicit economy is frequently thin, but nevertheless sufficient to induce the local
population to withhold intelligence on the belligerents from the government in areas
where the government attempts to suppress the illicit economy and the belligerents
sponsor it. The acquisition of good local intelligence is a key ingredient of success in
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations against elusive belligerents. Not only
does suppression of the illicit economy compromise the government's ability to acquire
intelligence, it may well motivate the population to provide intelligence on government
units to belligerents in order to facilitate the belligerents' protection of the illicit
economy. If government actions against the illicit economy are especially threatening to
the population's interest in preserving the illicit economy, the population may even
engage in riots and military actions on behalf of the belligerents and against the
government. Similarly, if one belligerent group provides protection against the negative
involvement in the illicit economy by another belligerent group, the population is
motivated to provide intelligence, and possibly direct military action, for the sponsoring
group and against the belligerent group that threatens the illicit economy.
Table I summarizes the processes by which belligerent groups derive political
capital from illicit economies, showing the benefits they deliver to the population, and the
payoffs they obtain from the population.
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Table I: Benefits Belligerents and Local Population Obtain from Each Other
What the Belligerents Provide to the Local Population
* Reliable source of livelihood
* Security from government
* Security from traffickers
* Better prices from traffickers
* Security from other belligerent groups
* Otherwise absent social services
What the Local Population Provides to the Belligerents
* Denial of intelligence on belligerents to government units
* Provision of intelligence on government units to belligerents
* Denial of intelligence on belligerents to opposing belligerent groups
* Provision of intelligence on opposing belligerent groups to belligerents
* Shelter, supplies, safe-houses
* Riots and military action on behalf of the belligerents and against the
government
* Military action against opposing belligerent groups
Belligerents' legitimacy and support from the population also vary on the basis of
their ideology, their ethnicity, and their use or nonuse of brutality. But a crucial
component of their political capital is their ability to feed the population by protecting the
illicit economy and to deliver many otherwise absent physical goods. Sponsorship of the
illicit economy thereby allows them to demonstrate potency and expose the relative
unwillingness or inability of the government to provide for the population's needs.
Moreover, when other sources of legitimacy wane over time - for example, the appeal of
the belligerent's ideology declines -or when the belligerents' own brutality toward the
population erodes their local popularity, the political capital that comes from their
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sponsorship of the illicit economy may be sufficient to motivate the population to
continue keeping intelligence on the belligerents from the government.
To be sure, the belligerent and government responses to the illicit economy are
not the sole determinants of the willingness of the population to provide intelligence on
the belligerents. The government's ability to protect the population from reprisals by
belligerents can encourage intelligence provision. Also, levels of popular support
correlate with expectations of who will win the conflict and be able to dispense
punishments and rewards for previous defection and cooperation. 12 When deciding
whether to cooperate with the government against the belligerents by providing
intelligence, informers balance the risk to their survival from insurgent reprisals against
the risk to the survival of their livelihood from government suppression of the illicit
economy. However, the alienation due to government destruction of the illicit economy is
frequently large enough to discourage the population from cooperating with the
government even when other factors for intelligence provision are auspicious and even
when other sources of belligerent legitimacy have disappeared.
The conventional wisdom on narcoterrorism mistakenly assumes that if
belligerent groups no longer retain an ideology and political goals that appeal to the
population, they become completely illegitimate and lose support from the population.
This loss of ideology is supposed to take place especially when belligerent groups
12 See, for example, Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006), forthcoming; Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (London:
Chatto & Windus, 1966); Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., Rebellion and Authority: An Analytical
Essay on Insurgent Conflicts (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970); Orrin DeForest and David
Chanoff, The Rise and Bitter Fall ofAmerican Intelligence in Vietnam (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1990); and Robert W. Komer, "The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful
Counterinsurgency Effort," RAND Report, R-957-ARPA, February 1972,
http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2005/R957.pdf; and Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare (London: Pall
Mall Press, 1964).
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become involved with the illicit economy, and, as alleged by the conventional wisdom,
are consequently corrupted and become motivated solely by a desire for financial profits.
The conventional view maintains that at this point the destruction of the illicit economy
by the government has no impact on legitimacy of the belligerents and the support the
population provides to the belligerents. This view mistakenly assumes a very limited,
singular source of political capital (legitimacy and support), based essentially on
ideology.
My theory argues that positive involvement in illicit economies generates political
capital for belligerents even when the group's ideology (or its lack of) is unappealing to
the belligerents. My theory here is informed by work conducted in criminology. Even
criminal, purely nonideological, illegal organizations can have a certain degree of
political capital as long as they provide economic subsistence (or physical security) to the
population in a more effective way than alternative claimants to power. 13 In his classic
study of the Sicilian Mafia, Diego Gambetta demonstrates how, because of the
inefficiency, corruption, and absence of the state, the local population in fact welcomes
the presence of the Mafia. He asks the following two questions: What do the Mafiosi
offer and what are the prerequisites for them to remain successful in their business?' 4 He
argues that the key activity of the Mafia does not lie in the provision of illegal goods,
" The literature on organized crime typically assumes that criminal organizations serve one or more of the
following functions: economic - the generation of material profit; social - establishment of contacts and
promotion of social solidarity; and quasi-governmental - regulating the economic activity not only of their
members, but also of other illegal economic competitors within their sphere of influence by establishing
and enforcing rules of conduct. See, Klaus von Lampe, "Criminally Exploitable Ties: A Network Approach
to Organized Crime," in Emilio C. Viano, Jose Magallanes, and Laurent Bridel, eds., Transnational
Organized Crime: Myth, Power, and Profit (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2003); and Annelise
Graebner Anderson, The Business of Organized Crime: A Cosa Nostra Family (Stanford: Hoover
Institution Press, 1979). However, like politically-motivated belligerent actors, criminal organizations can
also regulate the organization of the larger society, establish rules and enforce them, be they related to an
illicit or licit economy.
"~ Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1993).
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such as drugs, which constitute only a peripheral activity for the Mafia, but in their
provision of protection. In poorly administered regions, such as Sicily, the threat of
untrustworthy and dangerous business competitors, corrupt government officials, as well
as thieves and robbers is so acute that the residents of these regions require protection.
Gambetta's main claim is that "the main market for mafia services is to be found in
unstable transactions in which trust is scarce and fragile," and implicitly describes a level
of legitimacy the Mafiosi acquire by providing guarantees and protection.1 5 Even though
these services are illegal and inherently dependent on the use of violence, they are
frequently welcomed by the residents. In fact, many consider them "extra legal" rather
than illegal. Facing uninterested and inefficient, if not outright corrupt, law enforcement,
many citizens feel they are better off having their physical protection and the protection
of their businesses, including legal businesses, assured by a well-known "man of honor."
The relationship that Gambetta describes is one of legitimacy, thin perhaps, but
legitimacy nonetheless, that goes beyond the initial trust between the Mafiosi who are
selling their services and the buyers. The deeper legitimacy comes from the mafia's
repeated and reliable service as an economic regulator and enabler.
Similarly, Fiorentini and Peltzman show that once the monopoly of coercion has
been acquired by a criminal organization in a particular locale, the latter can perform
" Ibid.: 17. Other scholars of organized crime also accept that "one main economic effect of criminal
organization derives from their role as alternative providers of public services, especially as alternative
enforcers of property rights ... [C]ompetition between the mafia and the state as alternative providers of
public services can be either a substitute for or a supplement to political competition among different
potential ruling groups for control of the state." Herschel I. Grossman, "Rival Kleptocrats: The Mafia
versus the State," in Gianluca Fiorentini and Sam Peltzman, eds., The Economics of Organized Crime
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995): 144, 155. See also, Diego Gambetta and Peter Reuter,
"Conspiracy Among the Many: The Mafia in Legitimate Industries," in Gianluca Fiorentini and Sam
Peltzman, eds., The Economics of Organized Crime (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995): 116-
142. Gambetta and Reuter further maintain that the mafia is one of the few nongovernmental institutions
that can provide the service of regulating competition if the state is unable or unwilling to meet the demand
of entrepreneurs for profit-enhancing or risk-reducing regulation.
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inside its territory activities typically performed by the state: levying of taxes, provision
of public goods -- namely, stable property rights and arbitration, and economic regulation
of private agents, such as the introduction of entry restrictions in order to limit excessive
competition. 16 These examples from criminology are analogous to the belligerents'
regulation and protection of the illicit economy.
Moreover, sponsorship of an illicit economy, especially the drug trade, has one
distinct advantage for belligerent groups as compared to some other sources of
legitimacy. Unlike ideology (which promises frequently hard-to-deliver benefits in the
future), the sponsorship of the illicit economy allows belligerents to deliver immediate
benefits to the population. In the majority of cases, belligerents do not need to create
such an illicit economy, unlike when they promise to bring socialism to a particular
country or lift the masses out of poverty; they simply need to embrace the illicit economy
in order to deliver immediately very concrete material benefits to the population. The
belligerents thus rapidly mobilize the illicit economy in order to win hearts and minds of
the population.
II.B. 3. Factors that Influence the Magnitude of Change in Belligerents' Strength
As a Result ofBelligerents'Involvement in the Illicit Economy
To recap, four factors influence the extent of belligerents' gains from their
positive involvement in illicit economies and losses from their negative involvement in
the illicit economy:
(a) state of the overall economy of the region/country (level of poverty and
alternative means of subsistence);
16 Fiorentini and Peltzman (1995): 1-30.
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(b) character of the illicit economy (illicit crops, synthetic drugs, conflict
diamonds, trafficking);
(c) presence of thuggish traffickers; and
(d) government response to the illicit economy (legalization, licensing of
production, tacit acquiescence, interdiction, eradication). Alternative
development, now referred to as alternative livelihoods, can accompany
any of the strategies.
Factor (a) captures the extent to which local population is dependent on the illicit
economy. Factor (b) captures the extent to which the illicit economy satisfies the
demands of the local population -- in other words, the extent to which it generates
employment with viable income. And factors (c) and (d) capture the extent to which the
local population (and the traffickers) need protection to preserve the existence of the
illicit economy in their particular locale. Factor (d) describes the strategic choices for the
government regarding the illicit economy.
Factor (a): The State of the Overall Economy in a Country or Region
The state of the overall economy is a structural condition outside the control of
belligerents and, at minimum in the short run, also beyond the control of the government.
While not a binary variable, it can be simplified for the purposes of this study into two
categories: poor where there is a lack of alternative means of subsistence for the local
population, and wealthy where there are plentiful alternative means of subsistence. All
other factors being equal, positive involvement in the illicit economy brings greater
political benefits to the belligerents if the economy is poor, since the belligerents'
participation in and protection of the illicit economy is more vital for a larger segment of
the population than when the economy is rich. By protecting the illicit economy in poor
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(underdeveloped) regions, the belligerents provide and protect reliable livelihoods for a
larger segment of the population who are critically dependent on the illicit economy for
basic subsistence than they would be in rich (developed) regions. To be sure, in
developed countries too, some individuals will engage in crime because they cannot
participate in the licit economy or because they are lured by the large profits derived from
illicit economic activities, but overall the population is not dependent on the existence of
the illicit economy for basic subsistence."
Factor (b): The Character of the Illicit Economy
This factor describes the extent to which the illicit economy generates
opportunities for employment for the local population. In general, the cultivation of illicit
crops is very labor-intensive and hence allows for the employment of a much larger
segment of the population than simply the trafficking in illicit substances or the
production of synthetic drugs, both of which are not particularly labor-intensive. As the
refinement of coca and opium into cocaine and heroin advances, the process employs
fewer and fewer people at each stage. At the retail level in consumer countries, there are
again a large number of participants, though still considerably less than at the cultivation
17 The analytical difficulty with this condition - the state of the overall economy -- is that there is a
very high correlation between poverty, the existence of large-scale illicit economies, especially the
cultivation of illicit crops, and military conflict. Consequently, it is difficult to find a developed country
with a large-scale cultivation of opium poppy and marijuana, for example, and military conflict. Since the
late 1990s, significant cultivation of cannabis is emerging in various national parks in California, such as
Yosemite, pushed by Mexican traffickers and tended to by poor, illegal Latino immigrants to the United
States. However, the scale of this narcotics economy in California is much smaller than the cultivation of
coca in Colombia, for example, and it employs many fewer people. Moreover, there is no military conflict
in California.
In developed countries with active belligerency, such as Great Britain or Spain, the illicit drug
economies in which belligerent groups, such as the Real IRA or the ETA participate either involve the
production of synthetic drugs or the distribution of narcotics. These illicit economies critically differ from
the illegal economy of cultivating illicit crops since they are not labor-intensive. From an analytical
perspective then, it is hard to isolate the effects of each factor as both factor "a" (state of the overall
economy) and factor "b" (character of the overall economy) point in the same directions.
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level. Thus, protecting cultivation of illicit crops is expected to generate large political
benefits for the belligerents since this stage of the illicit economy provides livelihood for
a large number of people, frequently in the hundreds of thousands. On the other hand,
direct trafficking or protection for trafficking are considerably less labor-intensive and
generate employment for relatively few people, frequently only in low thousands.
Consequently, the political capital belligerents obtain from their positive involvement in
this type of illicit economies is considerably smaller.
That said, the political capital that belligerents derive from both simple trafficking
with illicit commodities and the production of synthetic drugs is far from negligible. Even
labor-non-intensive illicit economies create important local powerbrokers, whose
patronage brings significant political benefits to the belligerents. Moreover, the
byproducts of even a labor-non-intensive, but vibrant illicit economy are frequently the
flourishing of broader local economies from which larger segments of population benefit.
Consequently, the belligerents still obtain some political capital from positive
involvement in labor-non-intensive illicit economies, albeit considerably smaller than in
the case of labor-intensive ones.
To some extent, the belligerents have a degree of control over the character of the
illicit economy in which they are involved. Although the belligerents cannot dictate
whether an illicit economy is labor-intensive or not, they make implicit and explicit
choices about what particular aspect of and what illicit economy to become involved in.
They choose whether to participate only in trafficking or also to tax and protect
cultivation. They choose whether to only extort the traffickers or also regulate and protect
production.
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Factor (c): Presence of the Thuggish Traffickers
The presence of thuggish traffickers increases the political capital of belligerents
by allowing the belligerents to provide protection to the population against the abusive
traffickers. It also allows the belligerents to serve as political and economic regulators for
the illicit economy, e.g. by bargaining on behalf of the farmers for better prices from the
traffickers. In other words, it allows the belligerents to function as the population's
agents.
Traffickers can be criminals or criminal cartels, but they also can be corrupt
government officials, or even a different belligerent group that has taken over the
trafficking role. I define traffickers to be present as long as there is some trafficking
individual or entity that is separate from the particular belligerent group in question,
whatever the motivations or origins of the traffickers. As long as there is such a separate
entity (criminals, corrupt government, a different belligerent group, call it belligerent
group B) and as long as it is thuggish (that is, abusive to the peasants), the peasants have
a demand for the protection and regulation services of the belligerent group A vis-A-vis
the traffickers, and the belligerent group A obtains greater political capital.
To the extent that thuggish traffickers are not present, these political benefits will
go away. Traffickers' absence also influences the size of the belligerents' financial
benefits. If traffickers are absent, the belligerents' financial profits depend on their own
ability to fulfill the trafficking function: If they do this well, their financial benefits will
increase. If they fail to do so, the illicit economy in the region, and hence their financial
profits, could plummet substantially.
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Modalities of the drug trade suggest that traffickers must be present in order for
the economic exchange to take place. Note again, that traffickers could be any individual
or entity facilitating the exchange: criminals, corrupt officials, or belligerents that are
separate from the belligerent group in question. As Kevin Jack Riley explains, given the
complexity, the large number, and the volume of drug transactions, drug flights, drug
shipments, drug brokerage functions, intelligence needs, and bribe arrangements, "from a
practical standpoint, it would be very risky if the farmers and retailers attempted to deal
with each other directly."' 8
Thus, the only way that the situation "traffickers' absence" could arise is if they
were physically eliminated - by the government or by the belligerents -- and then
replaced by the belligerents, the same and only belligerent group operating in the region.
Once the belligerents had taken over the trafficking function, they would no longer be
able to protect the producers, say illicit crop farmers against the traffickers (now
themselves). Nor could they provide regulatory services against themselves, such as
bargaining for better prices on behalf of the producers since this would involve
bargaining with themselves. Even if their pecuniary interests did not drive them to lower
the prices paid to the farmers, they could not keep increasing prices to the same extent
that they could demand that prices be increased when they were separate from the
traffickers. Thus, the belligerents now working as also traffickers could no longer
function as the peasants' agents, and their political capital would correspondingly
decrease.
There are various ways in which the elimination of traffickers could occur. The
government could eliminate them through interdiction operations. Other criminal
"8 Kevin Jack Riley, Snow Job? (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1996): 172.
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organizations could eliminate them and then fail to hold onto the region, thus leaving a
vacuum. The belligerents themselves could eliminate them, whether by accident, or lack
of trust, or a desire for greater financial profits and centralized control over the illicit
economy. Frequently, it would be hard for a belligerent group to eliminate and
successfully replace entire cartels because the belligerent group would most likely lack
international trafficking connections and distribution networks in consumer countries.
But belligerent groups are certainly capable of eliminating small or medium traffickers in
a particular region. In whatever way the absence of traffickers arises, the political capital
of the belligerents goes down. For this reason, the factor "the presence/absence of
thuggish traffickers" is one over which the belligerents have a degree of control.
Although belligerents almost always encounter some traffickers in their region, they face
the strategic choice of whether or not to eliminate them.
The discussion of the effect of the amplifier "presence of thuggish traffickers"
also reveals the very uneasy alliance between the narcotraffickers and other criminal
groups and the belligerents. Belligerents provide the traffickers with protection from the
government, from other belligerent groups and criminal organizations, and for the
traffickers' transportation systems. Importantly, they also provide the traffickers with
protection from themselves -- i.e. in a classic protection racket scheme, they guarantee
that they will not severely hamper the business of the traffickers. Moreover, they make
sure that the producers deliver the promised raw materials for the illicit commodities, by
providing them with protection from the government and making sure that peasants do
not cheat or abscond the region. In return, the traffickers provide the belligerents with
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financial benefits and intelligence on the government's military movements. Table II
summarizes these mutual benefits.
Table H: Benefits Belliferents and Traffickers Provide to Each Other
What the Belligerents Provide to the Traffickers
* Protection from government
* Protection for transportation systems
* Protection for themselves
* Reliable work from peasants
* Protection from other criminal organizations or belligerents groups
What the Traffickers Provide to the Belligerents
* Financial payoffs
* Denial of intelligence on belligerents to government
* Provision of intelligence on government units
* Denial of intelligence on one belligerent group to another
* Provision of intelligence on one belligerent group to others
However, the relationship is inevitably complicated by the fact that the
belligerents have multiple audiences and interests: They also protect the population from
the traffickers and bargain for greater prices on behalf of the population. Moreover, they
frequently demand greater financial payoffs from the traffickers than the traffickers want
to pay.
Belligerents and criminal organizations thus compete over both absolute and
relative gains. They face problems of trust since they are unable to enforce mutual deals
or assure that the other group will not defect and betray its partner, and since they
frequently struggle to coordinate their efforts. Far from seeing the criminals and the
belligerents as an identical actor, my theory of political capital argues that the belligerents
118
and the traffickers have many competing interests. Despite their desire to achieve
accommodation so that business can flourish, they often physically fight each other,
Factor (d): Government Response
A government's policies toward the illicit economy can vary from repressive
policies designed to eliminate the illicit economy; to a laissez-faire policy; to partial or
full legalization. In the case of narcotics, such policies include eradication (compensated
or not), interdiction, tacit acquiescence, alternative development (or what has recently
evolved into the concept of alternative livelihoods),' 9 partial or full licensing of
production, demand reduction (treatment and prevention), decriminalization, and
legalization. These various policies can also be adopted in combination; in fact, the
current mantra of counternarcotics policies is a so-called "holistic approach" that
combines eradication, interdiction, and alternative development.
19 The concept of alternative livelihoods evolved out of the policy of crop substitution that
encouraged farmers to grow licit crops, such as coffee and onions, instead of coca or poppy. Crop
substitution policies came to be seen as having largely failed all over the world to reduce cultivation of
illicit crops. The concept of alternative development replaced crop substitution and was supposed to
address the shortcomings of crop substitution. Alternative development was meant to encompass
comprehensive rural development that addressed the larger structural causes that motivated farmers to
choose illicit crops over licit ones, such as infrastructure inadequacies, the lack of market possibilities, the
instability of prices, and the lack of access to credit. In practice, alternative development policies mostly
ended up being of a more limited scope. They sought to reduce illicit crop cultivation once again largely by
seeking to replace on-farm income and treating the symptoms, rather than the drivers of illicit crop
cultivation. And once again, the successes in reducing illicit crop cultivation were few and far between,
with alternative development projects in Thailand being one example of lasting success in improving the
lives of the rural population and substantially reducing the cultivation of illicit crops.
Overall, the meager results of alternative development led to the advancement of a new concept
and policy: alternative livelihoods. In theory, the concept of alternative livelihood refers to a wider state-
building and development agenda that addresses the real drivers of illicit crop production, that is an integral
part of the country's overall development policies, and that measures success not only in the numbers of
hectares of illicit crops eliminated, but also in terms of overall development and improvement in the lives
of the rural population. It remains to be seen whether this theoretical concept, the chic dejour in the
counternarcotics field, will in fact be translated into actual policies or whether it will devolve essentially
back to crop substitution combined with some limited investment in infrastructure and microfinance. For
further elaboration of the theoretical difference and actual results of alternative development and alternative
livelihoods, see, "David Mansfield and Adam Pain, "Alternative Livelihood: Substance or Slogan?" AREU
Briefing Paper, October 2005.
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These policies include both policies toward production, or what are known as
source-country policies, and policies toward consumption, or what is known as demand-
policies. Since this study is concerned with the connection between illicit economies and
military conflict, I focus predominantly on policies toward production and their effect on
the strength of belligerent groups. I do not explore the issue of domestic consumption,
and hence do not assess the pros and cons of legalization of consumption. In any event,
legalization of consumption is a rather remote political possibility, certainly in the United
States, but also in Europe. Even in the Netherlands, a country with some of the most
permissive drug policies, the use of marijuana is only decriminalized, not legalized, and
only up to a certain amount per adult per time while the production of marijuana as well
as bulk sales remain illegal.20
Eradication
Contrary to the standard government wisdom and the narcoterrorism literature,
eradication will have dubious effects on the financial resources of the belligerents. Even
when carried out effectively - a rare occurrence -- eradication might not bring great, if
any, financial losses to the belligerents. One reason is that effective suppression of the
production of the illicit commodity may actually increase the international market price
for the commodity to such an extent that the final revenues may be even greater 2' (at least
20 For details on the Dutch approach, see Robert J. MacCoun and Peter Reuter, Drug War Heresies:
Learning from Other Vices, Times, and Places (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001): 238-264.
21 A lively academic debate exists about the elasticity of demand for illicit commodities. If demand for the
illicit commodity is sufficiently elastic, a liberalization of the regulatory regime for the illicit commodity
will result in increases in consumption. On the other hand, if demand is inelastic, liberalization of the
regulatory regime for the illicit commodity will not be associated with increases in consumption. Relatively
few empirical studies makes use of reliable and systematic data for illicit commodities, since, due to their
illicitness, such data are not easily available. Nonetheless, the existing data suggest that demand for
gambling and betting appears to be rather elastic. As far as demand for drugs is concerned, estimating
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temporarily greater - assuming that the illicit economy was not permanently completely
eliminated).
Moreover, the extent of the financial losses of the belligerents also depends on the
adaptability of the belligerents, traffickers, and producers. To what extent do they have
the ability to store drugs? Do the belligerents have money saved? In the case of cultigen-
based drugs, do the farmers have the ability to replant after eradication? Can they
increase number of plants per acre to offset losses from areas eradicated? Do the farmers,
traffickers, and belligerents have the ability to shift production to areas that are not being
eradicated, such as deeper into the jungles under tree cover, or into higher elevation under
cloud cover? Can they avoid detection by planting illicit crops in between licit crops? Do
demand elasticity is considerably more complicated due to the variety of physical dependence associated
with different drugs and with different individual physiological responses. While the physical dependence
of old users may well result in very inelastic demand, this may not be the case for new users. Moreover,
many users appear to be multidrug users, and hence could be rather responsive to changes in prices for a
particular drug. Thus, while the demand for drugs as such may be quite inelastic if the demand market is
dominated primarily by heavy long-time users, the demand for a specific drug may still be rather elastic.
See, for example, Peter Reuter, Disorganized Crime: The Economics of the Visible Hand (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1983); Fiorentini and Peltzman; Richard Lawrence Miller, The Case for Legalizing Drugs (New
York: Praeger, 1991). Accordingly, economists who have explored the possibility of decriminalization or
legalization suggest a price discrimination regime for users, with drugs being sold very cheaply to long-
time registered users and at very high prices to new users. For a seminal analysis, see Mark H. Moore,
"Policies to Achieve Discrimination on the Effective Price of Heroin," American Economic Review, 63 (2),
1973: 270-77.
Until recently, most drug control economists believed that the overall demand was in fact rather
inelastic. New analyses, however, suggest that price of drugs does matter. Demand for hard drugs, such as
cocaine and heroin, is now considered to be somewhat elastic with respect to price, such that a 1.0 percent
increase in price should reduce consumption somewhere between 0.2 to 1.0 percent. See, Mark A. R. Klein,
"Controlling Drug Use and Crime with Testing, Sanctions, and Treatment," in Philip B. Heymann and
William N. Brownsberger, eds. Drug Addiction and Drug Policy: The Struggle to Control Addiction
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001): 168-92; Henry Saffer and Frank Chaloupka, "The Demand
for Illicit Drugs," Economic Inquiry, 37 (1), 1999: 401-11; and Dhaval Dave, "Illicit Drug Use Among
Arrestees and Drug Prices," National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004,
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10648.pdf, downloaded March 19, 2004. Jonathan Caulkins and Peter Reuter
argue that prices for drugs are high and extremely variable over time and space and that while high prices
deter use, they have ambiguous effects on drug-related crime. See, Jonathan P. Caulkins and Peter Reuter,
"What Price Data Tell Us About Drug Markets," Journal of Drug Issues, 28 (3), Summer 1998: 593-613.
Regardless of the theoretical debate about the overall elasticity of demand for drugs, practical experience
suggests that a temporary suppression of production in a particular region will at least in the short-term of
up to several years result in an increase in farmgate and downstream prices. But the time lag before the
effect of suppression is felt in retail prices may in fact be substantial. At least so far, production has always
managed to recover before any suppression resulted in a substantial and lasting increase in retail prices. In
fact, retail prices have been falling steadily since the early 1980s.
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they have access to genetically-altered high-yield, high-resistance crops that do not die
after being sprayed?
Furthermore, even if counternarcotics policies succeeded in permanently wiping
out illicit crop cultivation in particular regions, belligerents always have the possibility of
switching to other illicit economies, such as extortion, illegal logging, other illegal traffic,
and, most easily and conveniently, they can switch to cooking synthetic drugs, such as
methamphetamines. In other words, do they have other sources of income and can they
generate other sources of income?
Yet, although the desired impact of eradication to decrease belligerents' financial
resources is far from certain and is likely to take place only under the most favorable
circumstances, eradication will definitely increase the political benefits of the
belligerents. As the government destroys the population's livelihood, the local population
will support the belligerents all the more strongly and will not provide the government
with intelligence. Good local human intelligence is a crucial factor in defeating terrorist
and insurgents groups. Without the willingness of the local population to provide such
intelligence to government units, the counterterrorism and counterinsurgency missions
are seriously compromised. Eradication may even motivate the rural population to more
actively support the belligerents, such as by providing them with food, shelters,
safehouses, or even fight along side the belligerents against the government.
Moreover, it is far from clear, that even if eradication were complete and
permanently successful, the local population would adapt by participating in the legal
economy. The local legal economy may not be sufficient to generate sufficient livelihood
for the population, and the population may be forced to leave the region or join the
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belligerents. Thus, even in the case of a total and permanent eradication, the link between
the population and the belligerents may not be severed. In short, eradication loses the
battle for hearts and minds without fulfilling its siren song of cutting off the belligerents
from resources.
Interdiction
Interdiction, the second policy option for the government, means disrupting the
flows of illicit traffic and destroying processing facilities and labs. Like eradication this
source-country policy still seeks to reduce the size of the illicit economy through law
enforcement; but unlike eradication, it does not directly target the larger rural population
by eliminating the raw ingredients that go into the production of drugs. Instead, it targets
drug traffickers and the much smaller portion of the poor population that is involved in
processing. Since it does not target the overall rural population and its cultivation of illicit
crops, the political capital gains of the belligerents are considerably reduced and the
alienation of the population from the government is significantly smaller than in the case
of eradication. Consequently, the population is more willing to provide information to the
military on the belligerents, all other factors being equal.22
In addition to reducing the belligerents' political capital, interdiction policies
(especially when combined with money-laundering countermeasures) further enhance the
possibility of detection and intelligence-gathering on belligerents by creating new sources
of vulnerability. This is because interdiction operations allow drug shipments to be traced
back not only to the traffickers, but also the belligerent groups, thus revealing other
22 Intelligence provision will also be influenced by the level of brutality imposed by the belligerents and the
government on the population and by the ability of the government to protect informers from reprisals by
belligerents.
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information about the belligerents' membership, leadership structure, and whereabouts.
Similarly, efforts against money laundering introduce a new vulnerability for belligerent
groups and increase the intelligence-gathering options for the government.
If interdiction were effective to such an extent that it made illicit traffic in a
certain locale impossible, the traffickers became uninterested in buying crops from that
region, and prices for illicit crops in that region collapsed, the effects of interdiction on
the local population would approximate that of eradication. The population's livelihood
would be fundamentally threatened, the number of affected people would be very large,
and consequently the number of people alienated from the government would also
substantially increase. Thus, the level of political capital the belligerents would derive
from the illicit economy would increase and approximate the levels obtained from
eradication.
Effective interdiction, especially when combined with effective counter-money-
laundering efforts, can also reduce the belligerents' physical resources, and hence their
overall military capabilities. Effective destruction of processing labs and transportation
networks with provisions to reliably prevent the resurrection of new labs and
transportation systems will decrease traffickers' demand for illegal crops and farmers'
prices will fall. Belligerents' revenues will fall since their profits from both taxing
peasants and taxing the displaced traffickers will fall. Similarly, effective money-
laundering would decrease the amount of revenues returning to source-countries and
production regions, thus reducing the traffickers' payments to belligerents as well as to
the producers. Highly effective and lasting interdiction and counter-money-laundering
measures could decrease the traffickers' benefits to such an extent that they would vacate
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the region and set up production, processing, and trafficking operations elsewhere,
possibly where belligerents were not present. Thus, belligerents could suffer large
financial losses, provided that they fail to adapt by finding an alternative source of
revenue - an unlikely scenario.
However, it is extraordinarily difficult to carry out interdiction and money-
laundering countermeasures effectively. Interdiction is believed to capture about 25-40%
percent of cocaine shipments, and about 10 percent of heroin shipments since heroin is
more compact and hence easier to hide. 23 The effectiveness rate of money-laundering
countermeasures is frequently considered to be even lower. Combating money laundering
is extraordinarily difficult since money-launderers have a large menu of laundering
options, such as cash smuggling, currency exchange bureaus, front companies, purchase
of real estate, securities, trusts, casinos, and wire transfers to name a few, and since it
requires intensive international cooperation that is frequently lacking. In the case of
Islamic groups, the problem is further complicated by the availability of the informal
funds transfer systems, such as hawala, that easily escape monitoring.24 Nonetheless, the
advantage of interdiction is that is does not threaten the peasants directly, thus reducing
the belligerents' political capital, and that it introduced new points of vulnerability and
intelligence gathering, unlike eradication.
23 Peter Reuter, "The Limits of Drug Control," Foreign Service Journal, 79 (1), January 2002: 18-23. The
development of new technology for drug detection has been met with an equal ability of traffickers to
improve their smuggling technology and elude law enforcement.
24 See, for example, Peter Reuter and Edwin M. Truman, Chasing Dirty Money (Washington, DC: Institute
for International Economics, 2004); Robert E. Powis, The Money Launderers (Chicago: Probus, 1992); and
Stephen E. Flynn, "The Global Drug Trade Versus the Nation-State: Why the Thugs Are Winning," in
Maryann Cusimano Love, ed. Beyond Sovereignty: Issues for A Global Agenda (Toronto, Canada:
Wadsworth, 2003): 167-194.
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Tacit Acquiescence
Tacit acquiescence, a third government policy option, is an essentially laissez-
faire policy, a policy approach similar to "decriminalization" of production.25 The
government does not legalize the production of illicit substances and commodities, but
also does not try to enforce its prohibitions against the illicit economy. In other words,
tacit acquiescence is a hands-off approach. Such a policy can be expected to reduce the
political gains of the belligerents. Since the government is not threatening the
population's livelihood, the positive relationship between the belligerents and the
population is weakened. All other factors being equal, the population is more willing to
provide intelligence on the belligerents to the government and otherwise support the
government against the belligerents.
Similarly, the traffickers' dependence on the belligerent group for business
protection is greatly reduced. Consequently, the traffickers may well attempt to displace
the belligerents from the illicit economy by providing intelligence on the belligerents to
the government or physically fighting against the belligerents in order to eliminate
protection payoffs.
The real downside of this policy is, of course, that it will likely leave the
belligerents' financial gains unaffected. Moreover, if the international demand for the
particular illicit commodity - a variable exogenous to my theory -- is not satiated or is
growing, tacit acquiescence will likely result in an expansion of the illicit economy in the
particular locale and hence possibly also in greater financial benefits for the belligerents.
The only way the belligerents' financial resources could be reduced under a policy of
25 The term decriminalization is usually applied to reducing the sanctions against the use of drugs, but
maintaining sanctions against trafficking and marketing.
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tacit acquiescence is if the belligerents were displaced from the illicit economy. They
could be displaced by the traffickers who no longer needed the belligerents' protection or
by the government that would obtain better intelligence from intelligence from peasants
and the traffickers.
Licensing ofProduction
Licensing of production will allow the government to deprive the belligerents of
political gains since the government no longer threatens the livelihood of the population.
Consequently, the population is much more motivated to provide the government with
intelligence on the belligerents, if not more actively supporting the government.
Licensing of production, especially if carried out in ways that make diversion into illicit
uses and illicit traffic very difficult, also substantially decreases the financial profits of
the belligerents. Moreover, since the government now captures at least a part of the
revenues from the economy, its own financial resources are also increased.
The difficulty with this policy, especially in the case of illegal drugs, is the limited
size of legal markets for derivates from illicit crops. Although opium resin derivates are
widely used in medical purposes for anesthetics, such as morphine and codeine, heavy
legal and political regulation makes it every difficult for new entrants to participate in this
legal market.26 The legal outlets for coca derivates are even more limited, again
consisting of a very limited market for pharmaceutical purposes, such as specialty
anesthetics, and at various periods also including items, such as coca wine, coca
toothpaste, and coca soap. However, licensing of production in compliance with certain
26 The major legal producers of medical opiates for export are Turkey, India, Australia, France, and Spain.
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regulations was adopted in the case of blood diamonds, for example. In that case,
certificates were issued to indicate that the diamonds did not come from mines belonging
to belligerent groups, and that consequently they were legal and legitimate. 27 Such
licensing schemes could be applied to other illicit commodities, such as ivory and timber.
Legalization
Full legalization entails not only the legalization of production of a certain
commodity, but also its legal consumption. Thus, unlike the case of licensing for special
limited purposes or with certain regulatory constraints, this approach would entail the
broad legalization of the previously illicit product. In the case of drugs, for example,
poppy cultivation would be allowed not only for the production of morphine and codeine,
but also for the production of opium and heroin. Processing, trade, retail, and
consumption of the previously illegal commodities would also become legal. Since in this
case the government would once again not destroy the livelihood of the population, the
political gains of the belligerents from their sponsorship of the illicit economy would be
greatly reduced, if not virtually eliminated, and the population would be willing to
provide the government with information on the belligerents. Moreover, the financial
benefits of the belligerents would also be greatly reduced. Instead, the government would
capture the financial gains in the form of taxes. Expansion of the economy and of
consumption of the commodity is likely to follow as well.
27 See, for example, Greg Campbell, Blood Diamonds (Boulder: Westview Press, 2002), and Douglas
Farah, Bloodfrom Stones (New York: Broadway, 2004); Jeffrey S. Morton, "The Legal Regulation of
Conflict Diamonds," Politics & Policy, 33 (3), September 2005: 389-414; E. Ablorh-Odjidja, "Conflict
Diamonds: The Kimberley Process for Corruption," New African, (421), August/September 2003: 40-1;
and Ana M. Perez-Katz, "The Role of Conflict Diamonds in Fueling Wars in Africa: the Case of Sierra
Leone," International Affairs Review, 11 (1), Winter/Spring 2002: 60-75.
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The reason why both the political capital and physical resources of the
belligerents would be greatly reduced but may not be altogether eliminated is that without
effective government preventive measures, the belligerents could setup a parallel
informal or illegal economy alongside the legal one. They could tax the producers
considerably less than the government and hence attract a portion of the producers to
their parallel economy. The emergence of this parallel economy would be analogous to
the existence of an illegal market for cars in the context of a legal market for cars.
In the case of illicit drugs, such full legalization remains politically infeasible in
most countries. However, certain pariah governments, such as North Korea (and at times
Panama and Afghanistan) that may not be significantly concerned about their
international legitimacy and may be less sensitive to additional sanctions - resulting, for
example, from the decertification by the United States for failure to cooperate with U.S.
counternarcotics policies28 -- could adopt at least veiled legalization. Under such veiled
legalization, illicit crop cultivation and drug production would remain dejure illegal, but
de facto permitted, and the government would tax, regulate the illicit economy, and
28 Enacted by the U.S. Congress in 1986, the drug certification process requires that every year the State
Department review whether the world's major drug producing and drug-transit countries are complying
with international counternarcotics regulations and U.S. counternarcotics efforts and the U.S. president
certify whether such compliance is taking place. The law gives the president three choices in his
certification determination -- to certify fully, to deny certification, or to grant a waiver on the basis of"vital
national interests." If certification is denied, the decertified country automatically faces economic sanctions,
such as withholding of at least half of most of U.S. government assistance. The process is frequently
criticized as both lacking objectivity and being driven by other political considerations as well as limiting
the effectiveness of a variety of U.S. policies. See, for example, Bill Spencer with Gina Amatangelo, "Drug
Certification," Foreign Policy in Focus, 6 (5), February 2001, http://www.irc-
online.org/fpif/briefs/vol6/v6n05drugs.html, downloaded April 24, 2005. Proponents of the certification
process, however, argue that it is a key factor in reducing global drug production. Former Secretary of
State, Madeleine Albright, for example, commented that while the certification law "certainly can be
refined, it has produced amazing results in the fight against illegal narcotics." See, Eric Green, "Drug
Control," http://www.usembassy.org.uk/drugs33.html, downloaded April 24, 2005.
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participate in the illegal traffic. 29 Thus, unlike in the case of tacit acquiescence, the
government would not only tolerate the illicit economy, but also actively manage it, even
if not officially declaring it legal.
Full open legalization, however, remains a definite possibility in the case of other
illicit economies and commodities, such as illicit logging. A government can easily
remove the prohibition on logging in national parks and tax the industry. While
environmental groups may oppose such deregulation, the international pressure to amend
the policy will likely be considerably smaller than in the case of deregulation of illicit
narcotics.
To recap, government policies toward the illicit economy face a tradeoff between
winning the hearts and minds of the population and decreasing the belligerents' military
capabilities. Repressive government policies toward the illicit economy increase the
political capital of the belligerents without likely accomplishing their promise of reducing
the belligerents' physical resources. Laissez-faire government policies toward the illicit
economy decrease the belligerents' political capital, and all other factors being equal,
increase the government's political capital in terms of legitimacy and the population's
cooperation with the government. However, such policies leave the belligerents' financial
profits unaffected or even increased. Licensing/or legalization policies greatly decrease
both political capital and military capabilities of the belligerents. The posited effects are
relative to each other. My theory makes no statements regarding what policies toward the
illicit economy are necessary or sufficient for the defeat of the belligerents. Other factors,
29 Frequently, even when the government carries out eradication, corrupt elements within the government
can nonetheless participate in the drug trade.
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such as the size of government forces relative to that of the belligerents and levels of
government and belligerents' brutality, for example, obviously also play a vital role. My
theory simply describes and explains why and how government policies toward the illicit
economy hamper or enhance the government military effort against the belligerents.
Relative Importance of the Four Factors
Among the four factors that have a significant effect on the magnitude of increase
or decrease in belligerents' strength as a result of their involvement in the illicit economy,
the most important factor is the state of the overall economy. The second most important
factor is the character of the illicit economy. The third and fourth are government
response and the presence of thuggish traffickers.
The state of the overall economy is the most important factor since it determines
how many people are dependent on the illicit economy for basic livelihood and hence
how they view government response to the illicit economy. Similarly, the second most
important factor - the character of the illicit economy -- determines the extent of the
population's positive or negative view of the government. The attitudes toward
government policies crucially influence the level of belligerents' political capital and
popular support for the government. In a poor country with a labor-intensive illicit
economy, by far the most prevalent combination of factors in the context of military
conflict, government policy toward the illicit economy has a major impact on the level of
belligerent's political capital. However, the impact of government policy is considerably
weakened in the case of labor-non-intensive illicit economies even in poor countries.
Government destruction of methamphetamine labs even in poor countries, for example,
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affects only a small number of people. The amplifying effect of government policies in
the case of a labor-non-intensive economy in a rich country is even smaller, and the
detrimental effects of repressive policies toward illicit economies on the political capital
of the belligerents is minimal. The presence/absence of traffickers is the weakest factor
affecting belligerents' political capital since it affects the producers' (farmers') profits
and work conditions, but not the overall importance of the illicit economy to the
population.
III. Methodology, Empirical Implications, and Threats to Validity
In this section, I specify empirically observable implications of my theory and of
the competing conventional wisdom. I also discuss potential threats to validity and
explain how my method and cases address these threats.
Empirical Implications of the Conventional Narcoterrorism View
As detailed above, conventional narcoterrorism view agues that belligerents
engage in the illicit economy with the purpose of obtaining large financial profits. These
profits increase their military capabilities and allow them to escalate and prolong conflict.
Consequently, the government needs to eliminate the illicit economy in order to cut the
belligerents off from resources and limit conflict. The eradication of the illicit economy is
desirable and will result in critical reduction of the belligerents' resources. Consequently,
the government will be much more easily able to defeat the belligerents. The
conventional wisdom does not recognize that belligerents also make political capital from
their sponsorship of the illicit economy. A corollary proposition is that belligerents and
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criminals can no longer be distinguished from each other and need to be fought as a joint
enemy.
The empirical implications are:
1) A belligerent group engaged in the drug economy will be no more popular in
the areas with drug production than in areas without drug production. The sponsorship of
the illicit economy will not bring any political support to the belligerents. Rather their
legitimacy will be based wholly on their ideology and use or nonuse of violence toward
the population. Similarly, they will be equally popular or unpopular in areas of illicit crop
cultivation as in areas of drug trafficking without cultivation or in areas of the
manufacturing of synthetic drugs but without the cultivation of illicit crops.
2) The belligerent groups will not bargain on behalf of the peasants for better
prices from the traffickers since such an activity does not increase their own financial
profits.
3) The population's cooperation with the government's counterinsurgency effort
does not change with change in government policies toward the illicit economy,
regardless of whether the policy adopted is eradication, interdiction, tacit acquiescence,
etc. All other factors being equal, the population will provide the government with equal
amounts of equally reliable (or unreliable) intelligence whether or not eradication is
undertaken.
4) Eradication will severely weaken belligerent groups and deprive belligerents of
physical resources. The groups will no longer be capable of carrying out effective
operations against the government. Deprived of their earnings from the particular illicit
economy, they will no longer be capable of obtaining weapons, providing logistics for
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their operations, and paying their soldiers. Government's success against the belligerents
will be greatest when and where the government carries out the most extensive and
repressive eradication.
5) Violence among belligerent groups and traffickers will be rare. The alliance
between the traffickers and the belligerents will be weakest when the government most
aggressively attempts to destroy the illicit economy.
Empirical Implications of the Political Capital of Illicit Economies
My theory, the political capital of illicit economies, argues that belligerents derive
much more than simply large financial profits from their sponsorship of illicit economies.
They also obtain freedom of action and, crucially, political capital. The extent and scope
of their gain from the illicit economy depends on four factors: a) the state of the overall
economy; b) the character of the illicit economy; c) the presence of thuggish traffickers;
and d) the government response to the illicit economy. Far from having morphed into a
unified actor, the belligerents and the traffickers frequently have competing interests.
The empirical implications from my theory include a) those that are directly
opposed to the conventional wisdom and b) those that if true support my theory but are
not all addressed by the conventional wisdom.
Empirical Implications that Contradict the Conventional Wisdom:
1) The support for a belligerent group active in the drug economy will be stronger
in drug-producing regions, especially in regions where illicit crops are cultivated. The
population will approve the sponsorship of the illicit economy by the belligerents and
praise the belligerents for their sponsorship of the illicit economy.
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2) Support for the belligerents will be strongest in the drug-producing regions
even when the ideology of the belligerents is no longer appealing, and/or the belligerents
have become more brutal, and/or their overall popular support has declined.
3) Support for the belligerents will be weaker in areas or periods of trafficking
only - that is where there is no cultivation of illicit crops -- or in areas and periods when
the belligerents are engaged in the manufacture of synthetic drugs or in other labor-non-
intensive illicit economies but do not sponsor the cultivation of illicit crops.
4) Those belligerent groups that provide greater social services and are more
active in bargaining on behalf of the peasants for better prices from the traffickers will
receive greater cooperation from the peasants.
5) The willingness of the population to supply the government with intelligence
and otherwise cooperate with the government will be much smaller if not altogether
halted during periods when the government carries out strong suppression of the illicit
economy, especially eradication. The affected peasant population will condemn the
government efforts to suppress the illicit economy and praise the belligerents for their
protection of the illicit economy. But if the belligerents neglect to protect the illicit
economy, they will alienate the population and lose some of their political capital.
6) During periods and in regions when the government has adopted a tacit
acquiescence approach (or fully legalized the illicit economy), the population will
cooperate with the government to a much greater degree and will provide it with
intelligence.
7) Eradication will not severely weaken the belligerents, who will either continue
to find ways to derive large profits from the illicit drug economy or switch to other forms
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illicit economic activity. They will be able to continue carrying out their military
campaign at a level that presents a serious threat to the government.
8) The narcotraffickers and the belligerents will be frequently in conflict,
physically fighting each other and trying to displace one another from the illicit economy.
They will even conspire with the government in order to get rid of the other actor.
Traffickers' cooperation with the government against the belligerents will increase when
the government does not attempt to eradicate the illicit economy or interdict the illicit
flows and bust labs.
Empirical Implications of My Theory Beyond the Scope of the Conventional View:
1) Less labor-intensive illicit economies will generate far smaller political capital
for the belligerents.
2) The belligerents will lose some of their political capital when they get rid of the
traffickers since they will stop functioning as the peasants' agent protecting them against
the traffickers and will put themselves in the position of the monopolist.
3) Belligerents who initially are religiously or ideologically-motivated to suppress
the illicit economy will become concerned about the negative reaction of the population
dependent upon that economy, leading to their tolerance if not outright embrace of the
illicit economy. Such a switch by the belligerents away from suppression will occur even
when the belligerents have other large sources of income.3o
3o Statements of concern by the belligerents over negative reactions from the population could, of course,
be just a way to disguise their purely pecuniary motives. However, it is compelling evidence in support of
my political theory especially if the population also praises the belligerents' sponsorship of the illicit
economy and condemns and physically resists the attempts by the government to suppress it.
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Difficulties with the Study
An obvious difficulty for the conduct of the study is the availability of data due to
the criminal nature of the activities studied, the secrecy of many insurgent and terrorist
organizations, and the difficulties of doing systematic fieldwork in countries consumed
by civil war and violence.
The limited availability of good data is an acute problem even in the easiest aspect
of the study to research, i.e., the size of various illicit economies. In the case of the drug
economy, even the most basic step of estimation, the size of the area cultivated with illicit
crops, is at best a wild guesstimate, and numbers vary dramatically among estimates by
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, local governments, and the United States.
Moreover, any further derivative estimates, such as the amount of heroin or cocaine
produced, the volume of goods being trafficked, the efficacy of interdiction, farmgate or
street prices of illicit goods, and the size of the belligerents' financial profits from the
illicit economy, are even more difficult to assess.
The official estimation process works like this: Satellite data are gathered to
estimate the area cultivated with illegal crops, say coca. Alternatively, a research team is
sent to a sample area to measure the area cultivated with illicit crops, an estimate from
which the size of the overall cultivated area in the country is extrapolated. The physical
estimation procedure, however, makes the assumption that the area where the
observations are carried out is representative of the overall territory, which may or may
not be true. Even the satellite method is not mistake-proof. Satellites rarely cover the
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entire territory of even major-producing countries, and frequently do not penetrate cloud
cover and fail to detect the presence of illicit crops under dense foliage of forests. 31
Based on the already unreliable data about the level of cultivation, a formula is
used to derive the number of coca leaves harvested, the amount of coca paste produced
from the quantity of coca leaves, and finally the amount of cocaine produced from the
coca paste. Yet as the State Department admits, estimates of crop harvest can hinge upon
"small changes in factors such as soil fertility, weather, farming techniques, disease."32
Furthermore, productivity per plant also varies with the plant's age, the number of
harvests per year, and the specific variety of coca. For example, at least nine different
varieties ofcoca plant exist in Latin America, with different alkaloid yields, yet there is
no estimate of the distribution of each variety in the total area cultivated.
With each further step up the processing ladder, estimates become more
complicated and less reliable. Yields after refining, for example, depend on the technique
used, the quality of precursor agents, and the skill of the local workers and chemists.
Thus, at each step, new uncertainties are introduced, compounding the soft character of
3" The wild jumps in estimates of Mexican marijuana cultivation during the mid-1980s illustrate the
softness of the data. The estimates of net production (after eradication) by the National Narcotics
Intelligence Consumers Committee (NNICC), an interagency group chaired by the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), rose from 4,125 metric tons in 1985 to 5,460 metric tons in 1986. The State
Department estimates, released in the annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, however,
showed a substantially smaller increase from a considerably different base, with production estimated at
2,700 metric tons in 1985 and 2,800 in 1986. In 1987, the Department of State showed a slight decrease in
net cultivation in Mexico, while the NNICC showed a one third increase in production. The International
Narcotics Matters Bureau of the Department of State justified their data as follows: "The Department of
State considers its country estimates more reliable because the data were derived principally from aerial
surveys. There are, however, no survey data of marijuana cultivation in Mexico; the State Department
relied on random reports from Mexico which were higher than the NNICC figures, which is an
extrapolation of seizure data." General Accounting Office, Control: Drug Interdiction and Related
Activities along the Southwestern US Border, Fact Sheet, GAO/GGD-88-124FS, Washington, DC,
September 1988: 53; and Peter Reuter, "The Organization and Measurement of the International Drug
Trade," Economics of the Narcotics Industry, Conference Report, November 21-22, 1994,
http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/MISC/economic.htm, downloaded February 18, 2003.
32 U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 2004, http://
http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2003/index.htm, downloaded March 18, 2004.
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the initial input data. Estimates of flows and the effectiveness of interdiction, for
example, are based on seizures. Yet, since the knowledge of the size of production is so
poor, it is not clear what percentage of output interdiction is actually capturing. Instead,
because of the inherent difficulties of catching small bulk products over thousands of
miles of territory, it is frequently assumed that interdiction captures about ten to twenty
percent of illicit flows. How can one interpret, however, a sudden dramatic jump in the
amount of drugs seized? Does it mean that interdiction efforts have suddenly become
more effective or that larger quantities of drugs are flowing across the borders? The case
of synthetic drugs is even more complicated, because production can only be estimated
on the basis of seizures and numbers of labs busted. But again, no one knows what
percentages of total output seizures and labs busted represent. Once again, this approach
introduces the baseline problem.33 Estimating prices, such as payoffs to traffickers,
belligerents, and government officials, including the "easiest component," street prices in
consumer countries, is even more of a magical process. In the highly segmented, highly
imperfect markets, prices vary greatly over time and even from shipment to shipment.
Estimating "softer" variables, such as political capital, legitimacy, and support
provision for belligerents, faces even greater challenges. Measuring popular support in
the absence of frequent and reliable polling data is inherently difficult. Yet, both polling
data as well as other systematic measures of the popular support for belligerents are hard
to obtain in areas where violence and lawlessness are prevalent and belligerents,
3' For critiques of the estimation method, see, for example, Peter Reuter, "The Organization and
Measurement of the International Drug Trade," Economics of the Narcotics Industry, Conference Report,
November 21-22, 1994, http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/MISC/economic.htm, downloaded February
18, 2003; Francisco Thoumi, "The Numbers' Game: Let's All Guess the Size of the Illegal Drug Industry,"
TNI Crime & Globalization Paper, http://www.tni.org/crime-docs/numbers.pdf, downloaded October 2,
2005; C. Peter Rydell and Susan S. Everingham, Controlling Cocaine: Supply Versus Demand Programs
(Santa Monica: RAND, 1994); Washington Office on Latin America, "U.S. Wholesale and Retail Prices of
Heroin," http://www.wola.org/ddhr/ddhr_data_measures.htm, downloaded November 17, 2005.
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traffickers, and the military repress the local population. Even common demographic data
is frequently missing. Thus, the study needs to rely on qualitative descriptors of the level
of popular support and legitimacy, and the overall aggregate political capital, based on
less than systematic data. Insisting than only variables that can and have been measured
can be examined in a study would eliminate a host of theoretically and policy-significant
subjects, including the large components of the study of insurgency, terrorism, and the
drug trade.
Interviews are also difficult to conduct since traffickers and frequently peasant
producers tend to be wary of admitting participation and disclosing information. While
government officials may well be willing to give interviews, their information could be
significantly biased. While recognizing the inherent limitations of the data produced
through fieldwork and interviews, I have carried out fieldwork in four countries analyzed
in the study: Peru, Colombia, Afghanistan, and Burma.34
Another difficulty is the very high level of multicolinearity. The character of
government response influences also to a large extent whether or not drug traffickers are
present. Legalization of the illicit economy may allow governments to eliminate all
traffickers. Yet, the relationship is not fully determinative, thus not allowing for the
removal of the factor "the presence of thuggish traffickers": A black market, with
thuggish traffickers, may exist even within a legal economy. Similarly, there is a very
strong correlation between the state of the overall economy and the presence of the drug-
conflict nexus. There is, for example, not one case where in the context of an overall rich
" The lack of systematic data also bears directly on the difficulty of constructing the universe of cases of
the nexus between drugs and insurgencies. Most analysts of the drug issue, in fact, complain that no
systematic data exists prior to mid-1980s. Indeed, the CIA only started reporting on narcotics activities
around in the world in its World Factbook in 1986. My expectation therefore is that the "universe" of cases
of the drug-insurgency nexus I constructed from various literatures is imperfect.
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economy with multiple alternative sources of livelihood an extensive cultivation of illicit
crops coincides with military conflict. Finding critical cases where the variables do not
covary is extremely difficult in this domain of inquiry.
The baseline problem presents yet another potential threat to testing the validity
of the propositions. Some of the factors that influence the size and scope of the
belligerents' benefits have not varied in reality, even if they can vary theoretically. Thus,
full legalization of drugs has not been tried anywhere. The best variation the study can
achieve with respect to this factor is a defacto legalization in some countries. Similarly,
some combination of structural and policy conditions - large-scale labor-intensive illicit
economy in a rich country in the context of military conflict - do not exist. Consequently,
my study can offer only a limited test.
Case Selection
Therefore, to address these threats to validity, it is especially important to
examine in detail the relationships between illicit economies and military conflict in
particular cases instead of relying on statistical regression. I examine the relationship in
detail in three cases: Peru, Colombia, and Afghanistan. Northern Ireland, Burma, Turkey,
and India are brought in as extensions in the final chapter.
The principal cases have been selected on the basis of their capacity to illuminate
both the impact of illicit drugs on the two main components of belligerents' strength and
the impact of the four factors on the size and scope of the belligerents' benefits from
illicit economies. Special attention has been paid in the selection of cases to achieve
maximum variation of the one condition over which the government has direct and
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immediate control: namely, government response to the illicit economy, and thus to
mitigate against the potential baseline problem. All too often, studies of the drug trade
and other illicit economies neglect to consider cases with such variation.
Peru and Afghanistan are particularly illustrative of the impact of change in
government policy toward the illicit economy on the strength of the belligerents and
conflict processes. In the Peru case, the government policy toward drug cultivation kept
changing back and forth between repressive policies and laissez-faire policies even while
other variables influencing government legitimacy and intelligence provision kept
constant, thus allowing for an isolation of the impact of government policies. Moreover,
the repressive policies also covered a range of possible options (both eradication and
interdiction) that were at times adopted in isolation, thus allowing for a fine-tuned
distinction between the impact of each specific policy. The case of Peru also contains two
non-governmental belligerent groups interacting with both the illicit economy and the
drug traffickers, and hence provides a good vehicle for analyzing the relationship
between politically-motivated belligerents and criminal organizations. Moreover, the
types of belligerents' involvement with the illicit economy also covered a spectrum from
negative involvement, to noninvolvement, to positive involvement.
The Afghanistan case is rich with a multiplicity of conflicts and belligerent actors
with dramatically different ideologies, goals, and beliefs, including anti-colonial forces,
pro-Communist guerrillas, anti-Soviet mujahideen, warlords, and the Taliban -- all
interacting with a variety of illicit economies, including drugs, and adopting a different
type of involvement at various times. The case thus allows for an analysis of possible
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intervening variables, such as ideology, on the ability of groups to derive benefits from
the illicit economy.
Second, the Afghanistan case contains both labor-intensive and non-labor
intensive illicit economies, which generate approximately the same level of financial
benefits to belligerents, but which are predicted by my theory to generate vastly different
levels of political capital for their sponsors.
The official policy toward drugs also varied along several dimensions in
Afghanistan. First, in different regions, various ruling elites adopted different attitudes
toward drugs. Second, over time, even in the same regions, such as those controlled by
the Taliban, official policy varied from stringent eradication to a defacto, if not dejure,
legalization, thus allowing for an isolation of the impact of various government policies
on the different components of the strength of belligerent movements.
The case of Colombia, the most studied case in existing literature on the impact of
illicit economies on military conflict, complements the previous cases in allowing
observation of two values of the amplifying factors with low incidence: a rich overall
economy in the region in the context of military conflict and illicit economies,
specifically M-19 insurgents' involvement in the drug trade in Bogota, and the absence of
traffickers. Multiple belligerent groups, covering a large ideological spectrum, are present
in the case of Colombia, and at various times eliminate the traffickers from different parts
of the country under their control. Focusing on the impact of this variable, in addition to
their ability to extract various gains from the illicit economy, allows me to mine this case
freshly, with a different lens than applied so far in other analyses.
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Finally, although the case of Colombia does not allow for the evaluation of the
various government responses to the illicit economy since the policy has been a more or
less intensive eradication, it allows for evaluating the ability of eradication to bankrupt
belligerent groups. Since very intensive large-scale eradication has been applied
consistently for several years in Colombia, if it can succeed in bankrupting the
belligerents anywhere, it should be in Colombia.
Table III summarizes how the selected cases achieve variation with respect to
type of belligerents' involvement in the illicit economy and with respect to the four
factors that function as amplifiers of the posited relationships.
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TYPE OF INVOLVEMENT
AMPLIFYING FACTORS No
POSITIVE NEGATIVE
INVOLVEMENT
SL, MRTA SL
STATE OF Poor FARC, ELN, A UC MRTAFARC
mujahideen, mujahideen
OVERALL ECON. Taliban, warlords
Rich M-19
Labor SL, MRTA SL MRTA
FARC, ELN, A UC FARC
CHARACTER OF Intensive mujahideen, Taliban (drugs & ELN, M-h9
Taliban, warlords logging)
ILLICIT ECON. FARC, ELN,
Labor-Non- M-19
Intensive mujahideen,
Taliban, warlords
SL, MRTA
FARC, A UC, ELN, SL MRTA
PRESENCE OF Present M-19 FARC ELN
mujahideen,mujahideen, Taliban mujahideenTaliban, warlords,TRAFFICKERS Northern Alliance
Absent FARC, A UC warlords
mujahideen,
Taliban, warlords
SL, MRTA
Eradication FARC, A UC, ELN SLMRTAFARCTaliban, warlords, ELN
Northern Alliance
GOVERNMENT SL, MRTA
FARC, A UC, ELN
Interdiction Emirs of 19t ' British colonial MRTA
RESPONSE TO century; Warlords, forces ELN
Taliban
ILLICIT ECON. SL
Tacit Mujahideen, SL (1970s), MRTA
Acquiescence warlords, Northern Mujahideen
Alliance
Licensing/ Taliban Taliban
Legalization
Peru, Colombia, Afghanistan
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IV. Conclusions
This chapter provided the theoretical framework for analyzing the interaction of
illicit economies and military conflict. It argued that the existing analyses of the
phenomenon, expressed in the conventional view of narcoterrorism and narcoinsurgency,
provide a highly incomplete and mistaken understanding of the dynamics of the
interaction between illicit economies and military conflict. Consequently, such analyses
lead to ineffective and counterproductive policy recommendations. The chapter offered
an alternative theory - the political capital of illicit economies - which corrects the
deficiencies of the existing theory and provides a more comprehensive understanding of
the nexus between illicit economies and military conflict.
The conventional narcoterrorism view agues that terrorists derive large financial
profits from their engagement with the illicit economy. These profits allow them to
escalate and prolong conflict. Consequently, the government needs to eliminate the illicit
economy in order to cut the belligerents off resources and limit conflict. The eradication
of the illicit economy is desirable, and will result in critical reduction of the belligerents'
resources. Consequently, the government will be able to defeat the belligerents much
more easily. A corollary proposition is that belligerents and criminals can no longer be
distinguished from each other and need to be fought as a joint enemy.
My theory ofpolitical capital of illicit economies holds that belligerents'
involvement in illicit economies affects the strength of belligerents, but not only the
military component of strength, but also the political one. Positive involvement in the
illicit power (in other words, its sponsorship) increases the strength of belligerents;
negative involvement decreases their strength; and non-involvement leaves their strength
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unaffected. The strength of belligerents is not only the belligerents' physical resources,
but also their freedom of action - both of which constitute their military capabilities --
and, crucially, their political capital. Positive involvement in the illicit economy generates
not only an increase in belligerents' military capabilities, but also, and crucially, an
increase in their political capital.
The magnitude of increase in strength resulting from positive involvement in the
illicit economy (or the magnitude of decrease in strength resulting from belligerents'
negative involvement in the illicit economy) is a function of four structural and policy
factors: a) the state of the overall economy of the country/ region; b) the character of the
illicit economy; c) the presence of thuggish traffickers; and d) the government response
to the illicit economy. A corollary position of my theory is that the traffickers and the
belligerents have highly competing goals and frequently physically fight each other.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, my theory predicts that eradication of the
illicit economy will have dubious effects on the financial resources of the belligerents and
is extremely unlikely to result in serious weakening of the belligerents' ability to continue
with their military campaign. Rather, eradication will lose hearts and minds of the people
and result in an unwillingness of the local population to provide the government with
intelligence. Less repressive and nonrepressive policies toward the illicit economy, such
as interdiction, tacit acquiescence, and licensing, are predicted to result in smaller
alienation of the populace and better intelligence provision.
The two competing theories each give rise to empirically-observable implications
that I have specified in the methodology section of this chapter and the presence of which
in the cases will support or disconfirm the two theories. I have also described the likely
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threats to validity and explained how my methodology and case selection addresses these
threats. The following chapters will test these theories in the cases of Peru, Colombia,
and Afghanistan.
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CHAPTER FOUR - Peru
I. Introduction
Peru had one of the largest illicit narcotics economies in the world from the 1980s
through the mid-1990s. During this period, its illicit narcotics economy was the biggest in
the Southern hemisphere in terms of area cultivated with coca, which in 1992 peaked at
130,000 hectares. Peru was thus the world's and the United States' largest supplier of the
raw ingredients for cocaine - coca leaf and coca paste, even though Colombian cartels
dominated both final processing into cocaine and the traffic from Peru. Although not as
large as the illicit coca economy in Bolivia in terms of its economic importance relative
to the legal economy, the illicit narcotics economy in Peru employed up to 500,000
people, generated large inflows of hard currency during a time of acute economic crisis in
Peru, and represented between 4-5 percent of Peru's GDP.' The United States devoted
large resources to combat the drug trade in Peru and put major pressure on the Peruvian
government to do so as well.
At the same time, Peru also experienced the emergence and growth of one of the
most brutal and most effective Communist guerrillas, the Shining Path. The insurgency
kept steadily increasing throughout the 1980s, and by the early 1990s, many Peruvians
and many foreign analysts believed it would topple the government. Over the first ten
years of the conflict, 20,000 Peruvians were killed, and there were 500,000 internal and
external refugees while $10 billion of infrastructure was destroyed.2
Patrick L. Clawson and Rensselaer W. Lee III., The Andean Cocaine Industry (NewYork: St. Martin's,
1996): 161.
2 David Scott Palmer, "Peru's Persistent Problems," Current History 89 (543), January 1990: 6-7.
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This chapter analyzes the interaction between the illicit narcotics economy and
insurgency in Peru from the late 1970s through the current period. I explore these
dynamics with respect to the two main insurgency groups in Peru during last thirty years,
the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso or Sendero or SL) and the Tupac Amaru
Revolutionary Movement (MRTA). As part of this analysis, I also describe how the illicit
narcotics economy is structured and how it operates at various times in order to explicate
how belligerent groups obtain a variety of gains from sponsoring illicit economies.
I also briefly examine the interaction between the remnants of the Shining Path
and the illicit logging economy during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Illicit logging
provides a useful comparison with the illicit narcotics economy with respect to the
belligerent group's ability to derive political capital from its sponsorship of illicit
economies. Among other things, it shows what kinds of adaptation strategies belligerent
groups have at their disposal if their sponsorship of the dominant illicit economy is
severed.
The case of Peru well illustrates the ways in which a government's
counternarcotics policy influences its effectiveness in counterinsurgency operations.
Peru's policy toward the illicit economy kept changing back and forth between repressive
policies and laissez-faire policies even while other variables influencing the
government's legitimacy and its ability to obtain intelligence on the insurgents kept
constant -- thus allowing for analytic isolation of the impact of government policies.
Moreover, the repressive policies also covered a range of possible options (both
eradication and interdiction) that were at times adopted as discrete policies -- instead of
together as in the so-called "holistic approach" (where a range of repressive and non-
150
repressive policies are adopted simultaneously) -- thus allowing for a fine-tuned
distinction between the impact of each specific policy. The case of Peru also contains two
non-governmental belligerent groups interacting with both the illicit economy and the
drug traffickers, and hence provides a good vehicle for analyzing the relationship
between politically-motivated belligerents and criminal organizations.
In addition, the Peru case is useful in revealing how the demise of the belligerent
group affects the existence of the illicit economy. Unlike the cases of Colombia and
Afghanistan, where military conflict persists and many belligerent groups continue
operating undefeated, in Peru, both the Shining Path and the MRTA were defeated, and
only small remnants of the Shining Path continue operating. The case of Peru can be
therefore used to test one of the central propositions of the conventional view that
eradication leads to the elimination of the illicit economy and hence the defeat of the
belligerents. In fact, one of the major proponents of the conventional view argues that the
Shining Path was defeated and Guzmmn was captured because the guerrilla and the drug
traffickers were fought at last as a single entity and that in fighting them as one, Peru was
able to defeat both.3 I will show, however, that empirical evidence fundamentally
contradicts this assertion. Rather, it was a combination of tacit acquiescence by the
government toward the narcotics economy in the countryside and an intelligence
operation in the urban theater, unrelated to counternarcotics, that led to the defeat of the
Shining Path. In fact, when Sendero was defeated, the illicit economy was at its peak.
Only several years after the defeat of Sendero was there a substantial decline in the size
of the illicit economy.
3 Douglas J. Davids, Narco-terrorism (Ardsley: Transnational Publishers, 2002): 23.
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With respect to the entire period of Sendero's interaction with the illicit economy,
my theory of political capital of illicit economies performs considerably better than the
conventional view. The analysis will show that in the early 1980s, Sendero's strength was
limited and the belligerent group was more an irritant than a fundamental threat to the
government. Its numbers, extent of operations, and political capital were limited. Once
Sendero was able to tap into the drug trade, however, its strength grew dramatically both
in terms of its military capabilities and in terms of its political capital.
The analysis will also show how Sendero's ability to effectively exploit the illicit
economy was crucially affected by the eradication policy undertaken by the government
in the early 1980s. Eradication antagonized and radicalized the peasants while the
government's dismissal of peasants' efforts to stop eradication, fueled by U.S. pressure to
carry on with eradication, exposed the ineffectiveness of the peasant coca defense groups.
Sendero was able to step in and offer itself to the peasants as a more effective protector of
the illicit economy and their interests.
I further show how subsequently the Shining Path was able to harness and
increase political capital by protecting the peasants not only against the government
eradication teams but also against the traffickers. Sendero bargained on behalf of the
peasants for better prices, protected the peasants against the traffickers' brutality, and
with its drug money sponsored various social services. Clearly, such behavior was not
driven by a desire to increase its pecuniary gains, thus disconfirming the conventional
view. Sendero's overall interaction with the traffickers reveals the fallacy of assuming a
unity of goals, if not identity, between the criminal trafficking organizations and the
guerrillas. Much of Sendero's attitude toward the traffickers was driven by its desire to
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solidify and maximize its political capital. In fact, political support for Sendero was
greatest in the coca growing regions, and neither ideology nor coercion adequately
account for Sendero's political capital.
Moreover, I demonstrate that when the military in command of the coca-growing
regions adopted a tacit acquiescence policy toward the narcotics economy, it was able to
obtain vital intelligence on the guerrillas from the rural population and even the
traffickers. It was subsequently able to effectively push out Sendero from the coca
growing regions. When on the other hand the government insisted on aggressive
eradication, the population was antagonized, stopped providing intelligence, and even
actively fought alongside the guerrillas against the government. This oscillation in
government counternarcotics policy matched by the increased and decreased
effectiveness of the counterinsurgency effort contradicts the conventional view.
Finally, I show that once Sendero was defeated, a combination of fungus and
aerial interdiction were effective in diminishing the size of the illicit narcotics economy.
However, this success in greatly limiting the extent of illicit crop cultivation did not
bankrupt the remnants of Sendero. Instead, the remaining Senderistas adapted by
penetrating another illicit economy, illicit logging. While able to obtain financial profits
from this economy, they have not been able to obtain large-scale political capital, due to
the small numbers of the remaining Senderistas, and, crucially, due to government laxity
(tacit acquiescence) in enforcing the prohibitions against illicit logging. Renewed forced
coca eradication, however, has created new political openings for Sendero, and the group
is actively competing for the allegiance of the once-again antagonized and radicalized
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peasants. The current situation thus again supports my theory while disconfirming the
conventional view.
The following table summarizes how the Peru case covers the variation of the
amplifying factors and types of belligerents' involvement as determinants of the strength
of belligerents.
DETERMINANTS OF STRENGTH OF BELLIGERENTS
TYPE OF INVOLVEMENT
AMPLIFYING FACTORS
POSITIVE NEGATIVE NO INVOLVEMENT
Sendero (until 1983;
STATE OF Poor Sendero (1985 --)enero (19834) and several months in
MRTA (1986-7) 1984 after pushed out
OVERALL ECON. from UHV)MRTA (until 1986)
Rich
Sendero (until 1983;
CHARACTER OF Labor Sendero (1985-) Sendero (1983-4) and several months in
Intensive MRTA (1986-7) 1984 after pushed out
ILLICIT ECON. from UHV)
MRTA (until 1986)
Labor-Non-
Intensive
Sendero (until 1983;
PRESENCE OF and several months inSendero (1985-)Present MRTA (1986-7) Sendero (1983) 1984 after pushed out
TRAFFICKERS from UHV)
MRTA (until 1986)
Absent
Eradication Sendero (1985-89; 1996-) Sendero (1983-4: Sendero (until 1983)
GOENMENT MRTA (1986-7) eradication by MRTA (until 1986)GOVERNMENT police)
Interdiction Sendero (late 1989-)
RESPONSE TO Sendero (several
Tacit Sendero (1989) Sendero (1983-4: months in 1984 after
tacit acquiescence
ILLICIT ECON. Acquiescence Sendero (after 1996 - by military) pushed out fromillicit logging) UHV)
Licensing/
Legalization
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The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows: I first analyze the limits of Sendero's
strength prior to its access to the illicit narcotics economy. Second, I show how Sendero
was able to grow and increase its physical resources, freedom of action, and political
capital as a result of its effective exploitation of the illicit economy. Third, I show how
Sendero's sophistication in exploiting the illicit economy grew over time and how it
provided an example for the MRTA to emulate in its own approach to the narcotics
industry. In this third section, I also disconfirm the conventional view's proposition of a
unity of purpose and goals among the traffickers and the belligerents. In the fourth
section, I discuss how government policy toward the narcotics economy impacted on the
effectiveness of the counterinsurgency campaign. In section five, I analyze how the
remnants of the Shining Path adapted to the capture of their leadership, the defeat of the
bulk of their force, and the decline in the illicit narcotics economy, and how they are
exploiting eradication during the current period to rebuild the belligerents' political
capital. In presenting the empirical work, I evaluate the validity of the two competing
theories in each section. Finally, I present a summary of evidence and discuss the
cumulative implications of the evidence supporting and disconfirming the two theories.
II. The Shining Path Before Access to Drugs
The Shining Path (or in its full name, the Communist Party of Peru on the Shining
Path of Jose Carlos Maridtegui), one of the most effective and most brutal Maoist
guerrilla movements, emerged in the rural Andean province of Ayacucho in Peru in the
early 1960s when Dr. Abimael Guzman started the long process of recruiting and
organizing a system of SL's cadres. After a final split from the more traditional Peruvian
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Communist Party in 1970, GuzmAn's group started using the name Sendero Luminoso.
Since its inception, the guerrilla movement had Marxist political goals. It sought to take
over the political and military power in Peru and establish a new radical Marxist society.4
Several explanations have been advanced as to the causes of the emergence of the
Shining Path -- ranging from a subsistence crisis and a radical decline in standards of
living of the Peruvian periphery since the 1960s5 to the failure of the government's
reforms and the subsequent revolution of rising expectations6 to the brilliant
organizational skills of the Shining Path, mainly its tremendously successful recruitment
and indoctrination of teachers, students, and young people in general7 to the provincial
origins of Sendero which allowed for the development of a quasi-religious character of
the organization.8 McClintock (1998) provides a multivariate synthetic analysis according
to which the sine qua non of Sendero's success was the profound economic crisis in Peru,
which threatened the peasants' very subsistence. This economic situation interacted with
the organizational skills of Sendero - their adept recruitment of disillusioned middle class
teachers and students whose opportunities for advancement had been blocked - and with
the progressive deterioration of the state's capabilities due to a profound economic
4For more details on the emergence and organization of the Shining Path, see David Scott Palmer, ed.,
Shining Path of Peru, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994) and Gustavo Gorriti, The Shining Path: A
History of the Millenarian War in Peru, Robin Kirk, trans. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1999). The Shining Path was a true Maoist guerrilla movement that early on rejected the Cuban-style
foco model of guerrilla movements based on the ideas of Che Guevara.
5 Cynthia McClintock, "Theories of Revolution and the Case of Peru, " in David Scott Palmer, ed., Shining
Path ofPeru, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994): 243-259.
6 David Scott Palmer, "Introduction: History, Politics, and the Shining Path in Peru," and "Conclusion: The
View form the Windows," in Shining Path of Peru, David Scott Palmer, ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1994): 1-33; and 259-275.
7 Carlos Ivan Degregori, "Sendero Luminoso: Los hondos y mortals desencuentros," in Movimientos
Socialesy crisis: El caso peruano, Eduardo Ballon, ed. (Lima: DESCO, 1985): 261 and Carlos Ivan
Degregori, "A Dwarf Star," NACLA Report on the Americas, 24 (4) (December-January 1990-1991): 10-
19.
8 Ibid. See, also Gorriti (1999).
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crisis.9 McClintock thus combines a demand-driven explanation, i.e., the threat to peasant
subsistence, with a supply-driven explanation, i.e., the availability of political
entrepreneurs and social networks capable of exploiting the social conditions for
mobilization. What it is important for the purposes of this inquiry is that the emergence of
the Shining Path was due to social problems in the culturally diverse and geographically
isolated periphery of Peru, not due to the production of drugs in that region or in Peru
more broadly. In fact, the Shining Path only gained access to drugs more than fifteen
years after its inception, and hence its emergence was fully independent of the presence
of the illicit economy.
Under the leadership of Guznin, the Shining Path embraced a variant of Maoist
ideology. Its teachings emphasized protracted guerrilla war in the countryside,
culminating in the capture of urban centers, and the destruction of markets in any form,
including small local markets. Guzmin further combined this Maoist strategy with the
radical indigenismo of Jose Carlos Marintegui, a Peruvian Communist theoretician of the
1920s who called for agrarian communism based on the indigenous peasant community.' 0
Sendero was thus highly sectarian and inward-looking. Rejecting all forms of Marxism
other than Maoism, Guzmin not only attributed a fundamental role to violence in the
political process, but also exalted violence as a transformational process. Indeed, Sendero
did not shy from violence - whether against unarmed civilians or political leaders and the
military - and often employed great savagery. Guzmin sought a fundamental
restructuring of Peruvian society, by rooting out existing popular and communal
9 Cynthia McClintock, Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN & Peru's Shining
Path (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998): 14-15, 281.
10 Carlos Ivin Degregori, Sendero Luminoso, lucha armadas y utopia autoritaria (Lima: Instituto de
Estudios Peruanos, 1986).
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organizations and replacing them with revolutionary ones." As Carlos Ivin Degregori
put it, the Shining Path combined "ideological zeal, military strategy, and [a] totalitarian
political project."' 2
Creating a god-like aura around Guzmin, Sendero insisted on absolute obedience
to superiors and devotion to its leader. The resulting organization was thus extremely
hierarchical. Part of its recruitment strategy was the indoctrination of teachers who then
went out to the peasant communities and spread Sendero's message. In theory, the
movement as a whole was to be controlled by its national executive committee, known as
the Czipola, with Guzmin as its head. The committee in principal coordinated the various
subordinate political and military units. But while Guzm&n and the top leadership defined
the large parameters and strategies of Sendero's struggle against the state, they found it
very difficult to fully control what at its peak was ten thousand active members. 13
Even though the Shining Path was conceived in the 1960s, only in 1979, after
over fifteen years of organizing, did Guzmcin and his Central Committee make the
decision to launch an armed struggle. On May 17, 1980, the day before the first free
presidential election since General Juan Velasco's military coup of 1968, four masked
students from the University of Ayacucho (where Guzmin had been a professor of
philosophy), armed with non-functioning pistols, entered the town hall in the city of
Chuschi in the Ayacucho province, tied up the registrar, seized the registration book and
11For details on methods, including the separation of children from their parents and training of children to
enjoy tormenting others, see, Ponciano del Pino H., "Family, Culture, and 'Revolution': Everyday Life
with Sendero Luminoso," in Steve J. Stem, Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1998): 158-92.
12 Carlos Ivin Degregori, "Harvesting Storms: Peasant Rondas and the Defeat of Sendero Luminoso in
Ayacucho," in Steve J. Stem, Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995 (Durham:
Duke University Press, 1998): 136.
13 See, for example, Cyrus Emesto Zirakzadeh, Social Movements in Politics: A Comparative Study (New
York: Longman, 1997): 206-8.
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the ballot boxes, and burned them. 14 The long revolution thus took off with a purely
symbolic start.
For the remainder of 1980, the armed struggle continued to be very low-scale.
Only a few bombs exploded in the Andean region and in Lima, taking the lives of seven
people in total. In 1981, the Shining Path's military activity escalated. The number of
terrorist attacks grew to 685, and there were over 50 bank robberies in Lima. But still
only 13 people were killed that year, thus making the total 20 for the first two years. 15
The people killed were either police officers or victims chosen by Sendero to gain
approval from the peasants in villages where Sendero was trying to build its support
organizations.• 6 As Richard Clutterbuck maintains, "the SL spent 1980 and 1981 building
up their support organizations in the villages in Lima, training their 'People's Guerrilla
Army' and, perhaps more important, raising funds by bank robberies and extortion.""17
What inhibited the expansion of conflict by the Shining Path was its weakness -in terms
of both military capabilities and political capital.
The lack of access to the Peru's illicit economy limited not only Sendero's
popular support and its capabilities in terms of money and weapons, but also its freedom
of action. The lack of assured financing dictated that robberies and extortion remained the
main source of revenues. The guerrillas were unable to raise a large amount of money to
buy weapons and other supplies. Their weapons comprised revolvers, outdated rifles and
shotguns, a few machine guns, and dynamite - all looted from police and military
14 Richard Clutterbuck, Drugs, Crime and Corruption (New York: New York University Press, 1995).Gordon H. McCormick, "From the Sierra to the Cities: The Urban Campaign of the Shining Path (Santa
Monica: RAND, 1992): 22.
16 Billie Jean Isbell, "Shining Path and Peasant Responses in Rural Ayacucho," in David Scott Palmer, ed.,
Shining Path of Peru, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994): 79-86.
17 Clutterbuck: 19.
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outposts.18 Struggling with supply and logistics problems even in small-scale operations,
the movement of Sendero's units and operatives was highly constrained.
The Shining Path tried to overcome this major military impediment by attacking
police and army outposts and seizing their weapons. As with bank robberies, this source
of weapons procurement consumed a large amount of the guerrillas' time and energy and
was intrinsically inefficient from the perspective of the revolution since it indicated a
choice of operational tactical targets that were not optimal from the SL's strategic
perspective. As Carlos Ivin Degregori, a leading Shining Path experts maintains, "apart
from the police, whom Shining Path placed on the run during the early years by
dynamiting their rural posts, the most important targets were abusive peasants, cattle
thieves, corrupt judges, and drunk husbands.""19 Such a target list, while pleasing to some
peasants in particular villages, did little to launch Sendero onto the path of a major
insurgency in Latin America. Although highly time- and resource-consuming activities,
bank robberies and extortion of individuals brought only very revenues per each action
undertaken. Sendero was also unable to pay salaries to its soldiers during this period. The
group had no ability to bring down the Peruvian government and little ability to seriously
engage the military.
An equally important impediment to the growth of Sendero's power and its ability
to expand conflict was its limited political capital. Although peasants welcomed the SL's
execution of unpopular landowners and thieves, they otherwise remained passive. Very
much aware of the critical need to build political support, Sendero tried to compensate for
its inability to deliver large material benefits to the population by providing regular
18 Rensselaer W. Lee III., The White Labyrinth: Cocaine and Political Power (New Brunswick:
Transaction Publishers, 1989): 175-76.
19 Degregori (1998): 135.
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paramedical services, agricultural advice, and at least limited food handouts. The
Senderistas killed, pushed out, and robbed well-to-do landowners and shopkeepers,
distributing the spoils among the peasants.2 0 As in the case of their own financing, such
high-consuming activities generated only very limited resources that could be distributed
among the rural population, and hence constrained the extent of popular support Sendero
could buy.
Despite the large constraints on Sendero's political capital and military
capabilities, the group tried to up violence. The number of people killed by the Shining
Path rose to hundreds a year in 1982. The Shining Path even launched operations in three
company-sized units of one hundred fighters or more. 21 In fact, this level of violence was
now sufficient to scare President Fernando Beladinde Terry into overcoming his
unwillingness to use the military to suppress the insurgency. 22 Still, SL's actions
remained rather low-key and limited compared to the level of violence that took place
after 1986, i.e., after the guerillas consolidated control over Peru's coca cultivating
regions. A lack of access to Peru's illicit narcotics economy thus critically limited not
only Sendero's physical resources, but also severely constrained its freedom of action
and, crucially, its ability to obtain political capital. In short, during this period the Shining
Path was unable to present a systematic threat to the Peruvian state, even though it could
harass individual communities.
20 Cynthia McClintock, "Peru's Sendero Luminoso Rebellion: Origins and Trajectory," in Susan Eckstein,
ed., Power and Popular Protest (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001): 78-9.
21 Otto Guibovich, Shining Path: Birth, Life, and Death (Camberley: Staff College, 1993): 18.
22 President Belainde attempted to rely on the police for the first two years of the armed phase of the SL's
revolution since he feared that employing the military in any major way and giving it prominent
responsibility would undermine Peru's still new and fragile democracy.
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III. The Shining Path's First Encounter with Drugs: Testing the Effect of
Belligerents' Negative Involvement in the Illicit Economy
When Sendero first encountered the narcotics illicit economy, it decided to
prohibit the illicit economy. Since the state of the overall economy was poor, the illicit
economy labor-intensive, traffickers present, and the government was eradicating, my
theory of political capital of illicit economies predicts that such a negative involvement in
the illicit economy on the part of the belligerents will result in the inability of the
belligerents to generate political capital and the obtain support from the population. Since
the Shining Path was new to the region and had not built up any support base there yet,
the negative involvement in the illicit economy will not result in a loss of political capital
(there is none to lose since Sendero does not have any in the region), but will hamper
Sendero's effort to develop a support base.
I 1983 the military was deployed to the department of Ayacucho to suppress the
insurgency, and the department was placed under a state of emergency. The military
campaign rapidly pushed out the Shining Path from its strongholds in Ayacucho's
highlands, which until then had been its main areas of operations. The Peruvian military
now held the central highlands territory of the departments of Ayacucho, Huancavelica,
and Apurimac and continued making considerable inroads into SL's logistical
organization. Most significantly, it threatened Sendero in its traditional base where the
majority of Sendero's organizing and support network had been built. 23 The guerrilla
group was on the run and seriously weakened.
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23 Clutterbuck: 24.
To counter the logistical difficulties that the military was creating for the
guerrillas in its traditional region of operations, the Shining Path was forced to open a
new front in the Upper Huallaga Valley. The remoteness and inaccessibility of the
territory was ideally suited for guerrilla warfare. By chance, the area also happened to be
the main coca production region in Peru. At that time, Peru was the world's largest
supplier of coca, and the Upper Huallaga Valley the biggest coca-production region of
the world.24 Around 300, 000 families were growing coca on more than 100,000 hectares
in the region.25 At its peak, that number rose to seven percent of the economically active
rural population.26 Ninety-five percent of economic activity in the UHV was coca-
based.27
Engagement in the illicit economy was economically far superior for the peasants
than traditional non-coca livelihood. Even with only two full harvests of coca leaves per
year (a low average), the mean annual earnings of a coca peasant in the Upper Huallaga
Valley were estimated to be $3,630 - or three times higher than Peru's per capita income
of $1,000 and many more times higher than the income of a peasant in non-coca
24 The settlement of the Amazonian selva (forest) began in the 1960s, conceived by President Fernando
Belalinde as a solution to Peru's growing demographic problem that was overwhelming the major cities.
With a loan from the Inter-American Development Bank, the Peruvian government encouraged
colonization of the Tingo Maria-Tocache area in the departments of Huinuco and San Martin in the Upper
Huallaga Valley. But the various schemes of agricultural development failed to take off, and the population
that had migrated to the regions remained largely impoverished. Both the first colonization effort and the
subsequent coca boom contributed to critical deforestation and devastating environmental destruction of the
pristine Amazonian rainforest. This impact was further compounded by subsequent waves of eradication
and replanting after eradication by moving crops further into the jungle.
25Enrique Obando, "Subversion and Anti-Subversion in Peru 1980-2," Low Intensity Conflict and Law
Enforcement, 2 (2), Autumn 1993: 323. See also, LaMond Tullis, Unintended Consequences: Illegal Drugs
and Drug Policies in Nine Countries (Boulder: Lynne-Rienner, 1995): 96.
26International Crisis Group, Coca, Drugs and Social Protest in Bolivia and Peru, Latin America Report
No. 12, March 3, 2005,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/latin_americall 2_coca_drugs_and_social_protest in bolivia
and_peruamended.pdf, downloaded March 17, 2005.
"Los Intis de la Coca," Perz Econ6mico, September 1987.
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regions.28 Other estimates put profits from coca cultivation and the wage differentials
even higher: A coca farmer in the UHV could earn as a maximum gross income $12,350,
60% of which was profit. His net per-hectare earnings were thus ten times higher than
those of cacao farmers and 91 times higher than those of a rice farmer. 29 The price per
hectare that traffickers offered for coca leaves surpassed the price that peasants could get
for cacao pods between two and eight times, for rubber four times, and for maize more
than forty times.30 Coca was thus by far the most profitable crop. Even seasonal workers
hired to collect coca leaves would earn twice the average rate in the licit agricultural
sector, while pisadores (peasants who stamp on coca leaves to make coca paste) made
several times the wages of coca leaf pickers. In mid-1986, pisadores earned up to $40 a
day while a schoolteacher would earn $23 per month, or less than a dollar a month.31 In
fact, some parents' associations in the UHV provided teachers with at least a hectare of
land for growing coca while local peasants cultivated the plot and arranged for the
processing of coca,32 in order to make it at all attractive for anyone to remain a teacher.
But apart from price profitability, other structural drivers were crucial for
peasants' decision to grow coca. The plant erythoxylum coca grows in poor acid tropical
soil, rugged terrain, high humidity-heavy rain conditions unsuitable for many legal crops.
Native to the region, it requires little care, thus minimizing expenses on fertilizers and
28 Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano, with John B. Reuter, Sendero Luminoso and the Threat ofNarcoterrorism
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1990): 116.
29"U.S. AID Project Wins Few Friends and Fails to Match the Drug Industry's Complete Package," The
Andean Report, Lima, December 1985: 244.
30 David Whynes, "Illicit Drugs Policy in Asia and Latin America," Development and Change, (22), 1991:
475-96.
31 Lee (1989): 46. For a comparison with Bolivia, see Kevin Healy, "The Boom Within the Crisis: Some
Recent Effects of Foreign Cocaine Markets on Bolivia's Rural Society and Economy," in Deborah Pacini
and Christine Franquemont, (eds.), Coca and Cocaine: Effects on People and Policy in Latin America,
Cultural Survival Report Series, 23, 1986: 101-145.
32 Raul GonzAlez, "Coca y subversi6n en el Huallaga," Quehacer, (48), September-October 1987: 58-72.
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pesticides. Coca is also very durable with a lifespan of thirty-years, 33 and allows for 3-6
harvests a year. Growing coca thus brought not only more money, but did so with less
effort and smaller risks. Compared to the remarkably hardy coca plan, legal crops tend to
have fewer harvests per year, tend to be less sturdy, and are subject to greater market
price fluctuations. Moreover, planting legal crops often required initial investments that
the peasants could only put down by taking out high-interest loans.
Another key driver of coca cultivation was the lack of infrastructure. The Upper
Huallaga Valley and many other parts of rural Peru lacked roads. The inability to
transport easily and rapidly other agricultural commodities, such as bananas, citrus, and
pineapples, not only substantially raised transaction costs for the peasants, but frequently
resulted in their products getting spoiled before arriving in local markets, thus generating
critical financial losses for the peasants. Coca leaves and coca paste, on the other hand,
were frequently picked up by traffickers right at the farm, and thus transportations costs
were eliminated. Even when farmers took coca products to the local market themselves,
the shipments weighed less than shipments of licit products and were less subject to
spoilage.34 In short, growing coca greatly reduced transaction costs and market risks.
Coca also performed the function of a means of exchange. Wages, for example,
were often paid in coca and coca was bartered for potatoes, corn, and other altiplano
crops to highland farmers.35 Traffickers would advance financing, fertilizers (not
necessary for cultivation of coca but helpful), seeds, and even technical assistance to
33Unless, of course, spayed or burned down under U.S. sponsored eradication programs.
David Scott Palmer, "Peru, the Drug Business and Shining Path: Between Scylla and Charybdis?"
Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 34 (3), Autumn 1992: 68.
Edmundo Morales, New Trends in Coca and Cocaine Economy in the Andes ofPeru (Narcotics and
Drug Research, 1985): 7-14.
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cocaleros. This microcredit and exchange systems based on coca gave an additional
impetus to coca cultivation and to the spread of the coca economy in the UHV.
Not all coca in the UHV and Peru was illegal. Apart from the illicit market, there
was also a legal traditional market for coca. At least since the Incas, coca was chewed by
the highland people of the Andes as a mild stimulate, pain reliever, hunger suppressor,
and treatment of altitude sickness.36 A 1970 survey revealed that about 15 percent of
Peru's population chewed coca daily.37
In addition, there was also a legal industrial market for the production of licit
cocaine for specialty pharmaceutical purposes as well as a small market for a Coca Cola
extract. Both the licit and traditional production was regulated by Peru's national
wholesale agency, ENACO (National Coca Enterprise). However, neither the profits per
unit nor the size of the traditional and licit markets could compete with the illicit
economy. 38 The price ratios of the illicit to licit cultivation ranged from 3:1 to as high as
15:1. Moreover, cultivation for both legal and industrial purposes absorbed only a small
percentage of overall production. In 1986, for example, ENACO purchased only 4,000
tons of coca leaf out of the estimated 100,000 tons produced.39
The importance of the illicit economy becomes even more apparent in light of the
state of the overall economy in Peru during the early 1980s. From the late 1970s, national
economic trends in Peru were among the worst in the region. Living standards had
36 See, for example, Edmundo Morales, Cocaine: White Gold Rush in Peru (Tuscon: The University of
Arizona Press, 1989).
37Lester Grinspoon and James B. Bakalar, Cocaine: A Drug and Its Social Evolution (New York: Basic
Books, 1985): 12.
38 Since the early 1980s, the United States has strongly discouraged all efforts for commercialization of
coca-based products, arguing that such efforts would increase diversion into the illicit market and stimulate
further cultivation.
39Lee (1989): 60.
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declined precipitously for southern highlands peasants, Sendero's original base. During
the 1970s, the average annual economic growth per capita was 0.9 percent while during
the 1980s, the economy declined on average by 3.2 percent annually. 40 Inflation hovered
in three-digit levels a year, peaking at a four-digit 7,650% in 1990. 41 Unemployment and
underemployment were high. As Peru linked debt payments to export earnings and was
cut off from access to international loans, cash coming from the cocaine trade was
frequently the only source of hard currency coming into Peruvian banks. The gross
amount of hard currency was estimate to equal to about 20 percent of Peru's legitimate
GNP. 42
Thus when the Shining Path was pushed into the Upper Huallaga Valley, it found
a burgeoning drug economy amidst widespread grinding poverty in the rest of the
country. Paradoxically, since the Shining Path had not actively sought out to exploit the
illicit economy, it did not immediately know how to take advantage of the drug windfall.
In fact, Sendero's first reaction was to prohibit the anti-Marxist drugs, as it prohibited
prostitution and tried to limit the consumption of alcohol. The political economy in the
UHV represented what the Shining Path doctrinairely abhorred - unrestrained capitalism
in a "Wild West" setting. With no state presence, opulent riches of the drug traffickers,
ubiquitous casinos and prostitution houses, and large amount of social violence -- among
40 McClintock (1998): 163.
41 Palmer (1992): 66. Even out of those who were not employed in the coca economy, many survived by
participating in other forms of illicit or informal economy. See, Hernando de Soto, The Other Path
(London: Taurus, 1989).
42 Tazarona-Sevillano (1990): 113. Some authors have argued that by the late 1980s, income of the illicit
drug trade accounted for 40% of Peru's GDP. See, for example, Laura Vasquez, "Peru," in Scott B.
MacDonald and Bruce Zagaris, eds., International Handbook on Drug Control (Westport: Greenwood
Press, 1992): 218. Such a high number, however, is a gross overestimate. Francisco Thoumi, for example,
argues persuasively that in the case of Peru, returns from the drug trade never represented more than ten
percent of the GDP. See, Francisco Thoumi, Illegal Drugs, Economy, and Society in the Andes (Baltimore:
John Hopkins University Press, 2003).
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the Colombian cartels that controlled the trade,43 between the Colombian cartels and
Peruvian traquateros (intermediaries), and against the growers - the Upper Huallaga
Valley's drug regions were seen by the Sendero as the worst manifestation of capitalism,
"free market unfettered by the state." 44
While the top traffickers enjoyed great riches, the majority of the peasants earned
only a small percentage of the total earnings from the illicit economy, even if living
considerably better than the rural population elsewhere in Peru did. While the paste
producers and local traffickers were believed to collect $7.48 billion or 25.84% of the
trade, the coca peasants were estimated to earn collectively $240 million or around 0.86
percent of the total value of the Peruvian illicit drug trade. The remaining 73.3 percent
went to international, mainly Colombian, traffickers. 45 The Upper Huallaga was thus a
paradox -- poverty, combined with a desire for and a possibility of upward mobility
through the illicit economy, and wealth, achieved through the illicit economy. Observed
Rensselaer W. Lee: "The town of Tocache in Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley has six
banks, six Telex machines, several stereo dealerships, a discotheque, and one of the
largest Nissan outlets in Peru. Tocache also has no paved streets, no drinking water and
no sewage system."46
43 Colombian traffickers were the ones who introduced the expansion of coca cultivation in the En6 and
Upper Huallaga Valleys in the late 1970s, persuading the locals to engage in cultivation on a much larger
scale than the consumption of coca for traditional purposes required. For details on the role of Colombian
traffickers in the spread of coca cultivation, see Nelson Manrique, "The War for the Central Sierra," in
Steve J. Stern, ed., Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995 (Durham, Duke: 1988):
213-15.
44 Author's interview with Gustavo Gorriti, a prominent Peruvian journalist who did field work in the UHV
during the early 1980s and a leading scholar of the Shining Path, Lima, summer 2005.
45 Tarazona-Sevillano (1990): 113.
46Rensselaer W. Lee III., "Why the United States Cannot Stop South American Cocaine," Orbis, 32 (4),
Fall 1988: 503. The other main centers of the coca economy and the region were Uchiza and Tingo Maria.
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In other words, when the Shining Path entered the UHV, it encountered a totally
unregulated economy, rife with unmitigated violence and with an extremely unequal
distribution of income between top traffickers and the peasants. But instead of tapping
into the ready social base by embracing the illicit economy, Sendero at first tried to
capture the social base by agitating among the population in the same way it had done in
the central highlands - criticizing the government, denouncing capitalism, and, ironically,
prohibiting the illicit economy.47
However, the message did not resonate with the peasants of the UHV, and the
Shining Path made little progress in securing the allegiance of the coca farmers. Their
main grievance was not destitution for they were considerably better off than peasants
elsewhere in Peru. Their main grievance was not even exploitation by the drug
traffickers. Their main aspiration was not a socialist economic system that would abolish
the existence of the capitalist free trade with illicit drugs. Their main grievance was the
government threat to their coca economy.
Thus, instead of securing the peasants' support, Sendero's impulsive embrace of
the anti-drug policies and its prohibition of cultivation alienated the peasants. The
reaction from the peasants was fierce. The peasants were alienated and condemned
Sendero. The Shining Path saw its own prohibitionist policy backfiring and
fundamentally antagonizing the peasants from the movement.48 Although the population
did not turn to the government for help since the government too was eradicating the coca
economy, they rejected the Shining Path. Sendero was thus unable to obtain political
capital and grow in strength.
47Author's interviews in Peru, summer 2005.
48 Author's interviews in Peru, summer 2005.
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A Taste of Power: Testing the Effect of Government Response to the Illicit
Economy
Sendero's negative involvement in the illicit economy coincided at first with a
coca eradication policy on the part of the government. Given that the other amplifying
factors are a poor overall economy, a labor-intensive illicit economy, and the presence of
traffickers, my theory of political capital predicts that eradication will radicalize the
peasants and alienate them from the government, making them a ready base for a
belligerent group that will become positively involved in the illicit economy. The
prediction of the conventional view, on the other hand, is that eradication will destroy a
potential resources base of the belligerents, thus preventing the possibility of their
growth.
In addition to the peasants' reaction to Sendero's own prohibition of the illicit
economy, the group also witnessed the tremendous alienation of the peasants from the
government as a result of the government's coca eradication efforts. Not only did the
peasants' reject the government, they also active resisted against its eradication policy.
The first attempt at eradication in the UHV took place in 1978. Under steadily mounting
pressure from the United States, the government of President Francisco Morales
Bermudez placed coca-growing regions in the departments of HuAnuco, San Martin, and
Loreto under a state of emergency and ordered government forces to destroy the coca
crops, confiscate land, and incarcerate resisting peasants. In reality, during "Operation
Mar Verde," as the eradication effort was dubbed, government forces accomplished the
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eradication of only 60 out of the estimated 12,000 hectares of coca in the UHV in 197849
while dramatically boosting prices for coca and thus attracting more migrants into the
region. Instead of suppressing cultivation, eradication actually resulted in a rapid increase
in cultivation.
The second wave of eradication took place in 1983, this time as compensated
eradication. Under the name CORAH (Control y Reducci6n de los Cultivos de Coca en el
Alto Huallaga, or Special Project for the Control and Eradication of Coca in the Upper
Huallaga) and funded with an annual $1.3 million from the U.S. Bureau for International
Narcotics Matters, 450 men were hired to manually dig up coca plants while paying the
farmers a nominal fee for their losses. At its peak year in 1985, CORAH eradicated 5,000
hectares of coca while 20,000 new ones were planted that same year. The fee offered to
peasants -- $300 per hectare50 -- was a paltry fraction of what the peasants were making
on the illicit market for the same amount of coca.
Nor did alternative development fare any better in reducing the area of coca
cultivation. Under the name PEAH (Programma Especial del Alto Huallaga, or Upper
Huallaga Area Development Project) and with an annual budget of $3 million from U.S.
AID,5s the project was intended to promote crop substitution and general economic
development of the region. Eradication was seen as an integral part of alternative
development, promising to raise the perceived risks of coca cultivation and reduce the
profit margins to the point where growing alternative crops would be economically
49 Tarazona-Sevillano (1990): 109.
50 Cynthia McClintock, "The War on Drugs: The Peruvian Case," Journal ofInteramerican Studies and
World Affairs, 30 (2-3), Summer-Autumn 1988: 133.
51 Cynthia McClintock and Fabian Vallas, The United States and Peru: Cooperation at a Cost (New York:
Routledge, 2003): 113. Interestingly enough, the CORAH and PEAH efforts in Peru in the 1980s were one
of the rare moments when alternative development received more funding than eradication even though
both efforts were grossly underfunded given the scale of the problem.
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attractive. A key problem with the design of PEAH was a requirement that only peasants
certified by CORAH not to be cultivating any coca were allowed to participate in
PEAH's programs. Obtaining such a certification turned out to be a complex bureaucratic
headache, partially stemming from a lack of land registry and titles and compounded by
the fact that it was unclear who was cultivating coca legally for ENACO. The peasants
who actually participated in PEAH's projects were unable to raise sufficient money to
support themselves and their families and repay the debts they had to incur to cultivate
legal crops. The only way to repay these debts was to go back to growing coca.
Moreover, legal crops took too long to become productive, generating income only
several years after peasants had to had repaid their debts. Crop failure and low
profitability due to a decline of international market prices for legal crops also
systematically plagued the effort, impoverishing peasants who had agreed to eradicate
coca and participate in the legal schemes. Commented a UHV peasant (quoted by
MacDonald): "God made this valley for coca. I plant coffee: it gets knee high and it dies.
I plant cacao and it turns yellow. Coca - that's all that grows."52
Overall, the alternative development efforts largely failed, and employees of
PEAH became targeted by angry peasants. As Cynthia McClintock and Fabian Vallas
observed, "Gradually the fifty-odd employees of PEAH focused primarily on research
into viable alternative crops at PEAH's own headquarters."' 3 By 1986, PEAH spent
almost as much money on project administration and bureaucracy ($1.3 million) as on
agricultural extension services to peasants ($1.6 million). The early failure of PEAH
52 Quoted in Scott B. MacDonald, Dancing on a Volcano: The Latin American Drug Trade (New Praeger,
1986):
61.
McClintock and Vallas: 114.
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soured many Peruvian peasants on the concept of alternative development and made them
distrust its viability in general. Such a poor image of alternative development persists
even today.54
Eradication and the failure of alternative development generated widespread
resentment and resulted in the formation of local defense committees to negotiate with
the central government. Throughout the early 1980s, these local defense committees
continued organizing. One such committeewas Comit6 Regional de Productores de Coca
de La Provincia de Leoncio Prado y Anexos (Regional Coca Producers Committee of
Leoncio Prado Province) in the Leoncio Prado region of the UHV, a region that bore the
brunt of eradication efforts in the 1970s and 1980s. In the northern part of the UHV, the
coca peasants formed the Front for the Defense of the Interests of the People (FEDIP) of
Tocache province. At the peak of FEDIP's activity in 1986, its membership included tens
of thousands of peasants in the region. Their agenda included legalization of coca
cultivation, expansion of markets for legal uses of coca for medicines and food, and
protection of cocaleros' rights against the abuses of UMOPAR (the Unidad M6vil de
Patrullaje Rural or Rural Mobile Patrol Unit)55 that was tasked by the government to
protect eradication units56 and that came to be widely accused of gross human rights
violations. FEDIP's demands also included the promotion of agricultural and industrial
development of the region and development of social services and infrastructure.
54 Author's fieldwork in Peru, summer 2005.
55UMOPAR consisted of about 350 men that were trained by the DEA and directly or indirectly paid by
the U.S. government. Allegations of UMOPAR's abuses included violating personal and property rights,
raping women, stealing money from peasants, seizing coca leaves and reselling them to the traffickers, and
extorting money from the peasants.
56 Between 1982 and 1988, 32 eradication workers and six development workers were killed.
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Eradication thus premobilized the peasants for Sendero. In the central highlands,
peasants were unconnected to the state, and under Sendero's tutelage, gradually
embraced some of its teachings, but remained passive. In contrast, the peasants in the
drug-producing regions were already mobilized and fighting when Sendero encountered
them. All Sendero needed to do was to offer itself as a credible protector of their interests
and an agent of their goals, i.e., as protector of their coca. Once Sendero realized that
their own prohibition of the illicit economy was a mistake, this is exactly what it did. At
least some members of the United States government understood the dynamic. In his
Senate testimony, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Narcotics Matters, Clyde B. Taylor,
commented that
Many [cocaleros] see coca eradication efforts as a threat to their survival. When
[Sendero] recruiters announce that they have come to protect the livelihood of
growers against government interference, they find ready listeners. Paradoxically,
the U.S.-funded eradication efforts may be making the remaining growers more
desperate and more susceptible to the blandishments of terrorist recruiters.5 7
By 1985, the Shining Path thus abandoned its prohibition on coca cultivation and
became positively involved in the illicit economy. In its contestation for the allegiance of
the cocaleros, the Shining Path was helped by one important factor: the ineffectiveness of
the cocaleros' defense organizations. The defense groups did engage in symbolic actions.
They had organized strikes and shut down roads, even paralyzing economic activity in
the valley. They also captured and beat up UMOPAR members to deter them from
carrying out countemarcotics activities. 5s Most importantly, they forced the federal
57 Clyde B. Taylor, "International Insurgency and Drug Trafficking: Present Trends in Terrorist Activity,"
Joint Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S.
Senate, May 1985 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986): 133.
58 See, for example, Lee (1989): 62-4 and 86.
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government into negotiations. 59 But despite all of their actions and despite the
negotiations, they failed to achieve any meaningful and lasting concessions from the
central government, nor any real improvements in the lives of the rural population in the
UHV. By the mid-1980s, they were largely defunct; local farmers had lost interest in
joining the groups.60 Politicians from traditional parties representing the region in the
Peruvian Congress, such as Huinuco Senator Andres Quintana Gurt, or mayors in
Tocache and Tingo Maria, while critical of the counternarcotics policies and demanding
an end to CORAH, were equally ineffective in bringing about meaningful policy changes.
Thus, by 1986, the Shining Path began infiltrating both the Leoncio Prado committee and
the Tocache FEDIP and offering itself as a more effective alternative to protect the
interests of the cocaleros. The lack of legitimate and effective representation thus thrust
the cocaleros into the hands of Sendero.
Other entrepreneurs vying to represent the cocaleros lost to Sendero because they
were unable to deliver any real goods to the peasants. Sendero had several crucial
advantages. First, it could resort to violence in an organized and effective way in order to
successfully repel the eradication teams. The scale of violence that Sendero was able to
put up to frustrate eradication was considerably greater than the reprisals against specific
UMOPAR and CORAH individuals and general strikes the cocaleros' defense
organizations could organize. Second, unlike the establishment politicians and the coca
defense organizations, Sendero was under less pressure to deliver immediately. Every
failure of the peasant organizations' negotiations with the government exposed their
weakness and the futility of the effort. But Sendero was offering to solve the problem by
59One such major strike took place in 1986. Ibid.
60 Jo Ann Kawell, "The Cocaine Economy," in The Peru Reader: History, Culture, Politics, in Orin Starn,
Carlos Ivin Degregori, and Robin Kirk, eds. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995): 408-09.
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altogether overthrowing the system. At the same time, because of the scale of violent
resistance it could offer, it was able to deliver immediately visible results in halting and
interrupting eradication.
Furthermore, the continuous influx of people migrating to the UHV in search of a
better economic future was also highly advantageous to the insurgency, since it put a
greater number of people into contact with Sendero and isolated them from the state -
both physically and legally. As other means of representation - namely, the coca defense
committees -- dissipated Sendero became the only available protector for those
participating in the illicit economy.
In sum, Sendero's experience with the peasants' negative reaction to its own
prohibition and to the government eradication made the Shining Path change its policy
and eventually actively encourage the production of illicit substances. The Shining Path
justified its participation in the drug trade, violating its Marxist principles, by explaining
that the narcotics were destined for the United States, and hence contribute to the
corrosion and demoralization of "Yankee imperialists." 6' It is interesting to note that
while the SL turned out to be very inflexible and extremely doctrinaire with respect to its
other demands, such as the forcible recruitment of children as young as eight or ten and
the prohibition of legal crop markets, it learned not to interfere with coca production.
While it doggedly insisted on its other unpopular policies, it learned that it could not
support eradication. The costs in terms of political capital were simply too high for the
Shining Path to absorb while the political capital generated by SL's sponsorship of the
illicit economy was too valuable to forego. By reversing its policy and offering itself as a
61 Tarazona-Sevillano (1990): 118. Sendero did maintain its prohibition against drug consumption.
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protector of the cocaleros and the illicit economy, Sendero was able to capture a ready
and mobilized political base. Contrary to the predictions of the conventional view,
eradication was not able to prevent the growth of Sendero's strength, neither in terms of
military capabilities (described in detail below), nor in terms of political capital. In fact,
consistent with the prediction of my theory, government eradication antagonized the
peasants and contributed to Sendero's learning that its own prohibitionist policy of the
illicit economy was extremely politically costly, thus motivating Sendero to embrace the
illicit economy.
IV. Embracing the Drug Economy: Testing the Effect of Belligerents' Positive
Involvement in the Illicit Economy
By 1986, the Shining Path consolidated its control of the Upper Huallaga Valley
and became its active sponsor. Meanwhile, UHV's illicit economy continued expanding
despite the government counternarcotics efforts. According to the U.S. Department of
State, in 1986, coca was cultivated on 107,500 hectares in Peru.62 The numbers used by
Peru's Multisectoral Committee for Control of Drugs were even higher, ranging from
135,000 to 180,000 hectares. 63 Coca cultivation had spread to 14 out of Peru's 24
departments. The five departments with strong Sendero presence - Cuzco, Ayacucho,
San Martin, Huanuco, and La Libertad -- accounted for more than 90 percent of both
cultivation and production. Eradication also resulted in a balloon effect within Peru,
pushing production out of the Upper Huallaga Valley also in the Central Huallaga region.
62U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (Washington, DC, 1988): 78,
92, 109. In 1993, the USAID estimated that the illicit coca economy added $640 million to Peru's GDP, of
which $482 stayed in the country while $158 million remained abroad. Cited by Clawson and Lee: 13.
63 Quoted by Lee (1989): 23.
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The estimated earnings from the illicit economy ranged from $800 million to 1 billion
annually.64
Given Sendero's positive involvement in the illicit economy, both the
conventional view and the theory of political capital of illicit economies predict that
Sendero would be able to significantly increase its strength. However, while the
conventional view only predicts an increase in the group's physical resources, the theory
of political capital of illicit economies also predicts an important increase in its freedom
of action and political capital. Because the state of the overall economy was poor, the
character of the illicit economy labor-intensive, traffickers present, and the government
policy toward the illicit economy suppression, the theory of political capital of illicit
economies predicts a substantial increase in power, and significantly, a substantial
increase in the belligerents' political capital. Thus, while the conventional view predicts
the same level of popular support for the Sendero in both drug-producing and drug-non-
producing regions, my theory predicts a significantly greater support for the group in the
drug-producing regions.
Military Capabilities I: Physical Resources
After firmly securing control of the region in 1986, the Shining Path levied a five
percent tax on the coca paste sold by the campesinos to the traffickers who exported it to
Colombia. From this tax alone, Sendero was able to raise around $30 million a year.65
This income was later supplemented by the traquatero barons paying a facilitation fee of
$5,000 to $15,000 for Sendero's provision of a safe airstrip for each takeoff by an aircraft
64 MacDonald (1989): 59.
65 "Los Intis de la Coca," Peru Economico, September 1987.
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carrying coca paste out of the Upper Huallaga Valley, amounting to about $75 million
extra a year.66 The total income the guerrillas gained from drugs was estimated to be as
high $550 million per year. 67 Even at an actual income considerably lower, Sendero's
sponsorship of the illicit economy allowed it to be financially self-sufficient and
eliminated any need for foreign sponsors. Thus, unlike other Marxist/Maoist guerrillas,
the Shining Path was not financially hit by the collapse of the USSR and the economic
crisis in Cuba and the subsequent drying up of resources available to Communist rebels
from these two countries. 68
The financial profits from drugs increased Sendero's physical capabilities and
greatly facilitated an improvement in procurement and logistics. While elsewhere in the
country, including in its traditional stronghold Ayacucho, Sendero could operate only in
small columns of 10 to 15, in the UHV it was able to field actual companies of 60 to 120
individuals. Although dynamite stolen from mines continued to be used more often any
other weapon by the Shining Path throughout its campaign, after 1986 the guerrillas
could also procure weapons such as M-60 machine guns, G-3 and FAL automatic rifles,
66 Clutterbuck: 46. A roughly equal amount went to corrupt officials of the Peruvian police or armed forces
who turned a blind eye to coca trafficking. In 1994, there were about 82 such airstrips in the Huallaga
Valley, of which 14 were controlled by the army, another 10 known and patrolled by the air force, and
about 58 clandestine - a varying number, since on flat ground an airstrip can be made quickly and easily.
See, Clutterbuck: 44. According to a prominent captured Peruvian trafficker, Demetrio Limoniel Chavez
Pefiaherrera, known as El Vaticano, the air flight facilitation fees were as low as $5000 per flight plus $3
per kilogram of coca paste or $6 per kilogram of cocaine base.
67 Other analysts put Sendero's income substantially lower. McCormick estimates $20 to $30 million (p.
22). Jos6 Gonzales estimates an income of $20 to $100 million. See, Jos6 E. Gonzales, "Peru: Sendero
Luminoso en el Valle de la Coca, " in Coca, cocaine, y narcotrafico: Laberinto en los Andes, Diego Garcia
Sayan, ed. (Lima: Comision Andina de Jurista, 1989): 217. The $550 million figure was an estimate by a
Peruvian admiral, based on his knowledge of the airstrip fees in the Upper Huallaga Valley, in his
testimony to the Peruvian congress. See, Latin American Weekly Report, January 24, 1991: 1.
68It is important to note that in addition to taxing the drug trade, Sendero also levied taxes on businesses in
the areas they controlled. But profits from drugs represented by far the largest income.
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U.S.-made hand grenades, grenade launchers, and 81mm mortars. 69 Similarly, after
gaining access to the drug money, Sendero was able to pay salaries to its soldiers -- in
fact, very large ones by Latin American standards. The common salary range - $20-$500
per month - was about three to eight times the salaries of most of Peru's teachers.70 In
coca producing regions, salaries may have been as high as $1,000 a month.71 At an
estimated 10,000 guerrillas, around $5 million was thus spent on salaries annually. For
comparison, the salary of top military generals in Peru was less than $200 per month, and
about $10 for enlisted personnel.72 The SL also rewarded its other members and
sympathizers by providing them with food, housing, and livestock.73 Apparently,
Guzmin also ordered a considerable amount - possibly as much as $200 million - to be
deposited in foreign bank accounts, hedging for possible difficult times. 74
Military Capabilities II: Freedom of Action
But sponsorship of the illicit economy brought much greater gains to the Shining
Path than simply an improvement in its physical resources. Sendero's capabilities also
improved because its operational capacity, namely freedom of action, expanded. After
1986, for example, the SL no longer felt the need to acquire weapons by seizing police
and military caches or robbing banks. Instead, it focused on attacking regular military
69 McClintock (1998): 73, and Tom Marks, "Making Revolution with Shining Path," in Shining Path of
Peru, David Scott Palmer, ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994): 218. See also Newsweek, April 24,
1989: 45, and La Reptiblica, May 27, 1992: 22.
70 McClintock (1998): 292.
71 Cynthia McClintock, "The Evolution of Internal War in Peru: The Conjunction of Need, Creed, and
Organizational Finance," in Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection ofNeed, Creed, and Greed,
Cynthia J. Arnson, and I. William Zartman, eds. (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005):
63.
72 Palmer (1992): 70.
73 McClintock (1998): 292.
74 Ibid.: 72.
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units while continuing with a campaign of terror. Self-sufficiency in financing also
secured freedom from dependence on foreign support and allowed the belligerent group
to develop its struggle on its own terms and without any outside interference." An
effective exploitation of the illicit economy thus allowed the Shining Path to optimize its
tactics with its overall strategy.
Paradoxically, counternarcotics efforts beefed up the belligerents' military
capabilities yet in another way. They served as a training exercise for Sendero's fighters.
As Sendero came to actively protect the coca fields from eradication units (described
below in detail), its fighters became engaged in combat with Peruvian and U.S.
counternarcotics forces. As a top Peruvian military official, quoted by Tom Marks, put it,
"Providing security for the drug lords is good training." 76 Although it is unclear just how
much such military experience contributed to the efficacy of the guerrillas, it is likely that
such training experience was not negligible. The anti-narcotics squads frequently
operated with superior equipment and better training provided by the United States than
the counterinsurgency forces that were frequently badly equipped and faced low morale
problems. Overall, engagement in the drug trade thus greatly improved Sendero's
military capabilities.
Political Capital
75 Palmer (1992): 77. Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano maintains that even though the SL continued fund-
raising activities after it tapped the drug money, it did so only for symbolic purposes to demonstrate the
SL's international solidarity with Communist guerrillas. See, Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano, "The
Organization of Shining Path," in Shining Path of Peru, David Scott Palmer, ed. (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1994): 203.
76 A top Peruvian military official quoted in Marks: 218.
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Most importantly, positive involvement in the illicit economy generated large
political capital for the Shining Path. The most direct way in which Sendero acquired
political capital was by providing the large poor rural population with a reliable source of
livelihood. First, Sendero physically protected the coca fields from eradication. In August
1987, for example, Sendero led the cocaleros to shut down the jungle highway between
Tingo Maria and Tocache. They destroyed bridges, erected barriers, and dug trenches. A
year later, in August 1988, Sendero helped the cocaleros organize a general strike that
shut down business and paralyzed traffic in the UHV for five days. Sendero also
routinely engaged counternarcotics units and fired on CORAH, UMAPOR, and PEAH
workers. Over time, Sendero managed to place entire zones of the UHV off limits to
CORAH eradicators.
Sendero also attacked U.S. interdiction teams operating in Peru. In the mid-1980s,
the United States, jointly with the Peruvian government, launched a major drug
interdiction effort dubbed Operation Condor.77 It targeted processing labs, traffickers'
airstrips, and the traffickers themselves. The United States provided Twin Bell 214
helicopters piloted by a private security company, Evergreen Air.78 These U.S.-Peruvian
interdiction efforts were enhanced in 1990 when the United States built an anti-drug air
base in the heart of the Upper Huallaga Valley, at Santa Lucia. The goal of Santa Lucia
operations was to interdict airplanes leaving the UHV for Colombia with coca paste and
cocaine. In April 1990, Sendero attacked the base with rocket-propelled grenades.
77 Snowcap in Peru was a subset of a large Snowcap operation that involved nine Latin American countries
and funded with $24 million for three years.
78 See, Peter Andreas, "The US War on Drugs in Peru," The Nation, August 13-20, 1988; and Peru Report,
"Political Report," 2 (11), November 1988: 71-78.
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Catering to the farmers' sentiment, Sendero also opposed alternative
development. It correctly sensed that the concept of alternative development was
fundamentally discredited among the Peruvian peasants and seen as a ploy to lure them
into voluntary eradication without providing reliable livelihood in return. The Shining
Path thus came to threaten PEAH workers and literally immobilized PEAH's programs. 79
Sendero's rationale was pragmatic: In an internal document captured in 1986, Sendero
argued that "Through coca cultivation, the peasantry earns more [than through other
crops] because it is a product that has a ready market.'40 Shortly after the Palmas de
Espina palm oil plantation and processing complex started in the UHV, the Shining Path
attacked it and inflicted $1.5 million worth of damage.81 The peasants applauded.
Second, Sendero also adopted language and imagery that stressed the state's
threat to people's subsistence. As Cynthia McClintock recounts, Sendero described the
Peruvian state as "hambreador" (making people hungry) and genocidal, intentionally
killing people through starvation. 2 It adopted slogans such as "Against genocide and
against eradication." Simon Strong quotes a Senderista commander in Lima, F61ix
C6ndor, arguing in a eulogy for a boy: "They say that we are terrorists ... [But] the
terrorists are those who kill us with hunger every day."83 Both in its actions and in its
rhetoric, Sendero thus actively and ardently opposed government efforts to destroy the
illicit drug economy.
79 Elena Alvarez, "Illegal Export-Led Growth in the Andes: A Preliminary Economic and Socio-political
Assessment for Peru," A Study For UNRISD and UNU, draft of January 25, 1993, quoted in Tullis (1995):
98.
80 Document quoted in Lee (1989): 82.
81 Lawrence Jay Speer, "Legal, illegal firms share Peru jungle," Washington Times, July 13, 1993.
82McClintock (2005): 65.
83 F61ix C6ndor quoted in Simon Strong, Shining Path: Terror and Revolution in Peru (New York: Times
Books, 1992): 263.
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In addition to providing the cocaleros with protection against the government's
eradication efforts, Sendero protected the peasants from the narcos themselves. Prior to
the Shining Path's protection, the peasants were vulnerable to being killed by the drug
traffickers if they failed to deliver a certain amount of coca leaves, even if they failed to
do so because of the eradication of the crop by the anti-narcotics squads.84 Sendero put an
end to this practice. Commented a coca-plantation employee to a Lima journalist (quoted
by Tarazona-Sevillano): "From [the day the SL came] our salaries went up, and there
aren't so many abuses. The Senderistas come every week and ask the townspeople how
they are being treated by the traffickers, if there have been abuses, what problems we
have."85 Progressively, Sendero moved to regulate all sorts of aspects of the illicit coca
economy. After repeated complaints from the peasants about the traffickers using altered
weights for weighing coca leaves, for example, Sendero established rules about how to
weigh coca. There were even reports of Sendero executing traffickers who abused and
cheated the peasants.
Sendero also negotiated better prices for the peasants from the traffickers. In 1985
U.S.- Peruvian interdiction efforts under Operation Condor succeeded in disrupting
processing and traffic. The subsequent overproduction of unprocessable coca leaves led
to a precipitous decline in the price of coca leaf, slashing the price by half.86 Sendero's
reaction was to force the traffickers to pay above the market price to the peasants.
Sendero repeated this practice in April 1990, after it lost crucial political capital as a
result of the Peruvian government's ending eradication (as described in detail below). To
84 Rauil Gonzalez (1987): 67.
85 Interview reproduced by Tarazona-Sevillano (1990): 124.
86 See, for example, Richard Craig, "Illicit Drug Traffic: Implications for South American Source
Countries," Journal ofInteramerican Studies and World Affairs, 29 (2), Summer 1987: 21.
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regain political capital with the cocaleros, Sendero attempted to concentrate coca leaf
dealing in their own local committees and bases. This allowed Sendero to directly
supervise the price the traffickers were paying to the peasants and force them to pay more
than the market price.
Another mechanism by which Sendero acquired political capital was through the
use of its drug money to provide social services. As described above, the Upper Huallaga
Valley as well as most of rural Peru lacked basic services, such as sewage, roads, schools,
and hospitals. The large financial resources obtained from coca production allowed the
Shining Path to deliver the lacking social services and improve the existing ones.
Whenever it took over a village, Sendero organized water supply, sewage, and street
cleanup. 87 It also invested money in the building of a better transportation system and
building of hospitals and in the acquisition of medication.88 The Shining Path
supplemented this provision of social services by providing a previously-missing system
of law and order, albeit a brutal one. 89 Through its positive involvement in the illicit
economy, the Shining Path was thus able to fill- at least in a rudimentary way - the role
of the state in the areas it controlled. And it was able to deliver immediate material
benefits to the population.
87 Tullis: 22.
88 Zikarzadeh: 213, and Merrill Collett, "Maoist Guerrilla Band Complicated Anti-Drug War in Peru,"
Washington Post, June 4, 1988.
89 This system of law and order included prohibiting prostitution, punishing homosexuality, and clamping
down on crime. Those who did not comply with Sendero's rules were executed. Commented a resident in
La Morada, a UHV town under Sendero's control (recounted by Gonzales): "The best thing, though, is that
now the police don't abuse us like they used to and nobody steals a thing. You can leave your car in the
middle of the road unlocked for several days, go back and actually find it completely intact." Jos6 E.
Gonzales "Guerrillas and Coca in the Upper Huallaga Valley," in Shining Path of Peru, David Scott
Palmer, ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994): 129. Sendero also imposed tolls on roads and checked
the identity documents of anyone entering the areas under its control.
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Finally, positive involvement in the illicit economy also allowed the Shining Path
to increase its political capital by obtaining nationalist legitimacy. The Sendero Luminoso
was able to turn widespread resentment against the United States-sponsored coca-
eradication program into a nationalist campaign. As an experienced DEA agent, quoted in
an interview by Merrill Collett, put it, "You'll have imperialists cutting down coca trees
in front of a crying peasant woman. Mao could not have thought of anything better." 90 As
the American presence in the UHV increased after the opening of the base at Santa Lucia
in 1988 where 25 DEA agents and 450 Peruvians were located, Sendero happily prepared
to confront them, reasoning that if it could turn the insurgency into, in its words, "a war
of national resistance," then, "90 percent of the population would follow us.""'91 After an
increase in eradication and interdiction operations, Sendero predicted a national liberation
war between "the U.S. interventionist forces" and the Peruvians whom the SL would
lead.92 In an interview with the Peruvian daily, El Diaro, a Senderista commander
commented: "Here are the American advisers, their mercenary pilots, veterans of the
counterrevolutionary Vietnam war, who were defeated by that small nation - here they
will be defeated by the masses together with their Army of Popular Liberation [the
Shining Path]."" Both American and Peruvian journalists started reporting on the eerie
Vietnam-like image that U.S. agents in fatigues and Huey helicopters brought to the area.
90 Alan Riding, "Rebels Disrupting Coca Eradication in Peru," New York Times, January 26, 1989.
91 Proclamation of the Sendero Luminoso quoted in Gustavo Gorriti, "Shining Path's Stalin and Trotsky,"
in Shining Path of Peru, David Scott Palmer, ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994): 186.92 Sandra Woy-Hazleton and William A. Hazleton, "Shining Path and the Marxist Left," in Shining Path of
Peru, David Scott Palmer, ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994): 233. Although the 100,000 victims
within the next two years predicted by the SL in the upcoming conflict with the United States turned out to
be a gross exaggeration, the number of confrontations between the United States and the SL did in fact
increase dramatically. See interview with Luis Arce Borja, "There is no other way," by Anita Fokkema, in
"Fatal Attraction: Peru's Shining Path," NACLA Report on Americas, December/ January 1990-91: 25.
93 Reproduced in Lee (1989): 85.
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The Sendero Luminoso only encouraged that comparison, playing up the nationalist
card.94
Summary of Sendero's Gains
In sum, the Shining Path was able to derive large political capital from its
sponsorship of the illicit economy. Its protection of the coca fields against the
government eradication teams allowed the Shining Path to capture UHV's mobilized
peasant base and maintain its allegiance. Sendero further obtained political support from
the UHV peasants by providing the rural population with protection against the drug
traffickers, bargaining on behalf of the peasants for better prices, and using the illicit
economy to deliver otherwise absent social services to the rural population. Through a
successful sponsorship of the illicit economy, Sendero was thus able to identify a mutual
enemy with the peasants - the state and its eradication units - as well as joint goals with
the peasants - the end to eradication. At the same time, the sponsorship of the illicit
economy allowed Sendero to take on the functions of a protostate and reliably provide
lacking goods as a governing authority. Finally, by exploiting the presence and key role
of the United States in the war on drugs, Sendero was also able to portray itself as a
national liberation movement, thus crucially enhancing its political capital. The number
of Sendero's committed supporters thus grew to between 50,000 and 100,000, while its
passive support was even larger. 95
94 The Peruvian government wanted the United States to help it defeat the insurgency, but the US only
sought to provide military assistance for coca eradication and coca flow interruption. See Waltrud Queiser
Morales, "The War on Drugs: A New U.S. National Security Doctrine?" Third World Quarterly, 11 (3),
July 1989: 147-169.
95 David Scott Palmer, "The Revolutionary Terrorism of Peru's Shining Path," in Terrorism in Context,
Martha Crenshaw, ed. (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995): 270.
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This increase in the multiple dimensions of its strength - including political capital --
allowed Sendero to escalate to conflict to such an extent that, as will be shown below, it
posed a serious threat to the government.
Conventional View's Alternative Explanations for Sendero's Political Capital
The conventional view of narcoinsurgency would, of course, argue that Sendero's
acquisition of political capital was completely independent of the guerrilla's sponsorship
of the illicit economy. Two alternative explanations consistent with the conventional
view can in particular be offered as the source of Sendero's political capital -- ideology
and coercion. Offering these two explanations as potential causes of Sendero's political
capital is germane to the conventional view: As explained in chapters Two and Three, the
conventional view argues that when belligerent groups lose their ideological appeal, they
lose their legitimacy. Conversely then, ideology is the primary source of legitimacy.
Second, the French school of counterinsurgency that provides an important part of the
intellectual framework of the conventional view of narcoinsurgency stresses intimidation
and coercion as the key source of obtaining the peasants' allegiance.
According to the first alternative explanation, the Shining Path obtained the
peasants allegiance because it was able to present them with an attractive vision of the
social order, i.e. an ideology that resonated with the population. In other words, it was
Sendero's radical socialist ideology that attracted the peasants to support the movement.
The problem with this explanation is that the Shining Path never succeeded in uniting the
peasants behind its ideology. In fact, its radical socialist ideology significantly alienated
the peasants from the Shining Path. A key concept of Sendero's ideology was to end the
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capitalist economic system and prohibit the existence of markets. Frequently, Sendero
imposed systems of communal planting and barter in lieu of commercial exchange. Some
activists also insisted that villages terminate market relations with the rest of the country
and become economically self-reliant, leading Sendero to close down roads on market
days.96
Yet this ideologically-driven interference with markets turned out to be one of the
peasants' greatest grievances toward Sendero.97 The closing of markets in fact
undermined the peasants' ability to obtain basic commodities and satisfy subsistence
needs. As one of the peasant commented (quoted by Zirakzadeh): "We could not let them
close the markets. Where would we get our salt and matches?""98 Such Sendero's zealotry
backfired, and the peasants who had previously tolerated or even welcomed them into the
village, started reporting Sendero to the police.99 The peasants also resented Sendero's
instrumental interference with markets as a strategy to starve out cities and enlarge its
campaign into the urban areas after Sendero captured the countryside.' 00 As Cyrus
Zirakzadeh maintains, the peasants had limited goals: they did not want radical socialism;
they only wanted a piece of land and a stable income.' 0 ' It is significant to note that the
one market that Sendero learned it could not prohibit was the coca trade. The political
96 Isbell: 66-7; 71-2.
97See, for example, Orin Starn, "Maoism in the Andes: The Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path and the
Refusal of History," Journal of Latin American Studies, 27 (2), May 1995: 414-15. The population also
greatly resented the demand of the guerrillas to hand over little children to them for education in the
ideology and warfighting.
98 Zirakzadeh: 208.
99 Author's interviews with Peru's former intelligence officials, summer 2005. See also, Degregori (1998):
133.
100 Degregori (1998): 133.
101 Zikarzadeh: 191-94.
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costs of prohibiting the coca trade, as compared with prohibiting other markets, were
simply too high for Sendero to endure.
Importantly, support for the Shining Path was significantly greater in the coca-
producing regions than overall in the country. In fact, by far the greatest support was in
the Upper Huallaga Valley where the Shining Path had some of its strongest support
bases and where as much as 20 to 30 percent of the population actively supported the
Shining Path. The national average support for the Shining Path was estimated at 15
percent at most. 102 As a Peruvian journalist, quoted by McClintock, commented: "The
people of Tingo Maria and Tocache [i.e. the main coca-growing regions] never talk about
'terrorists' but about 'the movement,' 'compafieros,' and 'the party'. The Shining Path
[there] has a high level of support from the population."'0 3 If ideology were the primary
factor driving the peasants' allegiance, one would expect uniform geographical
distribution of results irrespective of coca production. Furthermore, because of the large
migration to UHV from the poor regions of Peru, the UHV was more ethnically diverse
than Sendero's traditional base. While in the non-drug producing regions, Sendero's base
consisted predominantly of the indigenous Ayacucho highlands farmers, in UHV Sendero
obtained legitimacy and support from other ethnic groups to whom it otherwise lacked a
connection. In short, ideology does not adequately account for Sendero's political capital,
undermining the potential validity of the conventional wisdom.
A second alternative explanation, derived from the conventional wisdom, for the
guerrillas' ability to secure the allegiance of the population is coercion. The allegiance of
the population is not primarily a function of the belligerent group's provision of benefits,
102 McClintock (1998): 73, 78-9; Marks: 219.
103 McClintock (1998): 79.
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but mainly a function of the belligerents' coercive power. Sendero Luminoso was in fact
highly determined to coerce the population into adopting its mores and was one of the
most brutal Maoist guerrilla movements. It routinely resorted to smashing in public the
heads of its victims with stones or cutting their throats with knifes.
Yet Sendero's excessive brutality turned out to be counterproductive, alienating
both the uncommitted population and previous supporters. Instead of scaring the
population into compliance, brutality only encouraged dissent and turned the population
against Sendero. The relationship between Sendero and the population followed a pattern:
The rural population initially accepted Sendero, or at least tolerated it. As shown above,
the level of acceptance was considerably higher in drug-producing regions. But as
Sendero progressively increased its brutality in an effort to coerce the population into
closing down markets and recruiting and separating children from their parents, its
political capital eroded. The rural population increasingly came to see Sendero with
mounting dissatisfaction. 04 To overcome the population's dissatisfaction and lack of
compliance, Sendero resorted to more indiscriminate violence. But as its brutality
increased, it started losing support among the peasants to such an extent that the peasants
were willing to organize self-defense units. Based on interviews with the population
under SL's control, Carlos Degregori argues that while the peasants welcomed some
level of order the SL established, they abhorred the level of brutality with which the SL
tried to enforce its rules: "'punish, but don't kill' marks the level of peasant
acceptance."' 05 Similarly, Cynthia McClintock maintains, "In various areas where the
Sendero was unable to make inroads or where it gradually lost support, the explanation
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104 See, for example, Isbell.
105 Degregori (1998): 137.
given was excessive violence: 'The Senderistas have killed too many innocent
people."' 10 6 Coercion thus does not appear to be a valid explanation for Sendero's
political capital. In fact, coercion directly undermined the political capital that Sendero
obtained from its distribution of benefits to the population.
Positive involvement in the illicit economy mitigated the negative effects of
excessive brutality. In the UHV region, Sendero did not need to use the same brutal
methods it had been known to use elsewhere.'1 7 If coercion is the dominant explanation
of support, then in areas where the Sendero exercised greater coercion should also be
areas of greatest support. But the opposite is the case. In UHV where Sendero was much
less brutal and coercive, it had considerably greater support. In fact, the sponsorship of
the illicit economy not only allowed Sendero to acquire peasant allegiance without the
need to resort to violence, but also mitigated against a future loss of political capital by
precluding the need to resort to violence. The Upper Huallaga Valley remained the
stronghold of Sendero, even after its popularity waned elsewhere. Thus, contrary to the
conventional wisdom, neither ideology nor brutality are compelling as explanations for
Sendero's acquisition of political capital, thus undermining the validity of the
conventional wisdom. It was the positive involvement the illicit economy that allowed
Sendero to acquire large political capital.
Sendero's Learning Curve About Political Capital and Military Gains Derived from
Positive Involvement in Illicit Economies
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106 McClintock (1998): 69.107 McClintock (2001): 94.
As shown above, it took some time for the Shining Path to learn how to
effectively exploit the coca production in the region. After it abandoned its initial impulse
to prohibit the illicit economy, it first satisfied itself with managing the illicit economy by
simply levying a tax on coca cultivation. Later, it also charged the narcos a protection fee
for their coca-paste and cocaine labs and a facilitation fee for each plane taking off from
an airstrip it controlled. i0 8 Next, Sendero used the coca gains to pay for the provision of
social services.
Over time, Sendero also sought to limit direct interaction between the peasants
and the traffickers. It established a system of delegations - i.e., groups of Senderistas
charged with dealing with the traffickers. A trafficking organization or individual
traffickers had to register with Sendero to gain access to coca leaf and pay a $15,000 fee.
Fifty percent of this fee reportedly went to SL's central accounts, forty percent was used
to purchase supplies for local units, and ten percent was left with the delegation.'09
Finally, the SL also branched into other phases of cocaine-production and
distribution. In the region of Xion, for example, Sendero became involved with currency
exchange. The Colombian narcos would arrive in the area with U.S. dollars which they
would need to change for Peruvian intis to carry out their transactions in Peru. Before the
involvement of Sendero with the currency exchange, the narcos would change in money
in the banks in Xion. However, once the Shining Path diversified its operations, it
insisted that all currency exchanges be carried out through them, fixing the exchange rate
108See, for example, Tarazona-Sevillano (1990): 121.
'
09 Enrique Obando, "El Narcotrifico en el Perui: Una Aproximaci6n Hist6rica," Andlisis Internacional (2),
1993: 85.
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and cutting large profits on hard currency at a time when the Peruvian government's hard
currency reserves were depleted."l 0
V. MRTA's Positive Involvement in the Illicit Economy
Once the SL figured out how to exploit the drug windfall to its advantage, it
provided a modus operandi for other guerrillas in Peru to emulate. Gleaning from
Sendero's successful exploitation of the illicit economy and the increase in the multiple
dimensions of Sendero's strength, Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA -
Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru) began emulating the Shining Path's policies
toward the illicit economy. Created in late 1983, the urban-based MRTA, headed by
Victor Polay Campos, presented itself as an armed Communist alternative to the Shining
Path. It denounced international corporations and the world economy as culprits of the
poverty of Peru's poor. The great majority of its members were students. Many of them
were disaffected supporters of the APRA party who believed that APRA became
institutionalized and stopped representing the poor and that democracy had failed in Peru.
Its goals were to replace the failed representative democracy with "the power of the
people" through revolution and the creation of a socialist political economy with limited
private ownership but predominantly based on communal ownership."'
Inspired by the Castro revolution in Cuba and having embraced Che Guevara's
"foco strategy" and Carlos Marighela's teachings, it sought to instill a martial spirit
among the urban poor and provoke the rich into an intolerable repression of the poor that
would provoke a large-scale revolution and topple the regime. It rejected Maoism and
110 Raifl Gonzales (1987): 70; Tarazona-Sevillano (1990): 121.
I11 James F. Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003): 72.
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exhibited a pro-Cuba, pro-Soviet orientation. It criticized Sendero as both ideologically
misguided and excessively brutal and liked to present itself as kindler and gentler than
Sendero. 112 MRTA operated through "Robin Hood" tactics, such as stealing food trucks
and distributing the food to the poor, and attacking symbols of capitalism. Approximately
one-thousand-militants strong at its apex, the MRTA was responsible for about ten
percent of all political attacks and about five percent of all deaths from violence. In
comparison, Sendero was responsible for about 75 percent of political attacks and 50
percent of violent deaths. 13
Although the MRTA was actually first in the coca-growing regions of the Upper
Huallaga Valley - specifically in the San Martin department - it essentially ignored the
illicit economy and the rural poor. Focused on the urban theater, the MRTA at first did
not consider mobilization among the rural poor crucial. As a result of its noninvolvement
in the illicit economy, it was not able to grow in strength and expand through the UHV.
In fact, it lost the San Martin sections of the UHV it previously controlled to Sendero.
Consistent with the theory of political capital of illicit economies, the MRTA's
noninvolvement in the illicit economy resulted in the stagnation of its strength.
It was only after the MRTA had observed Sendero's increase in strength due to its
embrace of the illicit economy that it attempted to emulate this policy and acquire control
over the illicit economy itself. Through positive involvement in the illicit economy, it
sought to attract legitimacy and support and obtain funds. It thus attempted to protect the
farmers' illicit livelihood against the government and the narcos. 14 Thus, in the San
112 Ibid.: 44.
113 McClintock and Vallas: 69.
114 James Anderson, Sendero Luminoso: A New Revolutionary Model? (London: Institute for the Study of
Terrorism, 1987): 1.
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Martin coca regions where it had made inroads, the MRTA protected the coca peasants
and dealers from the government counternarcotics teams. It also tried to bargain with the
traffickers for better prices for the cocaleros and ultimately attempted to penetrate
processing. Through positive involvement in the illicit economy, MRTA's power in the
rural theater grew and the MRTA was able to consolidate its control of the portions of the
UHV. So temporarily, the MRTA controlled Medio Huallaga and Alto Mayor, the area
between Juanjui el Norte to Tarapoto and Moyobamba -- while the Shining Path
controlled the Alta Huallaga - the area between Tingo Maria and Juanjui al Sur." 5
Naturally, the Shining Path was not keen on sharing the large and multi-faceted
gains from the drug economy with a rival belligerent group and Sendero actively resisted
MRTA's presence. After a major shootout with the MRTA in 1987, Sendero pushed the
MRTA out of the UHV and out of the drug business. Peasant support for Sendero against
the MRTA was important for Sendero's victory. The Shining Path obtained this support
by persuading them that the MRTA had betrayed them by pacting with the narcos on
coca prices." 6 The drug traffickers also helped Sendero push out the MRTA, by
providing Sendero with men, arms, and intelligence. 117 The drug dealers apparently
resented the fact that the MRTA tried not only to tax the peasants, but also to control the
processing stage of the cocaine industry, thus threatening the interests of the narcos.118
115 Enrique Obando, "US Policy Toward Peri6: At Odds for Twenty Years," in Addicted to Failure: US
Security Policy in Latin America (Lanham: Rowan and Littlefield, 2006), forthcoming. Author's copy.
116 McClintock (1998): 138
117 Ra61l GonzAlez (1987): 69.
118 Apparently, the MRTA was also close to the Colombia's M-19 which sent members to the area to help
the MRTA. But the M-19 was at odds with the Colombian cartels that controlled the upper stages of the
drug industry, thus further pushing the traffickers into cooperation with Sendero. For details, see Andreas
(1988).
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Ultimately, the MRTA did not succeed in gaining control of the UHV and the coca
production, but the significance of sponsoring the illicit economy was not lost on it.
Relations Between Belligerents and Traffickers: Testing the Unity Hypothesis of the
Conventional Wisdom
The rivalry between the MRTA, Sendero, and the traffickers also reveals the
uneasy relationship between belligerent groups and drug traffickers and the fallacy of
unity between these two groups assumed in the conventional wisdom, which argues that
criminals and belligerents have morphed into a conglomerate actor and need to be fought
as a joint enemy of the state. The drug traffickers actively sought to rid the UHV of the
MRTA. Ironically, once the MRTA was out of the picture, and Sendero did not face a
competitor, it also tried to get involved with the cocaine-processing part of the illicit
economy, thus threatening the turf of the narcos. The Colombian drug syndicates even
sent 300 heavily armed guards to the UHV to protect their Peruvian intermediaries and
the cocaine shipments from Sendero's attacks and extortion." 9 Both groups challenged
the traffickers on a number of points.
On the one hand, the narcos welcomed the MRTA and Sendero protecting the
coca fields from eradication and the cocaine labs and airstrips from destruction by the
counternarcotics forces. They also welcomed that the belligerents insured that peasants
delivered the promised amount of coca leaf. On the other hand, the belligerent groups'
other goals and interests threatened the interests of the traffickers. The belligerent groups
limited the violence, abuse, and cheating the traffickers could impose upon the peasants,
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killing the most abusive traffickers. First, Sendero insisted that the traffickers disband
gangs they had hired to prevent the farmers from organizing themselves against the
traffickers. If the traffickers refused, Sendero would simply kill the gang members one by
one.'12 Second, the insurgents reduced the traffickers' profit margins by forcing them to
pay more to the peasants. Third, they charged high protection rents for airstrips and labs,
consecutively increasing fees. Fourth, they sought to displace the traffickers from aspects
of the trade. In sum, the narcos and the belligerent groups in no way morphed into one
actor, nor did they even have identical goals. Their relationship was one of tension,
competition, and at times violent hostility.
Conflict Expansion
The vast increase in the multiple dimension of strength through its positive
involvement in the illicit economy also allowed the Shining Path to expand the military
conflict. Although effective sponsorship of the illicit economy was not the sole reason
why Sendero was able to expand conflict, it was an important one.' 2 1 Unlike prior to its
positive involvement in the drug economy, when Sendero was only able to impose death
tolls in the low hundreds, once it secured controlled of the coca economy in the UHV, it
was able to impose death tolls in the thousands. The number of people killed rose to over
3000 a year in 1989 and 1990.122 The table and graph below summarize the number of
deaths due to the armed conflict prior and after SL's access to drugs.
120 Tarazona-Sevillano (1990): 117.
121 Other factors that contributed to the overall effectiveness of the guerrilla were a long preparation and
charismatic leadership.
122 Clutterbuck: 26.
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Number of Deaths due to Conflict in Peru
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
7 13 244 2850 4081 1423 1534 1208 1447 2466 3724 3181 2683
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Data from Gordon McCormick: From the Sierra to the Cities: The Urban Campaign of the Shining Path
(Santa Monica: RAND, 1992): 22; David Scott Palmer, "Peru, the Drug Business and Shining Path:
Between Scylla and Charybdis?" Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 34 (3), Autumn
1992: 76; and James F. Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America (Boulder: Lynne Rienner,
2003): 70.
The graph and the table show two spikes, reflecting two expansions of the
conflict, one before the Sendero consolidated its access to drugs and one after Sendero
consolidated its access to the illicit narcotics economy. Does the pattern of violence mean
then that the escalation of the conflict was due to some factor other than increase in the
strength of the belligerents as a result of their access to the illicit economy? Yes and no.
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The dramatic increase in the number of casualties after the 1986 can indeed be attributed
to the increase in Sendero's activity, in large part stimulated by gains from sponsoring the
illicit economy. The first increase cannot be attributed to drugs; in fact, it cannot be
attributed to the Shining Path at all. Rather, the first spike denotes the first
counterinsurgency approach adopted by the Peruvian military forces between 1983 and
1985. In 1983, the military implemented a counterinsurgency strategy based on the
indiscriminate use of terror against the peasantry -- what came to be known as "the dirty
war"' 23 and highlighted in the graph by vertical lines. During this period, the military
tortured and killed even peasants suspected of merely sympathizing with the insurgents.
The peak number of deaths per year was thus rose to 4081 in 1984. During this period of
indiscriminate slaughter by the Peruvian armed forces, the vast majority of the deaths
were caused by the military forces, not the Shining Path.
By 1985, as a result of the arrival of a new government in Peru as well as the
recognition on the part of the military that the counterinsurgency strategy was not
working, the military abandoned the "brutality en masse" approach and resorted to
selective killing with the hope of gaining the support of the population. 124 This new
strategy is expressed in the sharp decrease in the number of deaths after 1985. The steady
increase after 1986, i.e., after Sendero consolidated its control over the UHV, was due to
the expansion of the SL's activity, in a large part due to the drug windfall. The
subsequent decline in 1990 reflects Sendero's losses in the countryside, to a large extent
123 Manrique: 192; Enrique Obando, "Civil-Military Relations in Peru, 1980-1996: How to Control and
Coopt the Military (and the consequences of doing so), in Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in
Peru, .1980-1995, Steve J. Stem, ed. (Durham, Duke: 1988): 385-410.
124 Jos6 Ruiz R6nique, "Apogee and Crisis of a 'Third Path': Mariateguismo, 'People's War,' and
Counterinsurgency in Puno, 1987-1994", in Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995,
Steve J. Stem, ed. (Durham, Duke: 1988): 325.
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driven by the military's tacit acquiescence to coca cultivation, detailed below in Section
VI.
An even better measure of the expansion of the conflict as a result of the increase
in Sendero's strength is the increase in SL's attacks from 1986 on. The graph and table
below illustrate this increase of SL's activities after the Shining Path consolidated its
involvement with the drug economy.
Number of Actions Undertaken by the Shining Path
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
178 685 969 1865 1888 1497 2098 2181 2189 3240 3672
Number of Attacks by the Shining Path
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Data from Gordon McCormick: From the Sierra to the Cities: The Urban Campaign of the Shining Path
(Santa Monica: RAND, 1992): 22.
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Once again as in the previous graph, there is a temporary spike in the number of
SL's military actions between 1982 and 1984, and a subsequent decrease in 1985. As in
the previous graph, this surge in activity corresponds to the military's aggressive
counterinsurgency policy. This temporary surge in SL's activity was due to both the
necessity on the part of the SL to defend itself against the military's attacks as well as due
to its strategy of increasing activity after military attacks to demonstrate that it has not
been defeated.'12 The steady increase after 1986 reflects the intensification of the conflict
as a result of the increase in Shining Path's strength due to access to the illicit narcotics
economy. Although the graph may give the impression of a steady increase in Sendero's
activity regardless of its positive involvement in the illicit economy, what it does not
capture is the previously described changed in Sendero's tactics. While very small-scale
Sendero attacks, such as robberies of farms, constitute a large portion of the pre-1986
period, after 1986, the post-1986 attacks become considerably larger and more deadly.' 26
For example, the level of casualties the Shining Path was able to inflict on the police and
military force rose from 31 police and one soldier in 1982 to 229 policemen and 109
soldiers in 1989.127
The vast gains from positive involvement in the illicit economy enabled the
Shining Path not only to increase the number and scale of attacks it carried out, but also
to expand the area where it operated and that it controlled. Thus, by 1991, the Shining
Path controlled not only Ayacucho and the neighboring Huancavelica and Apurimac, but
125 McCormick: 28.
126 Author's interviews with former Peruvian defense and intelligence officials, Peru, summer 2005. See,
McCormick: 20-32.
127 David Scott Palmer, "National Security," in Peru: A Country Study,Rex A. Hudson, ed., Area
Handbook Series, 4" Edition (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1993):
289-292. The total numbers of police and military deaths caused by the Shining Path over the ten-year
period were 795 and 401 respectively.
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also parts of the departments of San Martin, Huinuco, Pasco, Junin, and Cusco. It was
also able to extend attacks into the more prosperous departments, distant from its base,
Arequipa and Ica. In other departments the Shining Path also contested the military over
control of the area. An estimated 25 to 40 percent of Peruvian territory was brought under
the effective Sendero control or shadow Sendero administration, and more than half of
the population lived under a state of emergency.'28
The increase in Sendero's strength took place despite an improvement in the
counterinsurgency policy of the Peruvian military. In fact, most of the strategic and
tactical mistakes occurred prior to 1986. As indicated above, the years of 1983 to 1985,
were years of the so-called "dirty war" during which the military approach was to
brutalize not only the Shining Path, but also the peasants suspected of merely
sympathizing with the guerrillas. The military thus profoundly alienated the peasants who
refused to provide it with intelligence against the guerrillas. As Gordon McCormick
argues, the weakness of the Peruvian military response was further compounded by the
style and objectives of the military and police counterinsurgency operations: "The
military's chief measure of effectiveness is the body count. Rather than attempt to target
Sendero's organization, which would strike at the heart of the movement's capacity to
regenerate, the security forces have been content to tally up guerrilla kills. This objective,
coupled with severe resource constraints, training and leadership deficiencies, and the
general passivity of the forward-deployed units, has helped ensure that the SL will retain
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128 McCormick: 38.
the initiative."' 29 Consistent with the military's strategy, it was during this period that the
number of overall casualties in the conflict peaked.
Most analysts agree that the anti-guerrilla strategy of the military significantly
improved from 1986 on. Having experienced first-hand the importance of the cooperation
or non-cooperation of the peasants, the military changed its approach. Instead of
indiscriminate killing in the emergency zone, it resorted to only selective repression.
Moreover, the new president Alan Garcia also promised a socio-economic campaign to
alleviate the tremendous poverty of the regions of the insurgency as well as respect for
human rights.'30 Perhaps most importantly, however, between 1985 and 1989, the
Peruvian government undertook a vast reorganization of its intelligence, including the
creation of a special counter-terrorist intelligence unit, DIRCOTE. This groundwork in
intelligence gathering in the late 1980s ultimately led to the capture of Guzmin in
1992."' However, even though vast improvements were made during this period, the
number of SL attacks increased once again, topping 2000 in 1986.
In short, the increase in Sendero's military activity followed Sendero's
consolidation of control of the Upper Huallaga Valley and its successful exploitation of
the illicit economy, despite significant improvements in the military's counterinsurgency
129 Ibid.: 46. Sendero, under these circumstances, was in the position to determine its own level of
acceptable casualties. By expanding or contracting its scope of operations, it increased or decreased its
attrition rate. Long before the military could hit the core of the organization, the SL would scale down the
tempo of its operations.
130 Much of the socio-economic aid to the afflicted regions never materialized. While the military accepted
Garcia's emphasis on human rights, his investigation of the military's human rights violations and his
subsequent firing of three generals significantly complicated the relations between the president and the
military.. For details, see McClintock (1998): 141-49. For improvements in counterinsurgency policy in
specific regions, such as in the Ucayali area, see, for example, George H. Franco, "Battling Narcoterrorism:
The Peruvian Experience in the. Ucayali," Orbis, 48 (2), Summer 1994: 505-16. Based on the British
experience in Malaya, the counterinsurgency efforts in Ucayali sought to provide material benefits, such as
basic social services, to the population and protect it from reprisals by insurgents.
131 McClintock (1998): 149.
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policy. Although not the sole cause of conflict expansion, the access by the Shining Path
to the gains from the illicit economy crucially contributed to conflict escalation and
greatly increased the guerrilla's staying power.
VI. The Impact of Counternarcotics Policies on Counterinsurgency Objectives:
Testing the Effect of the Amplifier "Government Response to the Illicit Economy"
The case of Peru illustrates the way in which a government's acquiescence to
drug cultivation facilitates its efforts to defeat an armed insurgency and of the way in
which a government's drug eradication efforts hamper the overall efficacy of its counter-
insurgency policy. The following analysis will show how the five phases of the Peruvian
government's drug policy covaried with the success or failure of the overall anti-guerrilla
policies: When the Peruvian government did not attempt to eradicate coca, it scored
success against the Shining Path; when it undertook aggressive eradication, the efficacy
of its counterinsurgency policy was greatly reduced.
In the First Phase of the military counterinsurgency effort, the military did not
attempt to interfere with the drug trade. The military command in the zone of emergency
area concentrated on suppression of the guerrillas and largely ignored anti-drug
operations. The military's hands-off policy coincided with CORAH's and UMOPAR's
aggressive eradication campaign that, as shown above, had tremendously antagonized the
population in the UHV. The military quickly learned that counternarcotics efforts thrust
the population into the hands of Sendero. Between 1984-85, the military not only refused
to participate in counternarcotics efforts, but also actively sabotaged them. Given that the
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belligerents were mostly negatively involved in the illicit economy during this period,' 32
the state of the overall economy was poor, the character of the illicit economy was labor-
intensive, traffickers were present, and the military's'33 response to the narcotics
economy was tacit acquiescence, the political capital of illicit economies theory predicts
a substantial decrease in the belligerents' strength.
When placed in charged of the emergency zone in 1984, Army General Julio
Carbajal D'Angelo did not consider drug trafficking to be a real problem. Carbajal
maintained that the coca business was actually beneficial to the Peruvian economy since
it provided thousands of peasants with a source of livelihood and generated large foreign
exchange revenues for the country. Cocaine, he argued, was the gringos' problem.134 He
also maintained that involving the military in the fight against drugs could subject his
officers and soldiers to the temptation of corruption. 135 Carbajal and his successor during
1985 actively paralyzed the counternarcotics efforts of CORAH and UMOPAR, by
132 The learning regarding the need to tolerate the narcotics economy of the various, largely independent
Sendero columns.in the UHV was not uniform. However, during this period, many prohibited the narcotics
economy.
133I didn't use the term "government" response to the illicit economy because the government's policy was
split between eradication by the police and tacit acquiescence on the part of the government. However, the
military in the emergency zone became the governing entity and, at least during this period, controlled
counternarcotics policy.
134 William Montalbano, "Coca Valley: Peru Jungle Surrealism," Los Angeles Times, December 2, 1985.
135 Jose E. Gonzales (1994): 125. Carbajal's supposition about the danger of corruption of the military and
the anti-drug squads turned out correct. It is estimated thatthe traquateros ultimately paid as much money
to the Peruvian military for protection as they did to Sendero. The wage differentials between the military's
government's pay and the fees offered by the narcos reveal the difficulties of avoiding corruption. A
Peruvian two-star general's salary in.1984 was $3400 a year plus some perks, such.as a car. and a driver,
while a lieutenant-colonel's yearly salary was $3000. A facilitation fee provided by the traffickers for one
airplane takeoff was $15,000, a five-year salary earned by a lieutenant-colonel on a one time deal.
Sometimes the lieutenant-colonel would have to give a share of the profits to other. soldiers who turned a
blind eye to the airplane takeoffs. Nonetheless, he was able to earn several times more on a single takeoff
than was his yearly salary. For details, see Clutterbuck: 45-6. Corruption among the military became
pervasive..In 1987, Carbajal himself and 32 of his officers faced charges for accepting money from the
traffickers. Corruption among the military forces spread as the economic crisis of the latter 1980s forced
drastic cuts in the military budget, and salaries were dramatically slashed. In 1989-90, top generals earned
less than $200 a month or $24000 a year. Sometimes traffickers paid a facilitation fee twice for the same
plane takeoff- one to the military and one. to Sendero.
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refusing to protect the police and counternarcotics units against attacks or provide them
with intelligence on the location of fields and labs. In June 1985, for example, Peruvian
soldiers stood by as the cocaleros organized strikes and attacked UMOPAR and
CORAH, despite the police demands that the military break up the strike. The military
also severely restrained the movement of the counternarcotics units, de facto temporarily
confining UMOPAR to their barracks for five months from August 1984 to January
1985.136 When the military authorized UMOPAR and CORAH to operate, it allowed
them to do so only in areas where Sendero was not present or was weak. In effect, the
counternarcotics teams were not able to eradicate even one single hectare of coca in 1985
(although counternarcotics interdiction continued and destroyed 44 labs.) 137 Carbajal
made sure that the military's attitude toward counternarcotics was known among the
population. In the Monz6n district, for example, he publicly reassured the gathered
peasants that: "We guarantee that you will be able to continue with your normal
economic activities."
Carbajal's policy of keeping the antidrug squads from operating earned him
significant support from the local peasants as well as the drug traffickers. In the six
months of Carbajal's tenure, he managed to develop a rather positive relationship with
the local population, and both the peasants and the traffickers provided Carbajal with
intelligence that allowed him to drop platoons of soldiers along the SL's escape routes
136 See, Lee (1989): 89. Carbajal's attitude only worsened the already acute rivalry between the military
and the police. Many times subsequently the police attempted to sabotage the military's counterinsurgency
efforts, refusing to cooperate with the military's operations and denouncing members of the military as
traffickers.
137 McClintock and Vallas: 115.
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and throughout the region of its operations.' 38 Consequently, Carbajal was able to
disperse the guerrillas' columns in 1984 and temporarily to push them out of the UHV.' 39
The significance of the tacit acquiescence policy for motivating the peasants to
cooperate with the counterinsurgency effort is further enhanced by the fact that this
period was one of the military's greatest brutality which, tremendously alienated the
peasants. The fact that despite the military's brutality, the peasants were still willing to
provide the military with intelligence when eradication was halted reveals the crucial role
the government's anti-narcotics policy plays for the overall effectiveness of the
counterinsurgency policy. The support of the local population for the army
counterinsurgency efforts, including the provision intelligence to the army, is thus
consistent with the prediction of my theory.
In Phase Two, the new president Alan Garcia, under pressure from United States
and to capitalize on a popular anticorruption drive, adopted stringent anti-drug
operations. Both as a result of its success against Sendero and as a result of the new
emphasis on counternarcotics at the highest levels of Peru's new government, the army
was ordered to pull out from the UHVY and the state of emergency was lifted.
Surprisingly, the withdrawal was greeted in the UHV with dismay; local politicians
lobbied the government to reinstitute the state of emergency and the population signed
petitions to bring the army back. Nonetheless, the army was ordered to scale down its
operations in the area, and the police resumed coca crop eradication. Thus, 355 hectares
138 Andean Report, "Counterinsurgency and Anti-narcotics Measures Become Intertwined in Upper
Huallaga," 14 (6), June 1987: 102-106.
139 Jos6 E. Gonzales: 125. The narcos also took advantage of the government's acquiescence and started a
campaign of terror that frightened the-local populace. They also started paying the cocaleros smaller prices.
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of coca were eradicated in 1987; 5,130 in 1988, and 1,285 in 1989. The total area under
cultivation during these years was 109,500, 115,630, and 115, 630 hectares respectively.
Since Sendero was positively involved in the illicit economy and the government
response had changed to eradication (while the other amplifying factors remained the
same), my theory predicts that Sendero's strength will significantly increase. Eradication
will not limit the belligerents' group physical resources while the population will stop
supporting the government and providing intelligence on the belligerents. The
conventional view, on the other hand, predicts that eradication will deprive the
belligerents of critical physical resources while the intelligence provision by the
population to the army will be unaffected, thus increasing the effectiveness of the
counterinsurgency effort.
In fact, despite the end of the dirty war, the animosity of the local population
toward the police and its alienation from the government grew dramatically. The peasants
stopped providing intelligence on Sendero. The belligerents were rapidly able to
reestablish presence in the region, first infiltrating those regions that were hardest hit by
CORAH's eradication. The police frequently found itself outgunned and outmanned by
the insurgency.140 Sendero also began controlling entire towns, such as Uchiza and
Tocache. The strategy of provoking a split between the narcos and the SL failed. In fact,
the more aggressively the government and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency went after
the traffickers, the greater the protection the traffickers sought from the Sendero, and the
closer the cooperation between the narcos and the SL grew.
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140 Tarazona-Sevillano (1990): 129.
The aggressive eradication effort culminated in the Spike fiasco. In March 1989, a
new controversial herbicide spray Tebuthiuron, known as Spike, was tested in the UHV.
The coca growers were profoundly disturbed by this new threat to their livelihood,
fearing vast potential damaging effects to their livelihoods and health as well as the
overall ecology. 141 Sendero denounced the use of Spike, claiming that "the Yankee
monopolies themselves say [Spike] is like a series of small atomic bombs."' 42 The
Shining Path capitalized on the outrage of the cocalero farmers with the use of Spike and
with their support launched a military attack against the Uchiza police post that resulted
in one of the worst defeats the Peruvian government suffered in the Valley. 143 In this
case, the peasants not only applauded the SL, but also actively joined the guerrillas (as
did the narcos) in defeating the police. Significantly, this was one of the rare instances in
which the peasants actively fought alongside Sendero. Sendero's activity peaked, and
entire swaths of the countryside came under Sendero's control. The government's anti-
narcotics campaign was clearly counterproductive to the anti-guerrilla campaign in this
second phase. Contrary to the predictions of the conventional view and consistent with
the predictions of my theory, the effectiveness of the counterinsurgency effort declined,
141 The use of Spike was originally announced by U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese during his official
visit to Peru in April 1988. Under the U.S.-Peruvian agreement, an initial 100 to 250 hectares of coca
fields were to be sprayed with Spike from airplanes in May 1988. At the same time, the sole manufacturer
of the chemical, Eli Lilly and Company, refused to sell the herbicide to the U.S. Department of State for
use in coca eradication programs. The company's principal concerns were reprisals from drug lords against
its South American operations and liability for damages to the people and ecology of the region. The EPA
label on Spike indicated that the chemical was "intended for non-cropland vegetation control" and "should
not be applied directly to water or wetlands." Even the State Department-funded environmental report
described the UHV area as containing several tropical wet evergreen forests. Thus, amid the controversy,
the spraying with Spike was put on hold as President Garcia demanded more testing. For details, see
McClintock (1988): 133-34. In March 1989, aerial spraying with Spike was nonetheless undertaken. It is
important to note that severe ecological damage to the UHV also resulted from both the cultivation of coca
that led to deforestation and the pollution caused by coca processing into cocaine. Processing polluted large
areas of the region with millions of liters of kerosene, sulfuric acid, acetone, toluene, and a thousand metric
tons of lime, carbide.
142 Quoted in Rochlin: 62.
143 Gonzalez (1994): 130.
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Sendero's strength increased, and the population stopped providing intelligence on
Sendero.
The countryside was in such turmoil that Guzmfin finally came to believe that
militarily he was gaining the upper hand. Many exposed army and police outposts were
destroyed or overrun. Others were abandoned because of growing material shortages,
because of high desertion rates, and because of inaccessibility as Sendero cut off access
routes. In 1988, in a famous interview with a Lima newspaper El Diaro, Sendero's
mouthpiece, in which Guzmin analyzed the ideology, organization, strategy, and tactics
of his movement, he declared that his original estimate of the fifty-year war was too
pessimistic and that it was time to carry the war into the cities.144 The guerrilla campaign
thus expanded from the rural to the urban theater, including Lima, or in classic Maoist
terms, from the first phase of protracted defense to the second phase of equilibrium.
GuzmAn's decision to focus on Lima was highly controversial with the rest of
Sendero's leadership. A devote of Mao, Guzmin had anticipated and had preached about
a fifty-year struggle. A faction led by Guzmin's wife argued that Guzmin's sudden
change of mind contradicted Maoism and was premature. 145 Both she and top lieutenant
Osmin Morote, GuzmAn two closest associates, warned that the support in the
countryside was insufficient and the risk of defeat in Lima too great. 146 While until then
Sendero's operations were consistent with the long-term struggle thesis, Guzmin's
144 Sendero did engage in some proselytizing and some minor terrorist attacks in Lima before 1988, but the
scale of its operations was limited.
McClintock (1998): 66. Carlos Tapia, for example, carefully outlines the vast differences between
Mao's equilibrium in China and the situation in Peru after 1988. See, Carlos Tapia, Del "Equilibrio
Estrategico " a la derrota de Sendero Luminoso (Lima: Instituto de Estuadios Peruanos, 1996). However,
the vast and multiple gains from drugs enhanced Guzmin's false optimism that such a shift in strategy
could be undertaken. Author's interviews in Lima, summer 2005.
146 Ibid.: 92.
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decision to escalate the conflict in 1988 and take it to the capital was seen as not
consistent. Although security and economic conditions in Lima were not good, they were
not critical in 1988 when Guzmrin made his decision to undertake an escalation without
sufficient material support. Enrique Obando argues that GuzmAin decided to escalate
because he became simply impatient.' 47 Similarly, Carlos Ivain Degregori maintains that
over time Sendero's leadership succumbed to unjustified overconfidence. 148 It is very
likely that Guzmnin impatience and false optimism were stimulated by the vast and
tempting gains Sendero obtained from its positive involvement in the illicit narcotics
economy and the subsequent and unanticipated increase in Sendero's power. What
Guzmin failed to realize, however, was that to a large extent, Sendero's political capital
with the cocaleros was a function of the government's counternarcotics policies. When
the government stopped eradicating, much of Sendero political capital was lost.
This is precisely what happened in Phase Three. The UHV area was again placed
under a state of emergency with the military in charge, and the military once again
adopted tacit acquiescence toward drug cultivation. Given the belligerents' continuing
positive involvement in the illicit economy and no change in the values of the other
amplifying factors, the conventional view predicts a significant increase in the strength of
belligerents and a significant decrease in effectiveness of the counterinsurgency effort.
The political capital of illicit economies theory predicts the opposite: a significant
increase in the population's support for the counterinsurgency effort, including the
147 Enrique Obando, "La subversi6n: Situaci6n interna y consecuencias intemacionales," Analisis
Internacional, (1), January-March 1993: 45-62.
148 Carlos Ivin Degregori, "After the Fallof Abimael Guzmfn: The Limits of Sendero Luminoso," in The
Peruvian Labyrinth: Polity, Society, and Economy, Maxwell A. Cameron and Philip Mauceri, eds.
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997): 179-191.
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provision of intelligence to the government, a decrease in Sendero's strength, and an
increase in the effectiveness of the counterinsurgency effort.
In April 1989, Army Brigadier General Alberto Arciniega assumed control of the
EMZ. From the outset, he made it clear that he would concentrate on defeating the
guerrillas, and not on combating drug trafficking. He believed that gaining the
cooperation of the local populace was crucial for winning the anti-guerrilla war.
Arciniega noted that it was necessary to fight the SL, but not just in any manner:
It is necessary to consider that any rebel group seeks to gain the people's support,
and in the Huallaga Valley these are primarily cultivators of coca and are
repressed. How can we win their support? By taking them out of their present
precarious situation, that's how. The cocalero peasants were harassed by the
police and by any other official organization that happened by because they were
considered to be criminals. CORAH harassed them by eradicating their crops, the
police by considering that they were engaged in criminal activities ... We are
talking about 80 percent of the population! What we do then is to change the
situation to keep the coca grower, the group which Sendero supports in order to
accomplish its goals, from being subject to harassment. If we can persuade the
people to join us, the war is won. 149
To demonstrate his commitment not to interfere with coca production, Arciniega
did not allow the police, whom the peasants resented for their coca suppression practices
and human rights violations, to stay at his military base, and refused to cooperate with
them. Arciniega also promised large economic aid to the region to promote alternative
development. The general's acquiescence to coca cultivation was vastly applauded by the
populace, and the General received an unprecedented level of popular support. When he
asserted in the city of Uchizo in the UHV that the fight was against SL, not against the
growing of coca, 30,000 campesinos cheered. 50 With intelligence provided by both the
149 Quoted by Ra61 Gonzalez, "Las armas de un general," Quehacer, (62), December 1989-January 1990:
38-43. Even under Arciniega rule, however, there were allegations that the army still carried out human
rights abuses, harassed the peasants, and that the number of disappearances increased.Jos6 E. Gonzales (1994): 134-6.
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peasants and the drug traffickers themselves, Arciniega was able to effectively attack
Sendero in successive waves, and the military was gaining the upper hand. Tacit
acquiescence toward drug cultivation and trade thus greatly facilitated the
counterinsurgency effort.
The bad experience with Spike and the impact of counternarcotics efforts on the
counterinsurgency campaign also translated into civilians questioning the wisdom of the
anti-drug operations in light of the overall guerrilla effort. Eradication came to be seen as
counterproductive not simply by the Peruvian military, but also by politicians and
technocrats in the government. They feared that repressive enforcement measures would
only lose the hearts and minds of the Peruvian peasants to the Shining Path. Said an
APRA Congressman, Hector Vargas Haya, "What we need in this country are
greenbacks, not Green Berets."'15 Primarily as a result of these concerns, the Bush
Administration's $35.9 million anti-drug aid, aimed at eradication and interdiction, was
rejected by President Garcia in April 1990 and subsequently by President Fujimori in
September 1990.152
Sendero reacted to the losses in the countryside with increasing violence toward
the peasants. Since the military's tacit acquiescence toward narcotics cost Sendero much
of its political capital and Sendero was no longer capable of providing the population
151 Christian Science Monitor, 3 May 1990: 3. Many U.S. analysts had a similar reaction. One U.S. analyst,
for. example, commented that the U.S. request that Peru wage an all out war against drugs is like "asking a
country that's fighting the Civil War and going through the Great Depression to take on Prohibition as
well." Quoted in Peter Andreas, "Peru's Addiction to Coca Dollars," Nation, April. 16, 1990: 515.
152 After intense pressure from the United States, Fujimori subsequently accepted the counternarcotics aid
package, but only after assurances that a greater budget would be allocated for alternative development and
that peasants would not be labeled criminals. Finally, in April 1992, further U.S. counternarcotics aid was
suspended by Fujimori's dissolution of the parliament and suspension of democracy in Peru, the so-called
autogolpe. Ironically, it was the ending of democracy in Peru, which disqualified Peru from receiving U.S.
aid, that allowed the country to suspend eradication against the wishes of and pressure from the United
States since Peru no longer feared theeffect ofdrug decertification.
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with tangible benefits by protecting the illicit economy, it tried to obtain peasants'
cooperation though coercion. Sendero's brutality toward the peasants only further
antagonized them. Peasant self-defense units called rondas campesinas, promoted by the
government, expanded throughout the countryside. The premise of rondas was that local
peasants would be both more motivated to protect themselves against Sendero, and better
capable of doing so because they would know who the Senderistas were. Unfamiliar with
the territory, the military forces frequently were unable to tell Senderistas apart from the
local population. 153 Rondas interacted with a variety of local organizations, such as
parent-teacher associations, women's clubs, and irrigation committees.154 In the coca-
growing regions, rondas frequently overlapped with the cocaleros' defense
organizations. Since the UMOPAR was no longer harassing these organizations, they
could actively mobilize, and since Sendero was no longer useful as a protector of the
peasants against CORAH and UMOPAR, these cocaleros self-defense units could
manage to recapture the peasants' trust and fight against Sendero. Two such
organizations, the Defense Front Against Coca Eradication in the Upper Huallaga
(FEDECAH) and Agrarian Federation of the Selva Maestra (FASMA), in particular
expanded greatly. 155 Moreover, because of their profits from the drug trade, these rondas
were frequently well equipped and did not need to rely on the military's unreliable
153For several years, the military opposed the use of rondas, arguing that weapons provided to the peasant
self-defense units would turn up in the hands of Sendero. Others, such as human rights groups, criticized
the concept by arguing, rondas would turn noncombatant peasants into cannon fodder for the
counterinsurgency effort.
154 Orin Starn, "Villagers at Arms: War and Counterrevolution in the Central-South Andes," in Steve J.
Stem, ed., Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995 (Durham: Duke University Press,
1998): 245.
155 For details, see James Jones, "La Experiencia del PNUFID," in Desarrollo Alternativoy Desallorro
Rural: Debate sobre sus Limitesy Posibilidades, Hugo Cabienses and Eduardo Musso (Lima: Centro
Regional Andino and IICA, 1999).
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supplies.'56 Sendero was thus trapped fighting not only the military, but now directly the
peasants themselves. This effort not only depleted Sendero's energy and momentum, but
also severed the link between the population and the guerrillas. Consistent with the
prediction of my theory and contradicting the predictions of the conventional view,
Sendero was significantly weakened, the population started supporting the military, and
the effectiveness of the counterinsurgency effort was greatly increased.
Sendero's losses in the countryside coincided with its move into the cities and the
launching of its urban campaign. As shown above, the decision to move to the cities took
place in 1988, fueled by Sendero's optimism about how well the campaign in the
countryside was proceeding. By 1990, the urban campaign became all the more vital for
the success of Sendero's insurgency projects since the situation in the countryside was
more and more unfavorable to Sendero.
Although effective in terms of the overall counterinsurgency effort, the tolerant
narcotics approach of the Peruvian military soon came under threat. As a result of
information provided to the United States government by the Peruvian police who
strongly disliked the general, Arciniega was accused of receiving bribes from the
narcos. 157 Arciniega vehemently denied the charges. A bitter public fight in the
156 Author's interviews in Peru, summer 2005.
157 Melvyn Levitsky, Testimony of the Director of the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, US
Department of State. Hearings of U.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigation, 26-29 September. 101" Congress, F~ session. (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1989). Given Peru's economic crisis and the minimal resources the military
had available, the military was forced to rely, to a significant extent, on the drug money to finance their
military operations, pay salaries, buy equipment, and repair military installations. According to the Army's
Inspector General's office cited by the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, on occasion the
traffickers even donated food to the troops. Author's interviews in Peru, summer 2005. See, for example,
WOLA, "Drug War Paradoxes: The U.S. Government and Peru's Vladimiro Montesinos,"'Drug War
Monitor, July 2004: 6; and Isaias Rojas, "Peru: Drug Control Policy, Human Rights, and Democracy," in
Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy, Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin,
eds. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005): 194. See also, Pablo G. Dreyfus, "When All the Evils Come
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newspapers between the general and the U.S. Assistant Secretary for International
Narcotics Matters, Melvyn Levitsky, ensued. The new Peruvian president Alberto
Fujimori exploited the drug-corruption charges to take control of the military and purge it
of officers who were not his staunch supporters. Arciniega was thus removed from his
post after having directed the counterinsurgency for seven months.158
Following Arciniega's removal and the subsequent investigations into the
military's corruption (manipulated by Fujimori and his chief of intelligence services
Vladimiro Montesinos to eliminate opposition), the generals in charge of the Upper
Huallaga Valley became careful to avoid exposing themselves to drug-corruption
charges. The military moved closer to the position of the police and the United States
government: not interfering with drug suppression efforts. The counternarcotics efforts
undertaken, however, were interdiction, not eradication. The theory of political capital
would thus predict increased alienation of the peasants from the government and a
weakening of the population's support for the counterinsurgency effort, but to a smaller
degree than in the case of eradication.
As the Santa Lucia base became fully operational and the Peruvian military
stopped interfering with interdiction operations, the DEA and Peruvian police put large
pressure on the traffic. Since the traffickers were not able to transport the coca and
cocaine out of the UHV, their demand for UHV's coca leaf dropped, resulting in a large
overproduction of coca leaf in the Valley. Prices for coca leaf fell dramatically, from $2
Together: Cocaine, Corruption, and Shining Path in Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley, 1980 to 1995," Journal
of Contemporary Criminal Justice 15 (4), 1999: 370-96. It is, in fact, hard to imagine that the military
could have remained immune to the vast profits from the drug trade. However, it is also true that it was the
standard practice in Peru to accuse one's political enemies of drug corruption, and the police frequently
used this method in its turf wars with the military.
158 Fujimori also denied Arciniega military protection, a move that de facto invited the Shining Path to
assassinate the general, and Arciniega was forced to leave Peru for exile abroad.
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per kilo of coca leaf in mid-1989 to $0.3 in mid-1990, well below the cost of
production.i59 The peasants saw a precipitant decline in their income.
Again, the public sentiment turned against the military. A coca grower from UHV
(quoted by Gonzales) characterized the mood: "We are very disappointed, because we
thought we had governmental and military support, but now we are thinking it was only
Arniciega who understood us and had the courage to live among us."'16 Disillusioned
with the government, the peasants stopped providing intelligence on the guerrillas to the
military. As an official of the Interior Ministry noted at that time, "with growing popular
discontent, Sendero could recover as a major force in the valley, especially when the
local growers continue not to receive the economic assistance that Arciniega
promised." 6"' Or a coca grower in the Uchiza area (quoted by Gonzales) put it:
We really want to move out of coca production because we know that it is
harmful and because of all the problems it causes us. We are harassed and
persecuted because we grow coca, and we are victims of corruption and abuse as
well. But if we can't count on help from our own government or from foreign aid,
then our only recourse may be to get Sendero's support.' 62
Effective interdiction thus renewed the population's demand for Sendero's
positive involvement in the illicit economy. Aware of the peasants' poor economic
conditions, the Shining Path stepped in and once again provided its regulation services. It
made the drug traffickers pay higher prices to the peasants for coca leaves. The peasants
were grateful and again embraced Sendero. Thus, enhanced counternarcotics suppression
measures once again hampered the success of the counterinsurgency policy.
159 Jos6 E. Gonzales (1994): 137.
160 Quoted by Jose E. Gonzales (1994): 138.
161 Ibid.
162 Ibid.
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Despite the glitch in the countryside as a result of aggressive and effective
interdiction, Fujimori quickly learned that counternarcotics policy could easily hamper
the counterinsurgency effort against Sendero. The new president insisted that the drug
suppression efforts to be undertaken be interdiction, not eradication. In October 1990,
Fujimori gave a major speech in which he explained why he rejected eradication:
In no way we are opposed to an effective program to eradicate illegal coca
crops. ... But we wish to address repression in a larger context. ... An effective
program of repression that leaves the peasants without other alternatives would
sharply increase the number of those in extreme poverty and could unchain a civil
war of unsuspected proportions. ... We will not repeat the errors of President Ngo
Dinh Diem of Vietnam, who, during the 1950s, pitted himself against the
informal, common law order of the peasants. ... We will not push peasants and
their families into the arms of terrorists and drug traffickers. 13
Fujimori was heavily influenced by the ideas of Hernando de Soto,164 who for a while
became his chief adviser for counternarcotics. De Soto advocated giving the coca farmers
titles to land to facilitate their switching to legal crops, making them eligible for bank
loans, and creating transportation networks to establish access to legal markets. Fujimori
also recognized the counterproductiveness of eradication in the context of
counterinsurgency. During a major counterdrug summit meeting among Latin American
governments and the United States in San Antonio in February 1992, Fujimori rejected
counternarcotics efforts unless more was done to help the farmers. During a meeting with
President George Bush, in what a U.S. diplomat characterized as "an in-your-face
163 Quoted by Clawson and Lee: 218.
164De Soto also argued for multinational firms and international organizations to guarantee a set quantity
of alternative crops to be purchased for a guaranteed price. He resigned in 1992, claiming that his plan for
how to deal with the illicit economy was corrupted and sabotaged from within the government. Vladimiro
Montesinos, the head of Peru's intelligence services and Fujimori's closest aide, managed to usurp control
of counterdrug policy from de Soto, leaving him largely powerless.
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outburst," Fujimori argued that "No government may fight against an entire
population."' 65
The eradication of all mature coca was thus suspended in Peru until 1996.
Eradication of coca seedbeds continued, but despite U.S. pressure, Peru insisted on
eradicating only the 15,000 square meters per month target set in negotiations between
the U.S. and Peru, and no more. These efforts made only a small dent in the overall
cultivation and did not really complicate the lives of the peasants.
In 1991, the CIA and the Peruvian government, specifically Vladimiro
Montesinos, began working out a policy alternative to eradication. Since the mid-1980s,
the U.S. government had been considering the idea of shooting down planes suspected of
carrying drugs from Peru to Colombia. Fearful of mistakenly shooting down civilians and
exposing the government to potential lawsuits, the Reagan administration never
undertook the program. However, in 1991, Montesinos and the CIA reopened
conversations about the program and began setting up the infrastructure that in 1995
ultimately became Operation Air Bridge Denial. 166 Although the United States officially
did not collaborate in the air interdiction program until 1995, air interdiction by the
Peruvians began in 1991 and appeared to be effective. In 1991, the CIA and
SOUTHCOM installed radar stations to facilitate the efforts of the Peruvian air force to
165 Quoted by Michael Isikoff, "Bush, Latin Leaders Agree to Stepped-Up Drug Fight," Washington Post,
February 28, 1992. At the summit, President Bush agreed that more had to be done to support alternative
development. In practice, little aid for alternative development materialized in the subsequent U.S. aid
packages for Peru's counternarcotics effort.
6 By then, Montensinos had established a counternarcotics office within national intelligence services he
controlled and de facto controlled counternarcotics policy. The DEA and the Department of State objected
to the CIA's effort to manage: counternarcotics efforts in Peru through Montesinos, citing his widespread
and deep connections to Peruvian traffickers, and fearing that "the fox would be guarding the henhouse."
Cited by Gustavo Gorriti in "The Betrayal of Peru's Democracy: Montesinos as Fujimori's Svengali,"
Covert Action, 49, Summer 1994: 55.
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track drug planes. In 1991, ten trafficker's airplanes were seized, seven in 1992, and
thirteen in 1993.167
It is important to note that the military's acceptance of interdiction was not
altogether uniform across the country. The 1994 arrest of one of Peru's most prominent
traffickers, Demetrio Chavez Pefiaherrera known as El Vaticano, revealed that in the
Campanilla region where he operated an airstrip for cocaine shipment to Colombia, he
received protection from Vladimiro Montesinos,168 as well as from the military leadership
in Campanilla, such as General Nicolas Hermoza Rios. ChAvez claimed that his men
cooperated with the military in keeping Sendero out of the region. And in fact, unlike in
the Upper Huallaga Valley, Sendero was never able to establish significant presence in
Campanilla or control the trade. Apart from revealing the corruption of Fujimori's
counternarcotics efforts, this episode once again confirms the lack of an ideological
alliance between criminal trafficking organizations and belligerent groups. It also shows
that when and where tacit acquiescence to the illicit economy by the government was
adopted, Sendero struggled to penetrate the illicit economy and even failed to do so.
Despite the peasants' resentment at the effects of interdiction, rondas continued to
snowball throughout the country. By 1993, more than 4,200 self-defense organizations
sprung up across the country, with a membership of almost 236,000.169 Moreover, the
Peruvian military - at least in specific areas such as the Ucayali region -- adopted an
explicit hearts and minds approach, extending state presence and distributing material
167 McClintock and Vallas: 120-1.
168 Montesinos came to considered by the United States a close Peruvian ally and someone who could
guarantee the success of counternarcotics operations in Peru.
169 David Scott Palmer, "'Terror in the Name of Mao': Revolution and Response in Peru," Democracy and
Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past, Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson, eds. (Washington: United
States Institute of Peace, 2006), forthcoming, author's copy.
221
benefits to the population, including road repair, medicines, and school supplies.
Intelligence provision further improved, and Sendero's influence weakened. Thus,
although interdiction did alienate the rural population from the government to some
extent, this counterproductive effect of interdiction was considerably less pronounced
than that of eradication, as predicted by my theory. Although interdiction suppressed
prices and reduced the income of the farmers, it did not wipe out their livelihood to the
same extent as eradication did, and Sendero was not able to secure the population's
support to the same extent as it did during periods of eradication. While interdiction was
in place since 1990, Sendero kept losing further and further territory in the countryside.
The importance of the urban theater grew as conditions in the countryside
continued turning against Sendero. The expansion of the insurgency campaign to Lima,
and the increases in number of casualties and attacks, created a real sense in both Peru
and abroad that Sendero could topple the government. As Cynthia McClintock argues,
one of Sendero's greatest strategic achievements was to create the impression in the
minds of many Peruvians that its march to power was inexorable.170
Sendero's urban strategy sought to create such a degree of chaos in the cities that
would allow it to bring down the government through a combination of a popular
uprising and its own military effort. In preparation for this final onslaught, Sendero
attacked banks and companies - foreign and domestic - to force them and their capital to
leave the country. An exodus of Peru's economic and political elite was to follow. This
drainage of the economic leadership would bring the economy to a standstill, resulting in
the collapse of all social and public services and major economic deprivation for the
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170 McClintock (1998): 293.
masses. The masses would resort to looting and strikes. The military would be dispatched
to crush them, a move that Sendero believed would cause a schism in the military, which
Sendero could exploit to take over the government.
By the end of 1990, Sendero took control over many shantytowns on Lima's
outskirts. The economic crisis resulted in the state having to curtail even the most basic
services among the urban poor, increasing their economic hardship, radicalizing them,
and discrediting neighborhood leaders with less belligerent policies than Sendero. 71
Meanwhile, continuing with its policy of the 1980s, Sendero was distributing public
services, such as free haircuts and health clinics, roofing for schools, soup kitchens, and
organizing street trash cleanup.172 Sendero also began detonating car and truck bombs
inside the city, including in the very affluent neighborhoods, such as Miraflores. Between
1990 and 1992, with an unrelenting rate, Sendero was attacking police stations, factories,
businesses, schools, and paralyzing the capital's roads to the interior. Political
assassinations by Sendero became commonplace. Businessmen, doctors, and the
professionals were leaving the country, and the military was experiencing high desertion
rates. Sendero's predictions appeared to be materializing. The police were rapidly losing
credibility for containing growing crime.' 73 As Enrique Obando, Peru's prominent
defense expert and defense official put it, "Sendero came very close to succeeding in its
plan." 174
171 Susan C. Stokes, Cultures in Conflict: Social Movements and the State in Peru (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1995): 61-83172 Palmer (2006), forthcoming, author's copy.
173 Jo-Marie Burt, "Barriadas: The Case of Villa El Salvador," in Shining and Other Paths: War and
Society in Peru, 1980-1995 Steve J. Stem, ed. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998): 271.
174Author's interview, Lima, June 2005.
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The great downside of moving the campaign to the capital and posing such a
direct threat to the political and economic elite of the country was the elite's intensified
desire to eliminate Guzman.' 75 A major intelligence effort to capture the leader of the
Shining Path was undertaken. Guzmdn's move into Lima also greatly limited the area in
which Guzmin could continue evading the intelligence services, and hence increased the
chances of their apprehending him. Both dangers materialized. In 1990, supported by the
CIA, GEIN (Grupo Especial de Intelligencia) a special intelligence unit with the sole
purpose of capturing GuzmAn was created within the antiterrorism police (Direcci6n
Nacional Contra El Terrorism or DINCOTE). In 1992, GEIN, under the leadership of
Col. Benedicto Jim6nez, finally succeeded in capturing GuzmAn. His capture turned out
the critical blow to the insurgency. It shattered his image as invincible god. More
importantly, it reduced the decision-making capacity of the remaining Sendero since the
organization was strictly hierarchically organized around Guzmin. The capture also
provided additional vital intelligence on the remaining top echelons of the Shining Path.
To escape the death penalty, Guzmin struck a deal with the government and ordered to
his troops to surrender. Taking advantage of Guzmin's call for the end to the conflict, the
government announced a "repentance law" in 1993 - that is a modest penalties or
amnesty, retraining and reintegration into society for the guerrillas who turned
themselves in and provided intelligence. 76" By 1994, Sendero ceased to pose a threat to
the Peruvian state and was largely defeated.
175 The threat Sendero posed in the urban theater also allowed Fujimori to justify the dismantling of
democractic institutions under his autogolpe.
176 The repentance law was based on the success of the Italian pentini laws against the Red Brigades. As it
turned out, however, the guerrillas who turned themselves in frequently provided false intelligence.
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In sum, Sendero Luminoso was ultimately defeated without the elimination of
coca production and trafficking in Peru, and, in fact, without any eradication taking place
at all. Sendero was not defeated as a result of either eradication or interdiction
bankrupting the guerrilla group. Sendero was defeated as a result of a combination of an
intelligence operation that led to the capture of Guzman in 1992, which was completely
independent of the counternarcotics efforts, and of a successful counterinsurgency policy
in the countryside, which won the hearts and minds of the population by tolerating coca
cultivation and which used effectively the peasant self-defense forces. In short, as
predicted by the political capital of illicit economies theory, eradication hampered
counterinsurgency efforts, and the government's tacit acquiescence to coca production
was crucially instrumental in defeating the insurgency in the countryside.
VII. Hunkering Down in the Jungle and Hoping to Recapture the Cocaleros
The elements of the Shining Path that did not surrender and escaped the
government were those that operated in the UHV and were closest to both the narcos and
the peasants. Despite the increase in the numbers of rondas throughout the countryside,
the strongest support for Sendero remained in the coca-growing regions. Outraged at
Guzmrn's concessions and plea bargain, hardcore Cipola member Alberto Ramirez
Durand ("Feliciano") created a new organization, Sendero Rojo (Red Sendero). Ramirez
had close contacts with the drug trafficking group of Waldo Vargas, a.k.a., El Ministro.
According to former Shining Path members, Ramirez had collected $200 million from
drug trafficking before 1994.177 Although the armed members of Sendero Rojo number
177 Clawson and Lee: 181. Recounting a radio broadcast, Clawson and Lee do not provide any greater
detail regarding Ramirez's role. It is unclear whether he collected this amount of money on behalf of the
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less than 500 and operate almost exclusively in the coca-growing regions, they have
recently increased their mobilization efforts.
As the following analysis will show, a counternarcotics policy based until the late
1990s on interdiction was not only effective in reducing the size of the illicit narcotics
economy, but also in making it difficult for the remnants of Sendero to regenerate
political capital from the illicit economy. The suspension of interdiction in 2002 and the
subsequent increase in eradication, however, are presenting a new opening for the
remnants of the Shining Path to exploit for acquiring political capital while once again
radicalizing the rural coca-growing areas and increasing social instability.
The Success of Interdiction in Limiting Narcotics Production, with Help from a
Fungus
Until 1996, eradication of mature coca was suspended in Peru, and only coca
seedbeds were being destroyed. Fujimori's insistence that eradication of mature crops not
take place was unpopular in Washington, and until 1996, Peru barely eluded
decertification by the Department of State and the resulting cutoff of economic aid. In
1995, the country did not receive full certification, but was instead issued a "national
interest" waiver. 178
By 1995, the United States and Fujimori nonetheless worked out an aerial
interdiction program against the traffickers' planes. Named "Air Bridge Denial," the
entire Shining Path, his faction, or himself personally. The latter two possibilities, however, do not appear
likely as Ramirez continued struggling with a small number of guerrillas deep in the jungles during the
1990s. Ifhe had such a large amount of money at his disposal he would have been able to field a more
impressive looking band of belligerents, despite the counterinsurgency pressure from the Peruvian
government.
178 Ted Galen Carpenter, Bad Neighbor Policy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003): 142.
226
interdiction operation was premised on the idea that in the unpopulated region between
the UHV and Colombia, it would be easy to locate and identify aircraft taking off from
Peru for Colombia with coca paste and cocaine. A crucial reason why the United States
felt it could officially collaborate with Peru in the aerial interdiction program was new
legislation passed in 1994 authorizing the U.S. president to identify countries that posed
an extraordinary threat from drug trafficking to the United States and exempting the U.S.
from liability for civilian deaths during the shoot-downs of suspected planes, thus
circumventing the Montreal Protocol which made the downing of civilian aircraft a
criminal offense. And U.S. soldiers were not to fly the interdiction airplanes; the
Peruvians would. U.S. agents at the Santa Lucia center, however, would provide the
Peruvians with intelligence. As the program kept expanding through 2002, the CIA, the
DOD, the DEA, the National Security Agency, and the U.S. Customs provided technical
assistance, trained the Peruvian counternarcotics officers, and provided intelligence.
In 1995, some 22 aircraft were downed under the interdiction operations. The fee
demanded by pilots operating drug trafficking planes increased from $30,000 in 1994 to
$180,000 in 1997.179 Coinciding with the interdiction campaign was a major drop in coca
leaf prices that made the returns unattractive for the farmers and caused a major decline
in the area cultivated. The price for coca leaf fell from $2.5 per kilogram at the beginning
of 1995 to $.6 at the end of 1995.180 Price remained under $1 per kilogram, below the
profit margin, until May 1998.181 The area under cultivation decreased from 115,300
179Anthony Faiola, "As Coca Market Goes, So Shall They Reap," Washington Post, November 18, 1997.18 0McClintock and Vallas: 126. See also, Theo Ronken et. al., The Drug War In the Skies: The U.S. "Air
Bridge Denial" Strategy: The Success of a Failure (Cochabamba: Acci6n Andina, Transnational Institute,
1999).181 Obando (2006), forthcoming, author's copy.
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hectares in 1995 to 43,400 in 2000 and 46,700 in 2002.182 Manual eradication on a small
scale also began again in 1996. Fujimori felt that the threat posed by Sendero was
minimal while the pressure from the United States on Peru to restart eradication was
large. Thus in 1996, 1,259 hectares were eradicated; 7,825 in 1998; and 13,800 in
1999.'"8
A major debate exists among experts about the cause of the drop in coca leaf
prices. The U.S. government and some counternarcotics experts attribute the drop in
prices to the combination of interdiction and eradication. The Director of the Office on
National Drug Control Policy at the time, Gen. Barry McCaffrey, for example, called the
counternarcotics efforts in Peru "revolutionary," "without historic precedent," and
"absolutely astounding."' 84 Other counternarcotics experts and human rights advocates
point to the aging of coca plants, their reduced productivity and increased susceptibility
to a fungus (Fusarium exysporum) that between 1991 and 1993 infected the coca plants
in Peru.'85 Still others suggest the emergence of a new supply market in Colombia, which
was driven by the destruction of the big Medellin and Cali cartels in Colombia. The new
and considerably smaller cartels it is argued could not operate well across borders and
182 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Coca Cultivation in the Andean Region: A Survey of
Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, June 2005, http://www.unodc.org/pdflandean/Partl_excutive_summary.pdf,
downloaded on May 5, 2006. These numbers were disputed both by the United Nations Drug Control
Program and some Peruvian scholars. Author's interviews, Lima, summer 2005.
183 U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (Washington, DC: U.S.
Department of State), annual reports, 1997-2000.
184 McClintock and Vallas: 125.
185 Tullis: 98; Rojas: 205; and WOLA, July 2004: 8-9. Allegations have been made that the fungus,
Fusarium exysporum, did not occur naturally, and was released. by the CIA. See, for example, Jeremy
Bigwood, "The Drug War's Fungal 'Solution' in Latin America, "Andean Seminar Lecture Series
sponsored by GWU and WOLA, December 8, 2000, http://jeremybigwood.net/Lectures/GWU-WOLA-
JB/GWUNov2000.htm, downloaded May 5, 2004. These allegations were denied by U.S. and Peruvian
officials during the author's interviews in Washington, DC and Lima, Peru, in the summers of 2004 and
2005. The use of a fungus was under consideration for dealing with the opium poppy problem in
Afghanistan. Author's interviews with U.S., U.K., and Afghan officials, summer 2004 and winter 2005.
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had to stimulate new production in Colombia, thus displacing Peruvian supply of coca
leaf. 186
Although the presence of the fungus no doubt negatively affected the illicit
economy, reduced the desirability of UHV's coca leaf, and hence contributed to the
decline in prices, it would be wrong to altogether dismiss the importance of the
interdiction operations. First, it is unlikely that although interdiction on a much smaller
scale had been effective in disrupting traffic and lowering prices before the emergence of
the fungus, e.g., between 1989 and mid-1990, it would have no effect at all after 1995
when adopted on a much larger scale. Second, the fact that old plants were not replaced
with new ones is a result, not a cause, of the decline in demand for Peru's coca leaves.
Had there been sufficient demand, farmers would have invested in replanting with new
coca plants. Third, although the new boutique Colombian cartels were likely limited in
their trafficking abilities across borders and found it easier to operate from a production
base in Colombia, it is not at all obvious that such an inconvenience would have been
sufficient to deter them from buying in Peru without the great inconveniences imposed by
Air Bridge Denial. Expanding production is a costly and risky activity, and profit-
maximizing and risk-minimizing organizations undertake it only if no better alternatives
are available. Yet other trafficking organizations, smaller than the emergent Colombian
boutique cartels, such as in Burma and Pakistan, and even individual traffickers, such as
in Afghanistan, did manage to operate across borders very well. Rather, it is very likely
that the considerable pressure that interdiction under Air Bridge Denial was putting on
the Peruvian drug traffic was a key factor that motivated the new cartels to shift
Autnor's interviews In Lima, summer 2003. See also, McClintockl and Vallas: 127; and Kojas: 21.
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production to Colombia, despite the risks and costs involved. Without Air Bridge Denial,
the new boutique cartels would likely have been able to continue operating from Peru.
Fourth, the extent of eradication during that period, on the scale of less than 10,000
hectares a year, was much too small to bring production down by almost 60 percent as
happened between 1995 and 19 9 9 .187
Although effective in keeping production down, interdiction was also manipulated
by Vladimiro Montesinos to obtain money and increase his power over the drug trade in
Peru and nationally. Montesinos ordered interdiction operations only against certain
traffickers while, for considerable payoffs, shielding others. Yet he effectively
manipulated control of interdiction to portray himself as a staunch U.S. ally in the war on
drugs and to consolidate the control of both counternarcotics operations and drug
trafficking in Peru in his own hands. In addition to collecting large protection fees,
evidence emerged that Montesinos himself was involved in money laundering and
cocaine trafficking, including using army helicopters to transport cocaine.' 88 After
Fujimori's departure from Peru in 2000 and the reestablishment of democracy in the
country, Montesinos, along with 18 generals and more than 50 other high-ranking civilian
and military officials were arrested on drug-corruption charges.
On April 20, 2001, the Peruvian air force accidentally shot down a plane
belonging to the Association of Baptists for World Evangelization, causing the death of a
187 One part of the reason why eradication tends to be ineffective in reducing cultivation is that manual
eradication is extraordinarily labor-intensive. It takes perhaps twenty man-days of effort to pull up one
hectare of coca plants. See, Kevin Jack Riley, Snow Job? (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1996):
112. Moreover, coca production is easy to move. At its peak, 130,000 hectares (or less than 900 square
miles) were planted with coca in Peru. Yet at least 20 million hectares (or 80,000 square miles) in Peru
could support coca cultivation, making it extremely easy to move production and avoid detection.
188 Montesinos was indicted on a variety of trafficking and laundering charges, including on sellingAK-
47s worth $8 million to the FARC. He was also apparently directly connected to several Mexican cartels,
including the Tijuana cartel. For a comprehensive list of the various charges, accusations, and evidence, see
WOLA (July 2004).
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U.S. missionary and her daughter. Despite the 1994 legislation exempting the U.S.
government from liability under the Montreal Protocol, the Baptist Church sued for $50
million, and ultimately received $8 million. The U.S. suspended its financial and material
support for aerial interdiction abroad. Although Washington instituted new procedures
for monitoring anti-narcotics activities and placed additional restrictions on the "deadly-
force phase" of aerial interceptions, aerial interdiction has not been reinstituted in Peru.
The Peruvian government does not have the means to carry out interdiction on its own,
and even U.S. financial aid to Peru could make the United States liable for interdiction
mishaps.
Sendero's New Mobilization: The Effect of Eradication
In fact, at the time of this writing, eradication does constitute the bulk of the
counternarcotics policy in Peru. The remnants of Sendero continue to militarily challenge
the government, even if on a small scale. The conventional view predicts that eradication
will deprive the remaining Shining Path of physical resources and finally completely
eliminate the belligerent group. The political capital of illicit economies theory, on the
other hand, predicts that given no change in the values of the other amplifying factors -
poor state of the overall economy in the rural regions of Peru, labor-intensive illicit
economy, and the presence of traffickers, the change in government response to the illicit
economy toward eradication will generate new opportunities for Sendero to attempt to
recapture its social base. My theory does not predict that Sendero will succeed in
reestablishing a social base - much will depend on the ability of the cocaleros to find
other representation as well as on the skills of Sendero's current leadership to provide
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effective protection to the illicit drug economy -- but it does predict that the rural
population will be once again alienated from the government and that Sendero will be
able to exploit this alienation for new mobilization efforts.
Indeed, eradication is generating widespread social strife in Peru. During the
period that predominantly emphasized interdiction, the remnants of the Shining Path were
not capable of effectively exploiting the coca economy: They were neither making a large
amount of money on the drug trade nor deriving a large amount of political capital from
sponsoring the illicit economy since they were not able to provide effective protection to
the peasants or the traffickers. Their numbers and weapons were too limited to seriously
threaten Air Bridge Denial, nor could they kill the fungus that was killing the coca.
Instead, the remnants of Shining Path have been deriving their finances from
illicit logging of mahogany, cedar, oak, and other specialty hardwoods' 89 along Peru's
northern border. This has been the case of especially one armed faction called Proseguir
(In Pursuit) under the leadership of commander "Alipio."' 19 Illicit logging and the
cultivation of coca are intimately linked. In order to plant coca, the land must first be
stripped of trees. Conversely, in highly acidic tropical soils, deforestation frequently
causes such soil degradation that few plants other than coca can be planted in cleared
areas. Illicit logging is highly lucrative and labor-intensive. In the context of continuing
189 Illicit logging has been widespread in developing countries. Cambodia's Khmer Rouge, for example,
was estimated to derive about $10 million a month from. its illicit trade with timber for Thailand in. 1992.
See, for example, Jamie Thomson and Ramzy Kaanan, "Conflict Timber: Dimensions of the Problem in
Africa and Asia," A Report for the United States Agency for International Development,
http://www.usaid.gov/our work/cross-cuttingprograms/transition_initiatives/pubs/vol 1 synth.pdf,
downloaded December 10, 2005. As with all estimates of profits from illicit economies, such numbers
should be taken with a grain of salt. In fact, they appear to be grossly overestimated. Nonetheless, even if
overestimated ten times, the data indicate how highly lucrative illicit trade with timber is.
190 Author's interviews in Peru, summer 2005. "Alipio" has taken over the leadership of the faction after
the arrest of Feliciano in 1999. Proseguir has also obtained finances from extorting the gas company,
Camisea.
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large-scale and deep poverty in Peru, positive involvement in the illicit logging economy
could thus potentially generate substantial political capital for the remnants of the Shining
Path. Yet since the Peruvian government does not have the means to patrol the large
Amazon jungles nor the motivation to substantially crack down on illicit logging - there
is a high level of state corruption related to illicit logging -- and since the United States is
also putting only minimal pressure on Peru to prevent illicit logging, a tacit acquiescence
policy is de facto in place. 191 Consequently, the loggers do not need the Shining Path for
protection and Sendero has not been able to translate its participation in the illicit
economy into a new social base. The extent of the gains the remnants of the Shining Path
are deriving from the illicit logging economy is thus limited and confined to gains they
can obtain from direct smuggling, rather than large-scale provision of protection.
Instead, it is the increased emphasis on eradication as the principal
counternarcotics approach since the late 1990s, and especially since the suspension of
aerial interdiction in 2002, that is once again radicalizing the cocaleros and presenting a
new mobilization opportunity for the remnants of Sendero. The United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime estimates that about 50,000 families are involved in coca cultivation in
Peru today.' 92 Peruvian experts believe that this number underestimates the scale of the
problem, and put the number of people directly involved in the coca economy between
191 Meanwhile, the illicit economy is threatening a fragile and highly bio-diverse and rich ecosystem in the
Peruvian Amazon. For details, see, for example, Chris Fagan and Diego Shoobridge, "An Investigation of
Illegal Mahagony Logging in Peru's AltoPfirus National Park and Its Surroundings," Parks Watch, January
2005, http://www.parkswatch.org/specreports/logging_apnpeng.pdf, downloaded, September 15, 2005,
and Kenneth R. Young, "Environment and Social Consequences of Coca/Cocaine in Peru: Policy
Alternatives and Research Agenda," in Dangerous Harvest: Drug Plants and the Transformation of
Indigenous Landscapes, Michael K. Steinberg; Joseph J. Hobbs, and Kent Mathewson, eds. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2004): 249-273.
192 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Peru Coca Cultivation Survey, June 2004,
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/peru/peru_coca_survey 2003.pdf, downloaded on May 5, 2005.
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300,000 to 500,000.193 As a result of aerial spraying in Colombia, the resulting
suppression of cultivation in Colombia, and an increase in prices for coca leaf in Peru, the
area under coca cultivation has increased in Peru from 44,200 hectares in 2003 to 48,200
hectares in 2005.194 Coca cultivation has spread out of the Huallaga Valley to other areas.
Although cultivation still continues in the UHV at high levels, other important cultivation
areas now include the Apurimac-Ene Valleys, La Convenci6n y Lares, San Gabain,
Inambari Tambopata, and Marafion. Coca cultivation also appears to be increasing in the
Napo river near the border with Colombia's Putumayo department. Moreover, cultivation
of poppy is also emerging in the northern jungle areas. 195 Moreover, coca leaf prices in
Peru have been climbing steadily since 1998, from US$ 0.8 per kilogram of sun-dried
coca leaf in 1997 to US$ 2.9 in 2005.196 At 2005 prices, a hectare of coca brought to a
farmer an annual income of $7,500, compared with $600 from coffee and $1,000 from
cocoa. 197 The drug industry continues to be fragmented, essentially run as mom-and-pop
193 Author's interviews in Peru, summer 2005.
194 UNODC (June 2005) and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Peru Coca Cultivation Survey for
2005, June 2006, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/andean/Peru_coca_survey_2005.pdf, downloaded September
08, 2006. Under the Peruvian counternarcotics law, Law 22095, 11,500 hectares are permitted to be planted
with coca for traditional and legal purposes. However, a lack of clarity about who is entitled to legal
cultivation complicates enforcement. Peru's ENACO and various social movements have tried to expand
the legal market, both domestically and for exports, promoting products such as coca tea and coca wine.
One such a recent undertaking in Peru has been the promotion of a power drink flavored with extracts from
coca leaves but without the alkaloid cocaine, called Vortex. The United States opposes the exploration and
promotion of legal uses, including Vortex, arguing that diversion into illicit uses would not be preventable,
eradication would become more complicated, and such schemes would serve as money-laundering ventures
for traffickers.
195 Peruvian counternarcotics experts emphasize the lack of knowledge about the state and size of opium
poppy cultivation in Peru or its origins. Some U.S. experts believe that opium was introduced in Peru by
the Calf cartel. See, for example, Berry et al.
196 Obando (2006), forthcoming,. and UNODC (June 2006). The United States attributed the rise in prices
to slow speed of eradication while the Peruvian government has attributed it to the suppression of
production in Colombia and the suspension of interdiction in Peru. See, Isaias Rojas, "The Push for Zero
Coca: Democratic Transition and Counternarcotics Policy in Peru," Drug War Monitor, WOLA Briefing
Series, February 2003.
197 "Battles Won, A War Still Lost," Economist, 374 (8413), February 12, 2005: 35. The majority of coca
farmers plant between 0.5 to 2 hectares of coca.
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processing operations. However, increasingly the bulk of processing takes place in Peru
itself. With the destruction of the big Colombian cartels, the influence of Colombian
traffickers has waned, and Mexican cartels have become the dominant trading partners
for Peruvian producers and traffickers. Peru has also been supplying a new cocaine
market in Brazil, and Peruvian traffickers are dealing directly with emerging drug
syndicates in Brazil.
Even stepped-up eradication is not sufficient to keep increases in cultivation
down. Manual eradication has intensified, uprooting 6,206 hectares in 2000 and 12,232
hectares in 2005.198 But as indicated above, cultivation has increased also, with more
coca cultivation in 2005 than in 2000. Peasants have adapted in a variety of ways, among
others by increasing the number of plants per hectare. While the average number of
plants per hectare in the Apurimac Valley is 30,000 to 40,000, up to 300,000 per hectare
have been observed.' 99
As efforts at alternative development have failed to substantially improve the
economic conditions of the rural population in Peru, dependence on coca continues.
Between 1995 and 2000, the United States spent about $15 million on alternative
livelihood programs in Peru.20 0 With this money, about 600 km of roads and 17 bridges
were repaired. Credit for legal crops was extended to several thousand families. Some
alternative development funds have also been allocated to improvements in health and
198 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Peru Coca Cultivation Survey, June 2005,
http://www.unodc.org/pdfiandean/Part4_Peru.pdf, downloaded May 04, 2006, and UNODC (June 2006).
Peruvian law prohibits aerial eradication. The use of biological and chemical defoliants has been prohibited
in the Monz6n area in 2000 after major strikes and protests. Since then the population has become so
radicalized in the region that eradication had to be suspended altogether in the Monz6n.
199International Crisis Group (March 3, 2005).200 McClintock and Vallas: 128.
235
education service. 20 1 But the majority of farmers found it difficult to obtain funds or
otherwise benefit from the programs. Credit and technical assistance continue to be
scarce. Critical infrastructure is still lacking. Most peasants were poorer in the late 1990s/
early 2000s than in 1994. As Diego Garcia-Sayan put it: "They were promised alternative
development and instead, they got alternative poverty."202 Although alternative
development experts in Peru believe that alternative livelihoods programs are helping to
limit the increases in coca cultivation and that in their absence coca cultivation would be
far greater, the programs yet have to make substantial improvements in the economic
conditions of the majority of the cocaleros.2 03 Having negative experience with
alternative development programs in the early 1980s, the majority of peasants have come
to distrust alternative development schemes, including those promoted by various NGOs,
such as CARE and Chemonics. Unlike the European Union which prefers to undertake
alternative livelihoods programs without requiring eradication, the United States insists
that alternative development cannot be successful without eradication and frequently
demands that eradication come first before alternative livelihoods aid is disbursed. The
coca farmers, however, do not trust such proposals, worrying that they will eradicate, but
the promised alternative livelihood programs will fail, and they will be unable to meet
basic needs.
201 Based on annual reports by the U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy
Reports (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State), 1999-2005. An individual successful project was the
building of a palm oil extraction facility in the Ucayali region, once.a stronghold of Sendero. But such
successes are not numerous and operate on a scale too low to make any overall difference in the economic
situation of the cocaleros and to substantially reduce cultivation.
202 Quoted by Nicole Bonnet, "Special Report - the Apurimac River Valley," The Peru Report and Peru
Business Digest, February 19, 1998: 29.
203 Author's interviews with alternative development experts, Peru, summer 2005.
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Meanwhile, eradication is generating widespread social protest. Since 2000,
several major strikes by the cocaleros have paralyzed parts of Peru for days or weeks, not
only the countryside, but increasingly also major cities, such as Arequipa, Puno, and
Cusco. In 2003, the peasants led a major march on Lima. Between January and
September 2004, there were 8,956 protests against the government. 204 Repeated
negotiations with the government have failed to achieve a satisfactory compromise
between the government and the cocaleros, who are demanding suspension of forced
eradication, withdrawal of NGOs from the coca regions, and increased rural development
with money given directly to them. Under pressure from the cocaleros, the Peruvian
government temporarily adopted "gradual and negotiated self-eradication" where the
coca growers would destroy their own crops, in exchange for a payment of $100 per
every hectare eradicated, $300 for every hectare reforested, plus food aid, emergency
loans, and rural development. 205 Under this negotiated approach, however, eradication
proceeded too slowly to satisfy the United States, which has demanded a return to forced
and faster eradication. The United States also insists that any compensation be provided
only after coca has been eradicated and the area certified as coca-free.
The seething social unrest in Peru is likely to grow since the coca farmers are
becoming better organized. 206 Although they lack the cohesion, party organization, and
leadership of their counterparts in Bolivia (Evo Morales' Movimiento al Socialismo -
MAS) 207, they have formed institutional structures, such as the National Confederation of
204International Crisis Group (March 3, 2005): 13
205 See, Rojas (2003): 7.
206 The following section draws on my article, "Trouble Ahead: The Cocaleros of Peru," Current History,
105 (688), February 2006: 79-83.
207The membership of the MAS party has become considerably broader than simply cocaleros, but the
coca farmers still represent an important and powerful faction of the membership.
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Agricultural Producers in Peru's Coca Growing Valleys (CONPACCP). Such
institutionalization gives the movement greater political power than unorganized
spontaneous riots can achieve.
Lack of unity still undermines the effectiveness of the cocaleros since the various
regions of coca production in Peru have competing interests. Cusco, which for years has
had some legal cultivation of coca for traditional use in addition to illegal cultivation,
never fully allied with its illegal counterparts in the other production areas. While Cusco
has tried to straddle the boundaries of legality, the Monz6n Valley not only protects its
illegal economy with arms, but has also been trying to prevent even the minimal state
presence the Peruvian government has attempted to field in that region. Police presence
in the Monz6n Valley is virtually nonexistent, while the power of drug traffickers is very
strong.
The various drug-production regions would benefit from the collapse of their
competition in the other regions. Their own coca leaf price could increase, and they could
capture a greater share of the market. The Monz6n Valley coca farmers, for example, did
not join the CONPACCP, and created their independent organization, the Monz6n Valley
Association of Agricultural Producers (APAVM). In fact, the producers and coca-
growing technical experts hired by the drug dealers in the various regions are in intense
competition with one another over who can achieve greater coca productivity. So far,
Monz6n is winning, with up to six harvests of coca leaf a year. Ironically, it is the
common threat of eradication that is pushing the separate groups together and cementing
the bonds among organizations of otherwise competing interests.
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Also in recent years, the cocalero movement has been trying to make alliances
with other disgruntled protest groups, such as anti-mining groups, environmental groups,
those who oppose free trade with the United States for fear of not being able to compete
with U.S. businesses, and those who oppose increases in mandatory car insurance. Some
of these groups have a strong urban base. Most importantly, the cocalero movement has
increasingly good ties to many of the peasant self-defense groups that fought the Shining
Path and that are still today armed. Some of these self-defense groups directly overlap
with the cocalero groups. But even when there is not a direct overlap, the self-defense
groups are frequently sympathetic to the cause of the cocaleros.
The United States has dismissed the cocaleros as valid interlocutors. It has
disparaged their leaders, Nelson Palomino, Nancy Obreg6n, and Elsa Malpatrida as being
on the payroll of the drug traffickers. The United States has also begun designating the
peasants as criminals, calling them" narcofarmers." 20 8 When the department of Cusco
legalized cultivation of coca in summer 2005, the United States strongly and successfully
pressured the Peruvian government to reverse the decision. The United States insists that
any weakening of counternarcotics policy and laws cannot be tolerated.
Meanwhile, however, the social movement is up for grabs by various political
entrepreneurs. As the United States insists that the cocaleros cannot be treated as valid
interlocutors, the only political entrepreneurs available to represent the movement and
become its leaders are at the extremes of the political spectrum. The Humala brothers'
Etno-Caceristas, an ultranationalist, fascist-like group, is openly defending coca
208 Rojas (2005): 217. It is very likely that at least some elements of the cocalero movement are receiving
funding from the drug traffickers. But it would be wrong to assume that the entire movement has been
captured by criminals or that the cocaleros genuinely do not believe in their cause. Author's fieldwork in
Peru, summer 2005.
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cultivation, and has tried to coopt the movement. 20 9 Although in the June 2006
presidential elections the ex-president Alan Garcia managed to defeat Ollanta Humala
came very close to winning and managed to capture the rural areas. Another competitor
for the capture of the cocaleros' movement is Peru's far-left Patria Roja. Moreover,
external actors, such as Evo Morales and Hugo Chivez, have tried to exploit or coopt the
Peruvian cocaleros movement. Morales has been trying to forge a pan-American
movement of indigenous people and coca peasants of the Andes.
Crucially, the remnants of the Shining Path are also among the aspirants to the
leadership of the coca peasants. As of 2006, two armed factions of Sendero have been
operating in the coca-growing regions. One group, led by "Artemio," professes loyalty to
GuzmAn, numbers 300 guerrillas, and operates primarily in the Upper Huallaga Valley.
The other faction, Proseguir, numbers between 100 to 150 insurgents and is located
primarily in the Apurimac-Ene area.210 Senderistas have begun pledging to defend the
cocaleros against eradication and counternarcotics agents.211 Senderistas have also
stepped up an agitation campaign at universities, with (by one account) 1,200
proselytizing at schools. 212 Increasingly, many rank-and-file Senderistas are being
released from prison. Senderistas have participated in the cocalero strikes in Ayacucho
during the summers of 2004 and 2005.213 Shining Path has already apparently established
209 Michael Shifter, "Breakdown in the Andes," Foreign Affairs, 83 (5), September/October 2004: 126-
139.
210 Allegations have appeared that Proseguir does have some exchanges with Colombia's leftist guerrilla
group, the FARC, and that FARC members have traveled to Peru to meet with Proseguir as well as
Peruvian drug traffickers. Author's interviews in Peru, summer 2005.
211 "New 'Ultimatum' from Sendero Leader," Latin American Weekly Report, 2004, (16), April 27, 2004:
5.
212 Estimate by Carlos Tapia, a renown Peruvian Sendero expert, reproduced by McClintock (2005): 81.
213 Author's interviews in Ayacucho during the 2005 strikes, July 2005. During the 2004 strikes,
government offices were set afire and 10,000 court files - mainly on terrorism and drug trafficking - were
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a working relationship with Federaci6n de Cocaleros del Apurimac (The Apurimac
Valley Coca Growers Federation) and Frente de Defensa de Ayacucho (The Ayacucho
Defense Front).214 But far from all cocalero groups have embraced Sendero, and the
memory of Sendero's brutality still persists. Sendero today does not pose a strategic
threat to the Peruvian state. However, a successful recapture of the cocalero movement
would add substantial political capital, in addition to increased capabilities, to the
guerrillas.
Moreover, traffickers' adaptation to threats posed by aerial interdiction also
presents the remnants of the Shining Path with new opportunities for once again
penetrating the trade and protecting traffic. Aerial interdiction first shifted traffic to river-
boat transportation through the Amazon. As law enforcement caught up with this evasion
mechanism on the part of the traffickers and started focusing on river interdiction, the
traffickers shifted to land transportation. Instead of planes taking off from the jungles to
Colombia, coca paste and increasingly cocaine are carried by people from the Peruvian
jungle down to the coast and then smuggled by sea to Mexico and onward to the United
States. Although hard to detect, such caravans, analogous to heroin traffic in Burma
during the 1980s and 1990s, are also exceedingly vulnerable to capture once detected.
The Shining Path appears to be protecting at least some of these trafficking routes and
charging a protection fee for it.215 The remnants of the Shining Path are thus already
financially benefiting from several illicit economies, and are attempting to increase their
political capital by offering themselves as protectors to the cocaleros threatened by
destroyed at the attorney general's office. Drug traffickers, independent of Sendero, played an important
role in that incident.
214 Palmer (2006), forthcoming.
215 Author's interviews with Peruvian officials and policy experts, Peru, summer 2005.
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eradication. Instead of bankrupting the remnants of the belligerents, eradication has
resulted in social strife and has allowed Sendero to once again adopt a tested mobilization
strategy, thus confirming the predictions of my theory.
VIII. Conclusions
A detailed examination of the case of Peru strongly supports the validity of my
theory of political capital of illicit economies and critically undermines the validity of the
conventional view. Although as predicted by both theories, the Shining Path derived large
financial profits from its positive involvement in the illicit economy, it derived much
more. The Shining Path also derived considerable freedom of action and, crucially, large
political capital. Contrary to the conventional view, the defeat of the Shining Path took
place without elimination of Sendero's income source.
The first data point supporting my theory, and also the conventional view, is the
weakness of the Shining Path prior to its positive involvement in the drug economy. Until
such positive involvement in the mid-1980s, the Shining Path's operations were confined
to isolated attacks against military and police outposts to secure weapons, to robberies to
secure immediate finances, and to selective killings and political assassinations to
eliminate opponents and obtain some political capital. The Shining Path was clearly not
able to pose a systematic threat to the state. The belligerents' noninvolvement in the illicit
economy resulted in the stagnation of their power.
It was only after the Shining Path tapped into the drug economy in the mid-1980s
that the guerrilla group was able to grow. First, as consistent with both theories, Sendero
derived large financial benefits - between 30 to 100 million dollars annually - from
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tapping into the drug trade. As a result, its procurement and logistics greatly improved.
But Sendero's freedom of action also greatly increased, a fact ignored by the
conventional wisdom. The Shining Path no longer had to concentrate on robbing banks
and attacking isolated outposts and could undertake large engagements with military
units.
Crucially, Sendero derived large political benefits from its positive involvement
in the illicit economy, thus confirming my theory, and again showing the inadequacy of
the conventional view. Consistently, the peasants condemned the government for
eradication and praised Sendero for protecting them against eradication. Sendero actively
exploited such sentiments by portraying the government as impoverishing the population
and carrying out economic genocide against the population. Sendero also obtained
nationalist legitimacy by stressing the role of the United States in demanding eradication.
The Shining Path was consistently more popular and had greater support in the drug
regions than elsewhere in the country. It also had to resort to less brutality to control the
population than elsewhere in the country, thus avoiding antagonizing the population in
the drug regions.
Both ideology and brutality fail as alternative explanations of Sendero's ability to
obtain political capital. These two factors are favored explanations for legitimacy in the
conventional view, which frequently assumes that once belligerent groups lose ideology,
they lose legitimacy and become illegitimate criminals. Conversely, ideology is seen by
the conventional wisdom as the dominant source of legitimacy. Yet the vast majority of
the rural population never bought onto Sendero's ideology and found it too extreme and
radical. Sendero derived strongest political capital when and where it could protect the
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illicit economy and distribute immediate and vital material benefits obtained from the
illicit economy to the population.
Nor is coercion - another favored explanation of the conventional view for
popular allegiance - an adequate explanation for the peasants' allegiance and provision of
information. Sendero was extremely coercive and brutal toward the population, yet this
policy only antagonized the population. The more Sendero increased its brutality, the
more the population became alienated and opposed Sendero. Moreover, it was especially
when and where Sendero was not able to present itself as a necessary protector of the
illicit economy that it had to resort to greatest brutality. It was also then that it
encountered the greatest resistance.
In fact, it was the unsustainable political costs of prohibiting the illicit economy -
Sendero's first ideological impulse - that motivated Sendero to reverse its earlier decision
to suppress coca cultivation and trade. When Sendero prohibited the illicit economy in
the early 1980s while the military adopted a tacit acquiescence policy toward coca
cultivation and trafficking between 1984 and 1985, the population stopped supporting the
belligerents, and Sendero was driven out of the UHV. It was only after Sendero reversed
its policy toward drugs and embraced the illicit economy that it was able to recapture the
coca-growing regions.
The significance of the political costs to Sendero is even more obvious in view of
the fact that Sendero was extremely dogmatic and ideologically driven. It attempted to
forcibly indoctrinate the rural population in Marxist ideology and insisted on brutal and
unpopular policies, such as recruiting young children. Despite the unpopularity of these
policies and the backlash they engendered, Sendero did not reverse them. Importantly, it
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also prohibited many other legal peasant markets and insisted on the prohibition of such
markets despite the peasants' hostile reaction. In these policies toward the rural
population, Sendero was thus willing to ride out large political costs. But costs of
maintaining its prohibitionist policy toward the illicit economy were too large for
Sendero to absorb.
The Shining Path also observed the way drug eradication carried out in the UHV
prior to 1984 antagonized the peasants from the government. In fact, government
eradication and the inability of non-guerrilla representation - legitimate politicians and
cocaleros' defense organizations -- to prevent eradication and satisfy the needs of the
cocaleros played a crucial role in the ability of the belligerent group to capture the
movement and penetrate the illicit economy. Eradication and the failure of alternative
livelihood programs radicalized the population, but cocaleros' representation proved
ineffective in protecting the peasants' interests. As the legitimacy of cocaleros' self-
defense organizations and traditional politicians faded, Sendero was able to step in and
offer itself as an effective defender of the peasants' interests. When eradication was at its
most intense, such as during the trial use of herbicide Spike, Sendero's political capital
was at its greatest. It was also at that time - the only time - that the peasants actively
fought alongside the Shining Path. Sendero's ability to capture the allegiance of the
peasants and derive large political capital from offering itself as a sponsor of the illicit
economy clearly supports my theory of political capital of illicit economies. On the other
hand, the ability of Sendero to capture the cocaleros as a result of eradication is clearly
inconsistent with the conventional view. The prediction derived from the conventional
view is that eradication, especially in a stepped up form of the early 1980s, would
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eliminate the illicit economy and hence prevent Sendero from increasing its physical
resources. This prediction clearly failed to materialize.
The relationship between the peasants, the traffickers, and Sendero also
contradicts the conventional wisdom. Although Sendero protected the traffickers from
government interdiction and the coca fields from eradication, Sendero never morphed
into a unified entity with the traffickers nor did the two actors develop identical goals. In
fact, since Sendero also protected the peasants against the traffickers and attempted to
displace the traffickers from aspects of the illicit drug trade, the two groups had highly
competitive interests and even fought each other. Crucially, when eradication and
interdiction lessened up, such as under the leadership of generals Carbajal and Arciniega,
and later early in Fujimori's administration in the Campanilla area prior to Air Bridge
Denial, the traffickers were willing to provide key intelligence on Sendero to government
units. Similarly, the traffickers fought against the MRTA, the other leftist guerilla group
in Peru, when that group attempted to penetrate the drug trade. The MRTA's desire to
obtain the multiple benefits from the drug trade was a product of Sendero'sproviding a
successful example for the belligerent group to emulate with regard to narcotics.
The large and multidimensional increase in the strength of the Sendero, derived
from its positive involvement in the illicit economy, crucially contributed to Sendero's
ability to expand conflict, both in terms of the scale of attacks and in terms of the area
and theater of operation.
The case of Peru also reveals the importance of government counternarcotics
policies for the overall effectiveness of the counterinsurgency policy. Again, the evidence
clearly supports my theory while fundamentally disconfirming the conventional view.
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When eradication was undertaken, until 1984 and between 1985 and 1989, the military
lost ground to Sendero. The belligerents were able to capture the peasants' allegiance and
make major inroads in the countryside, fundamentally destabilizing the rural areas.
When, as under generals Carbajal and Arciniega, eradication was halted and the military
did not allow the police to interfere with the peasants' livelihood, both the peasants and
the traffickers were willing to provide vital intelligence to the military and the military
scored key successes against the Shining Path. The importance of tacit acquiescence by
the government in winning the hearts and minds of the rural population and the resulting
improvements in military effectiveness against the insurgents is further underscored by
the fact that Carbajal was able to secure intelligence from the population on Sendero and
sufficient loyalty from the population to expel Sendero from the UHV even during the
height of the military's brutality toward the peasants. This repression-en-masse approach
tremendously antagonized the peasants, yet the tacit acquiescence policy toward the drug
economy mitigated against the peasants' alienation from the military to such an extent
that the peasants still provided the military with intelligence and Carbajal was able to
score important victories against Sendero.
In fact, it was tacit acquiescence to the illicit economy after 1989 that allowed the
military to ultimately and permanently win the countryside back. This outcome once
again strongly supports my theory. Since the peasants no longer needed Sendero for vital
protection of their livelihood, they were willing to provide the military with the necessary
information on Sendero's movements and the government was able to effectively strike at
Sendero. The role of peasants' self-defense units, rondas campesinas, was also important
in reclaiming the countryside back from Sendero, but many rondas in the UHV directly
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overlapped with the cocaleros' previous anti-eradication defense committees, and the
strength and effectiveness of these units was crucially dependent on the military's anti-
eradication posture.
The conventional view predicted that Sendero would be defeated through the
suppression of the narcotics economy and the resulting drying up of the belligerents'
finances. In fact, Sendero was defeated while eradication was not being undertaken and
the illicit economy continued to flourish. Sendero was defeated as a result of a tacit
acquiescence policy toward narcotics being adopted in the countryside (later
supplemented by interdiction) and of an intelligence operation in the urban theater
(unrelated to counternarcotics) that led to the capture of Guzmin. The demise of Sendero
thus once again supports my theory and critically weakens the validity of the
conventional view. Only after Sendero was defeated, the illicit economy was significantly
diminished as a result of interdiction and the emergence of a fungus.
To some extent, interdiction too created opportunities for Sendero to obtain
political capital, but to a considerably smaller degree than did eradication. Between 1989
and 1990, interdiction was effective in temporarily driving coca leaf prices in the Upper
Huallaga Valley down, causing a substantial decline in the peasants' income. Interdiction
thus antagonized the population from the government and increased the population's
demand for Sendero's regulation of the illicit economy. Sendero was hence able to
reintegrate itself into the drug economy and demand greater prices to be paid by the
traffickers to the peasants. Nonetheless, the level of political alienation was not sufficient
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to allow Sendero to obtain enough political capital to grown anew, and Sendero
continued losing ground in the countryside.216 By 1995, Sendero was defeated.
Meanwhile, the remnants of Sendero have been financing their activities through
illicit logging. They have thus been able to avoid bankruptcy even when the major illicit
economy - with drugs -- was declining and when the Senderistas were no longer able to
participate in the drug economy to the same extent as they did during the 1980s.
Government laxity in enforcing prohibitions against illicit logging, de facto tacit
acquiescence to the illicit logging economy, as well as the small numbers of the
remaining Senderistas have prevented the Shining Path from rebuilding its political
capital, even though their positive involvement in illicit logging has kept them well
funded.
The suspension of aerial interdiction in 2002 and a renewed strong focus on
forced eradication, however, are once again creating opportunities for the Shining Path to
attempt to rebuild its political capital. Sendero has offered itself as a defender of the
cocaleros against eradication and as a protector of land traffic. Eradication is once again
antagonizing and radicalizing the cocaleros.
Overall, the political capital of illicit economies theory performed significantly
better than the conventional view. Although the conventional view was correct in its
argument that belligerents obtain large financial resources from the drug trade -also
consistent with my theory - it failed to predict the effects of belligerents' positive
involvement in the illicit economy on their political capital as well as on their freedom of
action. The conventional view's prediction that eradication will deprive belligerents of
216 A negative side-effect of interdiction, however, was that it allowed Vladimiro Montesinos, Peru's chief
of intelligence services, to manipulate counternarcotics policy to eliminate drug trafficking opposition and
increase his control over and profits from the illicit traffic.
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their physical resources and thus Significantly decrease their power never materialized,
despite numerous periods of eradication. Instead, eradication increased the belligerents'
political capital and greatly diminished the population's support for the government,
including in terms of intelligence provision. During periods of interdiction and especially
during periods of tacit acquiescence by the government to the illicit economy, Sendero's
political capital decreased, and the population cooperated with the government
counterinsurgency effort. Consequently, Sendero was dislodged from the rural regions,
significantly weakened, and ultimately defeated. The case of Peru thus clearly shows
how, contrary to the conventional view, eradication is counterproductive in the
counterinsurgency effort.
The next chapter explores the relationship between illicit economies and military
conflict in Colombia during the past forty years. According to the conventional view, no
other case is supposed to epitomize so well the merger of belligerents with criminals and
the need to attack the illicit economy in order to destroy the belligerents. Moreover,
Colombia has experienced one of the most intense and sustained drug eradication
campaigns in history. If eradication should work anywhere to bankrupt the belligerents, it
should be there. Moreover, Colombia is a useful case, because it contains both labor-
intensive and labor-non-intensive illicit economies and because these illicit economies
interact with military conflict in both poor and rich areas, thus complementing the other
principal cases examined in the study.
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CHAPTER FIVE - Colombia
I. Introduction
For over twenty-five years, Colombia has had one of the largest illicit narcotics
economies in the world as well as a host of other illicit economies. Colombia produces
roughly 80 percent of global production and 90 percent of U.S. cocaine.' Since the mid-
1990s, Colombia's cultivation of coca has been the largest in the world. It is also the
Western Hemisphere's largest producer of heroin, supplying 50 percent of U.S. heroin.
Returns from illicit drugs as percentage of GDP hover since the mid-1990s at about three
percent.2
For decades now, Colombia has been torn by a civil war, pitting various leftist
guerrillas, rightist paramilitaries, and the Colombian state against each other. The conflict
has caused than 3,000 casualties per year, resulting in over 47,000 casualties over the past
15 years.3 In addition, the conflict caused the internal displacement of almost 2 million
people. Colombia also has one of highest homicide and kidnapping rates in the world.
Colombia is the poster case for the conventional view. In fact, the entire concept
of narcoguerrilla and narcoterrorism was developed with reference to Colombia.4 The
former Colombian Ambassador to the United States, Luis Alberto Moreno, for example,
1 U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) (Washington, DC, Government Printing Office: 2000).
2 Roberto Steiner Sampedro, "Los Ingresos de Colombia Producto de la Exportacion de La Drogas
Illicitas," Coyuntura Economica, 16 (4), December 1996: 73-106. Author's interviews with Colombian
economists specializing in the illicit drug economy, Fall 2005.
3 Jorge Restrepo, Michael Spagat, and Juan F. Vargas, "The Dynamics of the Colombian Civil Conflict: A
New Data Set," 2004, forthcoming in Homo Oeconomicus,
http://www.rhul.ac.uk/economics/ResearchlWorkingPapers/pdf/dpe0410.pdf, downloaded May 18, 2006.
Colombia's income distribution is the world's ninth most unequal, with two thirds of Colombians living on
less than $3 a day. In the rural areas, poverty levels climb to over 85 percent. Contraloria General de la
Rep6iblica de Colombia, Evaluaci6n de la politica social 2003 (Bogota: CGR, July 2004): 43,
http://www.contraloriagen.gov.co:8081/internet/html/publicaciones/detalles.jsp?id=81, downloaded June
03, 2005.
4 U.S. Ambassador to Colombia between 1983-1985, Lewis Tambs, is widely credited with coining the
term narcoguerrilla.
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characterized the conflict in Colombia in the following way: "Drugs are the root of
almost all violence in Colombia. ... While they may hide behind a Marxist ideology,
Colombia's leftist guerrillas have ceased to be a political insurgency. They have traded
their ideals for drug profits."'5 Similarly, President Alvaro Uribe declared in March 2004:
"If Colombia would not have drugs, it would not have terrorists."6 Finally, Colombia's
Minister of Justice and Interior, Fernando Londofio highlighted eradication as the key
tool to defeating the leftist guerrillas by eliminating the financial income they derive from
the cultivation of coca and opium poppy: "It will be liquidated and nothing will be left. In
order to maintain a guerrilla army of 15,000 they need a lot of coca and this will
disappear." 7
Colombia represents a tough case for my theory and an easy case for the
conventional view since unlike in Bolivia or Peru, where cultivation of coca had been
part of the culture for centuries, cultivation of coca in Colombia is a relatively new
phenomenon of the last thirty years, and not infused with special cultural significance.8
Moreover, unlike in Bolivia or Peru, Colombia's drug traffickers unleashed high levels of
violence in the 1980s, thus revealing the threat of the trafficking organizations and the
narcotics economy to the country's society at large. The drug economy came to be seen
by both the elite and the wider society as dangerous and in need of being restrained.
s Luis Alberto Moreno, "Aiding Colombia's War on Terrorism," New York Times, May 2, 2003.
6 From a speech to the Organization of American States Permanent Council, Washington, DC, March 25,
2004, cited in International Crisis Group, War and Drugs in Colombia, Latin America Report No. 11,
January 27, 2005: 9,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/latin_america/1 1_war_and_drugs_in colombia.pdf,
downloaded February 10, 2005.
' Cited by Gabriel Marcella, The United States and Colombia: The Journey from Ambiguity to Strategic
Clarity (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College 2003): 49.
' See, for example, Madeline Barbara L6ons and Harry Sanabria, eds., Coca, Cocaine, and the Bolivian
Reality (Albany: State University of New Press, 1997), and Francisco E. Thoumi, Illegal Drugs, Economy,
and Society in the Andes (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2003).
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Furthermore, unlike in Peru, where the large cartels and prominent capos were never
present, Colombia's drug dealers were ostentatious, visible, and threatening to
Colombia's traditional elite. To a much larger extent than Peru, Bolivia, or Afghanistan,
Colombia by the 1990s internalized the international norm against drug cultivation and
trafficking.9 Moreover, the belligerent groups connected to the drug trade have become
increasingly brutal, thus losing large political capital. For these reasons, Colombia
represents an ideal case for the conventional premise that eradication will neither alienate
the population from the government, nor generate political capital for belligerents.
At the same time, Colombia also represents the ideal case to test the validity of
the conventional view's central claim that eradication will bankrupt the belligerents.
Although the case does not allow for a comparative evaluation of the various government
responses to the illicit economy, since the government policy has been one of more or
less intensive eradication since the late 1970s, if eradication should succeed anywhere in
bankrupting the belligerents, it should do so in Colombia. If the central claims of the
conventional view fail to materialize in this case, the validity of the conventional view is
thrown seriously into doubt. On the other hand, if my theory performs better, the validity
of my theory is substantially enhanced.
In addition to presenting a hard test for my theory regarding the effect of
eradication, the case of Colombia also allows for the observation of two values of the
amplifying factors that rarely occur: a rich overall economy in a region of military
conflict and illicit economies (specifically an urban belligerent group's involvement in
the drug trade); and the absence of traffickers (at various times, belligerent groups
eliminated the traffickers from different parts of the country under their control).
9 Author's interviews in Peru, Colombia, and Afghanistan, Summer and Fall 2005.
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Exploring the impact of these variables, I can mine this case freshly, with a different lens
than applied so far in other analyses. Furthermore, in addition to containing the labor-
intensive illicit crop cultivation, Colombia also contains labor-non-intensive illicit
economies, such as extortion, kidnapping, and provision of protection to traffickers
without the regulation of cultivation.
This chapter analyzes the interaction between these illicit economies and military
conflict in Colombia from the late 1970s through the current period. I explore the
dynamics with respect to several leftist insurgency groups -- Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia (Armed Forces of the Colombian Revolution or FARC);
Movimiento 19 de Abril (1 9th of April Movement or M-19); and Ejdrcito de Liberaci6n
Popular (Popular Liberation Army or ELN) - and the rightist paramilitiaries and their
umbrella organization, Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (the United Self-Defense
Forces of Colombia or AUC). As part of this analysis, I also describe how the illicit
narcotics economy is structured and how it operates in order to explicate how belligerent
groups obtain a variety of gains from sponsoring illicit economies.
The case of Colombia also provides an opportunity to test the validity of two
additional claims of the conventional view: a) that popular support disappears with the
loss of ideology; and b) that belligerents and traffickers have merged into a conglomerate
actors with harmonious joint goals. To assess these two claims, I analyze the ability of
the two major drug cartels of the 1980s -Medellin and Cali - to obtain political capital as
well as their relations with each other and the belligerent groups.
Examination of the whys, hows, and effects of the interactions of the variety of
belligerent groups in Colombia with the variety of illicit economies will show that my
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theory of political capital of illicit economies performs considerably better than the
conventional view.
The analysis will show that until the late 1970s when the FARC was not involved
in any substantial illicit economy, its strength was limited and the belligerent group was
more an irritant than a fundamental threat to the government. Its physical resources and
freedom of action were greatly constrained, and its political capital virtually nonexistent.
The FARC further undermined its small political capital when it became negatively
involved in the illicit narcotics economy. Once the FARC switched and became
positively involved in illicit crop cultivation, however, its strength grew dramatically
with respect to physical resources, freedom of action, and political capital.
I will show how the FARC was able to obtain political capital by protecting the
population against the government effort to eradicate the drug fields and against the
traffickers' abuse, thus providing a variety of regulation and protection services to the
illicit economy. I will further demonstrate how the FARC's elimination of small and
medium traffickers from the areas under its control from the mid-1990s on, thus resulting
in the absence of traffickers, caused a substantial decline of the group's political capital.
Similarly, I will show how the paramilitaries' political capital was always limited
because they were frequently identical to or courting the traffickers, resulting in the
absence-of-traffickers condition, which precluded the paramilitaries from providing the
full panoply of protection and regulation services for the rural population.
The examination of the M- 19's and the ELN's interactions with illicit economies
will also support the validity of my theory regarding the importance of the amplifying
factors the state of the overall economy and character of the illicit economy. In the case
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of the M-19, its participation in the labor-non-intensive extortion of traffickers failed to
generate political capital for the group, and (because of its bungled execution) even
physical resources. M-19's later switch to providing protection to the traffickers --
another labor-non-intensive aspect of the drug economy -- in the context of the relatively
rich state of the overall economy in Bogota, where the group operated, not only failed to
generate political capital for the group, but resulted in its losses.
Similarly, the analysis will show that the ELN's participation in the labor-non-
intensive illicit extortion economy failed to generate much political capital for the group,
even if it did generate vast physical resources. At the same time, the mixture of
noninvolvement and negative involvement in the labor-intensive drug cultivation further
compounded the group's lack of political capital.
My theory also performs better than the conventional view with respect to the
criminal organizations' interactions with belligerents and among each other. The leftist
belligerents and the traffickers have not merged into one unified actor. And even when
the rightist paramilitaries and the traffickers did merge, their relations were frequently
fraught with violence and the provision of intelligence to the government on one another.
Moreover, I will show that even purely criminal organizations without political ideology,
such as the cartels, were able to use the illicit economy to obtain political capital.
Finally, I will show that despite eradication being undertaken in Colombia on the
largest, most intense, and most sustained scale anywhere in the world, eradication has
failed to bankrupt the belligerents. But eradication generates large costs to the
government in terms of limiting populations' provision of intelligence to the government
and increasing the belligerents' political capital.
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The following table summarizes how the Colombia case covers the variation of
the amplifying factors and types of belligerents' involvement in the illicit economy as
determinants of the strength of belligerents.
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DETERMINANTS OF STRENGTH OF BELLIGERENTS
TYPE OF INVOLVEMENT
AMPLIFYING FACTORS
POSITIVE NEGATIVE NO INVOLVEMENT
FARC (1981 --)
STATE OF Poor paramilitaries FARC (1978-80) FARC (until 1978)
ELN (from late 1990s --) ELN (1996) ELN (drugs: until late
OVERALL ECON. M-19 1998)
Rich M-19
Labor FARC (1981 --) FARC (1978-80) FARC (until 1978)
CHARACTER OF paramilitaries ELN 1996 ELN (drugs until late
ELN (from late 1990s --) 1998)
FARCILLICIT ECON. Labor-Non- paramilitaries
Intensive M-19
ELN (from early 1980s)
FARC (1981- mid/late
1990s)
paramilitaries (1981- FARC (until 1978)PRESENCE OF Present mid-1990s) FARC (1978-80) ELN (until 1998)
ELN
TRAFFICKERS M-19
FARC (mid/late 1990s --)
Absent paramilitaries (mid-1990s
ELN (extortion)
Eradication FARC FARC (1978-80) FARC (until 1980s)
paramilitaries ELN (1996) ELN (until late
GOVERNMENT ELN (from 1998) 1990s)
RESPONSE TO FARC FARC (until 1980s)
Interdiction paramilitaries FARC (1978-80) ELN (until late
ELN (1996) 1990s)ILLICIT ECON. Tacit
Acquiescence
Licensing/
Legalization
H. The FARC before Access to Drugs: Failing to Grow
The FARC, a powerful guerrilla group and one of the oldest still in existence,
originated in La Violencia, the widespread civil war that swept over Colombia in the late
1940s and 1950s and killed between 200,000 and 300,000. Triggered by the assassination
of Liberal Party leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitain in 1948, La Violencia was rooted in a
profound socioeconomic crisis and the inability of existing political institutions to deal
with these socioeconomic challenges. The state was widely absent from the rural areas
where lawlessness was widespread. Land distribution was profoundly inequitable. 10 The
nonelites had little access to political representation and participation. Members of the
elite, aligned with either the Liberal or the Conservative Party, were engaged in an
intense power struggle.
Pitting the partisans of the Liberal Party against partisans of the Conservative
Party, the civil war failed to remedy the institutional failures and resolve the
socioeconomic problems. After it ended in 1958, the peasants remained politically
powerless, land concentration in the hands of the wealthy had increased, the same
dominant classes retained control, the exclusionary biparty political system was
resuscitated under a power-sharing arrangement known as the National Front," and the
political and economic inequity was not ameliorated.
'o About three-quarters of the population were peasants while 3 percent of landowners controlled more than
half of the agricultural land, including the best land. See, Harvey F. Kline, Colombia: Democracy Under
Assault (Boulder, Westview Press, 1995): 43.
" Jenny Pearce aptly characterized Colombia's political system as "democracy without people." See, Jenny
Pearce, Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth (London: Latin American Bureau, 1990): 207. During the 1980s,
the political system underwent a process of decentralization and political opening, culminating in the
adoption of a new, more inclusive constitution in 1991. See, for example, Harvey F. Kline, State Building
and Conflict Resolution in Colombia, 1986-1994 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1999).
Nonetheless, the lack of representation that the party system still offers to the majority of the population
and its steadily increasing delegitimation has continued. Its most recent manifestation has been the victory
of Alvaro Uribe in presidential elections in 2006, by running as a candidate outside the two traditional
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In the context of the continuing deep rifts in Colombian society and unresolved
socioeconomic problems, several guerrilla movements emerged in the 1960s out of La
Violencia 's peasants' self-defense organizations: the FARC, the ELN, the EPL' 2, and the
M-19. The causes of the guerrillas' emergence and the causes of the subsequent and
continuing modern-day violence replicated those of La Violencia: unresolved land
conflict and the failure to build consensus behind laws and strengthen state's control; 13 a
fundamentally exclusionary political system with only the veneer of democracy; 14
internal regional imbalance coupled with the corrosive coexistence of prosperity and
poverty;15 forcible expulsion of peasants and a persisting exclusionary system;16 and the
combination of inequity, poverty, and a lack of development in the countryside."7 In other
words, a profound distortion and underdevelopment of political and economic institutions
and their consequent inability to adjudicate social struggle, including the agrarian
question, have been the sources of conflict in Colombia.
Excessive elite control of the country core coupled with exploitation and neglect
of the periphery and a traditionally weak state resulted in a serious underprovision of
political and economic institutions and social services throughout major portions of the
parties. Uribe's presentation of himself as an essentially independent candidate and with a new political
party only as a temporary electoral vehicle replicates the trend toward a legitimacy crisis of traditional
parties across Latin America in the 2000s.
12 The EPL stands for Ej6rcito de Liberaci6n Popular or Popular Liberation Army.
~3 Nazih Richani, Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 2002).
14 Pearce.
15 Gonzalo Sinchez G., "Introduction: Problems of Violence, Prospects for Peace," in Violence in
Colombia 1990-2000: Waging War and Negotiating Peace, Charles Berquist, Ricardo Penaranda, and
Gonzalo Sinchez G., eds. (Wilmington: A Scholarly Resources Inc. Imprint, 2001).
16 Ricardo Vargas Meza, "The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Illicit Drug
Trade," 1999, http://www.tni.org/archives/vargas/farc.htm, downloaded April 28, 2006.
'7 David Bushnell, The Making of Modern Colombia: A Nation in Spite of ltself (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1993).
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country - what Guillermo O'Donnell has called "brown areas"'8 -- where a kind of
lawlessness developed. These "brown areas" were the staging grounds for Colombia's
Marxist guerrillas. To a large extent, such profound state weakness continues to present
day. 19
The future FARC leader,20 Pedro Antonio Marin, alias Manuel Marulanda
V6lezor Tirofijo ("Sureshot"), began his guerrilla career in 1949 when he joined a Liberal
guerrilla band in the epicenter of the sectarian violence to protect the land interests of the
poor farmers from large landowners. The original FARC leaders and its rank-and-file
members were both of predominantly peasant origins. FARC's social base has not
changed significantly since then, and by the late 1990s, 70% of FARC members were still
peasants, while the working class, students, and teacher represented another 20%, and
middle-class intellectuals the remaining 10%.21 The FARC is hierarchically organized
and highly cohesive.22 Adapting Soviet Marxism, the FARC's political agenda at the time
"1 Guillermo O'Donnell, "Poverty and Inequality in Latin America: Some Political Reflections," in
Guillermo O'Donnell, ed. Counterpoints (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999): 195-215.
'9 Colombia has, for example, a very low ratio of policemen to population as compared with other
countries, the situation being especially acute as Colombia has been struggling with a protracted civil war
for fifty years and has one of the largest crime rates in the world as well as multiple extensive illicit
economies. See, Mauricio Rubio, Crimen e Impunidad: Precisoines Sobre la Violencia (Bogota: Tercer
Mundo Editores y Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Econ6mico, Universidad de Los Andes, 1999): 182.
The state has a very weak tax collection system. At its peak, tax collection in 2003 amounted to 14.4% of
GDP. See, Kate Calligaro and Adam Isacson, "Do Wealthy Colombians Pay Their TaxesT'?"
http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/040804cip.htm, downloaded March 23, 2006. Crucially, the state is
unable to provide an effective legal and judiciary system to protect property rights and resolve conflicts, in
addition to failing to obtain a monopoly on violence.
20 FARC's other members include Jorge Bricefio (a.k.a. Mono Jojoy), Ra6l Reyes, and Alfonso Cano.
21 Richani: 63. As much as 40% of FARC's members are women, and perhaps one third are under eighteen.
See, Adam Isacson, "Was Failure Avoidable? Learning From Colombia's 1998-2002 Peace Process,"
The Dante B. Fascell North-South Center Working Paper Series, Paper No. 14,
March 2003, http://www.miami.edu/nsc/publications/NSCPublicationslndex.html#WP, downloaded
August 20, 2004.
22 FARC members sign up for life, and there is little opportunity for exit. Individual desertions have been
infrequent. FARC members can only rarely see their families, and women members need to argue hard to
be allowed to have a child, and even then they must put the child under the care of relatives. See, for
example, Francisco Guti6rrez Sanin, "Criminal Rebels? A Discussion of Civil War and Criminality from
the Colombian Experience," Politics and Society, 32 (2), June 2004: 268-271.
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of its emergence included the establishment of socialism, empowerment of the lower
classes, especially the peasantry, land redistribution, and the development of the
countryside.23
Before becoming positively involved in the illicit narcotics economy in the late
1970s, the group spent the first fifteen years of its existence hanging on for life. Although
it sought to expand its base and military capabilities, the lack physical resources, freedom
of action, and political capital limited FARC's activities. By 1966, after suffering several
large military defeats and the seizure of 70 percent of its weapons, 24 the FARC engaged
mainly in isolated ambushes on small military units and raids on farms while
occasionally offering protection to peasants against unscrupulous landowners. However,
while this strategy generated some legitimacy among the rural population for the
guerrillas, its effect was negated by the need to resort to extortion to obtain vital food and
supplies, which the FARC directed not simply against large landowners, but also against
the poor peasants. 25 This extortion economy - both labor-non-intensive and, in fact, to a
large extent directed at the FARC's support base - thus not only failed to generate
political capital for the FARC, but also antagonized the population against it.
23 After the demise of the Soviet Union, the FARC shed its Marxist-Leninist rhetoric and orthodoxy and
replaced it with a new ideological concept, labeled Bolivarian. In addition to soft-paddling its socialist
ideas, the new ideological package explicitly embraced nationalism. FARC's declarations during the 1990s
thus included the following goals: the state's principal ownership of the energy, communications, public
services, and natural resources sectors, but not total state ownership; land redistribution; confiscation of
assets from or renegotations of contracts with multinational companies in Colombia; guaranteed stable and
profitable prices for agricultural products; and the distribution of national budget at 50 percent for social
welfare and 10 percent for scientific research. Instead of altogether overthrowing the political system,
FARC in essence advocated making the state more interventionist in and concerned with the poor sectors
and regions. See, for example, Cecilia L6pez Montafio and Arturo Garcia Durin, "Hidden Costs of Peace in
Colombia," in Colombia: Essays on Conflict, Peace, and Development (Washington, DC: World Bank,
2000): 152-3.
24 Pearce: 167.
25 See, Robin Kirk, More Terrible Than Death (New York: Public Affairs, 2003): 99-103.
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The lack of access to a large and profitable illicit economy (and other sources of
finance) thus critically limited the FARC's military capabilities, in terms of both physical
resources and freedom of action, which in turn necessitated a choice of tactics that
undermined potential political capital of the belligerents.
The lack of political capital was especially evident in FARC's experiment with
so-called self-defense groups. These were fomented by the FARC to extend its presence,
assure control of population centers in the countryside, spread guerrilla ideology, and
consolidate FARC's social base in areas where the FARC was operating. However, not
only did the self-defense groups fail to generate new political capital for the FARC, but
the FARC lacked sufficient political capital even to control the self-defense groups it had
created.26 Increasingly autonomous, the groups began defending against the FARC itself,
including against the FARC's effort to extort food from the peasants. By the end of the
1970s, the FARC attempted to dismantle the extant self-defense groups and stopped
organizing new ones for fear of not being able to control them. Its support base failed to
grow substantially despite the widespread alienation of the rural population from the state
and the FARC's effort to offer itself as the main representative of the peasantry.
Between 1964 and 1980, the FARC's main objectives were capturing military
equipment, securing food and supplies, capturing hostages for extortion, and settling
scores with informers. As FARC's membership remained in the low hundreds, around
350,27 its military campaign was of very low intensity. The FARC could not engage in
major confrontations with the armed forces, incapable of fielding more than 50
26 Romin D. Ortiz, "Insurgent Strategies in the Post-Cold War: The Case of the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 25, 2002: 133.
27 Alfredo Rangel Suirez, Colombia: guerra en elfin de siglo (Bogoti: Tercer Mundo Editores, 1998): 12.
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combatants in a single operation.2 8 Any operation exceeding half a hundred not only
taxed its operational capacity, but also threatened to wipe out a substantial portion of its
membership. Instead of confronting the army, FARC's activities included mainly long
walks in the jungles, trying to avoid detection by any present military units. As Walter
Broderick put it, the guerrillas were essentially engaged in an "imaginary war."2 9
The FARC continued to struggle for survival throughout the 1970s. In 1969, the
FARC had opened a second guerrilla front30 in the Magdalena Valley. And in 1971, it
established a third front in the Urabd area, in the Darien gap between Panama and
Colombia. In 1974, the organization established a general staff and a secretariat to
provide political direction.31 Yet these arrangements were more organizational than
reflective of the group's actual expansion, and its military activities remained limited.
The group did not seriously threaten the government in Bogota, nor could it take over
parts of the country. Hardly more than a remote band of peasant fighters, the FARC could
still operate only in areas where state presence was weak or nonexistent, such as in the
intermontane regions and along the edge of the rainforest.32 The 1960s and early 1970s
were years of survival for the FARC, not expansion.
28 Ortiz: 136.
29 Walter Broderick, El guerrillero invisible (Bogotai: Indermedio, 2000).
30 The FARC refers to its military units operating in a particular region as fronts. A front includes both
combat, support, and infrastructure components. The combat units per front vary from one to several
companies, with between 50-55 fighters per company. See, Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Colombian
Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability (Santa
Monica: RAND, 2001): 25.
31 Rabasa and Chalk: 24.
32 Mark Chernick, "Economic Resources and Internal Armed Conflicts: Lessons from the Colombian
Case," in Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection of Need, Creed,, and Greed, Cynthia J.
Arnson, and I. William Zartman, eds. (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005): 190.
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m. Rise of the Drug Economy, Emergence of Cartels, and FARC's Negative
Involvement in the Illicit Narcotics Economy
In the late 1970s, the FARC encountered the illicit drug economy and decided to
prohibit it. Since the state of the overall economy was poor, the illicit economy labor-
intensive, traffickers present, and the government's policy was essentially one of tacit
acquiescence,33 my theory of political capital of illicit economies predicts that such a
negative involvement in the illicit economy on the part of the belligerents will result in
the inability of the belligerents to generate political capital and obtain support from the
population, but will instead hamper the FARC's effort to develop a support base.
The Rise of the Drug Economy
Low-scale drug production and trafficking had been present in Colombia since the
1950s. Labs in Medellin processed on a low-scale heroin, cocaine, and morphine, which
were then transported to Cuba for distribution in Miami and through Mexico for
distribution elsewhere in the United States.34 By the early 1970s, marijuana cultivation
also became well established on the slopes of Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta and the
adjoining sections of the northeastern coastal region. The presence of the drug economy
took place within the context of a long tradition of smuggling with various licit and illicit
33 As will be described below, the government had engaged in the eradication of marijuana fields in the
department of La Guajira, but it essentially ignored the southern region where coca was grown. See, for
example, LaMond Tullis, Unintended Consequences: Illegal Drugs and Drug Policies in Nine Countries
(Boulder: Lynne-Rienner, 1995): 67-88.
34 Andr6s L6pez Restrepo and Alvaro Camacho Guizado, "From Smugglers to Drug-Lords to "Traquetos":
Changes in the Colombian Illicit Drug Organizations," University of Notre Dame Kellogg Institute, 2001,
www.nd.edu/-kellogg/pdfs/LopeCama.pdf, downloaded October 28, 2005. Coca cultivation, sale, and
consumption were banned in Colombia in 1947 by President Mariano Ospina. Nonetheless, perhaps as a
result of a substantially smaller indigenous population than in Peru and Bolivia, traditional use and cultural
significance of coca in Colombia were considerably smaller than elsewhere in the Andean region.
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products, such as cigarettes, emeralds (mined mainly in the western part of the
department of Boyaca), and domestic appliances. 35
However, the early and mid-1970s brought about important changes in the
international drug trade, which critically contributed to a vast expansion of narcotics
production and a greater illicit crop cultivation in Colombia. First, the United States
undertook two major drug suppression campaigns in the two main U.S. suppliers of
marijuana: the Buccaneer Campaign in Jamaica in 1974 and, along with the Mexican
government, the so-called "Permanent Campaign" that fumigated Mexico's cannabis
fields with paraquat. These campaigns were temporarily successful, and the resulting
shortage in supply to the United States allowed Colombia to increase its own production
of marijuana. 36
Second, increasingly dissatisfied with their business partnership with the Cubans
and the share of profits they received and seeing the potential for drug production
expansion, the Colombian smugglers decided to eliminate their Cuban counterparts from
the business. They sent gunmen to the United States who systematically eliminated the
Cuban drug smugglers, and by the end of 1978, the Colombian crime organizations took
control of wholesale distribution in the United States.37
" Phillip McLean, "Colombia: Failed, Failing, or Just Weak?" Washington Quarterly, 25 (3), Summer
2002: 123-34. In fact, many drug experts argue that what gave Colombia comparative advantage in the
drug trade was the widespread know-how in eluding border controls, widespread corruption of border
officials, and a general view of smuggling as benevolent. See, for example, Mauricio Reina, "Drug
Trafficking and the National Economy," in Charles Berquist, Ricardo Peflaranda, and Gonzalo Sanchez G.,
eds. Violence in Colombia 1990-2000: Waging War and Negotiating Peace (Wilmington: A Scholarly
Resources Inc. Imprint, 2001); and Thoumi (2003). Only very scant data is available on the illicit
smuggling with licit goods in Colombia. Estimates of the size of this economy during the early 1990s
ranged from $1.59 billion to $5.5 billion annually. See, Reina: 88-9.
36 Marijuana production did not spread throughout the country, but it highlighted to Colombian traffickers
the immense potential profits if production of drugs significantly increased.
37 For details, see Howard Abadinsky, Organized Crime (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1997) and
Elaine Shannon, Desperados: Latin Drug Lords, U.S. Lawmen and the War America Can't Win (New
York: Viking Press, 1988).
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Finally, encouraged by the success of drug suppression operations in Mexico and
Jamaica, the United States pressured the Colombian government to undertake a similar
marijuana eradication campaign.38 In 1978, to divert suspicions that he himself was on
the payroll of the traffickers, Colombian President Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala finally
agreed to eradicate while the United States undertook interdiction both at U.S. borders
and on the seas. This pressure on marijuana, facilitated at the interdiction level by
marijuana's great volume and characteristic smell, persuaded Colombian traffickers to
switch their focus onto cocaine.
The Emergence of Cartels
The emerging drug economy gave rise to the Medellin and Cali cartels,39 two of
the largest and most notorious criminal organizations in history. These two organzations
contributed to and oversaw the spread of drug production and traffic in Colombia.
Headed by six Medellin-based capos (Jorge Ochoa Vazquez and his brothers Fabio and
Juan David, Pablo Escobar Gaviria, Carlos Lehder Rivas, and Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez
Gacha) and two Cali-based drug lords (Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela and Jose Santa Cruz
Londofio), the cartels earned an estimated $5 to 6 billion a year from cocaine sale.40 The
3 One of the reasons why eradication was undertaken was the widespread perception that the Colombian
police in charge of internal interdiction were too corrupt for interdiction to make any significant impact on
production in Colombia. See, Richard B. Craig, "Illicit Drug Trade and U.S.-Latin American Relations,"
Washington Quarterly, 8 (4), Fall 1985: 105-24.
39 Although the Cali and Medelin cartels have come to epitomize the quitessential criminal organization as
tightly-controlled and hierarchically-organized, criminal organizations vary widely in their internal
structure, formality and hierarchy of organization, durability of internal and external linkages, and other
characteristics. Yet even the classic, hierarchically-organized Cali and Medellin cartels relied on layers of
subcontractors and freelancers. See, for example, Patrick L. Clawson and Rensselaer W. Lee III. The
Andean Cocaine Industry (New York: St. Martin's, 1996): 40-1.
40 Rensselaer W. Lee IM., The White Labyrinth: Cocaine and Political Power (New Brunswick:
Transaction Publishers, 1989): 3. Many of the main Medellin capos had experience with other illicit
economies and smuggling. Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha, for example, trafficked in smuggled emeralds and
enthusiastically participated in violence associated with that trade. Carlos Lehder stole cars and sold
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traffickers integrated and subcontracted various logistical functions of the traffic, set up a
transport insurance system to allow smaller traffickers to participate and thus distributed
the effects of seizures,41 established large-scale processing laboratories, 42 organized
distribution in the United States, 43 acquired their own security forces and a system of
informers, developed sophisticated money-laundering methods,44 hired lawyers,
economists, and financial experts, and diversified into poppy cultivation and heroin
processing.45 Finally, Carlos Lehder revolutionized the drug trade by conceiving the idea
of deploying light aircraft to transport drugs.46 In order to launder money and establish
themselves as a new elite, the narcos began acquiring land, further contributing to
inequitable land concentration.47 Colombia's annual income from the drug trade in the
marijuana in New York before becoming one of the narco chiefs. Beginning his criminal career in his teens,
Pablo Escobar stole headstones from local graveyards, filing off the inscriptions and reselling them. See,
Francisco Thoumi, Political Economy and Illegal Drugs in Colombia (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994a),
153-4. Their Cali counterparts began their criminal careers in counterfeiting and kidnapping. See also, Paul
B. Stares, Global Habit: the Drug Problem in a Borderless World (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution
Press, 1996): 33; and Andr6s L6pez Restrepo, "Conflicto interno y narcotriffico entre 1970 y 2005," in
Alfredo Rangel Suarez, ed., Narcotrafico en Colombia: Economia y Violencia (Bogota: Fundaci6n
Seguridad y Democracia: 2005): 87-144.
4' Francisco Thoumi, Economia, Politicay Narcotrdfico (BogotA: Tercer Mundo, 1994b): 148-9.
42 The most notorious of these labs was Escobar's immense complex Tranquilandia, the largest cocaine lab
ever found. When the Colombian police raided it in 1984, it found 13.8 metric tons of cocaine, worth at
least $34 million. For colorful details on Tranquilandia and Escobar's other ventures, see, Kirk: 71-91.
43 See, for example, Guy Gugliotta and JeffLeen, Kings of Cocaine (New York: Harper, 1990).
44 The Cali cartel, for example, reportedly owned parts of several prominent Colombian banks to facilitated
money laundering. See, Stares: 59. Such direct capture of the financial institutions by the traffickers was
aided by Colombia's lax money laundering laws during the 1980s.
45 This diversification decision was made by the Cali cartel at the end of the 1980s. Facing saturation of the
U.S. market for cocaine, the Cali cartel also decided to diversify distribution to Europe, engaging in a
business partnership with the Italian Cosa Nostra and other criminal organizations.
46 At one point, Lehder bought an entire Bahamian island and converted it into a drug shipment center,
equipped with storage facilities, loading docks, and refueling equipment.
47 In the 1980s and 1990s, drug traffickers acquired about 4.4 million hectares of land, frequently of the
best land, worth $2.4 billion, and set off major land speculation. See, Richani: 34, and Reina: 77-8.
According to another study, in the 1980s and early 1990s the drug traffickers acquired between 5 and 6
million hectares from Colombia's traditional rural elite. See, Alejandro Reyes, "Compra de tierras por
narcotraficantes," in Drogas ilicitas en Colombia, Francisco Thoumi et. al., eds. (Bogota: Ariel, UNPD,
Ministerio de Justicia, Direcci6n Nacional de Estupefecantes, 1997): 279-346. Other major investments by
the drug lords went into construction, one of the most convenient methods to launder money. In the early
1990s, drug money accounted for about 30% of construction. See, Stares: 98.
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early 1980s and mid-1980s was estimated to be $2.6 and 4.2 billions, 48 representing about
8.7% of Colombia's GDP in 1985.49 Colombian traffickers had accumulated between $39
billion and $60 billion by the late 1980s, operating with as much capital to invest in
Colombia as the entire private sector.5 o
Coupled with the decline of the agrarian sector, the rise of the drug cartels and the
scale at which they were able to process and transport cocaine contributed to the spread
of coca cultivation in Colombia. Although throughout the 1980s, the Colombian cartels
obtained coca paste to a large extent from Peru and Bolivia, Colombia's domestic
cultivation steadily grew from the late 1970s on. Large-scale cultivation of coca took
place in the southeastern and southern plains and jungles of Colombia, in the departments
of Putumayo, Caquetk, and Guaviare. As in Peru, cultivation of coca was economically
greatly superior to other crops. In those regions, roads were essentially nonexistent. Thus
it cost more for farmers to transport traditional licit crops, such as rice, corn, yucca, and
bananas, to markets than they received for their sale. Consequently, the bulk of licit
cultivation took place only for consumption.'5 Coca was the first product that allowed
peasants to make profits, even if small ones, on their crops, with returns surpassing the
costs of transport.52 Coca also did not require transportation since traffickers picked it up
right at the farm. In addition, the coca plant grew easily in an acidic poor quality soil
where other crops struggled and did not require special irrigation and fertilizers. Finally,
48 See, Roberto Steiner, "Colombia's Income from the Drug Trade," World Development, 26 (6), 1998:
1013-1031.
49 Thoumi (1994b): ch 5. Other estimates put the returns from illicit drugs as a percentage of GDP at 10.9
pjercent in 1984. See, Steiner.
Francisco Thoumi, "The Economic Impact of Narcotics in Colombia," in Peter Smith, ed., Drug Policy
in the Americas (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992): 68-70.
s5 Jaime Jaramillo, Leonidad Mora, and Fernando Cubides, eds., Coca, Colonizaci6ny Guerrilla (Bogota:
Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 1986): 107.
52 In the mid-1990s, a hectare of coca (converted to cocaine base at the farm) netted about $4,000, while a
hectare of poppy converted in to morphine base netted about $13,000-$14,000. See, Clawson and Lee: 17.
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coca leaves were easy to process into coca paste, thus becoming largely nonperishable
where licit crops required either expensive canning or immediate consumption. Unlike
coca, licit crops thus did not allow farmers to build up any stocks or retain profits. Not
surprisingly, the bonanza cocalera attracted a large migration into the regions. What in
the early 1980s might have been 25,000 peasants participating in coca cultivation grew to
300,000 to 500,000 by the late 1990s.53 Progressively, many parts of the south were
transformed into a pure coca economy. Between 1978 and 1998, the area cultivated with
coca in Colombia increase by 400%, reaching in 1998 100,600 hectares.54
FARC's Negative Involvement in the Illicit Narcotics Economy
FARC first encountered the drug economy in the middle and lower regions of the
Caguin River in the Department of Caqueta' in about 1978. Seeing drugs and the
unrestrained capitalism, anarchy, enrichment of the traffickers, and social violence that
drugs brought to the region as counterrevolutionary, the Marxist group's original reaction
was to oppose the cultivation of illicit crops. This policy, however, proved vastly
unpopular with the local population, and the peasants actively resisted the policy. 55
Instead of allowing the FARC to secure control of the region and build up support bases
by ending the latest manifestation of capitalism, FARC's decision to prohibit the
53 Vargas Meza (1999): 5. Ricardo Rocha estimates that between 1988 and 1993, the second coca boom
(described in detail below) attracted 578,000 people into the southeast. See, Ricardo Rocha, La Economia
Colombiana tras 25 Aflos de Narcotrdfico (Bogotai: United States Drug Control Program and Siglo de
Hombre Editores, 2000): 150; and Lee (1989): 43.
54 Richani: 96.
55 Author's interviews, Bogota, Fall 2005. See, Henry Salgado, "Conflicto agrario y expansi6n de los
cultivos de uso ilicito en Colombio," Controversia (182), Junio de 2004; Juan Guillermo Ferro, "Las FARC
y su relaci6n con la economia de la coca en el sur de Colombia: Testimonios de Colonos y Guerrilleros," in
Violencias y estrategias colectivas en la regi6n andina, Gonzalo Sinchez G. and Eric Lair, eds., (Bogota,
Editorial Norma, 2004); Jose Jairo Gonzilez, "Cultivos ilicitos, colonizaci6n y revuelta de raspachines,"
Revista Foro, September 1998; and Juan Guillermo Ferro and Graciela Uribe, El orden de la guerra: LAS
FARC-EP: entre la organizaci6n y la politica (Bogotai: CEJA, 2002).
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cultivation of coca severely undermined its legitimacy and led to the population opposing
FARC's presence in the region. Suddenly, even the traffickers and their security forces
looked more appealing to the peasants than the guerrillas.56 The FARC's prohibition of
coca cultivation did not lead to the peasants' greater cooperation with the government
and its military forces since the state was largely absent from the region. Nonetheless, as
predicted by my theory, it hampered FARC's ability to build up a support base and
threatened to consolidate the population's allegiance to the traffickers.
IV. Embracing the Illicit Economy: Testing the Effect of FARC's Positive
Involvement
Fearing the loss of its social base, the FARC recognized that it needed to tolerate
coca production. By 1982, the FARC thus embraced the illicit economy. The policy of
protecting coca production, taxing the narcos, and recruiting people in the lower end of
the drug business was laid out formally in the unpublished "Conclusions" of the FARC's
Seventh Conference.57 In its public statements since then, the FARC has acknowledged
that drugs represent a serious problem, but has stressed that the drug traffic is not the
cause of the conflict in Colombia and is the result of government's corrupt practices. As
is to be expected, the FARC has stressed crop substitution, not eradication, as the
appropriate response to the drug problem, even though acknowledging that once
alternative crops can guarantee survival for the peasants, eradication may be
56 Presentation by Jos6 Olarte (mayor of Calamar, Guaviare) at Georgetown University and National
Endowment for Democracy Conference on "Local Government Amidst the Armed Conflict: The
Experience of Colombian Mayors," Georgetown University, Washington, DC, September 27, 2000. Quoted
in Rabasa and Chalk: 26.
57 Rabasa and Chalk: 26.
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appropriate.58 Meanwhile, it has become positively involved in various stages of the illicit
economy.
Given the FARC's positive involvement in the illicit economy, both the
conventional view and the theory of political capital of illicit economies predict that the
group would able to significantly increase its strength. However, while the conventional
view only predicts an increase in the group's physical resources, the theory of political
capital of illicit economies also predicts an important increase in its freedom of action
and political capital. Because the state of the overall economy was poor, the character of
the illicit economy labor-intensive, traffickers present, and government policy quickly
became eradication, the theory of political capital of illicit economies predicts a
substantial increase in the FARC's power, and significantly, a substantial increase in the
FARC's political capital. Thus, while the conventional view predicts the same level of
popular support for the FARC in both drug-producing and non-producing regions, my
theory predicts a significantly greater support for the group in drug-producing regions.
Learning Curve
At first, the FARC tapped only into the most basic component of drug production,
by taxing the coca farmers with a standard "revolutionary tax" of 15 percent on coca all
transactions.59 Progressively, however, the guerrillas sought to participate in other aspects
of drug production. They levied new tariffs on other illegal transactions, from importing
58 See, Letter from FARC to the U.S. Congress, March 14, 2000,
http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/031407.htm, downloaded March 13, 2004.
59 Mark Chernick, "Negotiating Peace Amid Multiple Forms of Violence," in Comparative Peace
Processes in Latin America, Cynthia J. Arson, ed. (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press,
1999): 166. The FARC's overall taxation system is progressive, and the poorest peasants are exempted
from at least some taxation. See, Richani: 70.
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precursor agents to refining cocaine. The FARC collects about 20% of the shipment's
value for trafficking use of the territory under its control, such as for river transport. The
guerrillas also demand rents from the narcos for coca paste, protection of labs, and the
provision of airstrips.60 In the 1990s, the FARC standardized its fees, charging $15.7 for
every kilo of coca paste and $52.6 for every kilo of cocaine that the traffickers produced
in its territory. FARC's protection fees for a domestic drug flight from one of its airstrips
is $2,631, and for an international flight $5,263.61 After his arrest, a Brazilian top
trafficker who was one of the FARC's international connections claimed that
considerably higher fees were charged by the FARC: $500 per each kilo of cocaine to be
shipped and $15,000 per each flight.62 In the early 1990s, the FARC also began acquiring
coca plots and processing coca leaf into cocaine. The FARC has further diversified its
portfolio by taxing the production of heroin and reemerging marijuana.63 The leftist
guerrillas are believed to control approximately 70 percent of the opium poppy producing
municipalities. 64
Until the late 1990s, there was no evidence that the FARC has managed to
participate in international smuggling operations or distribution in source countries.
According to the DEA's testimonies in the U.S. Congress, "To date, there is little to
indicate the insurgent groups are trafficking in cocaine themselves, either by producing
cocaine HCL and selling it to Mexican syndicates or by establishing their own
60 Vargas (1999): 1, 5.
61 Mark S. Steinitz, "The Terrorism and Drug Connection in Latin America's Andean Region," CSIS,
Policy Papers on the Americas (XIII), Study 5 (Washington, DC), July 2002.
62 Gabriel Marcella, The United States and Colombia: The Journey from Ambiguity to Strategic Clarity
(Carlisle: U.S. Army War College 2003): 27.
3 Although poppy plants are rather fragile and fairly easy to destroy, they are frequently located high on
Colombia's mountains in the so-called cloud forest, escaping detection and making it frequently impossible
to deploy spraying planes.
64 Camilo Echandfa Castilla, "La Amapola en el Marco de las Economicas del ciclo Corto," Analisis
Politico, (27), January-April 1996.
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distribution networks in the United States.'"65 Evidence obtained in the early 2000s,
however, has revealed that the FARC has developed contacts with international
smuggling networks, indicating that it could potentially bypass Colombian middlemen.6 6
Nonetheless, the operational demands for developing an international smuggling network
are very high and not easily accomplished by a local belligerents group. All in all, 23
FARC's fronts, or slightly more than 50 percent, were active in drug-rent collections in
coca-growing regions and six in opium zones by 2000.67
Military Capabilities I: Physical Resources
Its positive involvement in the illicit narcotics economy and other illicit
economies allowed for a major expansion of the FARC's military capabilities. Although
the exact figures of Colombian insurgents' financial gains from drugs are not known, the
overall FARC's income is estimated to be hundreds of millions of dollars annually. Most
credible estimates of FARC's income from taxing the illicit economy fluctuate between
$60 and $100 million per year.68 According to some estimates, the protection rents
65 Donnie Marshall, Chief of Operations, the Drug Enforcement Agency, "Cooperative Efforts of the
Colombian National Police and Military in Anti-narcotics Efforts, and Current DEA Initiatives in
Colombia, " Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal
Justice, July 9, 1997 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office: 1997): 6.
66 See, for example, Alexandra Guaqueta, "The Colombian Conflict: Political and Economic Dimensions,"
in Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, (eds.), The Political Economy ofArmed Conflict: Beyond Greed
and Grievance (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003): 80-1, and War and Drugs in Colombia, Latin America
Report No. 11, January 27, 2005,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/latin_america/i 1_warand_drugsin colombia.pdf,
downloaded February 10, 2005: 9. The extent of FARC's penetration of international smuggling network
and its distribution capacity in source countries continues to be hotly debated among experts on the FARC
and drugs. Having contacts with smuggling organizations is, of course, not the same as having the know-
how and the will to carry such activities on its own. In March 2002, U.S. courts indicted FARC members
for the first time on drug trafficking charges and requested their extradition. In March 2006, a federal grand
jury in Washington DC indicted 50 top FARC commanders. Sim6n Trinidad, one of the top leaders, has
been extradited to the United States.
67 Author's interviews in Bogota, Fall 2005. See, International Crisis Group, (January 27, 2005): 9.68 Author's interviews in Bogotai, Fall 2005.
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extracted by guerrillas from narcotraffickers in 1996 amounted to $600 million, and less
than $200 million annually in 1997 and 1998,69 Already in the early 1980s, the FARC
was believed to obtain about $3.8 million per month from the coca economy.70
It is crucial to realize that despite the FARC's enormous income from the drug
trade, drug rents represent only about 48 percent of FARC overall income. The rest
comes from other illicit economies, labor non-intensive ones, and other criminal
activities. Extortion of oil companies and other large businesses generates additional 36
percent. Kidnapping brings in another 8 percent of FARC's total resources,7' and cattle
rustling another 6 percent. The rest comes from bank robberies and other illegal
activities. 72 As mentioned above, these other illicit economic activities played a
prominent role for generating finances all along,73 serving as a financial survival
mechanism for the guerrillas even though failing to generate political capital for the
insurgents before the FARC was able to tap into the drug trade.
The FARC has also imposed "revolutionary" taxes on other political and
economic transactions. For example, in the regions they control, the guerrillas frequently
69 Richani: 75. A study by the Colombian police put FARC's and the AUC's income at a high $105 million
per month. Colombia National Police Internal Document A-4523, Government of Colombia, December
2000, cited in Edgardo Buscaglia and William Ratliff War and Lack ofGovernance in Colombia: Narcos,
Guerrillas, and U.S. Policy (Stanford: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 2001): 26. Other
intelligence sources placed the total income of the guerrilla in 1995 as high as $800 million. See, Mark
Chernick, "Colombia's Escalating Violence," Strategic Comments, 3 (4), May 1997. However, given the
size of the Colombian economy and its known difficulties in absorbing illicit monies, this figure is likely
inflated.
70 Mark S. Steinitz, "Insurgents, Terrorists and the Drug Trade," Washington Quarterly, 8 (4), Fall 1985:
142.
71 The Colombian government estimates that kidnapping brought $1.2 billion to the FARC and the ELN
between 1991 and 1998. See, Pax Christi Netherlands, The Kidnapping Industry in Colombia (Utrecht: Pax
Christi Netherlands, 2001): 35. The majority of kidnapping today is carried out by the leftist guerrillas,
especially the FARC. Currently, guerrillas take an average of 1,500 people per year. Colombia has one of
the highest kidnapping rates in the world.
72 Alfredo Rangel SuArez, "Parasites and Predators: Guerrillas and the Insurrection Economy of Colombia,"
Journal ofInternational Affairs, 53 (2), Spring 2000: 585.
73 See, for example, Restrepo, Spagat, and Vargas (forthcoming).
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"recommend" individuals for jobs in local bureaucracy, and collect a "facilitation fee"
from their earnings, demand payments for the award of public work contracts, and collect
a cut of public expenditures.74
The FARC was able to convert these profits from the various illicit economies
into a major increase in its fighting capacity, growing both in numbers of combatants and
the quality of weapons at its disposal. In 1979, the FARC had nine fronts. By the end of
1983, this number grew to 27.75 By 1986 the FARC had approximately 3600 fighters in
32 fronts, and as resources from drugs continued flowing in, the number of fighters
continued to grow to 7000 in 60 fronts in 1995.76 The continuing income from the drug
trade and an opportunity to organize and regroup in the so-called demilitarized zone
(zona de despeje) of 42,000 square kilometers in the south-central part of Colombia,
which was granted to the FARC under President Pastrana's peace plan in the late 1990s,
allowed the FARC to further expand its numbers to 15,000-20,000 in over 70 fronts by
2000.77
The following table and graph summarize the FARC's dramatic expansion after
its positive involvement with the drug economy.
Number of FARC Members
1964 1966 1986 1995 2000
44 350 3600 7000 18,000
74 Presentation by Gilberto Toro, Executive Secretary, Federacidn Colombiana de Municipios, at
Georgetown University and National Endowment for Democracy, Conference on Government Amidst the
Armed Conflict: The Experience of Colombian Mayors," Georgetown University, Washington, DC,
September 27, 2000, cited in Rabasa and Chalk: 50.
7 Pearce: 173.
76 In 1989, the FARC estimated that it needed about $56 million to increase the number of combatants from
13,200 at the time to 18,000. See, Richani: 76.
77 Rangel Suirez (1998): 12. President Uribe's military operations against the FARC since 2002, described
below, resulted in the capture of several thousand guerrillas.
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Data: Based on sources quoted above. 1982 marks the begging of FARC's positive involvement with the
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The FARC has not only expanded in terms of numbers of querrillas, but also
geographically. In 1979, the FARC had some presence in the departments of Huila,
Cauca, Tolima, Putumayo, Caquetfi, Antioquia, and C6rdoba, and in the Magdalena
Medio region.78 In 1983, the guerrillas controlled only 173 municipalities, 13 percent of
the country's total. By the mid-1980s, guerrilla influence spread to the departments of
Guaviare, Meta and key regions of Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, Serrania de San Lucas,
and Bota Caucana. 79 By 1998, the guerrillas expanded their control to 622 municipalities,
61 percent of the total. In most of the municipalities with illicit substances, the guerrillas
established military presence or control.80 The group thus managed to operate in 40 to 60
percent of the country, much of which comprises sparsely populated jungles and plains
east and south of the Andes. At least prior to President Uribe's Plan Patriota (a major
military campaign against the FARC described below), the FARC leadership's long-term
78 Eduardo Pizarro Leong6mez, Insurgencia sin revoluci6n (Bogota: Tercer Mundo 1996): 99.
79 Ibid: 126-7.
s0 Richani: 96.
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goal was to build a force of 30,000 to enable it to engage in large-scale offensive
operations against the Colombian military.8 ' By the end of the 1990s, the FARC was
larger and more entrenched than ever before.
In early 2002, following the ceasefire breakdown between the government and the
FARC, a serious level of violence erupted once again, and the FARC expanded its
military attacks to cities. This expansion to the urban theater was not a reaction to its
weakness in the country, but rather the opposite. Expansion into the cities and, crucially,
encircling of the capital, had been an important part of the FARC's grand strategy,
consisting of four steps: 1) to consolidate its control of the coca-growing regions in the
southern and eastern parts of Colombia and of poppy-growing regions on the eastern
slope of the Andes to build up their military capabilities; 2) to expand its theater of
operations into the entire country so as to disperse the government's forces and reduce its
ability to regain the military initiative; 3) to isolate the capital Bogota and other major
cities by interdicting roads of land communication; and 4) to move to large-scale
offensive operations that would culminate in a general uprising.82 Throughout the 1990s,
the FARC was drawing closer to the cities and managing to control infrastructure in
certain territories. During the late 1990s, the FARC used its demilitarized zone to
increase coca cultivation, regroup, and begin building up an urban branch. 83 As of 2004,
some analysts estimated the strength of the urban branch as high as 12,000 men and
81 Karl Penhaul, "Colombian Rebels Map Out Plan to Topple Government," News Agency Colombia,
January 14, 1999.
82 For details, see Rabasa & Chalk: 40.
83 Julia E. Sweig, "What Kind of War for Colombia?" Foreign Affairs, 81 (5), September/October 2002:
127-131.
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women with access to explosives and arms drawn from the urban poor,8 4 though others
generally put it in the lower thousands, a more likely number.85 Apart from several bomb
attacks in 2002, including of a disco in Bogota, the FARC has generally been reluctant to
pursue terrorist operations in the cities, fearing a substantial decline in legitimacy as a
result of such operations, but Bogota's electrical grid became a routine target until
President's Uribe counteroffensive in 2003.
The FARC's military equipment also underwent a major improvement. Prior to
the positive involvement in the illicit economy, the belligerent group had at its disposal
old rifles, frequently dating back to La Violencia. Since its positive involvement in the
illicit narcotics economy, it has acquired M60 machine guns, M16 rifles, AK-47 assault
rifles, mortars, RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenades, M79 grenade launchers, land mines,
explosives, and detonators. In May 2000, Colombian officials intercepted anti-aircraft
and anti-tank rockets specifically destined for the FARC. In addition, there have been
reports that in the past, the FARC received SA-14, SA-16 and RPG-7s from Russia, as
well as 'Redeye' and 'Stinger' missiles from Syria,86 even though the FARC has not yet
used surface-to-air-missiles in the conflict. The FARC has upgraded its communications
equipment with Japanese and European voice scramblers and encryption technology.87
The FARC also possessed boats. In 1989, the leadership of the group contemplated
84 Alejandro Reyes, "La Violencia Politica," in Marc Chernick, ed., Prevencidn de conflictosy alerta
temprana: El caso de Colombia (Washington DC and Bogota: United Nations Development Program,
Georgetown University, and Universidad de los Andes, 2005).
85 Author's interview in Bogota, Fall 2005.
86 See, LaVerle Berry, Glenn E. Curtis, Rex A. Hudson, and Nina A. Kollars, A Global Overview of
Narcotics-Funded Terrorist and Other Extremist Groups, A Report Prepared by the Federal Research
Division, Library of Congress, May 2002,
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdffiles/NarcsFundedTerrsExtrems.pdf, downloaded August 05, 2004.
87 Douglas Farah, "Colombia Rebels' Arsenal Grows as Cocaine Sales Increase in E. Europe," Washington
Post, November 4, 1999.
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acquiring 6 small airplanes, 10 speedboats, and 2 ships.88 It is not clear whether this goal
was accomplished.
Participation in the narcotics economy exposed the FARC to international
smuggling arms organizations. The FARC was able to use drug smuggling routes and
contacts for weapons procurement. In 2000, for example, the Peruvian ex-chief of
intelligence, Vladimiro Montesinos, helped facilitate a cocaine-for-arms swap between
the Russian mafia and the FARC with the FARC purchasing 10,000 AK-47s and 3
million cartridges in a single shipment. Although this particular shipment was intercepted
in October 1999, a single airdrop delivered $50 million worth of AK-47s deep in FARC's
territory, according to U.S. intelligence officials. Positive engagement in the illicit
economy thus not only gave the FARC the necessary financial means to acquire
sophisticated weapons, it also greatly simplified procurement mechanisms and logistics.
Other illicit activities, such as extortion and kidnapping that the belligerents had engaged
in prior to their tapping into the drug trade, generated some financial resources, but their
effect on procurement and logistics improvement was limited. Unlike the drug trade, such
highly localized criminal activities did not put the guerrillas in contact with major
international weapons-smuggling organizations.
Military Capabilities II: Freedom of Action
Positive involvement in the illicit narcotics economy also gave the FARC a
greater freedom of action. Both the growth of the number of its combatants and the
solving of procurement and logistics gave the FARC the flexibility to develop highly
specialized military units and to concentrate on strategic targets. The FARC, for example,
88 Richani: 76.
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has used sapper units in assault and demolition operations8 9 as well as at least four other
mobile blocks.90 According to the Colombian army officials, "the combination of armed
struggle with drug trafficking makes [guerrilla] squads more stable to a certain extent.
[...] [S]quads located in coca and poppy growing areas are the 'strongest qualitatively
and quantitatively."' 9 ' It also should be noted that an important part of the FARC's
freedom of action comes from its having bases in neighboring countries, including
Ecuador, Venezuela, and Panama, where it can retreat when under pressure from the
Colombian military.
Proponents of the conventional view have objected that participation in the illicit
economy limited the mobility and freedom of action of the FARC by forcing it to defend
the illicit economy from government actions, namely government squads eradicating
coca fields.92 According to such analysts, FARC's ability to retreat from a drug-
cultivation territory as a strategic maneuver was compromised by its need to defend the
coca plantations from spraying planes, thus undermining one of the imperatives of
guerrilla warfare -- mobility.
However, the decision to retreat or not to retreat can be a matter of choice for the
belligerent group. If in order to protect the fields, it does not retreat, it does so because it
chooses such a strategy, not because it does not have the capacity to adopt another
strategy. In fact, as will be described below, the FARC did at times choose not to defend
the coca fields and simply retreated, albeit at great cost to its political capital Running
away or defending a particular territory became options for the FARC after it tapped into
89 Ortiz: 136.
90 Guiqueta: 77.
9' Col. Fernando Milan Prez, Col. Eduardo Santos Quinones, "La Guerrilla en Colombia a la Ideologia y
la Politica," in Revista Fuerzas Armadas, LI (160), July-September 1996.
92 Author's interviews with U.S. government officials, summer 2004.
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the drug economy, whereas prior to embracing the illicit economy, it had no option but to
run. Overall, the FARC's positive involvement in the illicit economy greatly strengthened
its military capabilities, both in terms of physical resources as predicted by the
conventional view, but also in terms of its freedom of action, as predicted by my theory
of political capital of illicit economies.
Political Capital
Crucially, however, positive involvement in the illicit economy also increased the
FARC's political capital. One important mechanism by which the illicit economy has
generated political capital for the belligerents has been their provision of protection and
regulation services to the population in the illicit crop regions. As described earlier,
during the FARC's negative involvement in the illicit economy, the FARC was barely
able to hold onto the Caguun region, facing an imminent displacement of its authority by
the drug traffickers and their security services. The negative reaction of the peasants
toward FARC's prohibition of the illicit economy led the FARC both to reverse its policy
and also to form "self-defense groups" among the population to preserve order and
prevent the domination of the region by the narcos. However, the self-defense groups
exhibited little interest in protecting the peasants from abuses of the traffickers and, in
fact, came to abuse the farmers themselves.93
By the late 1980s, the community petitioned the FARC to assert greater control of
the region, 94 to which the group responded. First, the FARC established more security for
the peasants, making sure that they would not be robbed when receiving payments for
93 The self-defense groups also showed no interest in moderating the rise in burglary, homicides, and
prostitution. See, Chernick (2005): 198; Ferro (2004): 10.
94 Chernick (2005): 198.
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their coca crops. It also established local policing. Second, the guerrillas began
dispensing justice and promulgating and enforcing laws regarding the carrying of arms,
fishing, hunting, working hours, liquor consumption, prostitution, drug abuse, and cutting
of trees. 95 The guerrillas thus provided protection from a proxy, which got out of control.
Moreover, the guerrillas came to provide protection from the drug traffickers. The
guerrillas limited the abuses of the traffickers and their intermediaries. They forced the
traders to pay the farmers in cash, not basuco (crack) and demanded that the traffickers
pay better wages to the cocaleros, imposing price controls on coca leaf and paste.96 In
areas in which the guerrillas' presence was weak or nonexistent, the price of labor paid
by the narcos is lower than in areas in which the guerrillas have strong military
presence.9 7 The FARC also established quotas on the amount of land to be seeded with
coca, encouraging farmers to dedicate a part of their plot to food crops, centralized
purchases of coca leaf and limited who, including which traffickers, entered the region.98
Furthermore, the FARC also limited the expansion of landholding by the drug traffickers,
large landowners, and cattle ranchers at the expense of the coca peasants.99 Similarly, in
the marijuana regions in the early 1990s, the guerrillas provided a regulatory framework
for the illicit economy, making sure that buyers did not take advantage of the peasants.'00
95 Richani: 89.
96 Pearce: 173. See also, Ricardo Vargas Meza, "Cultivos ilicitos en Colombia: elementos para un balance,"
in Alfredo Rangel Subrez, ed., Narcotr4aico en Colombia: Economiay Violencia (Bogotai: Fundaci6n
Seguridad y Democracia, 2005): 87-144.
97 Richani: 110. See also, Thoumi (2003): 228.
98 Ferro (2004). Author's interviews in Colombia, Fall 2005. See, also, Camilo Echandia Castilla, El
Conflicto Armado y las Manifestaciones de la Violencia en las Regiones de Colombia (Bogoti: Presidencia
de la Repfiblica de Colombia, Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, 2000): 79.
99 Author's interviews in Colombia, Fall 2005. See, also Richani: 70-1.
100 Sergio Uribe, "Los Cultivos Ilicitos en Colombia: Evaluaci6n-Extensi6n, T6cnicas y Tecnologias para la
Producci6n y Rendimientos y Magnitud de la Industria," in Francisco Thoumi, ed. Drogas Ilicitas en
Colombia: Su Impacto Econ6mico, Politico y Social (BogotA: Editorial Planeta, 1997).
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The guerrillas thus came to provide complex protection and regulation services for the
illicit economy and the coca peasants.
The FARC also provides protection against the government's efforts to eradicate
the illicit crops. The effects of eradication on popular support for the FARC and
cooperation with the government will be discussed in detail below in the sections on
eradication during the mid-1990s and since the launch of Plan Colombia. Suffice to say at
this point, that since the 1980s, the FARC has systematically attempted to prevent
eradication, shooting at spraying planes and attacking ground eradication teams.
Colombia began spraying coca fields experimentally in late 1984, and by the end of 1985,
2000 hectares (or 10-15% of Colombia's crop at the time) were eradicated both by aerial
spraying and manual eradication.'• ' In response, the FARC capitalized on the growing
resentment and mobilization of the peasants, organizing resistance and acquiring stronger
bases of support. A U.S. counternarcotics official operating in the town of San Jos6 del
Guaviare, characterized the situation in an internal memorandum (reprinted by Lee) in
early 1986 as the following:
The civilian population in San Jose is more hostile than ever. Many campesinos
are threatening legal action and scream about losing their livelihood and against
police abuses at every opportunity. ... [Large] scale demonstrations and other
problems could be on the horizon. Intelligence sources also claim an increase in
guerrilla activity in the San Jos6 area. 102
Since then, eradication has generated widespread resentment among the rural
population, and FARC's interference with eradication has received cheers from the
101 Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report (INCSR) (Washington, DC, Government Printing Office: 1986): 90.
102 Reprinted in Lee (1989): 211. Challenged as illegal under Colombian laws during the 1980s, aerial
fumigation was suspended in early 1986. It was restarted again in the mid-1990s. Manual eradication has
continued since the 1980s, though the policy has varied in intensity.
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population, translating into the major source of the FARC's legitimacy and support. 10 3
The FARC's operations against the government's military deployments and units have
frequently been justified as counter-counternarcotics operations, including its destruction
of the army base at Las Delicias in Putumayo. 1' 4 Moreover, given the high degree of
corruption of the Colombian military and police, the peasants were frequently forced to
pay drug rents to the law enforcement officials whose treatment of the peasants was often
more arbitrary and threatening than that of the guerrillas.'0 5 The FARC efforts to prevent
the presence of counternarcotics forces thus resulted not only in smaller destruction of the
peasants' illicit crops, but also in smaller and less arbitrary protection rents and less
abuse. The FARC has also provided protection against the government interdiction
efforts to destroy processing labs, thus providing protection to the drug traffickers, in
addition to the rural population.
Interestingly, overall the FARC has encouraged alternative development, even if
occasionally threatening alternative development workers and specific projects. Even in
the Caguin region, for example, where it first learned how to exploit the illicit economy
to increase its strength, the FARC cooperated with local community groups and
Colombian government organizations in the mid-1980s to implement an ambitious $25
million regional development plan, which included technical assistance for growing new
crops, infrastructure development, telecommunications system, new sewage and portable
water system, and legalization of peasants landholdings. 10 6
103 See, for example, Vargas Meza (1999); Rabasa and Chalk: 66; Ortiz: 137; Gutierrez 2004.
104 Vargas Meza (1999).
105 Pearce: 173. Revelations of widespread corruption among Colombian air force command officers in
1998, for example, gave rise to the expression "the Blue Cartel," referring to the color of the air force
uniforms.
106 Jaramillo, Mora, and Cubides (1986): 135-57.
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Although the FARC's advocacy of alternative development as the appropriate
counternarcotics policy is easily understood - it allows the FARC to oppose eradication
and stress the plight of the peasants - its actual cooperation with alternative development
projects is less obvious. The success of alternative development would undermine the
strength of the illicit economy in a particular region, thus limiting both the FARC's
financial income and its political capital. Perhaps the FARC has learned that alternative
development projects frequently fail and rarely manage to provide alternative subsistence
to the farmers. This allows the FARC to embrace alternative development without facing
the diminishment of its strength as a result of alternative development reducing the size
of the illicit economy. Equally important, the FARC is also taking its clues from the rural
population. Unlike in Peru where alternative development has been largely discredited
with the cocaleros, who frequently oppose any state presence, including that of
alternative development project managers, alternative development in Colombia is still
popular with the rural population in Colombia and is an important part of the cocaleros
negotiating demands. The FARC understands that its opposition to alternative
development projects would antagonize the local population. 107
The FARC has also used the drug money to provide for otherwise absent social
services. It has established local clinics and vocational schools and organized public
works, such as construction of infrastructure, paving of roads, and provision of means of
transportation. Indeed, in many municipalities, the FARC has been the sole provider of
essential public services.'lo According to a survey by Edgardo Buscaglia of 1,500
'07 Based on author's interviews in Peru, summer 2005 and Colombia, Fall 2005.
'0s In addition to exploiting the illicit narcotics economy, the FARC also has supplied the provision of
social services through other illicit economic activities, such as blackmailing major international companies
and forcing them to invest in local schools, vocational training, etc. See, Ricardo Vargas Meza, ed.,
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individuals concerning informal institutions in Colombia's war zones, 68 percent of the
sample population used health services established by the FARC and many also used
mediation services provided by the FARC. At the same time, 91 percent of the population
perceived municipal authorities as corrupt and 67 percent viewed local officials as
incompetent in the provision of public services. 109 In the marijuana-growing regions of
the early 1990s, for example, the FARC charged a fairly high tax (up to one third of the
buyers' payments) for the provision of various regulations and protection functions, but it
returned a portion of the profits for community development projects. 10 Although the
guerrillas probably would be able to provide some social services even without their
positive involvement in the illicit economy, the scale of social services provided is
critically dependent on the belligerents' positive involvement in the illicit economy.
Positive involvement in the illicit economy thus enlarges the scale and scope of the
protostate functions the belligerents can take on.
Another important mechanism by which positive involvement in the illicit
economy generates political capital for the FARC is the exploitation of nationalism. The
FARC frequently plays the nationalism card by comparing the U.S.-sponsored drug
eradication campaign to the U.S. intervention in Vietnam. In the areas the FARC
controls, it put up billboards which read: "Plan Colombia: los gringos ponen las armas
Colombia pone los muertos" (Plan Colombia: The gringos supply the arms, Colombia
Drogas, Podery Region en Colombia (Bogota: CINEP, 1994). It has also sought to control who runs local
administrations, both by nominating its candidates for elections and physically threatening their opponents.
The FARC places great importance on infiltrating local politics and exercising power at the local level.
'09 Buscaglia & Ratliff: 8-9. See also, James Dao, "The War on Terrorism Takes Aim at Crime," New York
Times, April 7, 2002.
10 Uribe (1997).
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supplies the dead)."'1 FARC's shooting at Colombian and Dyncorp's fumigation planes is
cheered by the rural population as not only protection of their livelihood, but also as a
nationalist cause. The FARC has intensified the nationalist message since 2002 when
U.S. policy toward Colombia changed, allowing U.S. aid to Colombia -- including arms
sales and training provision to Colombian military and police units -- be used not solely
for counternarcotics purposes, but also directly for fighting the FARC. 12 The nationalism
aspect is further enhanced by the controversial nature of the substance used for coca
spraying, glyphosate, known under its trademark name Roundup. Produced in the United
States, glyphosate is frequently alleged to have a vast negative environmental impact, and
be potentially harmful to humans."13 The FARC thus alleges that the gringos are
conducting chemical warfare in Colombia.114
The FARC's positive involvement in the illicit economy consequently resulted in
its acquisition of political capital. In areas where the FARC had previously no foothold
and where the population resented its presence, the FARC was welcomed once it
embraced the illicit economy. Since then, it has consistently had the highest level of
political capital in the drug-producing regions. The major coca-growing departments of
" Daniel Lazare, "A Battle Against Reason, Democracy and Drugs: The Drug War Deciphered,"
NACLA 's Report on the Americas, XXXV (1), July/August 2001: 17.
112 Juan Forero, "Shifting Colombia's Aid: U.S. Focuses on Rebels," New York Times, August 08, 2002.
"3 See, for example, World Wildlife Fund, "Comments on Glyphosate," October 30, 1999,
http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/103001.htm, downloaded May 01, 2003; and "Report on Verification
Mission 'Impacts in Ecuador of fumigations in Putumayo as part of Plan Colombia,"' October 2002,
http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/02121301.htm, downloaded May 01, 2003. The United States
government denies that glyphosate has any negative effects, and several U.S. government-sponsored
studies have failed to find any negative side-effects of using glyphosate. Environmental groups point out,
however, that because of FARC's shooting at spraying planes, spraying is frequently conducted from a
height at which dispersion of the chemicals to non-coca areas cannot be controlled, that the substance is
mixed with other chemicals in order to assure that it sticks to coca leaves for as long as possible and hence
becomes dangerous to both humans and the environment, and that according to the label, it is not supposed
to be used near water sources, which obviously cannot be avoided in the southern and southeastern jungles
of Colombia where coca is grown.
114 Author's interviews in Colombia, Fall 2005.
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Guaviare, Caqueta', and Putumayo, and Meta have also been the areas of the FARC's
greatest political support. Similarly, since the early 1980s, the FARC's most loyal
supporters have been the coca farmers in the south." 5
In short, the sponsorship of the illicit economy allowed the FARC to vastly
increase its strength. Contrary to the predictions of the conventional view and consistent
with the predictions of the theory of political capital of illicit economies, the FARC's
positive involvement in the illicit economy increased its strength not only in terms of
physical resources, but also in terms of freedom of action, and political capital.
Moreover, contrary to the predictions of the conventional view, but consistent with the
predictions of my theory, FARC's political capital has consistently been strongest in the
coca growing regions and among the coca peasants, ever since the FARC became
positively involved in the illicit economy. The increase in the multiple dimensions of its
strength allowed the FARC to pose a serious challenge to the state and greatly increase its
staying power.
Conflict Expansion
The increase in the FARC's military capabilities and political capital allowed the
belligerents to intensify conflict. One indicator of conflict expansion is the number of
guerrilla-military confrontations. As mentioned above, prior to the 1980s, the guerrillas
spent most of their time hiding in the jungles, trying to avoid encounters with the
military. There were virtually no large military encounters between the FARC and the
armed forces prior to 1980. Since then, the guerrillas' willingness to attack targets and
11 Author's interviews in Colombia, Fall 2005. See also, James F. Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in
Latin America (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003): 100.
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even face confrontations with the military has substantially increased, at least until
President Uribe's military offensive against the FARC. Clashes between the guerrillas
and the government forces, i.e. military actions not purposefully initiated by the
guerrillas, were near an all time high during 2004, but attacks by the guerrillas against
undefended or weakly defended targets dropped from a peak of 2001-2002 to their long-
term averages."•6
The table and graph below again illustrate the dramatic and steady expansion of
FARC's military activity since the beginning of its positive involvement in the drug
economy. Over that period, the number of combat engagements between guerilla units
and the Colombian military escalated from under 100 to over 500 a year by the mid-
1990s, and, as President Alvaro Uribe V1lez embarked on a strong counteroffensive, to
well over 2000 in 2003."17
116 For details, see Restrepo, Spagat, and Vargas; and Jorge Restrepo and Michael Spagat, "The Colombian
Conflict: Uribe's First 17 Months," April 2004,
http://www.rhul.ac.uk/economics/Research/WorkingPapers/pdfldpe04O9.pdf, downloaded May 08, 2004.
117 Richani: 49; and "You Do the Maths," The Economist, January 10, 2004: 30.
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Between 1996 and 1998, the guerrillas were able to inflict several major defeats
on the Colombian army. In August 1996, for example, the FARC launched a surprised
attack on the military base at Las Delicias, Putumayo, and after fifteen hours of fighting,
destroyed it. In March 1998, FARC annihilated an elite army unit, the 52nd
counterguerrilla battalion of the Colombian army's 3rd Mobile Brigade." 8 The increase in
guerrilla strength is also reflected in the increase in the army/guerrilla ratio of fatalities
between 1980s and late 1990s (again, until Uribe's military offensive against the FARC
in 2002), favoring the guerrillas. While this ratio was 1:1.52 in 1984 it showed an
increase to 1:1.21 in 1999."'1 Positive involvement in the illicit economy by the
belligerents thus led to a vast escalation of the military conflict.
"~ For details, see Rabasa and Chalk: 42.
19 Richani: 45.
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Relations Between the FARC and the Traffickers: Testing the Unity Hypothesis of the
Conventional Wisdom
The nature of FARC's participation in the illicit economy offers little to support
the "narco-guerrilla thesis" of the conventional view that argues that the drug dealers and
guerrillas have morphed into a unified actor and predicts that violence among the groups
would be rare. My theory of political capital of illicit economies, on the other hand,
predicts substantial tensions and frequent violence between the two actors.
The drug dealers initially benefited from FARC's presence in the drug-growing
regions. The guerrillas established law and order in areas of their control, and ensured
that the peasants delivered on promised quotas.120 As described above, the FARC also
protected the fields from the Colombian and U.S. anti-narcotics squads.121 The Medellin
cartel, for example, gave arms to the FARC "to protect airstrips and drug processing
plants in the southwestern plains from the army."' 22 Yet progressively, the relationship
deteriorated as the FARC demanded greater rents for its protection services from the
traffickers and greater wages for the peasants. The FARC also controlled traffickers'
access to the peasants.
Crucially, the FARC interfered with the traffickers' effort to launder money and
buy themselves positions of power and respect through the acquisition of large tracks of
120 See, for example, Vargas Meza (1999): 7.
121 It is important to note that the Colombian drug dealers have an intimate relationship not only with the
insurgents and paramilitaries, but also with many Colombian politicians and members of the armed forces.
Corruption of the political system and the military is very high in Colombia. In its most notorious example,
the presidential campaign of Emesto Samper Pizano received a large contribution from the Cali cartel,
resulting in a U.S. decertification of Colombia as a partner in the war on drugs in March 1996 and the
revoking of U.S. visas for President Samper. For details, see Mauricio Vargas, Jorge Lesmes, and Edgar
Tllez, El Presidente que se Iba a Caer (Bogotd: Editorial Planeta: 1996), and Ted Galen Carpenter, Bad
Neighbor Policy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003): 125-130.
122 Daniel Garcia-Pefia Jaramillo, "Light Weapons and Internal Conflict in Colombia," in Jeffrey Boutwell,
Michael T. Klare, and Laura W. Reed, eds., Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light
Weapons (Cambridge: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995): 100.
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land. As the traffickers began buying land in the middle Magdalena Valley and
northwestern plains, the guerrillas tried to both limit the traffickers' encroachment on
peasant holdings and demanded high extortion rents from the traffickers.
Violent confrontations between the FARC and the traffickers took place once the
FARC became positively involved in the illicit economy. Among the first such
confrontations was a fight between the FARC and the security forces and assassins,
known as the sicarios, of Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha. By 1984, the 100 top Colombian
traffickers issued a manifesto denouncing any affinity to the guerrillas and opened a war
on the guerrillas. The drug traffickers hired private security forces, thus contributing to
the rise of the paramilitaries (described in detail below), to eliminate guerrilla presence in
the regions where they owned land and had processing labs or where the cultivation of
illicit crops took place.
In short, the FARC-narcos relationship has been extremely problematic, and the
competitive interests of the two groups led to antagonism and large and frequent violence
among the two actors, thus supporting my theory of political capital of illicit economies
while contradicting the predictions of the conventional view.
V. The M-19 Guerrillas and Illicit Economies: Testing the Amplifying Factors "State
of the Overall Economy in the Region" and "Character of the Illicit Economy" and the
Unity Hypothesis
The analysis of another Colombian belligerent group, the Movimiento 19 de Abril
(or M-19) is not only useful for a further exploration of the validity of the unity
hypothesis of the conventional view, but also for testing the effect of the amplifying
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factors of state of the overall economy in the country/region and character of the illicit
economy. The M-19 operated in the urban theater, with a strong presence mainly in
Bogotai, where the overall economy was considerably better off than elsewhere in the
country. At first, the M-19 operated not only in the rich city centers but also in its slums,
but, nonetheless, the economy was in a much better shape in the urban areas than in the
rural areas. Moreover, over time, the M- 19 became an essentially Bogotai affair, and the
state of the overall economy in the area of its operation could be classified as rich. The
M-19 became involved with a labor-non-intensive aspect of the illicit narcotics economy,
namely the extortion of drug traffickers. In this urban theater, the government policy
toward the illicit economy was not eradication, but interdiction and arrest of traffickers.
My theory of political capital of illicit economies thus predicts that the M- 19 would not
be able to obtain significant political capital from its positive involvement in the illicit
economy.
The M-19 emerged in the 1970s as a political-military organization presenting
itself as an alternative to the traditional Conservative and Liberal Parties. It took its name
from the date of presidential elections in 1970, which it believed were stolen by the
Conservatives. M-19 espoused a national agenda, opposed political fraud and corruption,
but never embraced any left-wing tradition or Marxist orthodoxy. It opened its military
campaign by stealing the sword of Simon Bolivar from a Bogota museum, proclaiming
that it took up Bolivar's fight against the exploiters of the people. 123 Led by Jaime
Bateman Caj6n, its members were union leaders and students, frequently sons and
daughters of the country's elite.
123 For a general overview of the group's origins and goals, see Kline (1999): 19-21.
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In addition to its middle-class student background and support base, the group
built up a following in the slums of Cali and other cities by providing services that the
state had failed to provide and engaging in Robin Hood tactics. Thus, in the early 1970s,
it gave out food, seized milk lorries and distributed the milk among the poor.' 24 But by
far the strongest support base of the group was in Bogoti. 125
The group did not seek to challenge state authority by holding onto a territory, but
instead, in the classic way of urban guerrillas, engaged in attention-drawing operations in
the urban centers. Not only were such tactics consistent with its ideology and its origins,
but the group was physically unable to carry out other operations. Although training in
Cuba for "an invasion" of Colombia, the M-19 lacked weapons and other equipment as
well as food. The weapons that it had at its disposal came from occasional robberies of
military arsenals. The military actions of the M-19 were thus limited to audacious, but
isolated, acts such as the M-19's takeover of the Dominican Republic's embassy in
Bogota in 1980. Moreover, by the late 1970s, during the highly repressive government of
President Turbay Ayala, M-19 was under tremendous pressure from the Colombian army.
Many M-19 members were arrested, and the group was stagnating at best and, as Robin
Kirk put it, "waging war mainly through advertising campaigns."' 26
Used to acquiring its finances from kidnapping, the M-19 decided in 1979 to
begin extorting the major drug capos. According to Bateman, extorting the major drug
traffickers had two advantages: they were rich and they could not appeal to law
124 Pearce: 171.
125 Jaime Zuluaga Nieto, "De guerrillas a movimientos politicos," in Ricardo Peflarada and Javier Guerrero,
eds., De la armas a lapolitica (Bogota: Tercer Mundo, 1999): 11-39. See, also, Chernick (1999): 163-5.
126 Kirk: 104.
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enforcement for protection. 127 The first target was none other than Carlos Lehder. But
although the group managed to seize him, he escaped. The M-19 then changed its target
list to relatives of the capos instead of the traffickers themselves, and abducted the three
children of Carlos Jader Alvarez, one of the prominent capos. Five weeks later, the group
also kidnapped Martha Nieves Ochoa, the sister of Juan David Ochoa.
The traffickers, apparently under Escobar's leadership, convened a meeting,
pledging support and money for the establishment of a security group, called Muerte a
Secuestradores (Death to Kidnappers) or MAS. MAS's purpose was to provide
protection to the traffickers and eliminate the bothersome guerrillas. The MAS started a
systematic campaign to hunt down, torture, and kill M-19 members and supporters.
Without ever receiving any money, the M-19 finally agreed to free Martha Ochoa in
February 1982, having meanwhile executed Alvarez's children. 128 By that time, MAS's
campaign against the M-19's had halved the guerrilla group membership. 129 Its freedom
of action became tremendously constricted. Unable to conduct offensive or demonstrative
operations, the group was on the run and had to go to hiding to avoid being completely
destroyed by MAS.
But not only did the extortion scheme fail to generate financial resources for the
M-19 (and in fact, tremendously hurt the group's physical resources), it also failed to
generate any political support for the M-19. Labor-non-intensive, and outright dangerous,
the illicit extortion activity did not bring any material benefits to M-19's supporters or the
127 Ibid.
128 Maria Jimena Duzan, Death Beat: A Colombian Journalist's Life inside the Cocaine Wars, Peter Eisner,
trans. (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1994): 4. On the payroll of the traffickers, some police
officers also apparently caught M-19 members and handed them over to MAS to be tortured, actively
cooperating with the cleansing campaign.
129 Kirk: 107.
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wider population. Since the MAS felt no need to be discriminate in their actions against
the M-19, frequently killing and torturing mere acquaintances of M-19 members and
since the M-19 was powerless to protect them, the M-19's participation in the illicit
extortion economy, in fact, jeopardized the lives of M-19 supporters, scaring people off
from associating with the group. The involvement in the illicit economy thus did not
bring any material benefits to M-19 supporters, but in fact jeopardized their lives.
The lack of new political capital turned into actual losses of political capital as the
M-19 switched its involvement in the illicit economy from extorting the traffickers to
providing protection services for them. Although the M-19 never became the traffickers'
full-fledged hitmen, like the sicarios or MAS, it nonetheless helped the narcos by
destroying crucial evidence against them.
To avoid being completely wiped out by the MAS, the M-19 guerrillas eventually
struck a cooperative deal with the traffickers.' 30 At the time, the narcos were involved in
a terrorist campaign against the state to deter the government from extraditing them to the
United States, murdering judges and policemen, offering the justice and law enforcement
officials the choice ofplata y plomo (bribe or bullet), and effectively paralyzing the
justice system. After the traffickers ordered the assassination of Rodrigo Lara Bonilla,
the Justice Minister, the state crackdown against the traffickers especially intensified.
Lara Bonilla had helped end Escobar's political career by revealing Escobar's prominent
role in the drug trade.
10 The M-19 agreed to the deal not only in reaction to its own experience with MAS, but also to the
systematic and effective effort of the MAS to eliminate the FARC's political party, Uni6n Patri6tica (UP),
during the guerrillas' peace negotiations with the administration of President Belisario Betancur. See,
Alonso Salazar, J., La Pardbola de Pablo: Auge y Caida de Un Gran Capo del Narcotrdfico (Bogota:
Planeta, 2001): 102-105, 135-145, 160-61.
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In November 1985, the day that Colombia's Supreme Court was supposed to rule
on the extradition of a number of prominent drug traffickers to the United States, the M-
19 stormed the Supreme Court's building in BogotA, the Palace of Justice, taking almost
400 people hostage, including the President of the Supreme Court, Alfonso Reyes
Echandia, and nine Supreme Court Justices. The Colombian government replied with
heavy force and after a 28-hour siege defeated the guerrillas. Approximately one hundred
people, however, died, including nine of the Supreme Court justices and most of the 60
M-19 guerrillas. During its siege, the M-19 burned up incriminating materials on the
traffickers.' 31 The M-19 denied that it undertook the action as a pay job for the Medellin
cartel, claiming instead that it sought to denounce the government of Belisario Betancur,
which it blamed for the failure of the peace negotiations between various leftist guerrillas
(including the FARC and the M-19) and the government. 132 Whether the attack was
simply a pay job ordered by the Medellin cartel or had larger political goals, the M-19
clearly went out of its way to destroy the incriminating evidence against the traffickers, in
addition to publicly denouncing the extradition policy. 133 Moreover, former M- 19
members subsequently admitted to receiving general assistance later on from Escobar, 134
and in 1988, the group was reportedly hired by the Medellin cartel to murder Attorney
General Carlos Mauro Hoyos.' 3 5
Whatever the M-19's motivation in taking over the Justice Palace, its protection
services for the drug traffickers failed to generate political capital for the group. Such
'13 Rex A. Hudson, "Colombia's Palace of Justice Tragedy Revisited: A Critique of the Conspiracy
Theory," Terrorism and Political Violence, 7 (3), Summer 1995: 100-121.
132 Scott B. MacDonald, Mountain High, White Avalanche (New York: Praeger, 1989): 42-3.
133 The M-19 was not unique in denouncing extradition. Apart from many political leaders, other guerrilla
groups, including the FARC and its political branch, the UP, also denounced extradition.
See, Salazar.
135 Scott B. MacDonald, Dancing on a Volcano: The Latin American Drug Trade (New Praeger, 1988): 35.
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involvement in the illicit economy failed to generate any tangible benefits for the wider
population, and, in fact, appalled the group's audience in Bogota and elsewhere. Its
actions received widespread condemnations.' 36 One of Colombia's leading newspapers,
(quoted by Kline) opined: "If there is in national public opinion a universally accepted
opinion, it is the absolute lack of justification for that guerrilla operation."37 In the
context of wealthy BogotA and the group's audience in other large cities, such labor-non-
intensive illicit economic activity did not resonate with the larger population, and,
discredited the group.
The M-19 had tried to become involved in the labor-intensive aspects of the illicit
narcotics economy, but beyond taking a rhetorical stance did not succeed. In 1984, the
government undertook a large-scale aerial eradication of marijuana fields, within two
years destroying about 60-80 percent, or 8,000 hectares."38 The eradication campaign
generated large protests, and the M-19 denounced the policy, threatening to fire on
government helicopters that came to spray the marijuana fields.' 39 Yet M-19's stand
failed to generate a substantial increase in the group's political capital. The belligerent
group could threaten, but it could not deliver. Its presence in the rural areas was minimal,
its urban audience was less concerned with the spraying issue, and other belligerent and
civil society groups espoused the same position. Moreover, in the rural areas, especially
as the campaign was extended to also spray coca fields, the FARC had began making life
136 Author's interviews in Bogota, Fall 2005.
137 Quoted in Kline (1999): 36.
'3 Lee (1989): 208-9. The fumigation campaign was suspended in 1986, amidst widespread protests and
complaints about the harmful effects of glyphosate.
139 Ibid.
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difficult for the eradication teams.140 The FARC was thus able to deliver while the M-19
could only promise.
In sum, the M-19 failed to penetrate the labor-intensive aspects of the illicit
narcotics economy, and its participation in the labor-non-intensive aspects actually
backfired. As predicted by my theory, because the M-19 operated in the relatively
wealthy urban environment and its target audience was to a large extent the middle class,
and because it became involved only in labor-non-intensive aspects of the illicit narcotics
economy, its positive involvement in the illicit narcotics economy failed to generate
political capital for the group. Moreover, the group's incompetence in penetrating the
drug trade also hurt the group's military capabilities, decimating a half of its membership
and putting the MAS on its tail.
It might appear at first glance that the M-19's relationship with the drug
traffickers supports the unity hypothesis of the conventional view. In order words, in the
case of M-19 there was no more meaningful difference between the criminals and the
belligerents. After the initial war between the two groups, the M-19 and the cartels signed
a truce, and the M-19 provided protection and possibly assassination services for the
traffickers.
But this interpretation is too simplistic. Even as the Medellin cartel launched a
second major wave of terror to deter the government from extraditing the capos to the
United States in 1989, the M-19 struck a deal with the government and demobilized. It
returned the sword of Bolivar, disarmed, and ended whatever was left of its efforts to
participate in the illicit economy. It subsequently transformed itself into a political party,
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140 Ibid.
the Democratic Alliance M-19. Clearly, it remained a separate entity from the drug
traffickers, with independent interests and goals.
Moreover, the M- 19 did not feel assured that the drug traffickers and their
paramilitaries would not attempt to liquidate the now demobilized M-19, just like they
tried to liquidate the M-19 in the early 1980s and continued killing the remaining
members of the FARC's political party, the Uni6n Patri6tica (UP). To demobilize and
survive, the M-19 had to negotiate another truce with MAS. A deal was struck where the
M-19 promised to support a ban on extradition and amnesty for the paramilitaries, and
MAS promised not to kill out the M-19, or at minimum give the M-19 a 24-hour warning
first before any M-19 member was assassinated, thus allowing the person to get out of the
country within the 24-hour period.' 4' Despite the fact that the M-19's presidential
candidate Carlos Pizarro Leong6mez was assassinated by the paramilitaries in 1991, the
truce largely held, and between 1991 and 1994 the Democratic Alliance M-19 became the
third largest political party in Colombia. Had the two groups merged into a unified actor,
they would not need to sign a truce. In short, even the M-19 case does not support the
conventional view's unity hypothesis.
VI. The Rise of the Paramilitaries & Their Positive Involvement in the Illicit
Economy: Testing the Effect of the Amplifying Factor "Presence of Traffickers"
The paramilitaries experience with the drug economy provides a useful test of the
amplifying factor presence or absence of traffickers. Since some of the paramilitary
groups originated as security forces for the traffickers while elsewhere traffickers and
their protection forces bought themselves positions in the paramilitary umbrella
141 Kirk: 138.
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organization, the AUC, as commanders of various regional "blocks," the boundary
between the belligerent group and the traffickers has been extraordinary fluid. In many
cases, the traffickers became paramilitaries while the paramilitaries eliminated
independent traffickers, resulting in the absence of independent traffickers in many areas
under the paramilitaries' control. Given that the other factors are the poor state of the
overall economy, labor-intensive of character of the illicit economy, 142 and eradication as
government response to the illicit economy, the paramilitaries positive involvement in the
illicit economy will result in an increase in both their military strength and political
capital. However, since traffickers are absent in many areas, this increase will not be very
large or consistent. The conventional view predicts an increase in physical resources, but
not in political capital.
The state's inability to protect legitimate businesses, such as plantations and cattle
ranches from the guerrilla threat, coupled with the guerrillas' threat to the interests of the
illicit business elites, created a need for private security providers and gave rise to one of
the most powerful belligerent group in Colombia, the paramilitaries. Private armies and
militias have existed in Colombia for decades if not centuries. Many current
organizations of this type originated as private protection units for cattle-ranchers, coffee
plantation owners, and other large landowners (usually referred to as autodefensas),143 for
142 In addition to participating in taxing the labor-intensive coca cultivation, the paramilitaries have also
participated in labor-non-intensive smuggling of drugs and other labor-non-intensive illicit economies, such
as smuggling with gasoline. Importantly, however, they have always also participated in the labor-intensive
illicit crop cultivation.
143 The term "self-defense groups" is also used for community-based militias, as distinct from the mobile
hit squads for hire by drug dealers and large landowners. In practice, the two groups frequently overlapped,
and after 1989, all the remaining self-defense groups became paramilitaries. Some of the groups were legal,
some were not. Almost all were tolerated by the government. The state itself promoted the creation of some
of these groups, such as the creation of CONVIVIR during the government of Ernesto Samper (1994-98).
Under the command of the Directorate of Security and Surveillance of the Ministry of Defense, these
vigilante groups were to provide logistical support and intelligence to the military forces. Even after the
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emerald mafias, 44 and for peasant communities tired of the guerrillas. And since the
early 1980s, as the traffickers and guerrillas interests increasingly clashed, the drug
traffickers also hired private security groups, such as the MAS, to protect them against
the guerrillas.
Frequently fighting in support of the regular military services and brutalizing both
the rural and urban population suspected of sympathizing with the guerrillas, the various
paramilitary groups'45 provided protection to their patrons against leftist guerrilla
kidnappings, extortions, cattle rustling, and land seizure. Largely avoiding encounters
with the guerrillas, their strategy was to intimidate the local population into not
supporting the guerrillas or force it out of the region. By the late 1980s, the narcos had
used the paramilitaries to protect their business interests in the departments of Santader,
Antioquia, Norte de Santader, Cesar, Meta, Cauca, Casanare, Huila, Boyaca, Caqueta,
Putumayo, and Crdoba.'46 Since then, the areas of most intense conflict between the
CONVIVIR was legally banned in 1999, some of them continued functioning as protection groups for land
owners and drug traffickers -- some independently, others by joining the umbrella paramilitary
organization, the AUC (described in detail below). For details, see Fernando Cubides C., "From Private to
Public Violence: The Paramilitaries," in Charles Berquist, Ricardo Penaranda, and Gonzalo Sanchez G.,
eds. Violence in Colombia 1990-2000: Waging War and Negotiating Peace (Wilmington: A Scholarly
Resources Inc. Imprint, 2001: 127-150; and Gustavo Duncan, "Narcotraficantes, mafiosos y guerrreros.
Historia de una subordinaci6n," in Alfredo Rangel Suirez, ed., Narcotrdfico en Colombia: Economia y
Violencia (Bogota: Fundaci6n Seguridad y Democracia: 2005): 19-87. See also, Carlos Medina Gallego, La
Violencia parainstitucional, paramilitary  parapoliticial en Colombia (Bogoti: Rodriguez Quito Editores,
1994).
144 For a good overview of the semi-illicit trade with emeralds, see Maria Victoria Uribe Alarcon, Limpiar
La Tierra: Gerray Poder entre Esmeralderos (Bogota: CINEP, 1992).
'14 Many of the self-defense groups were organized geographically, having control of their local fiefdom.
Examples of paramilitary groups include Peasant Self-Defense Group of C6rdoba and Urabi (ACCU),
headed by Carlos and Fidel Castaflo, Middle Magdalena Self-Defense Group, Pacific Bloc, Southern Bloc,
etc. Others included the Colombian Anti-Communist Alliance (AAC) and Death to Kidnappers and
Communists (MASCO).
'
46 Richani: 90. Author's interviews in Colombia, Fall 2005.
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FARC and the paramilitaries have remained the major areas of coca production:
Guaviare, Putumayo, and Caquetai, which both movements seek to dominate.' 47
But as the 1980s progressed, the paramilitaries developed a desire for autonomous
power, not simply as protectors of the business elite - legitimate and criminal - but as an
independent actor. This transformation process was crucially prodded along by Carlos
Castaiio, a prominent commander in charge of one of the most successful paramilitary
groups, Peasant Self-Defense Group of C6rdoba and Uraba (ACCU). Under his
leadership, many of the independent paramilitary groups became unified in 1997,
creating an umbrella organization, Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (the United Self-
Defense Forces of Colombia or AUC) and acquiring a national mission.
The AUC's goals included acquiring land through seizure (at which the
paramilitaries have been very successful, contributing to the dispositions and
displacement of hundreds of thousands),' 48 generating rents from drugs and other illicit
economies, and eliminating the leftist guerrillas. In addition, its declared conservative
agenda included support for the state, especially against the leftist guerrillas, a land
reform that would not include a fundamental redistribution of land, and opposition to
extradition of traffickers.' 49 The paramilitaries stressed tradition, property, and order.
Increasingly, their social discourse included populist advocacy for the poor.'50
Nonetheless, given that many paramilitary groups were only loosely affiliated with the
147 Rangel Suirez (1998): 50. The short-term stated goal of the paramilitaries is to wrestle the coca-
producing regions from guerrilla control. See, Sanchez G., 2000: 24. In December 2002, after the election
of President Uribe, the paramilitaries have declared an open-ended ceasefire.
148 The paramilitaries are estimated to have caused the displacement of one third of Colombia's internal
refugees.
149 See, L6pez Montafio and Garcia Durin: 153-4; and Bergquist, Peilaranda, and Sinchez G. eds., : 243-
55.
150 Adam Isacson, "Peace or Paramilitarization?" July 2005, http://ciponline.org/colombia/0507ipr.pdf,
downloaded August 4, 2005.
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umbrella AUC organization, many never fully or at all bought onto the national agenda
and continued functioning as pure protection armies for various legal and illegal elites.
Learning Curve
As the 1980s and 1990s went on, the paramilitary groups learned that their
participation in the illicit narcotics economy did not need to be limited simply to
collecting protection rents from the drug dealers. In addition to providing protection to
the narco-elite against the guerrillas and also against the government counternarcotics
forces for processing labs, the paramilitary groups taxed the coca farmers, and at least
some of them became directly involved in cocaine production and actual trafficking.' 5'
The demise of the Medellin and Cali cartels in the 1990s (described in detail below)
allowed the paramilitaries to diversify their operations into other aspects of drug
production and trade. Due in part to its control of Urab• and other areas close to the
border with Panama, a main contraband route, the AUC was able to inherit the trafficking
network and contracts in the interior of the country and in international markets."5 2
According to U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, William Wood, the AUC controls 40
percent of Colombia's drug trafficking. 153 Together, the FARC, the paramilitaries, and
the leftist ELN are involved in more than 70-75 percent of coca-grown in Colombia and
s5' For details, see Donnie Marshall, Chief of Operations, the Drug Enforcement Agency, "Cooperative
Efforts of the Colombian National Police and Military in Anti-narcotics Efforts, and Current DEA
Initiatives in Colombia, " Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs,
and Criminal Justice, July 9, 1997.
152 Author's interviews in Colombia, Fall 2005. See, Richani: 124.
153 Ambassador William Wood quoted in International Crisis Group (January 27, 2005): 16.
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at least 40-42 percent of coca production. 154 The right-wing paramilitaries are estimated
to control about 26 percent of heroin-producing municipalities. 155
By the early 2000s, the AUC (like, increasingly, the FARC too) was selling drugs
to cartels - the remaining Colombian boutique cartels as well as Mexican' 56 and
increasingly Brazilian trafficking organizations 157 -- for distribution in consumer
countries. The AUC has been clearly more involved with trafficking outside of Colombia
than the FARC and, at least prior to its demobilization in 2005-06, has been possibly
trying to establish its own drug distribution networks.' 58 This increased involvement
beyond the borders of Colombia is facilitated by the AUC's continuing transformation,
with many prominent traffickers, such as Diego Fernando Murillo a.k.a. Don Berna (a
long-time Medellin drug cartel capo), Victor Manuel Mejia Miinera (a ranking figure in
the Norte Del Valle drug cartel), Francisco Javier Zuluaga, and Guillermo Perez Alzate
a.k.a. "Pablo Sevillano" buying themselves leadership position in the AUC to take
advantage of AUC peace negotiations with the Colombian government (described below)
and avoid extradition to the United States under the resulting lenient treatment of the
paramilitaries. 159
Because of its close connections to Colombia's trafficking organizations, the
AUC has also been able to diversify its involvement into secondary illicit economies
surrounding the drug trade. It now also controls the illicit trade in gasoline, a key
'54 Buscaglia and Ratliff: 5.
"ss Echandia.
156 Steven W. Casteel, Assistant Administrator for Intelligence, "Narco-Terrorism: International Drug
Trafficking and Terrorism - a Dangerous Mix," Testimony before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
Mary 20, 2003, http://www.google.com/search?sourceid=navelient-ff&ie=UTF-
8&rlz=1B2GGGL_enUSI 77&q=Casteel+%22Narco-Terrorism%22, downloaded August 13, 2004.
157 Author's interviews with U.S. government officials, Washington, DC, summer and fall 2004.
'• International Crisis Group (January 27, 2005): 10.
59 Isacson (July 2005). See, also "Lording It over Colombia: Colombia's Paramilitaries and Drug Lords,"
Economist, October 23, 2004.
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ingredient in processing coca leaves into cocaine paste, which is mainly siphoned off
from Colombia's pipelines.'60 Additionally, the paramilitaries now control a big share of
counterfeiting, prostitution, and gang activity.' 6'
Military Capabilities
The AUC's annual income from the drug economy is believed to be around $75
million annually, which is approximately 70 percent of the group's total income.162 This
income is supplemented by protection rents from big business, oil companies, cattle
ranchers who hire the paramilitaries for protection from the guerrillas, and the AUC's
participation in illicit trade with gasoline and other precursor agents.
The paramilitaries' positive involvement in the illicit economy resulted in a large
expansion of their military capabilities. While in 1986, ACCU (the predecessor of the
AUC) counted only 93 members, there were between 4,000 and 5,000 paramilitaries in
1995,163 12,000 under AUC umbrella by 2000, and between 27,000 and 29,000 in
2006.164 The paramilitaries have spread throughout the country, having a presence in 26
of the country's 32 departments and 382 of its 1,098 municipalities.' 65
Although at first dependent on the army for weapons, after tapping into the drug
money, the AUC independently acquired 30 aircraft (11 of which are Cessna), 4 shipping
t60 International Crisis Group (January 27, 2005): 15.
161 Isacson (July 2005).
162 According to police estimates, as cited by Richani: 109. Carlos Castafio gave the 70 percent portion in a
televised interview in 2000. These numbers may have by now, however, become substantial
underestimates. As the AUC's portfolio came to include the 98% of the illicit trade with gasoline in
Colombia (which Colombian newspapers report is estimated to be $75 million annually) by the early
2000s, its income could have increased to over $150 million annually.
163 Richani: 123.
164 Adam Isacson, Peace talks with paramilitaries: four conditions for U.S. support, December 10, 2002,
http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/02121001.htm, downloaded August 04, 2003. Author's interviews in
Colombia, Fall 2005.
165 Isacson (July 2005): 4.
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planes, 14 helicopters with military equipment, and several speedboats.' 66 Unlike the
leftist guerrilla groups that do not pay regular salaries to their fighters and instead offer
only irregular special compensation,' 67 the AUC pays regular salaries to its soldiers that
range between $250 and $1000, depending on rank, as well as a $10 bonus per each
guerrilla killed.16" Similarly, in the 1980s, the paramilitaries were dependent on the army
for logistical support and training. Since then, they have used the illicit narcotics
economy to build up an independent supply system and have hired private security
companies to train them.' 69
The paramilitaries' military strategy has been to extend local control through the
intimidation of local officials and local population. Through the use of demonstrative
massacres170 and other intimidation techniques, the paramilitaries have either forced the
local population into compliance or into leaving the area."71 The paramilitaries have thus
adopted the coercion school of counterinsurgency. Instead of seeking to win the peasants'
hearts and minds, they have sought to deprive the belligerents' of popular support and
resources by destroying the resource base, burning down the homes of the peasants, and
forcing them to leave. In many areas, they succeeded in their objective, with the leftist
guerrillas finding it hard to operate in regions where the paramilitaries displaced the bulk
166 Richani: 124.
167 Gutierrez Sanin (2004): 268.
168 Richani: 148, and Kirk: 276.
169 In a frequently cited episode in the 1980s, some of the paramilitary groups hired private Israeli and
British security firms for training.
170 Much has been written about the paramilitaries' human right abuses. See, for example, Human Rights
Watch, Colombia's Killer Networks: The Military-Paramilitary Partnership and the United States (New
York: 1996), and Kirk. Massacres committed by the paramilitaries peaked in the period of 1997-2002. See,
Jorge Restrepo and Michael Spagat, "Civilian Casualties in the Colombian Conflict: A New Approach to
Human Security," CERP Davidson Institute, October 27, 2004,
http://personal.rhul.ac.uk/uhte/014/HS%20in%20Colombia%20Civil%20Conflict.pdf, downloaded
December 02, 1004. The leftist guerrillas have been also complicit in major human rights abuses, with the
brutality of the FARC increasing throughout the 1990s.
17' For an excellent discussion of the paramilitaries as "entrepreneurs of coercion," see Mauricio Romero,
Paramilitaresy autodefensas 1982-2003 (Bogoti: IEPRI, 2003).
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of the population. Once they "cleansed" the area of guerrilla sympathizers, the
paramilitaries would substantially decrease the level of violence against the local
population. The paramilitaries have also preferred avoiding direct military encounters
with the guerrillas, preferring attacks against villages and without armed opponents. 172
Political Capital
While the FARC has been primarily courting the peasant population, the
paramilitaries traditionally courted mainly the drug dealers. In the bidding war over the
coca trade, the paramilitaries pandered to the narcos' interests by charging smaller
protection fees,'73 not interfering with the traffickers' land acquisition, providing less
physical protection to the peasants, and in general not supporting peasant efforts to
increase prices for their products. The decline in coca prices in south Bolivar
demonstrates the paramilitaries' strategy. Before the takeover by paramilitaries in May
1999, coca paste was selling at about 2,200,000 pesos per kilo (about $1,100 at the time).
Once the paramilitaries had taken over, the price of coca paste declined sharply to
1,400,000 pesos ($700) per kilo or more than 60 percent.' 74 Moreover, the paramilitaries
have not attempted to enforce the contracts between the drug dealers and the peasants to
the same extent that the guerrillas did, hence rendering the peasants vulnerable to price
fluctuation and abuse.' 75 The failure to perform these regulation roles for the illicit
economy has been especially prominent in areas where drug traffickers bought
172 Jorge Restrepo and Michael Spagat, "The Colombian Conflict: Uribe's First 17 Months," Royal
Holloway University of London Discussion Series: 11, September 2004: 11, 24-26,
http://www.rhul.ac.uk/economics/Research/WorkingPapers/pdf/dpe0409.pdf, downloaded October 14,
2004.
173 The paramilitaries have also charged smaller protection fees to landowners and cattle ranchers.
174 Richani: 112.
75 Ibid.
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themselves leadership positions and where there is no more distinction between the
paramilitaries and the traffickers. 176
However, as the paramilitaries became an independent actor and expanded into
guerrillas' traditional areas, they have become more concerned with generating political
capital. Thus in contested regions, they have offered higher prices for the peasants for
coca paste than the FARC and reduced peasant taxes. In Mapiripin, for example, when
the paramilitaries took over, Castafio dropped the tax from 10% charged by the FARC to
6 percent. Similarly, when the paramilitaries entered the FARC and ELN strongholds in
southern Bolivar they offered to eliminate the peasants' debt to the FARC.' 77 This has
been an especially effective technique for the paramilitaries for generating popular
support and sympathy from the local population. 17
Similarly, in domains where competition with the guerrillas over the support of
the drug traffickers was not in question, such as in the provision of social services, the
paramilitaries have tried to exploit their positive involvement in the illicit economy for
obtaining political capital. Thus, in Puerto Boyaca', which in the late 1980s became a kind
of independent paramilitary republic, the ACDEGAM (Association of Peasants and
Ranchers of the Magdalena Medio), a paramilitary group bankrolled by the notorious
drug baron Pablo Escobar, ran its own clinics and schools, organized health brigades to
visit surrounding villages, helped build and repair roads, and even constructed a
communication center."79 In a joint social service venture, the paramilitaries and the
176 Author's interviews in Colombia, Fall 2005.
177 International Crisis Grou (January 27, 2005): 13. See also, Carlos Castafio memoirs, Alberto Aranguren,
Mi confesi6n (Bogota: Oveja Negra, 2002).
'78 Guiqueta: 82.
179 Pearce: 247. See also, Carlos Medina Gallego, Autodefensas, paramilitares y narcotrdfico en Colombia:
Origen, desarrollo y consolidaci6n: El Caso de Puerto Boyacd (Bogota: Documentos Periodisticos, 1990).
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traffickers thus took on the functions of a protostate. The paramilitaries have continued
with the provision of social services since, especially in much of northern Colombia
where they have a strong base.'18
The paramilitaries have indeed been able to exploit the illicit economy to generate
political capital. The AUC's political capital has been strongest in the drug regions:
According to the AUC's public assessment, provided by its leaders "Javier Montaiiez"
and Ernesto Baez of Bloque Central Bolivar, the most successful and most established
paramilitary groups were blocs operating in the drug cultivation areas or controlling
strategic corridors.'81
Expectedly, the paramilitaries support has been strongest in areas where they
charge smaller prices than the guerrillas and where they provide social services. In fact,
as the FARC's legitimacy declined as a result of the elimination of drug trade
intermediaries in the coca regions and the group's increasing brutality (described in detail
below), the population in smaller rural towns has voluntarily turned to the paramilitaries
for various protostate services, thus acknowledging the legitimacy of the group. While in
the past, the local population approached the FARC for mitigating personal disputes
related to property, debt, and political rivalry, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, it has
increasingly turned to the paramilitaries.' 82 Also as the AUC demobilization became
under way, many local inhabitants of AUC-dominated areas chose to leave for fear that
I80 The paramilitaries have also apparently used the provision of social services, such as health clinics
known as ARS, to launder money. Presentation by Rep. Luis Fernando Velasco ChAvez from Cauca at a
WOLA conference in Washington, DC on April 19, 2005, summarized in Kimberly Stanton, "The
Colombian Conflict: Regional Impact and Policy Responses," WOLA Conference Report, August 2005:
13.
'81 Cited in International Crisis Group (January 27, 2005): 16.
182 Gubqueta: 78.
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the FARC would return.'"3 The political capital obtained from the paramilitaries' positive
involvement in the illicit economy was thus partially able to mitigate the resentment
generated by their brutality. However, overall the popular reaction to the AUC has been
one of passive tolerance rather than of active support.' 84
As predicted by my theory of political capital and by the conventional view,
AUC's positive involvement in the illicit economy resulted in a dramatic increase in the
paramilitaries' military resources. However, contrary to the conventional view, the
paramilitaries were also able to derive some political capital from their positive
involvement in the illicit economy. As predicted by my theory, this level of political
capital has been crucially limited by the fact that the paramilitaries and traffickers merged
in various areas into a conglomerate actor, with the paramilitaries not providing
protection services against the traffickers. In fLact, even in areas where traffickers were
present, the paramilitaries frequently did not perform these functions and thus failed to
augment their political capital. This outcome was not predicted by my theory, but is not
inconsistent with it, given that the paramilitaries primary target of support has frequently
not been the rural population, but the regional elites - both legitimate cattle ranchers and
landowners and drug traffickers. Only since the mid-1990s, some paramilitary groups
became interested in obtaining political capital, and to some extent were able to do so,
especially as the FARC's own political capital declined (described below).
1s3 International Crisis Group, Colombia: Presidential Politics and Peace Prospects, Latin America Report
No. 14, June 16, 2005: 19,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/latin_america/l 4_colombiapresidentialipolitics_andpoliti
cal_prospects.pdf, downloaded September 27, 2005.
1'4 Author's interviews in Colombia, Fall 2005. See also, Romero (2003), and Duncan (2005).
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Unity Hypothesis
The relationship between the AUC and the traffickers also sheds light on the unity
hypothesis of the conventional view. While the conventional view argues that the
belligerents and criminals have merged into a unified actor and predicts that there will be
close cooperation and rare violence between them, my theory argues and predicts the
opposite. Because of their inherently contradictory interests and multiple audiences, my
theory argues, fighting among the two actors will be frequent.
In many respects, the case of Colombia's paramilitaries provides some of the
strongest evidence for the conventional view. As described above, many drug traffickers
bought themselves leadership positions in the paramilitaries to take advantage of
President Uribe's peace process with the paramilitaries and the distinction between
politically-motivated belligerent actors and profit-oriented criminals cannot easily be
sustained in the case of the paramilitaries. Clearly, there is much more evidence for the
notion that the belligerents and the criminals cannot be distinguished from one another in
the case of the paramilitaries and the drug traffickers than there is in the relationship
between the FARC and the drug cartels.
However, to end the analysis there would be too simplistic. Even though the
paramilitaries and some of the traffickers have become a conglomerate actor, with the
AUC since 2002 having both a drug cartel mafia section with considerable influence over
large cities, and a military branch, the grouping is far from monolithic. s"' Great tensions
and infighting exist among its various factions, and there is no unity of goals or interests.
'"8 Isacson (July 2005), and International Crisis Group, "Demobilising the Paramilitaries in Colombia: An
Achievable Goal?" Latin America Report No. 8, August 5, 2004,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/latin_america/08_demobilising_thearamilitaries in colom
biaan_achievable goal.pdf, downloaded August 27, 2004.
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Discord has been the norm. Turf wars between the two (increasingly merged) actors and
among their various factions have been intense. The relationship between the Norte Del
Valle cartel and AUC former leader Carlos Castafio is perhaps the most well-known. In
March 2003, Castafio apparently suggested to members of the cartel and other traffickers
that they should strike a deal with the United States to stop the drug business in exchange
for immunity from extradition. Some kingpins seemed amenable, but others, such as Don
Berna, and Castafio's own brother, Vincente, were vehemently opposed. A bitter struggle
exploded inside the cartel, and the faction that wanted to continue with the drug trade is
believed to have killed Castafio.' 86 A top pro-drug figure in the AUC, Salvatore Mancuso,
took over the leadership of the group. Infighting between various factions within and
among the various AUC blocs has also been common since the group's emergence.
Furthermore, many boutique cartels still exist in Colombia that have not been
incorporated into the AUC. The number of these small cartels that emerged after the
destruction of the Medellin and Cali cartels in the early 1990s is estimated at 400. Less
hierarchical than their two notorious predecessors, they are not interested in or capable of
controlling the entire drug chain within Colombia. They frequently specialize in a
particular component of the drug traffic while subcontracting other services to other
criminal business groups or individuals.
Great tensions and internal fighting between the paramilitaries and the cartels
existed already before the destruction of the cartels. In fact, a faction of paramilitaries
headed by Fidel Castafio was greatly instrumental in the destruction of the Medellin
cartel. After Pablo Escobar escaped from his specially-constructed and luxurious prison,
La Catedral near Medellin, in 1992, Fidel Castafio, nicknamed Rambo, organized a
186 Castaflo has not been seen since. International Crisis Group (January 27, 2005): 17.
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paramilitary group with the task of eliminating Escobar and his close associates, the
PEPES (Los Perseguidospor Pablo Escobar or People Prosecuted by Pablo Escobar).
The Cali cartel also contributed an estimated $50 million to the PEPES to pay informers
and assassins and buy weapons to hunt down Escobar.' 87 The PEPES did kill forty of
Escobar's people, gave evidence on about six of the Medellin cartel members, and
destroyed several of Escobar's properties, including his car park worth $5 million.'88 Far
from having morphed into a unified actor with identical goals, some paramilitary groups
and some of the traffickers fought each other. Ironically, Escobar made a temporary
alliance with the leftist guerrilla, Ejdrcito de Liberaci6n Popular (Popular Liberation
Army or EPL), and hired them for his protection.
In short, even when the power of the paramilitaries was considerably smaller and
they were not an actor fully independent from the drug traffickers, there was discord,
disunity, and major infighting between the paramilitaries and the traffickers. Even then,
the unity thesis of the conventional view did not accurately describe the nature of the
relationship. Since then, the infighting and factionalization has only increased.
VII. Destruction of the Medellin and Cali Cartels: Political Capital Without Ideology
In addition to enabling the expansion of the paramilitaries and shedding light on
the unity hypothesis of the conventional view, the destruction of the two notorious drug
cartels of Cali and Medellin illuminates how, in the context of poverty, the illicit
economy does generate political capital for those who become positively involved in it
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7 Kirk: 156.
8ss Kline (1999): 137.
even if they do not hold a clear political ideology. One frequent claim of the conventional
view is that belligerent groups lose popular legitimacy and support when they abandon
their ideology or the ideology becomes unappealing. Consequently, the theory would
predict that criminal elements without a clear ideology, such as the drug traffickers,
would not have any political capital. My theory, on the other hand, predicts that even
actors that lack a political ideology will be able to derive political capital from clever
positive involvement in illicit economies.
First, the cocaine boom of the 1980s -- although ultimately having negative
repercussions on the Colombian economy by driving exchange rate lower, increasing
inflation, encouraging real estate speculation, and undermining trust of legal investors8"'
--- cushioned the impact of the economic crisis in Colombia for many of the poor. In the
early 1980s, Medellin's textile economy collapsed because of competition from Asia, the
unemployment rate surpassed those of other cities, many businesses went bankrupt, and
poverty was widespread. But the cocaine economy brought hundreds of millions of
dollars into Medellin, stimulating a new miniboom in construction and other sectors, and
considerably reduced Medellin's unemployment rate, generating 28,000 in Medellin in
1987 alone.' 90
Second, participating in the illicit industry became a means of advancing through
a closed social system and achieving social mobility. Many of the capos came from poor
backgrounds, and they became a symbol of how to make quick money as well as become
'89 For the negative impact of large illicit economies on the licit economy, see, for example, Reina, and
Thoumi (2003).
'90 Lee (1989): 36.
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cultural icons.191 As Mary Rold~n put it, the drug trade became a vehicle for Medellin's
least powerful to contest the distribution of power and economic privilege in an otherwise
exclusionary system. 192
Third, many of the major traffickers, especially those associated with the
Medellin cartel, systematically tried to build up their political capital by investing in
various social projects and organizing social services. Pablo Escobar and Rodriguez
Gacha sponsored public projects in poor neighborhoods, such as building sports facilities,
hospitals, and schools, planting trees, and organizing sewer repairs. Under his slogan
"Medellin Without Slums," Escobar built 450 to 500 two-bedroom cement-block houses
in a Medellin slum that became known as "Barrio Pablo Escobar." Escobar also reputedly
donated a church to the town of Doradal in the Middle Magdalena Valley. Escobar made
sure that his services to the community were well advertised in the newspaper he owned,
Medellin Civico. Its articles contrasted Escobar's generosity with the selfishness of
Colombia's traditional elite. Similarly, when spending his thirteen months in his prison
La Catedral in his hometown of Envigado, Escobar donated large sums of money for
public education, school transportation, and the most extensive water and sewer system
services in the country.' 93 Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha donated an outdoor basketball court
to his hometown of Pacho and repaired the city-hall's fa9ade. Carlos Lehder organized
and funded a major earthquake relief effort in the city of Popayan and built a housing
project for the poor in his native city of Armenia. 194 Moreover, as noted earlier, the
191 For an excellent discussion of the socio-economic and cultural dimensions of the cocaine trade in
Medellin during the 1980s and early 1990s, see Mary Roldin, "Colombia: Cocaine and the "Miracle' of
Modernity," in Paul Gootenberg, ed., Cocaine: Global Histories (London: Routledge, 1999): 165-182.
192 Ibid.: 174.
'19 Lee and Clawson: 112. See also, Bruce M. Bagley, "Dateline Drug Wars: Colombia: The Wrong
Strategy," Foreign Policy, 77, Winter 1989: 160-1.
194 Ibid.: 5.
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Medellin cartel traffickers underwrote the paramilitaries' social services in Puerto
Boyaca's paramilitary stronghold of ACDEGAM. All these handouts, of course, came at
the price of extraordinary violence, with Medellin having the highest murder rate of any
city in the world in 1988, with a homicide committed every three hours.'95
Several of the traffickers also attempted to capitalize on their political capital and
generate further political power by getting elected to various government positions and
creating their own political parties. In 1982, Escobar ran on the Liberal Party ticket for
the Colombian House of Representatives. On a joint ticket with Jairo Ortega, Escobar
was elected as alternate representative for the Antioquia seat. Lara Bonilla, whom
Escobar arranged to have assassinated in 1984, blocked Escobar's further political
ambitions within the Liberal Party.
Similarly, after earlier unsuccessful attempts to win a seat in the national senate
and Bogota' municipal council, Lehder created a neofascist political party, Movimiento
Civico Latino Nacional (MCLN).' 96 In addition to promoting a Nazi agenda and
opposing communism, Zionism, neoimperialism, and neocolonialism, the party
vehemently opposed extradition of traffickers to the United States (in fact, Lehder
admitted that was the main purpose of creating the party) and advocated the legalization
of marijuana for personal use, and the protection of Colombia's natural resources.197
Lehder's campaign style consisted of trucking people from villages to his rallies, blasting
disco music, and handing out money to attendees. In 1984, his party managed to win 12
percent of the regional electorate in Quindio, which translated into 2 out of 13 deputy
'95 Clutterbuck: 60.
196 See, also, Craig.
197 Lee (1989): 136-7. See also, Jorge Eliecer Orozco, Lehder ... El Hombre (BogotA: Plaza y Janes, 1987):
57-60, 162-85.
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seats in the departmental assembly, as well as 11 seats in various city councils."98 The
success of the party was enhanced by the collapse of the coffee economy in Quindio,
which made the thousands of unemployed people more susceptible to Lehder's cash
handouts. MCLN's two deputies managed to persuade Quindio's assembly to pass a
resolution condemning extradition. When coffee harvest rebounded, Lehder was on the
run and his party lost in the March 1986 elections, not winning any representation in the
departmental assembly.
Finally, Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha was apparently the brain behind the creation of
MORENA, a political branch of the paramilitary's ACDEGAM group. MORENA
attempted to win votes in the Middle Magdalena Valley regional elections to promote the
paramilitaries' and traffickers' conservative agenda and oppose concessions to the
guerrillas. The party disappeared after Rodriguez Gacha's death in 1989.
The creation of the illicit narcotics economy and its use by the traffickers to
provide social service did result in their obtaining political capital. Escobar and others
were widely praised for their generosity by the poor.' 99 To Medellin urban destitute, the
traffickers were benefactors and employers, whose criminal background could be
overlooked. Especially during the period of economic downturn, Lehder's party did
reasonably well. At the same time, however, the new drug business elite was very
threatening to the traditional Colombian elite. The traffickers did not share the values of
the old guard to whom the traffickers were vulgar thugs. And now the thugs were also
attempting to acquire legitimate political power.
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'9' Lee (1989): 137.
'99 Ibid.: 116.
In the late 1980s, the Colombian government once again authorized a policy of
extradition of drug traffickers. 200 The Medellin cartel traffickers unleashed extraordinary
levels of violence.201 Under indictment, the traffickers created an association, Los
Extraditables, and initiated what Escobar called an all-out war against the Colombian
states. Scores of journalists and judges were assassinated or threatened, paralyzing the
judicial system.202 Politicians, especially those embracing extradition, were equally
targeted. The Medellin cartel assassinated the Liberal Party presidential candidate Luis
Carlos Galin, a strong supporter of extradition and the man who disqualified Escobar
from participating in the 1990 presidential elections, along with four other presidential
candidates.203 The traffickers also resorted to indiscriminate violence, placing bombs in
Bogotai and other cities, and attacking hotels, banks, and political offices. One bomb
destroyed the building of the Department of Administrative Security (DAS), killing 100
people. A bomb aboard an Avianca flight between Bogota' and Cali killed 119.204
In response, the Colombian government extradited more than twenty suspected
drug traffickers to the United States between August 1989 and December 1990 and
200 The traffickers' confrontation over Colombia's 1979 extradition treaty first came to a head in the mid-
1980s, when the traffickers offered in exchange for amnesty from prosecution to pay Colombia's external
debt, dismantle their cocaine factories and trafficking networks, and repatriate their off-shore assets, and
thus to inject $3 billion into the Colombian economy a year. Their proposal was rejected by the Colombian
government, resulting in the traffickers' unleashing the first wave of terror. For details, see, MacDonald
(1989): 40-3; and Craig (1985): 117. Lehder was the first to be extradited to the United States.
201 The Cali cartel was considerably more restrained in its use of violence or its effort to achieve visible
political power. Its kingpin Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela remarked that unlike the Medellin cartel, the Cali
cartel did not kill judges and others, but bought them. Cited in Thoumi (2003): 203. The Cali cartel also
perfected a "support your local police" policy, not only putting large numbers of officers on its payroll, but
also helping rid the city of social "undesirables."
202 242 judges were killed between 1981 and 1991, and many were forced into exile abroad to avoid
assassination. The judicial process has never quite fully recovered. See, for example, Marcella: 14-5, and
"Colombia's Court Reform," Economist, January 8, 2005.203 McLean: 128.
204 The Medellin cartel also attempted to buy 120 Stinger missiles in Florida in April 1990, but its effort
was foiled by the FBI.
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seized $125 million of their assets.205 Jose Gonzales Rodriguez Gacha was shot by the
police in December 1989. The administration of President Cesar Gaviria finally caved in
in 1991 and negotiated a surrender policy with most of the Medellin cartel's traffickers in
exchange for light sentences. Escobar turned himself in, on condition that he would be
placed in a special prison to be constructed by him near Medellin.206 For thirteen months,
Escobar stayed in the prison, continuing to conduct his drug business from there and even
leaving the prison on occasion. Ultimately, Escobar escaped the prison and was shot in
1993 on the rooftops of Medellin thanks to a large-scale law enforcement operation
facilitated by intelligence from the Cali cartel207 and Los PEPES.
One of the crucial manifestations of the traffickers' political capital was the lack
of intelligence provided by the local population on the capos to law enforcement officials.
Although the paramilitaries ratted on the traffickers and the traffickers ratted on each
other, ordinary people never betrayed Escobar to the police and Escobar moved freely
through the various Medellin neighborhoods and the areas around his estates.2°8 They
maintained their silence despite the fact that a private anti-Escobar group, Colombia
Libre, offered a $5 million reward for Escobar's head and the Colombian government
was offering $7 million, and despite the fact that Escobar was on the run and
progressively more and more powerless. In fact, in the poor barrios, Escobar's political
205 Clawson and Lee: 99. For a detailed account of law enforcement operation against Escobar, see Mark
Bowden, Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World's Greatest Outlaw (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press,
2001).
206 In addition to equipping his jail with various luxuries, Escobar also participated in the selection of his
own prison guards.
207 The Cali cartel, and specifically its capo, Londoflo, had already attempted to kill Escobar during the
1980s. Between 1992 and 1993, the Cali cartel hired as informers scores of Escobar's subordinates as well
Japanese communications experts to track Escobar down.
208 Gabriel Garcia-Marquez, News of a Kidnapping (New York: Penguin Books, 1998). For a while after
his escape from La Catedral, Escobar arranged for the provision of false information, having about a
hundred people call in different information on his location every day.
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capital lasted even after his death. Instead of being remembered as a brutal thuggish
terrorist who killed countless people, bombed city buildings, and organized an all-out-
war against the Colombian state, he was remembered as the man who distributed money
and groceries to the poor and who built soccer stadiums.209 Contrary to the predictions of
the conventional view and supporting my theory, even purely nonideological criminal
organizations were able to use the illicit economy to build up political capital.
The demise of the Medellin cartel temporarily left the Cali cartel to dominate the
drug trade in Colombia and the Western Hemisphere. In 1994, however, telephone
conversation tapes made public revealed that the presidential campaign of the recently-
elected Ernesto Samper was heavily funded by donations from the Cali cartel. Samper
became widely criticized at home and a persona nongrata in Washington, which denied
him visas to come to the United States. Relations between BogotAi and Washington
reached a long-time low.210 To clear his name and curry favor with the United States,
Samper aborted the negotiations initiated by the Cali capos with the Colombian
government in 1993 and put major pressure on the Cali cartel.211 With the help of U.S.
intelligence, Gilberto Rodriguez and Josd Santa Cruz Londofio were arrested, and other
top members of the cartel turned themselves in.212 The demise of the two large cartels
resulted in the emergence of Colombia's many boutique cartels and allowed Mexican
trafficking organizations to come to dominate the drug trade in the Western Hemisphere.
209 RoldAn: 175.
210 For details on U.S. decision-making on Colombia during that period, see Russell Crandall, Driven by
Drugs: U.S. Policy Toward Colombia (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002). On March 31, 1997, the U.S.
government formally decertified Colombia.
211 See, Thoumi (2003); 210-225.
212 Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela was extradited to the United States in 2004.
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VIII. ELN -- Extortion and Drugs: Testing the Effect of the Character of Illicit
Economy Factor
A fifth major belligerent group in Colombia, the Ejircito de Liberaci6n Nacional
(National Liberation Army or ELN), also interacted with two illicit economies: extortion
and the illicit narcotics economy. The ELN first became positively involved in the labor-
non-intensive extortion of oil companies. At the same time, it adopted a mixture of non-
involvement and negative involvement toward the labor-intensive illicit narcotics
economy. Since the state of the overall economy was poor, traffickers present, and the
government's policy was suppression of the illicit economies, 213 my theory of political
capital of illicit economies predicts that this mixture of noninvolvement and negative
involvement in the illicit narcotics economy on the part of the ELN belligerents will
result in the inability of the belligerents to generate political capital and obtain support
from the population. This lack of political capital will not be offset by the group's
positive involvement in the labor-non-intensive extortion racket, which even in the
absence of ELN's suppression efforts toward the narcotics economy would be predicted
to generate only small political capital.
A leftist guerrilla group, the ELN emerged in 1965. It was inspired by the Cuban
revolution and drew on Christian Liberation Theology. It sought to end economic
exploitation in Colombia and advocated economic redistribution. Its membership include
urban working class and labor unions, peasants, middle class, Catholic radicals, left-wing
intellectuals, and students. It espoused thefoco model, believing that a small core of
213 The government's policy toward the extortion racket was to protect the companies and prevent
kidnapping even though the government was rather ineffective. Its policy toward the narcotics economy
was eradication.
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guerrillas could initiate guerrilla warfare and inspire revolution, without first creating a
large-scale political organization and party.
The ELN's original areas of operation were the northern departments of Bolivar,
Antioquia, and Santander (which the group considered a Colombian version of Fidel
Castro's stronghold in Cuba). Failing to generate both political support and physical
resources, the ELN failed to mount military operations of any consequences and spent the
most of its military energies conducting internal purges. Several commanders who
wanted to escape a revolutionary execution during these purges turned themselves in, and
provided the army with intelligence that allowed it to capture a large number of ELN
members by the end of 1960s.2 14
Until the mid-1980s, the group was thus barely surviving. In the mid-1980s,
guerrilla priest Manuel Pdrez unified the remainders of the group and revived its military
capabilities by getting it positively involved in the extortion business. Perez made the
extortion of oil companies, located in areas of ELN operation - Santander, Arauc', and
Casanare - the ELN's main source of income, supplementing it by the extortion of other
large businesses. 2 15 Although since then the ELN has periodically blown up various of
Colombia's pipelines "to prevent the theft of Colombia's national resources by foreign
multinationals" and promote its anti-imperialist agenda, causing hundreds-of-millions of
dollars worth of damages per year,216 it has generated large income by kidnapping oil
214 Rabasa and Chalk: 30; Guti6rrez Sanin (2004): 263. For a good overview, see Carlos Medina Gallego,
El ELN: Una historia contada a dos voces (Bogoti: Rodriguez Quito: 1996).
215 Sanchez G. (2001): 24. Some of ELN's kidnappings have not been for profit simply, but also to generate
attention to itself and attract global media coverage, such as its hostage-taking of Avianca jetliner in
Bucaramanga in April 1999 and of a church congregation in southern Cali on May 30, 1999.
216 The FARC has also blown up the oil pipelines. In 2001 alone, the two groups staged 170 attacks against
the Cafio-Lim6n pipeline. See, Guiqueta: 85. Since the mid-1990s, the ELN does not oppose foreign
investment in Colombia's economy, but demands that their participation be limited and equitable. It
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executives and demanding ransom. Once its extortion activities got fully under way, the
group was able to bring in $150-$200 million a year in the early and mid-1990s. 217 The
group was thus able to expand its physical resources, growing from less than 500
guerrillas in 1979 to about 3,000-5,000 in 1998.218 Many of its troops, however, lacked
rigorous training and were part-time. They were not particularly adept at direct military
combat, concentrating mainly on isolated spectacular actions.2 19 Nonetheless, as its
membership grew through the oil rents, the ELN was also able to expand geographically
into Cauca, Huila, and Boyaci.
For religious reasons the ELN exhibited great reluctance to enter the drug
business.220 In 1996, the group prohibited the peasants in Sierrania de San Lucas from
growing coca and demanded that they destroy the crops, causing widespread
resentment.221 Because it was involved in a labor-non-intensive illicit economy -
extortion of oil companies -- its popular support remained limited. It could not offer
employment to the rural population in the areas under its control, even though it could
distribute some of the extortion profits in the form of social services. It forced the MNCs
to invest in health, education, water, and sewage in the areas where the companies
operated. It also forced the MNCs to hire some of the area's residents. 222 After the 1994
National Law of Royalties established the return of a large portion of the oil rents to the
advocates nationalization of oil resources, land reform, and development of scientific and technical
knowledge. For a detail list of demands, see L6pez Montafio and Garcia Duran: 152-53.
217 Richani: 86. In 2001, insurance companies routinely paid $1 million per kidnapping victim.
218 Ibid: 85; Rabasa and Chalk: 30-33.
219 Rangel Suarez (1998): 12.
220 Pearce: 283.
221 Author's interviews in Colombia, Fall 2005. See, Sergio Uribe, "Los cultivos ilicitos en Colombia," in
Francisco Thoumi, ed., Drogas ilicitas en Colombia: su impacto econdmico, politico y social (Bogota:
PNUD-DNE, 1997): 35-133.
222 Steve Wienberg, Armand Hammer The Untold Story (New York: 1989): 264-68.
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regions, the ELN has also extorted regional governments as well as attempted to
influence how the oil rents are spent.223
However, the social services organized through the redistribution of oil rents and
the limited employment in the oil companies that the ELN was able to extract for a few
individuals here and there did not generate the same benefits for the local population as
did the illicit narcotics economy. Nor did it fully offset the popular resentment generated
by ELN's prohibition of coca cultivation. By 1998, the ELN thus was unable to compete
with the FARC in attracting support. It was also unable to resist the paranmilitaries' and
the armed forces' military attacks or compete with the FARC in combat.224 Its political
capital was stagnating, and the group suffered serious military defeats.225
By the late 1990s, the ELN leadership came to the conclusion that if it wanted
remain at all competitive with the other belligerent groups, it needed to emulate their
drug practices. After Perez's death in December 1997, those in the ELN who argued for a
"pragmatic" approach toward the illicit narcotics economy -- i.e., tapping into the drug
trade -- prevailed.226 The group became positively involved in the illicit narcotic
economy, and drugs now generate about 20 percent of its income.227 While it still denies
that it extracts rents from the narcotraffickers themselves,228 at minimum, it provides
protection to around 3000 coca peasants in south Bolivar and North Santander and taxes
them for its protection services. It rescinded its prohibitionist policy. Even in the regions
where it did not appear to tax illicit crop cultivation, such as in the municipality of San
223 Guiqueta: 84-5.
224 The FARC and ELN have frequently fought each other over territory and resources.
225 lsacson (2003): 11; Richani: 62.
226 Rangel Suirez (1998): 12, 61-3.
227 Sanchez G. (2001): 24. See also, Eduardo Pizarro Leong6mez, Una democracia asediada (Bogota:
Norma, 2004): 185.
228 Thoumi (2003): 283.
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Sebastian in southern Cauca, it tolerated the cultivation of opium poppy, even if
controlling what drug dealers were allowed to come into the region to buy the opium
latex.229
Consistent with its effort to generate political capital by becoming positively
involved in the illicit narcotics economy, the ELN argues for crop substitution in
Colombia and demands reduction of demand abroad as the means to reduce the drug
economy.230 True to its national liberation credo, the ELN has also attempted to reap
political capital from its positive involvement in the narcotics economy by condemning
foreign interference in Colombia's counternarcotics policies and opposing extradition.
However, the ELN's embrace of the illicit narcotics economy came too late. Its
positive involvement in extortion activities did not generate large-scale political capital
and its prohibition on the narcotics economy generated resentment. In addition, the group
failed to acquire other sources of political capital, and it appears that the ELN does not
have any substantial political support anywhere. Thus, in 2000, when the ELN was
engaged in negotiations with the Colombian government to obtain a demilitarized zone
like the FARC did in 1998, at least 15,000 residents of the area protested vigorously
against the plan.231 By contrast, the residents of FARC's demilitarized zone had generally
welcomed its creation in 1998. Obviously, the population in ELN controlled areas did not
believe that the ELN could improve their lives and provide them with benefits.
Ultimately, the ELN did not get the demilitarized zone.
As predicted by my theory of political capital of illicit economies, although the
ELN was able to obtain physical resources from its participation in the extortion racket of
229 International Crisis Group (January 27, 2005): 18.
230 Statements by the ELN reprinted in Berquist, Pefiaranda, Snichez G., eds.: 244-5.
231 Rochlin: 127.
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oil companies, this labor-non-intensive illicit economy failed to generate large political
capital for the group. Moreover, and again consistent with the predictions of my theory,
this capital was insufficient to offset the losses of political capital generated by its
prohibition of and noninvolvement in the illicit narcotics economy. Thus, although the
ELN was able to grow in terms of its military capabilities, it failed to build up a support
base. Although the ELN ultimately concluded that it needed to become positively
involved in the illicit narcotics economy, it changed its policy too late in the late 1990s.
By that time, it was already under large military pressure from the paramilitaries and the
armed forces as well as the FARC, and by then the FARC had long provided protection
services to the illicit narcotics economy, outbidding the ELN in the competition for
political support of the rural population.
IX. FARC's Elimination of Intermediaries: Testing the Effects of the Amplifying
Factor "Presence of Traffickers"
Following the destruction of the Medellin and Cali cartels, FARC's expansion
during the 1990s, and its consolidation of control over many drug regions, the FARC
progressively eliminated many small traffickers and intermediaries between the peasants
and the boutique cartels.232 This decision on the FARC's part was not only facilitated by
the vulnerability of the boutique cartels, but also stimulated by the expansion of the
paramilitaries who were frequently identical to the traffickers. Frequently, if the FARC
232 Author's interviews in Colombia, Fall 2005. See, also Thoumi (2003): 238, and, "The World
Geopolitics of Drugs, 1998/1999: Annual Report," Geopolitical Drug Observer, April 2000: 143,
http://www.ogd.org, downloaded February 15, 2003. Obviously, the elimination of the traffickers is not a
completely uniform development since many of the front commanders have considerable autonomy.
Moreover, FARC's loses of control over some territories - to the AUC or the military -- at least temporarily
allow the return of traffickers. Nonetheless, the elimination of small and medium traffickers by the FARC
in the regions under its control has been a trend since the mid/late 1990s.
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had allowed the traffickers to come in, it would have been allowing the paramilitaries to
be coming in. Other factors being equal - poverty, labor-intensive illicit economy, and
eradication -- my theory predicts that, with the traffickers removed, the FARC should
experience losses in political capital.
Since the FARC displaced the small and medium drug traffickers who used to
deal with the peasants from the territory under its control, its provision of regulation and
protection services to the peasants weakened. Instead of raising prices for coca leaves
and coca paste, the FARC now imposes prices on the coca peasants, having monopsony
in its areas.233 The FARC also forced all farmers to sell only to the local FARC front. The
FARC also came to oppose alternative development projects in various areas and set
obstacles to road-building projects and communications construction to prevent the
government's presence.234
There are increasing reports that the FARC is now forcing peasants in various
areas to grow coca or poppy.235 For example, since the government launched Plan
Patriota, a major military offensive against the FARC (described below), the peasants in
the Caqueta and Putumayo reported that the FARC made everyone grow drugs (though
insisting that they also grow subsistence crops as insurance in case of eradication), even
landing money to farmers to be paid with proceeds from the following year's harvest.236
Various indigenous groups have also been reporting that the FARC forces them to grow
coca, despite their resistance. 237 Of course, reporting to authorities and journalists that
233 Author's interviews in Colombia, Fall 2005.
234 Uribe (1997).
235 Until at least the mid-1990s, such evidence was lacking. See, for example, Richani: 99.
236 International Crisis Group (January 27, 2005).
237 See, for example, Juan Forero, "Colombian Conflict Spills into Indians' Perfect World," New York
Times, May 02, 2005; and Indira Lakshmanan, "Still Battling for Survival," Boston Globe, November 16,
2004.
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they are forced to grow drugs is the best strategy for the peasants to minimize their role
as "criminals," and hence may not be completely accurate.238 Nonetheless, the frequency
of reports that the FARC actually forced the peasants to be growing drugs seems to be
increasing. To the extent the reports are accurate, the FARC's policy of forcing peasants
may have to do with Tirofijo's announcement in the late 1990s that the front commanders
were from then on responsible for their own financing. One of the consequences of this
announcement was a change in FARC's kidnapping tactics: while prior to the
announcement, the FARC concentrated mainly on prominent and relatively well-off
persons as kidnapping targets, after the announcement the group came to practice
"fishing trips," organizing roadblocks and capturing any traveler from any strata of
society and demanding ransom even from the poor. 239
The FARC also cannot provide protection to the cocaleros against the traffickers'
brutality since it had displaced the traffickers and now it does not have anyone against
whom to provide protection services. In fact, the FARC itself has become considerably
more brutal, including possibly in terms of forcing some peasants to grow coca. First of
all, it de facto subjected the peasants' to the brutality of the paramilitaries in the late
1990s since it failed to protect them against the AUC's massacres and instead frequently
chose to avoid military encounters with the paramilitaries. The group has clearly
preferred to preserve soldiers over keeping territory,240 but thus sacrificing its political
capital. Second, the FARC itself came to commit more atrocities. One method that has
238 In fact, Colombian experts maintain that in the case of indigenous groups, for example, there is a great
variation in the groups' attitudes toward the cultivation of illicit crops, and many do so voluntarily, since
coca represents the most reliable subsistence crop. Author's interviews in Colombia, Fall 2005.
239 Kirk: 66-7.
240 Francisco Guti6rrez Sanin, "Diverging Paths: Comparing Responses to Insurgent Challenges in
Colombia and Perii," Paper for the Crisis States Centre, London School of Economics, 2006, author's copy.
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resulted in large civilian casualties and generated a lot of resentment is the use of gas
cylinder bombs made out of a propane tank, nails, dynamite, and a launching tube.
Although easy to make, it has no accuracy and frequently kills scores of civilians. In May
2002, the guerrillas launched it against a church in Bellavista, Antioquia, where refugees
were hiding. The bomb killed 119 people (including 40 children) and injured another
98.241 Although at least until their demobilization in 2005-6, the AUC continued to kill
many more civilians than the FARC, the level of civilian casualties caused by the FARC
has been rising. 242 The increasing brutality is undermining the FARC's legitimacy.
A final fascinating development in the changes of FARC's management of the
drug economy in areas under its control has been the increasing cooperation between the
FARC and the AUC with respect to the drug trade. Although in many regions, such as
Putumayo and Catatumbo, vicious fighting over the control of the trade and the
cultivation territory continued in the 2000s, in some regions, such as the Serrania de San
Lucas, there appeared to be at least tacit coexistence between the two belligerent groups.
The leftist guerrillas there controlled the cultivation areas. The AUC controlled the rivers,
and hence transportation of both coca paste and precursor agents. Yet smuggling out of
these regions continued.243 This could have only happened if the two groups were in a
tacit collusion. When in February 2004, the Colombian military captured "Sonia," chief
financial officer of the FARC's Southern Bloc, they found e-mails on her laptop
requesting that the AUC lend a helicopter to "transport arms and drugs through the
jungle." 2" Since then Colombian authorities interdicted joint shipments of drugs,
241 Marcella: 22-5, and Kirk: 68-9.
242 Restrepo, Spagat. and Vargas (2004).
243 Author's interviews in Colombia, Fall 2005. See, International Crisis Group (January 27, 2005): 20.
244 Isacson (2005): 4.
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belonging to AUC, the FARC, and independent traffickers, including the biggest ever
shipment of drugs containing 15 tons of cocaine.245
The elimination of the drug intermediaries, FARC's increasing brutality, and its
lack of interest to find a negotiated solution to the civil war during its peace negotiations
with President Andrds Pastrana 246 led to a serious decline in the FARC's political capital.
As the difference between the FARC's and AUC's brutality has decreased and as the
FARC now also does not provide extra regulation services for the illicit economy, the
difference in political capital of the two groups has also shrunk. When the paramilitaries
took over a FARC territory in the 2000s, the local population not only did not resist, but
was frequently rather willing to easily tranfer its support.247 As Francisco Gutierrez Sanin
mentions, "the civilian support for [the FARC] - in particular the network of specialists
in mass organization and mobilization - frequently switch side, sometimes with
245 Ibid. In taking advantage of joint transportation, the AUC and the FARC are behaving in the same way
that the early traffickers and Medellin and Cali cartels behaved. Although rivals, the cartels frequently
shared the same transportation to minimize transportation costs and distribute the risk and costs of seizure.
246 On January 9, 1999, the government of President Andr6s Pastrana began disarmament negotiations with
the FARC. The talks collapsed on February 20, 2002, after which the FARC initiated a new offensive. As a
gesture of good will, Pastrana gave the FARC a large demobilized area, zona de despeje, which the
government vacated and which became a de facto FARC state. Although this decision has been widely
criticized as a critical mistake on the part of the Colombian government, it needs to be noted that the
government had no real control over the area to start with and was largely absent from there. During the
fitful negations, neither the government nor the FARC presented any serious negotiating options with any
substantive meat. Most of the discussions ultimately were about discussion procedures. The FARC
particularly showed itself extraordinarily stubborn, encouraged by its military strength at the time.
Moreover, the paramilitaries were not engaged in similar negotiations, and the FARC clearly feared that
after its demobilization, the paramilitaries would attempt to kill the guerrillas out, like they had done with
the UP in the 1980s. The Pastrana government also committed mistakes. Pastrana never mobilized the
support of the Colombian landowning and business class behind the negotiations, nor, critically, did he
obtain the support of the Colombian military. See, for example, Isacson (2003). In my interviews with
Colombian security experts, many believed that Pastrana exploited the negotiations for political/ electoral
purposes, rather than having an actual negotiating plan. See also, Thoumi (2003): 229. The FARC's failure
to participate seriously in the negotiations clearly discredited the FARC both in the eyes of the Colombian
professional elite and in the eyes of the international community. It is less clear how much its behavior at
the negotiating table actually discredited the FARC in the eyes of the rural population. The rural population
clearly wants peace, but the government was not proposing any serious reforms to address their other
concerns.
247 Author's interviews in Colombia, Fall 2005.
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astonishing suppleness."248 When the FARC retakes territory, the population switches its
support back to the FARC.
The loss of the FARC's political capital is tellingly revealed by the difference in
the group's ability to organize physical support from the cocalero community between
1996 and 2001. In both case, the FARC attempted to organize cocalero demonstrations to
oppose eradication. In 1996, it succeeded in organizing massive protests, with between
150,000 and 200,000 participating. The event was overwhelmingly interpreted as
indication of the FARC's impressive social base. FARC's effort in 2001 showed a
substantial decline in its political capital. The group ordered a stop to commercial and
transport activity, but the blockade received little voluntary cooperation from the local
population and was suspended without results after 70 days. 249
Clearly, as predicted by my theory, the FARC has experienced major losses of
political capital in the recent years after it eliminated drug traffickers from the territories
under its control and hence could not provide the same level of protection and regulation
services it did when traffickers were present. Although the decline in the group's political
capital cannot be attributed solely to the absence of traffickers (its increasing brutality has
played a significant role in reducing its political capital), the decline of the peasants'
support in the coca regions and their willingness to transfer support to the even more
brutal paramilitaries and then back to the FARC when the group retakes the territory is
indicative of the negative effect of the absence of traffickers on the FARC's political
capital. The FARC obviously provides no more benefits to the local population now than
do the paramilitaries under whose rule the traffickers were frequently absent all along.
248 Guti6rrez Sanin (2004): 270.
249 International Crisis Group (January 27, 2005): 12.
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Nor does the competition in brutality explain the FARC's loss of support. The
allegiance as function of brutality theory argues that the more brutal belligerent group
should be able to extract greater political support. Although this argument could explain
why the population switches support to the AUC, it cannot explain why the population
then switches support back to the FARC although the FARC is clearly less brutal than the
AUC. Nor does it explain why the FARC enjoyed greater support than the paramilitaries
prior to the mid-1990s when the FARC was considerably less brutal than the AUC.250
Clearly, in the eyes of the population, the AUC is no worse or no better now than the
FARC. What has equalized - downwards -- is the scope of protection and regulation
services the two groups provide to the cocaleros.
FARC's failure to reach a negotiated settlement with Pastrana and its participation
in the drug trade, especially its elimination of small and medium traffickers and its
increasing cooperation with the AUC in its drug operations, have led many experts to
argue that the FARC is no more than a cartel, that it no longer retains any political goals
or ideology, and that it has no interest in reaching any negotiated settlement.25' The
FARC became the poster profit-motivated thugs of the conventional view.252
Others have objected that the FARC still retains some political goals. It is still
committed to issues of political, economic, and social reform, such as land reform, rural
250 This was detailed in earlier sections of the chapter.
251 Author's interviews with U.S. and Colombian government officials, Washington, DC, Summer and Fall
2004. See, for example, Marcella; and Buscaglia and Ratliff.
252 One of the first people to talk about the FARC as a drug cartel without any political goals was Colonel
Luis Alberto Villamarin Pulido, whose book, El Cartel de las FARC (Bogota: Ediciones Luis Villamarin
Pulido, 1996), was widely circulated among government officials and military commanders in Bogota and
Washington. See also, lan Bannon and Paul Collier, eds., Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options
andActions (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2003); and Vinay Jawahar, "Turning Point in Colombia:
Rapporteur's Report," Colombia Working Group, Interamerican Dialogue, June 2004,
http://www.thedialogue.org/publications/2005/spring/2004AnnualReport.pdf, downloaded August 13,
2004.
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development, and more inclusive social participation.25 3 Moreover, power and the
process of struggle -- waging war for war's sake -- have become important goals in of
themselves.254 Gutibrrez Sanin has persuasively shown that participation in the drug
economy is still a means to power for the guerrillas, not for personal enrichment as would
be the case of ordinary traffickers: With few exceptions, neither the commanders nor the
troops live ostentatiously. Money derived from the drug trade still goes toward the war
effort. Guerrillas join for life and cannot enjoy their profits, and yet there have been very
few desertions from the FARC. Motivations for joining the FARC (the vast majority of
recruitment is voluntary) cover a wide range, including revenge and a sense of
community, but do not predominantly center on making money.255 Overall, the available
evidence indicates that the FARC still wants power, and that drugs are means to power,
not simply to money.
Although ascertaining the FARC's motivations for continuing to fight does have
real implications for the ability of the government to negotiate a solution, it has fewer
implications for whether or not the FARC still retains popular support. As shown in the
case of the cartels, even purely criminal groups, which the FARC as yet does not appear
to be, can frequently derive political capital from illicit economies. In fact, despite the
overall decline in the FARC's legitimacy, the guerrillas' protection of the peasants'
subsistence economy still continues to provide them with some political capital. In fact,
some analysts argue that were it not for drugs, their legitimacy would be nonexistent.256
Indeed, the strongest bases of the FARC' s support continue to be the areas of drug
253 Chernick (2005): 201; and Ortiz: 131.
254 Chernick (2005): 201; Rabasa and Chalk: XV; Isacson (2003); and International Crisis Group (January
27, 2005): 6.
255 Guttierez Sanin (2004).
256 Carpenter: 70.
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cultivation.257 Although the FARC's elimination of small and medium traffickers
diminished its political capital, given that the other amplifying factors continue to be
poverty, labor-intensive illicit economy, and eradication, its positive involvement in the
illicit economy still generates political capital for the FARC.
X. Eradication: Testing the Effect of Government Response to the Illicit Economy
The case of Colombia does not allow for a full evaluation of the relative effect of
various government responses to the illicit economy since the policy has been one of
eradication since the late 1970s. Nonetheless, eradication has varied in intensity,
increasing especially in the mid-1990s and then again in the 2000s under Plan Colombia,
thus allowing for at least a partial test. More importantly, the case of Colombia is ideal
for evaluating the central claim of the conventional view that eradication will bankrupt
belligerents and paralyze the insurgency. Nowhere else has eradication been so consistent
and intense. If eradication should succeed anywhere in bankrupting the belligerents as the
conventional view maintains, it should be in Colombia. Contrary to the conventional
view, my theory predicts that eradication will not result in substantial decreases of the
belligerents' physical resources, but will increase their political capital, resulting among
other things in a poor provision of intelligence to the Colombian military by the local
population.
In the mid-1990s, coca cultivation in Colombia experienced a major expansion.
Although cultivation of coca was taking place in the southern regions of Colombia since
the late 1970s, Peru and Bolivia nonetheless supplied Colombia's traffickers with the
257 See, for example, International Crisis Group( January 27, 2005). There is widespread consensus on this
among Colombia's experts. Based on author's interviews with more than thirty Colombia experts in the
United States and Colombia, Summer and Fall 2004 and Fall 2005.
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majority of coca leaf for processing into cocaine. The impetus for the major expansion of
the mid-1990s was the disruption of coca leaf supply from Peru and Bolivia under Air
Bridge (described in the previous chapter) and a large crisis of Colombia's licit
agricultural sector at the time. Partially caused by mishandled economic liberalization
policies and compounded by land seizures by the traffickers and paramilitaries, the
agricultural crisis left many rural workers jobless and destitute.25 8 Coca provided not only
the ideal, but frequently the sole source of livelihood. The area cultivated with coca
nearly doubled between 1990 and 1996, with 67,200 hectares sowed with coca that
year.259 The cultivation of coca, marijuana, and opium poppy thus spread to 27 out of
Colombia's 32 departments and 212 out of its 1,060 municipalities, with poppy
cultivation concentrated in the higher cooler regions of the departments of Tolima, Huila,
and Cauca.260 Coca alone was cultivated in at least 19 departments and 117
municipalities. Encouraged by the production declines in Bolivia and Peru and
disheartened by the balloon effect in Colombia, the United States applied major pressure
on Bogota to substantially increase its eradication efforts.
At the time, the Colombian military also started to accept Washington's view that
drugs were the center of strategy to end Colombia's violence. Until the mid-1990s, the
Colombian military was reluctant to participate in counternarcotics operations and see
drugs as the core of the problem. With close connections to the landed upper classes, the
army saw itself as the guarantor of stability after La Violencia, and its prime enemy was
the leftist guerrillas, especially the FARC as the strongest one of them. Although the
258 For details, see Guaqueta: 79-81.
259 Ibid.: 79.
260 About 70-80% of poppy cultivation took place in these three departments. See, Clawson and Lee: 16-7.
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military did not prevent the adoption of interdiction and eradication policies, 261 it did not
want to have to do anything with counternarcotics operations -- in its eyes, the job of the
police. For example, in 1988, Colombian Defense Minister Rafael Samuel Molina
observed (as quoted by Lee) that "The Army would have better results in the antiguerrilla
struggle if it were not tied down in counternarcotics operations." 262 And in 1992 the
military rejected a $2.8 million U.S. offer to set up army counterdrug units. 263
The army's reluctance was partially due to its tacit collusion with the
paramilitaries. The paramilitaries and the army occasionally fought alongside.264 The
paramilitaries could hold territory that the military was too thin to hold on its own. They
increased the numbers of available troops to combat the guerrillas. Crucially, however,
the army believed the paramilitaries could provide it with intelligence on the guerrillas
and their supporters.265 Wittily capturing the tacit, but at times uneasy and publicly
uncomfortable alliance between the army and the paramilitaries, a Colombian colonel
interviewed by Robin Kirk described the relationship as "the affair between a married
man and his mistress. One has one, but doesn't bring her home to meet your family." 266
Similarly, the army has on occasion cooperated with some of the major drug traffickers
261 The Colombian military has stayed out of political dispute, preserving its independence from both the
executive and legislative branches. At least until the presidency of Alvaro Uribe, it has exercised close to
absolute autonomy over national security and public order matters, including its budgets. At the same time,
it has not been shy in letting its preferences on policies be known, and has undertaken actions contradictory
to the interests and goals of the government. It opposed, for example, Betancfir's peace negotiations with
the M-19 and Pastrina's peace negotiations with the FARC. See, for example, Richani: 37-42.262 Interview with Molina in El Tiempo cited by Lee (1989): 215.
263 Kirk: 188.
264 See, Richani: 55, Pearse: 195, 240; and Human Rights Watch (1996).
265 Author's interviews in Colombia, Fall 2005. To reciprocate, the army has also provided intelligence to
the paramilitaries. Intelligence cooperation with the paramilitaries extended to other security agencies as
well. In October 2005, for example, information emerged that Colombia's secret police, the Administrative
Department of Security (or DAS), was deeply penetrated by spies of the paramilitaries and that its various
high officials were selling information to the paramilitaries. See, Juan Forero, "2 Top Directors Leave
Colombia's Secret Police as Scandal Mounts," New York Times, October 28, 2005.266 Kirk: 181.
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who eagerly fought the guerrillas and helped set up paramilitary groups, such as the
MAS.267 The army's overall strategy toward the insurgents was one of containment: keep
the guerrillas out of strategic military and economic areas and away from urban
centers. 268
By the mid-1990s, however, the Colombian army came to understand that its
embrace of counternarcotics operations would provide it with the badly needed U.S. aid.
Small in numbers, the Colombian military was also badly structured, with a heavy (6:1)
tail-to-tooth ratio. In 1997, for example, the combined number of soldiers in the navy, air
force, and army amounted to 131,000, with about only 22,000 professional soldiers,
deployed for defensive purposes or occasional incursions against the guerrillas. 269 With
the FARC at approximately 7,000 at the time, the 22,000 deployable force was far less
than the standard 10:1 ratio of military to insurgents. Moreover, in the mid-1990s, the
army suffered several humiliating defeats from the FARC.270 Thus, in 1998, Colombia
and the United States signed an agreement to form an elite, counternarcotics battalion
within the Colombian army, that would be the first major injection of U.S. aid into the
Colombian army. The 950-man and 33Huey helicopter strong battalion was to provide
the necessary security for aerial eradication in the departments of Putumayo and Caqueti,
two major drug-producing regions. Necessarily, providing security for eradication meant
attacking the leftist guerrillas on the ground, now with resources from the United
States.271
267 See, Lee (1989): 217-8; and Clawson and Lee: 187.
268 Author's interviews with Colombian military and security experts, Fall 2005. See, Richani: 42-3, 50.
269 Richani: 44.
270 See, Rabasa and Chalk: 42-5.
271 For details, see Maria Clemencia Ramirez Lemus, Kimberly Stanton, and John Walsh, "Colombia: A
Vicious Circle of Drugs and War," in Drugs and Democracy in Latin America, Coletta A. Youngers and
Eileen Rosin, eds. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005): 107. See also, Crandall.
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Encouraged by U.S. aid, the Colombian army rapidly became a major promoter of
the idea that counternarcotics operations were the sina qua non of success against the
leftist insurgents. Plan Colombia (described below) was the first manifestation of this
new paradigm in Washington and BogotA. The distinction between counterinsurgency
and counterdrug operations was fully erased in mid-2002 when the Bush administration
removed anti-narcotics restrictions on its aid to Colombia, allowing for all past and
present aid to be used for a "unified campaign" against Colombia's guerillas and the drug
traffic. In addition to the significant material incentive of U.S. military aid, the
Colombian military accepted the centrality of counternarcotics operations because it
could dismiss the negative consequence of eradication reducing the population's
willingness to provide intelligence to the military forces because it had alternative
sources of intelligence. After all, by the late 1990s, the paramilitaries' presence was
widespread, and they could extract intelligence from the rural population for the military.
A first major wave of eradication was thus undertaken by president Ernesto
Samper in 1994. After assuming office in 1994, Samper pledged that all coca would be
eradicated in Colombia within two years.272 More coca (4,910 hectares) was eradicated in
that year than in the preceding four years. 24,081 hectares were sprayed in 1995.273 Used
by Samper to appease U.S. anger at the corruption of his administration by drug money,
eradication was also billed as the way to substantially weaken the guerrillas. An editorial
in one of Colombia's leading newspapers, El Tiempo (reprinted in Clawson and Lee)
opined on January 15, 1995:
272 James Brooke, "U.S. Copters are a Target in Colombia," New York Times, March 27, 1995.
273 U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 1996): 83 and 88.
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If anything can persuade the guerrillas to negotiate a definitive and stable peace
with the government, it is a substantial and prolonged reduction in the high revenues that
they receive regularly from the [drug] traffic which permits them to maintain and equip
an expanding armed force. ... In other words, no solution to the problem of armed
insurgency in Colombia today is possible while the drug traffic continues to grow...274
The editorial succinctly captured the essential core of the conventional view, which has
been repeated countless times since.
But resentment of the rural population grew, frequently leading to strikes and
demonstrations, and the FARC was able to capitalize on it. In December 1994, for
example, about 4,000 cocaleros occupied the airport in San Jose del Guaviare, the capital
of the Guaviare department. In Putumayo, where according to its governor about 135,000
of the department's 314,000 inhabitants depend directly on the coca crop for their
livelihood, cocaleros occupied Ecopetrol pumping stations, disrupting the flow of oil and
causing the loss of millions of dollars in revenue.275 The capital of Caqueti, Florencia,
was virtually under siege by the cocaleros.276 The FARC started offering $200,000
bounty for every eradication helicopter or plane shot down, with the first being gunned
down on February 16, 1995.277 Crop eradication left many peasants jobless, thus driving
them further into the hands of the insurgents. Following large-scale fumigations in 1996,
the FARC organized massive protest marches against the government, demanding
suspension of forced eradication, adoption of voluntary eradication, and long-term
development projects. Between 150,000 and 200,000 participated, 278 powerfully
demonstrating the FARC's political capital and potency. The Army blew up the few
274 Reprinted in Clawson and Lee: 184.
275 Clawson and Lee: 219-20.
276 Christopher Torchia, "Colombian Coca Farmers Vent Rage," Washington Times, September 3, 1996.
277 Clawson and Lee: 220.
278 Adam Isacson, "The Tragedy of Alternative Development in Colombia," December 3, 2001,
http://www.colombiareport.org/colombia92.htm, downloaded November 3, 2003; Kirk: 243; and Vargas
Meza (1999).
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roads leading to main areas of the cocaleros' protests to prevent the demonstrators from
extending their marches, but also sealing the FARC there with them and further
constricting the state's presence in these areas.279
Meanwhile, while continuing to deny intelligence on the guerrillas to the
military, the rural population increased intelligence provision to the FARC. In March
1998, for example, local sympathizers in the Caguin region, where the FARC
connections to the cocaleros were the most long-standing, provided the FARC with
intelligence on the 52 nd counterguerrilla battalion of the Colombian army's 3rd mobile
brigade. The FARC destroyed the battalion.280 The lack of ability by the Colombian
forces to collect intelligence on the guerrillas was one of the reasons why the CIA relied
on Peru's Vladimiro Montesinos to obtain intelligence on the FARC. A conversation
between Montesinos and a Peruvian politician, Franscisco "Pancho" Tudela,
Montensinos (reprinted by McClintock and Vallas), revealingly shows the poor
intelligence provision available to the Colombian forces:
In [Colombia's demilitarized zone], I have five undercover agents; the best
information Washington has about Tirofijo is the information that I send from there.
...Because, as you know, satellite intelligence can't get in there. ...And they can't send
any Colombian for fear about the issue of corruption, the issue of drug trafficking. 281
The fact that better information was coming third-hand from Peru indicates the
lack of information available to the Colombian military on the FARC. Even if
Montesinos exaggerated his importance, Colombian intelligence experts uniformly agree
that the Colombian army has suffered from a chronic lack of good intelligence on the
279 Mary Matheson, "Colombian Leader Tries to Please U.S. on Drugs, But Ignites Peasant Revolt,"
Christian Science Monitor, August 12, 1997.
280 Rabasa and Chalk: 42.
281 McClintock and Vallas: 86.
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made on alternative development or political, economic, and judicial reforms until
permanent security was achieved throughout the country.292
Meanwhile, a newly intensified eradication campaign was launched in July 2001
when President Clinton signed into law Plan Colombia. Contained in an aid package of
$1.2 billion for counterdrug operations more broadly in Latin America, the Plan allocated
$860 million specifically for Colombia. Devised between 1998 and 2000, Plan Colombia
was originally conceived by President Pastrana as an effort to generate resources for
"peace, prosperity, and the strengthening of the state." Pastrana's original plan
recognized the importance of addressing the root causes of conflict in Colombia and
promoting social development, in addition to reducing violence and constructing peace. It
also argued for a major beefing up of alternative development programs to provide the
cocaleros with economic alternatives. However, the social and development components
soon became dwarfed by the military and eradication components, as many European
countries failed to provide resources for the plan and U.S. money came earmarked
predominantly for eradication. In 2001, the Bush Administration renamed the plan the
Andean Regional Initiative (ARI), but has maintained U.S. aid levels to Colombia
(extending them beyond the Plan's original expiration in 2005),293 removed restrictions
on the use of U.S. funds for counternarcotics purposes to permit the use of the funds for
counterguerrilla operations as well, and increased the cap on the numbers of U.S. military
advisers and private contractors to 800 and 400 respectively.
292 Sweig: 131.
293 The funding for Colombia's share of the ARI for 2006 was $741 million. Since 2001, Colombia has also
been receiving additional funding for counterterrorism, such as from the State Department's Anti-Terrorism
Assistance account. For details, see Ingrid Vaicius and Adam Isacson. The 'War on Drugs' Meets the 'War
on Terror. February 2003, http://ciponline.org/colombia/0302ipr.htm, downloaded August 08, 2004:18.
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A massive aerial eradication was undertaken.294 It was designed to "inflict
significant economic damage to both the farming and refining segments of the cocaine
industry long enough to force both dramatically reduce cocaine production in the medium
term and face bankruptcy in the long term."295 Between 2001 and 2003, the U.S.-
Colombian drug eradication campaign appeared to score unprecedented success. As a
result of President Uribe's willingness to allow herbicide planes to spray anywhere and
any time, the cultivation of coca in Colombia fell by 15 percent in 2002 and 21 percent in
2003, after the spraying of 270,000 hectares each year.296 But despite the continuation of
massive spraying in 2004 when 242,000 hectares were sprayed, the acreage of cultivated
coca remained the same. Then in 2005, after four consecutive years of decline and
170,060 hectares destroyed that year, coca cultivation increased by 6,000 hectares, with
the area under cultivation at 86,000.297 Coca continues to be grown in 23 departments. 298
294 Eradication has been accompanied by interdiction both on the seas, so called Operation Firewall, and in
the air, where the Air Bridge Denial operation was restarted in Colombia in 2003, although remaining
suspended elsewhere in Latin America.
295 "Comments from the Department of State," to the GAO Report, Drug Control: Coca Cultivation and
Eradication Estimates in Colombia.
296 Robert B. Charles, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs, U.S. Policy and Colombia, Testimony before the House Committee on Government Reform, June
17, 2004, http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/State%20-%20Charles%20Testimony.pdf, downloaded
September 19, 2004, and International Crisis Group (January 27, 2005).
297 U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) (Washington, DC, Government Printing Office:
2006), http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2006/voll/html/62106.htm, downloaded March 14, 2006, and
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Coca cultivation in Andes stabilizes in 2005, farmers need help
tofind alternative livelihoods, Press Release, June 20, 2006,
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press_release_2006-06-20.html, downloaded July 4, 2006. Colombian
drug experts dispute the area under cultivation as systematically underestimated, and argue that the actual
area under cultivation is over 100,000 hectares. Author's interviews in Colombia, Fall 2005. Alternative
development continues to remains limited. By 2004, for example, it reached about 33,400 families in
Colombia, resulting in the voluntary eradication of almost 22,000 hectares. However, the estimated
numbers of families dependent on the illicit economy and in need of alternative development is 136,000.
See, Government Accounting Office, July 2004: 2,11, and 26.
298 Poppy also continues to be grown. In 2005, it was grown on 1,950 hectares, down by 51 percent from
2004. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2006 World Drug Report: Volume II- Statistics: 232,
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/WDR_2006/wdr2006volume2.pdf, downloaded July 28, 2006.
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Obviously, the cocaleros have found a way to replant after eradication as well as
adapt in other ways. In addition to shifting production around into regions that were not
under eradication, such as Nariflo and Meta, and into shade where it cannot be easily
detected by satellites and spraying planes, coca producers increased the number of plants
per acre several times.299 To minimize detection, farmers decreased the size of lots
cultivated with coca. According to 2002 and 2003 estimates by the United Nations Office
on Drugs and Crime, more than 60 percent of Colombia's coca became grown on plots of
less than three hectares in size.300 Fumigation of such small plots is exceedingly difficult
and runs large risks of liquidating other licit crops or natural flora as well. Resistance of
coca plants to the herbicides also appears to be growing. Since the coca plant takes only
four months to grow from seedling to a harvestable plant, if farmers replant immediately
after the spraying planes leave, they miss only one harvest per year out of four.
The promise of eradication to financially break the FARC has not materialized so
far. First, there is no indication that the FARC is hurting financially.301 In fact, U.S.
Director of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy John Walters
explained the lack of cocaine price increase on U.S. streets until 2005 by insisting that the
FARC was feeding the market with stockpiled cocaine to maintain supply.302 This then
299 Author's interviews in Colombia, Fall 2005.
300 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Colombia: Coca Survey for December 2002 and Semi-
Annual Estimate for July 2003: 27-30, 46, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/publications/colombia_report_2003-
09-25.pdf, downloaded October 17, 2003.
301 Author's interviews with U.S. and Colombian government officials, Fall 2004.
302 United States Department of State, "Current Developments in Colombia in the Fight Against Drug
Trafficking and Narcoterrorism, Foreign Press Center briefing by John Walters, Director, White House
Office of National Drug Control Policy," (Washington, DC, July 29, 2003). In November 2005, John
Walter announced that over the past 7 months, U.S. street prices of cocaine rose by 19 percent while purity
declined. "U.S. Anti-Drugs Policy 'Succeeding,"' BBC News,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4449330.stm. It remains to be seen whether such a decline in purity
and increase in price is sustainable, especially as coca cultivation has increased in Peru and Bolivia. The
trend over the past twenty years has been a large decline in street prices for cocaine and heroin. Data
provided to the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) by the Office of National Drug Control
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leads to question of how large the FARC's and the paramilitaries' stockpiles are and how
long the belligerents can continue operating once their stockpiles are depleted? Can the
suppression of drug production be sustained until and after the depletion of the
belligerents' supplies? Evidence shows that by 1998, the FARC began storing coca
base.303
Given the very large annual profits both the FARC and the AUC gained from the
drug trade for many years, it is quite possible that the belligerents have accumulated
enough resources to continue operating for many years without new income coming in.
Moreover, the FARC (as well as the ELN and the AUC) have income from other illicit
activities, such as extortion and kidnapping. In the case of FARC, drugs constitute only
about half of its yearly income. Even if the income from drugs completely dried up, a
scenario that has not materialized, it would still continue receiving a very large
income. 304
The military offensive against the FARC under Plan Patriota305 did score
important results. President Uribe has launched 18,000 troops and special forces, backed
Policy (ONDCP) and available at WOLA webpage: http://www.wola.org/ddhr/ddhrdata_measures2.htm.
Moreover, many drug experts dispute the validity of ONDCP's 2005, pointing out that it has refused to
disclose it methodology. Author's interviews in Bogota, November 2005, and Washington, DC, Fall 2006.
303 International Crisis Group (January 27, 2005): 8.
304 Some Colombian security experts estimate the cost per belligerent at $3.00 per day. Author's interviews
in Colombia, Fall 2005. If this estimate is accurate, the FARC would need to raise about $60,000 for a
20,000-strong guerrilla force, an income still below the yearly income from non-drug illicit activities, such
as extortion and kidnapping, which is believed to be around $100,000 a year. A FARC invoice recently
captured by the Colombian military revealed that the FARC yearly expenditure on supplies and arms were
about $10 million. Author's interviews in Colombia, Fall 2005.
305 In addition to the military offensive, Plan Patriota, and the larger concept within which it has been
nestled, Democratic Security Policy, include developing a network of informants in the rural areas and
establishing peasant militias. So far, 600 such peasant squadrons have been established. Uribe also
increased the number of soldiers to 200,000, paid for with a one-time tax increase. Training and force
structures have improved, increasing the mobility of antiguerrilla units. The war effort over the past five
years is estimated to have cost Colombia $16.5 billion in the past five years. International Crisis Group,
Colombia: Presidential Politics and Peace Prospects, Latin America Report No. 14, June 16, 2005,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/flatin_america/I 4_colombia_presidential_politicsand_politi
cal_prospects.pdf, downloaded September 9, 2005. The Democratic Security Policy also included
constrictions on human rights and civil liberties. See, for example, Jawahar: 4-5.
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by American-supplied helicopters, against the guerrilla strongholds in the southern
jungles after clearing FARC from the mountains around Bogota. Colombian officials
claim that the FARC has lost some 6,000 of its members (or 20 to 30 percent) through
desertions, captures, and casualties.306 800 FARC encampments were destroyed, and 20
mid-level commanders removed from the battlefield.30 7 Police has been placed in every
municipality (though they frequently cannot leave their posts due to poor security
conditions and other elements of state continue to be absent in many areas).308 The FARC
has been pushed further away from the roads, and travel within Colombia is easier. While
important, these successes and improvements cannot be attributed to eradication, but
rather to the increased military offensive by the government forces.
Moreover, the leftist guerrillas do not appear to be defeated. After what may well
have been several months of tactical retreat, the FARC struck again in the spring and
summer of 2005 with a string of deadly attacks against the military and declaring its Plan
Resistencia. These attacks have continued into the summer of 2006. A leading Colombian
security analyst Alfredo RIngel Suarez notes that while the FARC attacks have been
smaller and less deadly since Uribe came to power, their frequency has not diminished.309
The guerrillas retain their capacity to attack and have the capacity to immobilize traffic
along major highways. Meanwhile, Colombia's military forces appear to be reaching the
306 International Crisis Group (June 16, 2005): 9.307 Gen. Bantz J. Craddock, Posture Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 14,
2006, http://ciponline.org/colombia/050309crad.pdf, downloaded March 18, 2006. These included Sim6n
Trinidad, "Rodrigo Granda," the FARC's foreign minister who was arrested in Caracas, and "Sonia."
308 Since Uribe took over, kidnapping rates have decreased by 39 percent and murder rates by 20 percent.
See, Government Accounting Office, Drug Control: U.S. Nonmilitary Assistance to Colombia Is Beginning
to Show Intended Results, But Programs Are Not Sustainable, GAO-04-726, July 2004: 20,
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04726.pdf, downloaded August 10, 2004.
309 "A New Offensive?" The Economist, 374 (8415), February 26, 2005.
350
limits of their military capacity. For one, the rate of guerrillas killed is declining.310 The
guerrilla practice has become to present the military forces sweeping into an area with
minimal resistance, while the bulk of guerrilla forces retreat. The military forces stay in
the area for several weeks or even months, without increasing other manifestation of state
presence, such as judges, doctors, and development experts. Then the military leaves, and
the guerrillas come back. The south still continues to be characterized by high levels of
violence.
President Uribe also managed to negotiate a disarmament agreement with the
paramilitaries. Stimulated by the threat of extradition to the United States on drug
trafficking charges, the paramilitary leadership agreed to negotiate a ceasefire and
demobilization deal in exchange for lenient jail sentences (with maximum confinement of
eight years) and no extradition to the United States. The paramilitaries also promised to
relinquish their control of the drug trade. Uribe's government accepted these terms, at
least tacitly agreeing not to extradite the paramilitary leaders, such as Salvatore Mancuso,
Ivain Duque, and Don Berna to the United States, and signed the so-called Justice and
Peace Law.31 By June 2006, some 24,000 of the estimated 27,000 to 29,000
paramilitaries, including their most notorious commanders, have demobilized. The
number of assassinations, torture, kidnappings, and disappearances committed by the
3 0 Author's interviews in Colombia, Fall 2005. See, Rangel Suirez's summarized by Stanton: 5-6.
31 The law has received widespread criticism from human rights groups as well as members of the United
States Congress for granting too lenient sentences to the paramilitary leaders and allowing them and rank-
and-file soldiers get away with major human rights violations without even having to disclose them. The
investigative and judicial components designed under the law to investigate these violations are too weak to
assure prosecution. See, for example, International Crisis Group, Colombia: Towards Peace and Justice?
Latin America Report No. 16, March 14, 2006,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/latin_america/ll6_colombia towards_ eace_andjustice.pdf,
downloaded April 18, 2006.
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paramilitaries have decreased since 2003. 312 The demobilized paramilitaries have also
given up some weapons, roughly one weapon for every three demobilized combatants.
On May 20, 2006, Colombia's constitutional court overturned key elements of the Justice
and Peace Law, including the lenient sentences.3 13 It remains to be seen whether the
paramilitaries will withdraw from the demobilization process.
Meanwhile, however, the paramilitaries have been transforming into more
regular style mafia organizations. Demobilized soldiers have joined city gangs, especially
in Medellin neighborhoods controlled by Don Berna. In some urban neighborhoods, the
paramilitaries have begun to impose their rules, such as prohibiting women from wearing
miniskirts, and engaged in "cleansing": harassing women leaders and prosecuting
homosexuals. 314 The paramilitaries also continue to reap vast benefits from the drug trade
and other illicit economies. Their drug networks remain unaffected. They have not given
up any substantial assets obtained through violence or illicit economic activities,
including ceased land. Through intimidation and financial payoffs (having at their
disposal financial resources frequently much larger than those of legitimate state
authorities and political actors), the paramilitaries have managed to acquire significant
political power at the local level in many municipal and gubernatorial offices, getting
their preferred candidates elected and buying off others.315 The AUC's influence is
especially pervasive along the Atlantic coast, such as in Cesar and Magdalena, the major
drug exporting regions. Moreover, new paramilitaries are emerging. Demobilized
312 Ibid.
313 Indira A.R. Lakshamanan, "Ruling Threatens Peace for Colombia," Boston Globe, May 20, 2006.
314 Author's interviews in Colombia, Fall 2005. See, International Crisis Group, Demobilizing the
Paramilitaries in Colombia: An Achievable Goal?, Latin America Report No. 8, August 5, 2004,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/latin_america/08•demobilising_theparamilitariesin colom
bia an achievable_goal.pdf, downloaded September 10, 2004.
5 Isacson (2005): 7 and Duncan. In 2004, Salvatore Mancuso, one of AUC's chiefs, boasted that the
paramilitaries controlled 30 percent of the national Congress.
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paramilitary leaders continue recruiting among the urban poor and unemployed, offering
$250 a month.316 At least 43 rearmed groups of ex-paramilitary combatants appear to be
operating in 22 departments.
The ELN remains weak, having suffered defeats from the army and paramilitaries
and from the FARC. It has engaged in on-and-off negotiations with the Colombian
government, which have so far failed to produce any agreement. Many ELN members are
becoming increasingly absorbed by the FARC.
While the promise that eradication would bankrupt the drug economy in
Colombia, dramatically reduce supply the global supply of drugs, and break the FARC
has failed to materialized so far, the costs of eradication have already materialized.
Eradication has generated widespread social strife, alienating the rural population from
the government. Popular alienation from the state is further compounded when the first
manifestation of the state is eradication -- i.e., the destruction of the rural population's
livelihood."17 Eradication policy has been condemned by many regional government
officials in Colombia. The governors of six of the Colombian departments most affected
by the fumigation policy were especially active in campaigning against aerial spraying.318
316 "Politics, Drugs, and the Gun," Economist, April 30, 2005.317 Presentation by a former U.N. alternative development specialist in Latin America, James Jones at a
WOLA conference in Washington, DC on April 19, 2005, summarized in Kimberly Stanton, "The
Colombian Conflict: Regional Impact and Policy Responses," WOLA Conference Report, August 2005:
23-4.
318 Jared Kotler, "Colombia Drug Policy Questioned," Associated Press, July 20, 2001, and Winifred Tate,
"Colombia's Role in International Drug Industry," Foreign Policy in Focus, 4 (30) (June 2001),
http://www.fpif.org/briefs/vol4/vo4n30colobody.html, downloaded March 19, 2003. Such statements are
frequently dismissed by proponents of eradication as being issued by political leaders who are either
handpicked by or under threat from the FARC.
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They saw intensified coca eradication as producing serious levels of social conflict and
further delegitimizing the Colombian government.319
Crop eradication policies have also led to the forcible expulsion of peasants from
lands used for drug production and the burning of their homes, further increasing the
scope of protection services the FARC can provide to peasants, and hence its political
legitimacy. Putumayo community leaders complained in November 2002 that the region
was a humanitarian disaster. According to them, eradication damaged not only coca
fields, but also food crops, and many families were going hungry. Community leaders in
Putumayo also believed that eradication was designed to expel them from their land.
Large numbers of people were in fact leaving Putumayo for other regions of Colombia
and Ecuador.320 Whether inadvertent or by design, the resulting depopulation of the
region was seen by some Colombian military specialists as welcome in BogotA and
Washington. Large-scale departure of the population from the region was seen as
facilitating the military campaign against the guerrillas by depriving them of support and
resources as well as facilitating alternative development by forcing the population to
move to areas that would perhaps be more suitable for licit economic development.32' At
the same time, however, young people driven by a lack of economic opportunities were
319 Interview with Jorge Devia Murcia, governor of Putumayo, Colombia Update, published by Colombia
Human Rights Committee of Washington, DC, 12 (1), Summer/ Fall 2000: 7,
http://72.14.207.104/search?q=cache:tZZotZMy68sJ:colhrnet.igc.org/newsletter/y2002/fall02.art/colombia
updatefD2.pdf+Colombia+Update,+published+by+Colombia+Human+Rights+Committee+of+Washington,
+DC,+12+(1),+Summer/+Fall+2000:&hl=en&gl=us&ct-clnk&cd=4, downloaded April 7, 2003.320 Ingrid Vaicius and Adam Isacson, The 'War on Drugs' Meets the 'War on Terror, February 2003: 9-10,
http://ciponline.org/colombia/0302ipr.htm, downloaded September 10, 2003.
321 Author's interviews in Colombia, Fall 2005. Ironically, displacement of the population from the original
drug regions further contributes to the geographic spread of illicit crop cultivation as a result of the
diffusion of knowledge and the frequent inability of internal refugees to find licit economic opportunities in
the areas where they arrive.
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volunteering for the FARC or the AUC,3 22 thus hampering counterinsurgency efforts.
Moreover, the FARC began relocating along with the displaced groups into areas, such as
Narifio, Meta, Guaviare.
Meanwhile, the FARC has stepped up its protection efforts against eradication. In
2001 alone, there were 86 incidents in which spraying aircraft and helicopters were hit by
ground fire.323 On December 27, 2005, for example, 300 FARC soldiers killed 29
policemen guarding the eradication teams in the national park La Macarena in one of the
deadliest FARC attack since Uribe came to power.324 In fact, one of the costliest effects
of Plan Patriota on the FARC was the resulting FARC decision to retreat to protect its
soldiers, thus preventing them from protecting the crops against eradication. The
consequence was a significant loss of the FARC's support among the cocalero
community who fell betrayed and disappointed by the FARC and increased peasant
community-organizing to establish independent community structure to oppose
eradication. These community structures were not responsive to the FARC. However,
after realizing the loss of support resulting from its abdication of the protection function
against the eradication teams, the FARC once again began protecting the coca fields
against eradication to recapture the farmers' support and resurrect its political capital.325
Members of the Colombian government have voiced objections to combining the
counter-guerrilla war with the anti-narcotics war. Unlike current President Uribe, who is
an enthusiastic supporter of the U.S.-sponsored eradication program, former President
Andr6s Pastrana was occasionally reluctant to carry out the spraying program as
322 Author's interviews with U.S. military officials, Summer and Fall 2004. See, Vaicius and Isacson
(2003): 9-10.323 Steinitz: 15.
324 "Colombia: One and Half Steps Forward, One Back," Economist, January 7, 2006: 41-2.325 Author's interviews in Colombia, Fall 2005.
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aggressively as U.S. officials demanded. After the first round of fumigation under Plan
Colombia (between December 2000 and February 2001), Pastrana temporarily suspended
fumigation to give alternative development a chance. The effort took a series of signed
pacts with cocalero communities, in which those who signed would receive basic
assistance, followed by technical and infrastructure aid, in exchange for eradicating of all
their coca within twelve months of the first receipt of aid. But most of the aid was never
delivered. By April 2002, only 8,500 of the 37,000 peasant families who signed the pact
received aid, and in July 2002 fumigation restarted without alternative development
having taken off.326 Gonzalo de Francisco, Pastrana's national security adviser,
commented that the U.S. applied constant pressure to accelerate the pace of coca
spraying, viewing it as cheaper and quicker than alternative development and crop
substitution. Pastrana instead focused on reaching a peace agreement with the FARC. 327
Although Pastrana's peace negotiations with the FARC failed for a variety of
reasons, and although even in the absence of eradication it is unlikely that they would
have succeeded, they were nonetheless also undermined by eradication.328 Refusal of the
U.S. government to talk with "narcoguerrillas" as well as stepped-up fumigation efforts
helped undermine the FARC's trust. Trust completely deteriorated in mid-2000, after the
U.S. Congress approved Plan Colombia. FARC statements repeatedly denounced the
U.S. plan, especially its military and counternarcotics components as foreign intervention
326 Vaicius and Isacson (2003): 8. It also needs to be added that the FARC killed several alternative
development workers in Putumayo in September 2001.
327 Scott Wilson, "U.S. Seeks to Avoid Deeper Role in Colombia," Washington Post, March 9, 2003.
32S The problems of the negotiations were detailed above. Chief among them were the lack of interest on
the FARC's part and the lack of plan on the part of the Colombian government
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and gesture of bad faith.329 The guerrillas progressively came to see the talks as a
dangerous ruse designed to lull them while eradication weakened their strength. 330
Despite the fact that Uribe has organized a network of over 2 million paid
informers, using sympathizers of the paramilitaries as the base of the informant network,
intelligence provision to the military forces continues to be poor. 33 Although much
information about current intelligence gathering is classified and concrete data cannot be
accessed, there are clear indications that the Colombian government is depriving itself of
local intelligence by pushing ahead with eradication. One episode illustrates this
dynamic: A U.S. government official in charge of administering alternative development
programs since the launch of Plan Colombia visited villages where the FARC was known
to operate. His expectation was that the FARC would oppose the programs since the
diminished cultivation of coca would reduce the guerrillas' income - as, in fact,
increasingly became the FARC's practice during the 1990s. In each village he visited,
however, the FARC not only failed to oppose the programs, but encouraged them. The
explanation the official received from representatives of the villages was always the
same. The FARC knows that if it opposed the alternative developments programs, we
[the villagers] would tell the government how to capture the FARC. The guerrillas need
to cooperate with our wishes so that we do not give the government the information.332
The moral of the story, of course, is that the local population knows the whereabouts of
the guerrillas, but as long as the government threatens the population's livelihood and as
329 Isacson (2003): 7.
330 Author's interviews in Colombia, Fall 2005. See, also Thoumi (2003): 200.
331 Author's interviews with Colombian intelligence and security experts who have advised the Colombian
military on intelligence acquisition, Fall 2005, and with U.S. government officials, Summer and Fall 2004.
See, Adam Isacson and Ingrid Vaicius, "Plan Colombia 2?" March 22, 2004,
http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/040322memo.htm, downloaded June 13, 2004.
332 Author's interviews with U.S., Colombian, and OAS officials, Summer and Fall 2004.
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long as the guerrillas sponsor that livelihood, the population chooses not to provide vital
intelligence on the guerrillas to the government. Another indication of the lack of
intelligence provision is the failure of the Colombian forces to capture any member of the
FARC's secretariat.
The lack of intelligence provision to the military is all the more significant now
that the FARC's legitimacy is at its all time low. As shown above, the FARC's
elimination of traffickers from the areas under its control and its increasing brutality have
resulted in large decreases in its political capital. Moreover, the military did manage for
several months to put the FARC on the run, thus decreasing the chances of FARC's
retaliation against informers. Despite all these auspicious conditions, the available
evidence suggests that the military is still not receiving adequate or increased intelligence
and has not managed to penetrate the FARC or its networks to obtain the necessary
intelligence.333
In short, as predicted by my theory and contrary to the predictions of the
conventional view, the FARC has not been broken financially as a result of eradication
one of the most extensive eradication campaigns in history. Proponents of the
conventional wisdom can counter that eradication has not been given sufficient time, but
after twenty-six years, with the last six especially intense, this argument becomes hard to
sustain. At the same time eradication has already generated large costs to the military by
increasing the belligerents' political capital and alienating the population from the
government. The population does not cooperate with the government, and intelligence
provision by the population to the military continues to be poor.
333 Author's interviews in Colombia, Fall 2005.
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XI. Conclusions
Despite Colombia being the poster case of the conventional view, a detailed
examination of the case since the 1960s through the current period undermines the
validity of the conventional view and supports the validity of my theory of political
capital of illicit economies. Belligerent groups examined in this chapter - the FARC, the
paramilitaries, the M-19, and the ELN - obtained not only physical resources from their
positive involvement in various illicit economies, but the belligerents that participated in
labor-intensive illicit economies, such as the cultivation of illicit crops, also gained
substantial political capital. Although drugs did not cause the conflict in Colombia, the
belligerents' positive engagement in the illicit narcotics economy substantially escalated
it.
The first data point supporting the validity of my theory is the evolution of the
FARC's involvement in the illicit economy. The group spent its first fifteen years not
involved in an illicit economy, relying on local banditry for food and supply acquisition
and isolated attacks against the military to obtain weapons. Not only did the FARC fail to
grow, it also alienated the local population. Then, when the illicit narcotics economy took
off in Colombia in the late 1970s and the FARC first encountered drugs, it sought to
suppress the illicit narcotics economy. Its negative involvement in the illicit narcotics
economy, however, alienated the local population and its control over the Caguin region
became threatened. Seeing the substantial alienation of the local population and fearing
the loss of control over the region to the drug traffickers and their security forces, the
FARC reversed its policy and came to positively sponsor the illicit economy. At that
point, the conventional view predicts that the FARC's physical resources would grow, as
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does my theory. In fact, they did: the FARC was able to grow from a few hundred
guerrillas on the run in the southern jungles of the country into a 20,000 strong guerrilla
country, largely controlling the southern and south-central parts of the country, and
present in at least 60 percent of the country.
But ignored by the conventional view and consistent with my theory is the
increase in FARC's strength also in terms of freedom of action, and, most crucially, in
terms of political capital. As a result of its positive involvement in the illicit economy, the
FARC was able to vastly enlarge the scope and magnitude of its operations. Most
importantly, it developed a secure base among the rural population dependent on the
illicit economy. While during the period of FARC's negative involvement in illicit crop
cultivation, the group alienated the local population and was about to lose control of the
region, after its positive involvement, the population welcomed it back. The FARC
protected the population against the abuses of the traffickers and the eradication teams,
provided a regulatory framework, and used the illicit economy to provide social services
to the population. Contrary to the predictions of the conventional view, but consistent
with the predictions of my theory, the FARC's strongest support has consistently been in
the drug regions. Positive involvement in the illicit economy thus vastly increased the
staying power of the FARC and allowed them to pose a serious threat to the government.
Positive involvement in the illicit economy on the part of the paramilitaries
supported another aspect of my theory: the importance of the amplifying factor,
"presence/absence of traffickers," on the belligerent group's ability to obtain political
capital from positive involvement in illicit economies. My theory predicts that if
traffickers are absent, the belligerents will derive smaller political capital than if they are
360
present. This prediction did materialize in the case of the paramilitaries. The
paramilitaries obtained large physical resources from the illicit economy, growing from a
few hundred in the mid-1980s to almost 30,000 in 2006, and they were also able to obtain
some political capital. Nonetheless, their political capital remained limited, because the
paramilitaries frequently were identical with the traffickers and hence did not provide a
variety of regulatory services to the farmers, such as bargaining for better prices and
ameliorating the violence of the traffickers toward the rural population.
Moreover, even when the paramilitaries were distinct and separate from the
traffickers and when traffickers were present in the territories they controlled, their
political capital remained limited because their primary audience was the traffickers. This
limited increase in the paramilitaries' political capital was not predicted by my theory,
but is not inconsistent with it. The reason the paramilitaries did not obtain large political
capital from their positive involvement in the illicit economy is that they were hired by
the traffickers and the landlords to protect their interests and were not vying for the
allegiance of the peasants, but for continuing employment from their rich patrons. But in
domains where the competition with the guerrillas for being hired to provide protection
services to the traffickers was not involved, the paramilitaries did attempt to obtain at
least some political capital, and, for example, invested in social services with their profits
from the illicit economy.
FARC's elimination of small and medium traffickers from areas under their
control by the late 1990s also supports the prediction of my theory regarding the absence
of the traffickers. When the FARC eliminated the trafficking organizations'
intermediaries, itself selling coca paste from farmers to the trafficking organizations and
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even the paramilitaries, it stopped providing a host of regulatory services to the peasants
and became more brutal. Its political capital decreased substantially, and the population
became largely indifferent in its support between the paramilitaries and the FARC.
The relationship between the belligerents and the traffickers also clearly supports
my theory and undermines the validity of the conventional view. The conventional view
argues that the belligerents and criminal organizations have merged into a conglomerate
actor that needs to be fought together and predicts joint interests and little conflict
between the two groups. The case of Colombia clearly contradicts these predictions and
arguments. The relationship between the FARC and traffickers deteriorated very rapidly,
and although at first, for a year or two, the traffickers welcomed the regulatory and
protective presence of the FARC, they soon became fed up with its interference in the
management of the drug trade and hired the paramilitaries to displace the traffickers. The
reverse side of the coin, of course, is that since the mid-1990s, the FARC has sought to
eliminate at least the small and medium traffickers from its territories.
The case of the paramilitaries and the traffickers is at first glance more supportive
of the conventional view's arguments. The paramilitaries were hired by the traffickers to
protect them from the guerrillas, and especially in the late 1990s and 2000s, many
traffickers bought themselves positions of power and leadership among the paramilitaries
to avoid extradition. However, even in this case -- when the paramilitaries and the
traffickers cannot easily be distinguished -- the conglomerate grouping is far from
uniform. Contrary to the predictions of the conventional view, internal infighting,
violence, and competing interests among various groups are endemic.
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Such was in fact also the state of relations among the major traffickers and cartels
of the early era of the Colombian drug trade. Examination of the Medellin and Cali
cartels in this chapter showed that the members of the cartels sought to eliminate each
other and frequently fought each other. The Cali cartel, for example, hired the
paramilitary group, PEPES, to kill Pablo Escobar and destroy the vestiges of the Medellin
cartel. Far from there being a great crime alliance to battle the state, there was business as
usual among the cartels and the traffickers: competition and violence.
The examination of the cartels also undermined another claim of the conventional
view - namely, that when groups lose ideology, they lose legitimacy and support. The
cartels never had any real ideology, even though their various members at times tried to
wrap themselves in the mantel of a mixture of conservative and populist ideology.
Nonetheless, through the distribution of a small portion of their drug rents to the poor
segments of the population and their provision of a variety of social services, they did
build up political capital. Thus, despite the fact, that Escobar was a brutal thug who had
scores of people murdered, the local population from Medellin did not provide
intelligence on him to law enforcement officials, and he was ultimately captured by
intelligence provided by the Cali cartel. Similarly, although the FARC arguably lost most
of its ideology and its remaining ideology no longer resonates with the population, and
although it has become brutal and its political capital decreased, it still continues to
maintain political capital in the drug regions.
The positive involvement of two other belligerent groups, the M-19 and the ELN,
supported the arguments of my theory regarding the importance of the character of illicit
economies in determining the scope and magnitude of belligerents' gains from the illicit
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economy. The M-19 was involved in the illicit narcotics economy, but not in the labor-
intensive cultivation aspects of the illicit economy. At first, the group became involved in
extorting the traffickers through kidnapping their family members. Not only did this
activity fail to generate any political capital for the group, it also failed to generate
physical resources, and the group suffered large physical losses at the hands of the
traffickers and their security forces, the MAS. Later, the M-19 switched to providing
protection services to the traffickers, such as opposing extradition and destroying judicial
evidence against the traffickers. Since the group operated in relatively wealthy Bogota, its
positive involvement in the labor-non-intensive aspects of the illicit economy not only
failed to generate political capital for the group, but widely antagonized the urban
audience from the group. The M-19 never managed to capture or build connections to the
rural population.
The ELN, on the other hand, operated in the rural areas of Colombia where the
state of the overall economy was poor. Even so, as predicted by my theory, its
participation in a labor-non-intensive illicit economy - namely, the extortion of
landowners and major companies, especially oil companies - failed to generate much
political capital for the group. The ELN did obtain vast financial resources from its
extortion business, at the rate of $150 million a year, and did invest to some extent in the
provision of social services. Nonetheless, it failed to build up substantial political capital
since its involvement in kidnapping and extortion did not generate many employment
opportunities for the rural population. Moreover, the group lost political capital by its
negative involvement in the illicit narcotics economy. For religious reasons, the ELN
either abstained from participating in the illicit narcotics economy until the late 1990s or
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at various times and in various regions actively sought to suppress it. By the late 1990s,
the group learned that if it wanted to remain at all competitive with the FARC and the
paramilitaries, it had to embrace the illicit economy. It started to protect and tax the coca
and poppy fields under its control, but by then the group was under substantial pressure
from the paramilitaries, the state, and the FARC, and remains very weak today.
Finally, the case of Colombia also illuminates the role of government response to
the illicit economy. Despite eradication being conducted for almost thirty years, with the
last six featuring the most intensive aerial fumigation in history, the policy has failed so
far to accomplish either of its two promised goals: Although the area under cultivation
has decreased, there has not yet been a substantial decline in the supply of Colombian
cocaine or heroin. Nor has eradication - even at the scale that it has been undertaken -
managed to bankrupt the FARC or the demobilizing paramilitaries. Even these two
groups, prototypical as they may be of the narcoguerrilla thesis, derive only 50% and
80% respectively of their finances from drugs. The rest of their income comes from other
illicit economies, such as extortion, kidnapping, and smuggling of illicit goods. Even if
eradication managed to completely eliminate the narcotics economy, the FARC would
still retain at least half of its current income. Meanwhile, there is no indication that it is
hurting financially. It has been under serious military pressure from the Colombia
government, but the successes against it cannot be attributed to eradication. Despite
eradication, the demobilizing paramilitaries, now deeply penetrated by drug traffickers,
have managed to preserve, if not consolidate, their involvement in the narcotics economy.
In short, even in the case of Colombia, in many respects the easiest test case for the
conventional view to pass, the conventional view fails in all of its central arguments.
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Meanwhile, as predicted by my theory, eradication has generated new political
capital for the belligerents. Although the FARC has lost most of its legitimacy, it still
remains strongest in the drug regions. The local population's cooperation with the
government is minimal if not altogether non-existent. Information-provision by the
population to the government continues to be poor, and the military is lacking
intelligence on the FARC. Eradication has deeply antagonized the local population from
the government.
The following chapter explores the relationship between a variety of belligerent
groups and several illicit economies in the case of Afghanistan. Like the case of
Colombia, the Afghan case contains both labor-intensive and labor-non-intensive illicit
economies and both positive and negative involvement on the part of belligerents in these
illicit economies. But it also contains a great variation of government responses to the
illicit economy. Not only does the government response range from eradication to
interdiction to tacit acquiescence, the case of Afghanistan is one of the few cases where a
defacto, if not dejure legalization of illicit drug cultivation had taken place.
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CHAPTER SIX - Afghanistan
I. Introduction
The alarming statistics on opium and heroin production in Afghanistan, which in
2006 climbed to a staggering 6,100 metric tons,' have captured the attention of the
general public, policymakers, and academic experts on narcotics. That Afghanistan
supplies more than 90 percent of the global illicit market for opiates and more than 95
percent of the European market are much quoted data points, as is the fact that profits
from drugs constitute more than 50 percent of Afghanistan's legal GDP, and more than
one third of the overall economy.2 Getting worse year after year since 2001, the statistics
continue to paint a bleak picture. Opium poppy cultivation has spread to all 32 provinces
of the country and underlies much of its economic and political life. Afghanistan has
become the poster "narco-state," vastly surpassing the previous poster "narco-state,"
Colombia, in the extent of the illicit economy. One of the poorest countries in the world,
Afghanistan has been torn by wars and insurgencies of various intensity since 1979.
The case of Afghanistan well illustrates the effect of two amplifying factors -
government response toward the illicit economy and character of the illicit economy - on
the scope and size of belligerents' benefits from the illicit economy. The case contains
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2006, September 2006,
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/index.html, downloaded September 16, 2006.
2 The estimated overall profits from the opium economy were $2.3 billion in 2003, while the overall 2002
GDP of Afghanistan was estimated at $4.4 billion. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan
Opium Survey 2003 (Vienna/Kabul, 2003): 3; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug
Report (Vienna: 2004): 12. In 2006, Afghanistan's GDP was estimated at $6.7 billion. Given that already
only the total farmgate value of opium is estimated at 11% of Afghanistan's GDP, the overall profits from
drug production and trade in Afghanistan likely reach over 50% of the entire GDP this year. The
calculation of the profits from processing and trade for 2006 were not yet available at the time of this
writing. Estimating the size of an illicit economy is notoriously hard. In the case of Afghanistan where a
major part of the legal economy is an informal economy, estimating the size of the GDP is equally
problematic. Some studies thus put the percentage of the drug economy at 50 to 60 percent of the GDP.
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both labor-intensive and labor non-intensive illicit- economies, which generate
approximately the same level of financial benefits to belligerents, but which are predicted
by my theory to generate vastly different levels of political capital for their sponsors. The
case also contains both positive and negative involvement of belligerents' in various
illicit economies, providing a further test of my theory.
Responses by the governing body toward the illicit narcotics economy covered a
spectrum from de facto legalization and tacit acquiescence to interdiction and eradication.
The official policy toward drugs varied along several dimensions. First, in different
regions, various ruling elites adopted different attitudes toward drugs. Second, over time,
even in the same regions, such as those controlled by the Taliban, or during the post-
Taliban occupation, official policy varied from stringent eradication to a defacto if not de
jure legalization, thus providing a great test for the impact of various government policies
on the different components of belligerents' strength.
Apart from being rich in a multiplicity of conflicts and illicit economies, the case
of Afghanistan also contains a multiplicity of belligerent actors with dramatically
different ideologies, goals, and beliefs. The case thus allows for an analysis of possible
intervening variables, such as ideology and religion, on the ability of groups to derive
benefits from the illicit economy.
This chapter analyzes the interaction between the drug and other illicit economies
and military conflict in Afghanistan from the 19th century to the present. It explores the
relationship between various forms of military conflict - from interstate warfare to
insurgency and civil war - and two large and dominant illicit economies in Afghanistan:
the illicit narcotics economy and illicit traffic with legal goods. Specifically, the chapter
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examines the dynamics between the illicit narcotics economy and military conflict: 1)
during the 19t century anti-colonial struggle by the Afghan emirs and Pashtun
insurgency against British efforts to incorporate the Afghan territories into the British
empire; 2) during the 1980s Afghan insurgency struggle against Soviet occupation; 3)
during the 1990s civil war and the Taliban's effort to control the territory; 4) during the
American invasion in 2001; and finally, 5) during the post-Taliban stabilization efforts
and the Taliban insurgency against the Karzai government and its U.S. ally.3 The illicit
traffic with legal goods, and the way this illicit economy interacted with the Taliban
effort to take over Afghanistan, is explored during the height of this illicit smuggling, the
decade of the 1990s.
In each period, I also describe and analyze the condition of the illicit economy. I
show how the illicit economy is structured, how it operates, and how it is evolving, both
as a result of its internal processes and as a result of exogenous shocks, such as policy
changes toward the illicit economy and changes in the intensity of military conflict. An
accurate picture of the structure of the illicit economy is important for the understanding
of how belligerents can and do exploit the illicit economy and what effects government
policies have on the relationship between the belligerents and the population.
In each of the examined periods and conflicts, the theory of the political capital of
illicit economies provides a better explanation of the dynamics of the illicit-economy-
conflict nexus than the conventional view. The 19 th century period of Afghan struggle
against British domination reveals the awareness of both Afghan and British elites of the
effect of the drug economy strengthening belligerency and of the costs of trying to
J Although the Taliban insurgency is the dominant insurgency, Jallaluddin Haqqani and Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar are also running two separate insurgencies that at times cooperate with the Taliban.
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destroy the illicit economy. It also shows how British efforts to bankrupt the Pashtun
belligerency by destroying the illicit economy failed to weaken the belligerents despite
the policies' success in largely limiting the illicit economy in Afghanistan.
The examination of the anti-Soviet struggle of the 1980s shows how the spreading
illicit narcotics economy crucially strengthened the mujahideen and how it did so in ways
consistent with the political capital of illicit economies. Beyond providing them with
financial profits, as emphasized by the conventional view, their positive involvement in
the illicit economy facilitated their freedom of operation and increased their political
capital, including in terms of intelligence gathering. The analysis of this period also
reveals how the mujahideen progressively learned how to better and more fully exploit
the illicit economy to increase their strength and how their exploitation of the illicit
economy provided an example for others to emulate.
The section on the civil war of the 1990s, prior to the Taliban's takeover of the
country, shows how and why the illicit narcotics economy continued to spread.
Consistent with the political capital thesis, the exploitation of the illicit economy allowed
former mujahideen commanders to obtain political legitimacy and support, displacing
traditional elites and transforming them from being simply warriors into being also
governing authorities.
The section on the Taliban strongly challenges the conventional view that illicit
economies bring simply financial benefits to belligerents. It shows that the Taliban's
eradication campaign of 1994, driven by its religious fanaticism, and then its reversal in
1995, took place within the context of the Taliban's profiting immensely from illicit
smuggling with licit goods and hence without financial need to reverse eradication.
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Consistent with my theory, the policy reversal was driven by large costs in terms of
political capital that eradication generated for the Taliban. It did so at a time when the
Taliban's control over the territory was still tenuous. Subsequently, the Taliban adopted a
de facto legalization of the opium economy, its political capital greatly increased, and the
movement was able to consolidate power. Finally, the section also addresses three key
questions about the Taliban's 2000 eradication campaign: Why, given the previously
encountered political costs, did the Taliban undertake such a dangerous policy? Did the
2000 eradication campaign generate new significant political costs for the movement?
And, if so, how could the Taliban afford to undertake such a policy? The answers to these
questions will once again show the greater explanatory power of the political capital of
illicit economies theory than of the conventional view.
The final two sections focus on the relationship between military conflict and the
illicit narcotics economy during the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and during the
subsequent U.S. counterterrorism/ counterinsurgency and stabilization efforts. Although
the policies are still being implemented and their effects are still evolving, this period
already provides rich material for evaluating the validity of the two competing theories. It
illuminates the effect of various counternarcotics policies on conflict limitation as well as
on the suppression of the illicit economy. Within the five years since 2001, the U.S., U.K.
and Afghan counternarcotics policies to the drug economy have ranged from tacit
acquiescence to interdiction and eradication (both compensated and not) and the
implementation of alternative livelihoods programs. The evidence reveals the clear
awareness on the part of the counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency forces of the large
costs of enforcing eradication in the context of an active military conflict. It also shows
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how the subsequent adoption of eradication has.failed to bankrupt the insurgents and
renegade warlords while feeding the existing Taliban insurgency and increasing not only
the political capital of warlords-cum-government officials, but, paradoxically, also their
financial profits from the illicit economy.
The exploration of the drug-conflict dynamics in the case of Afghanistan is
important not only as an academic debate and as a means to test the validity of the two
competing theories. A correct understanding of these processes - and, currently, of the
Taliban's management of the illicit narcotics economy -- is necessary for devising
appropriate counternarcotics and counterinsurgency policies. A distorted view of the
dynamics and policies during the Taliban period and wrong lessons based on this
distorted view have come to inform much of the current understanding, dooming the
major policies to failure.
The following table summarizes for the Afghanistan case, the study's key
analytical variables - namely, the range of values of the amplifying factors and types of
involvement on the part of the belligerent actors.
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DETERMINANTS OF STRENGTH OF BELLIGERENTS
TYPE OF INVOLVEMENT
AMPLIFYING FACTORS
POSITIVE NEGATIVE No INVOLVEMENT
Emirs of 19th century British colonial
Mujahideen (e.g. forces;
Hekmatyar; Nsim until Nassi
STATE OF Poor '90; & others); Massoud- Nassim ('90-'91); Mujahideen (e.g.
gems & drugs from 1990; Taliban ('4-'5; Massoud - drugs until
'00-'01);
OVERALL ECON. Taliban ('96-'99; '01-), Ali ('04-'05); 1990; & others)
warlords (e.g. Ali, Daoud Dad ('04-)
until '04; & others) Daoud ('04-)
Rich
British colonial
Mujahideen (e.g.
Hekmatyar; Nasim until forces;
'90; & others); Massoud - Soviet occupationLabor '90; & others); Massoud forces; Mujahideen (e.g.
Intensive 1990; Taliban ('96-'99; Nassim ('90-'91); Massoud - untilCHARACTER OF 1990; Taliban ('96-'99;'01-), warlords (e.g. Ali, Taliban (drugs: 1990; & others)S '94-'95; '00-'01 &
Daoud until '04; &ILLICITEcoN. others) logging)
mujahideen, Taliban
Labor-Non- warlords - illicit
Intensive smuggling w/ legal goods
under ATTA; drug
smuggling
PRESENCE OF Soviet occupation Mujahideen (e.g.
Present mujahideen, Taliban ('96- Massoud - drugs until
TRAFFICKERS '99; '01-), warlords Taliban ('94-'95; 1990; & others)
TRAFFICKERS '00-'01)
Absent Nasim, warlords Nassim ('90-'91)
Eradication Taiban ('01-), warlords Ali ('04-'05)
Taliban (' 01-), warlords Daoud ('04-)
Emirs of 19th & early 20 '" . British colonial
Interdiction century; Warlords, forces (1 9th & earlyTaliban ('01-) 
2 0 th century)
RESPONSE TO Mujahideen (e.g.
Tacit Hekmatyar; Nasim until Nassi Mujahideen (e.g.
ILLICIT ECON. Acquiescence '90; & others); Massoud - Nassim ('90-'91) Massoud - until
Acquiescence gems; warlords (e.g. Ali, Taliban('1990; & others)
Daoud until '04; &
others)
Licensing/ Taliban ('96-'99)
Legalization
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The rest of the.chapter proceeds as follows: I first analyze each of the periods
discussed above in chronological order. In presenting the empirical work, I evaluate the
validity of the two competing theories in each section. Finally, after analyzing the five
periods, I present a summary evidence section and discuss the cumulative implications of
the evidence for supporting and disconfirming the two theories.
II. Colonialism and Drugs: Testing the Effectiveness of Counternarcotics Suppression
Policies in Bankrupting Belligerents
Counterinsurgency and counternarcotics operations intersected in Afghanistan for
the first time in the late 19t" century, during the era of British colonialism. The British
colonial forces adopted a counterinsurgency policy analogous to the French
counterinsurgency approach and a counternarcotics policy based on interdiction in order
to deprive the Pashtun rebels of material resources. The counternarcotics interdiction
policy was very effective in limiting the extent of cultivation. This episode thus
represents an ideal case for the conventional view since not only is a suppression policy
toward the narcotics economy adopted, it succeeds in greatly diminishing production.
The conventional view thus predicts that belligerents will go bankrupt and be defeated.
Even in the context of a poor country with few alternative means of financing and a
severely-degraded labor-intensive illicit economy, the theory of political capital still
predicts that belligerents will find alternative sources of financing and will not be
seriously weakened as a result of counternarcotics policies.
Seeking to protect India from the threat of Russian invasion, Great Britain
invaded Afghanistan in 1838 and 1878. Each time it suffered a humiliating defeat, unable
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to overcome the combination of rugged terrain, a population of well-armed "martial
tribes," and a deep Islamic faith that encouraged jihad. 4 After a particularly disastrous
defeat during the Second Afghan War (1878-80), Britain decided to negotiate with the
ruling emir of Afghanistan to fix boundaries. The resulting shape of Afghanistan was
determined by a compromise among the major powers, creating a buffer state with
frontiers drawn to please British India, Russia, and Iran. Inevitably, the resulting borders
ignored the existing tribal distribution of the population, leaving large portions of
Afghanistan's leading ethnic groups on the wrong side of the borders.
Despite the new territorial division, the northwestern borders of the British lands
continued to be unstable, and Britain exercised only a limited control over the border
territories. Unable to defeat the Pashtun warriors who were crossing between Afghanistan
and today's Pakistan, the Britain adopted a punitive policy known as "butcher and bolt" -
- that is, march into the offending village, butcher the available civilians, and bolt out of
there before the tribe's warriors could retaliate.5
Britain also adopted a counternarcotics policy that was meant to limit the potential
strength of the marauding Pashtun tribes. Instead of encouraging the production ofopium
for revenue, as it did elsewhere in British India, Britain worked toward the gradual
abolition of opium cultivation in the Pashtun regions to deprive the Pashtun belligerents
of resources. Even then opium was a highly lucrative commodity. Since the production
was still minimal - for example, in 1870 only 1,130 acres of poppy were cultivated in the
North-West Territories along the border with Afghanistan -- there was little resistance
4 Ikramul Haq, "Pak-Afghan Drug Trade in Historical Perspective," Asian Survey, 36 (10), October 1996:
946.
5 C. Colin Davis, "The Problem of the North-west Frontier, 1890-1908 (London: Curzon Press, 1932): 26-8.
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from the tribes.6 Through a policy of gradual interdiction, the British reduced poppy
cultivation in the region until in 1901 "it had entirely ceased." 7
Britain never managed to completely eliminate the opium production in
neighboring Afghanistan, but through its interdiction policy, which prevented the Afghan
opium from reaching the Chinese and other markets, it nonetheless managed to keep
Afghanistan's production small. Some cultivation of opium in Afghanistan went on since
the ruling emir in Afghanistan did not restrict opium production in order to preserve his
independence and power base. A reformist, Emir Abdurrahman had a nonideological,
purely pragmatic conception of modernization: "to rationalize the institutions of the state
to make them more efficient, without thereby affecting traditional society."8' Thus,
although the state interfered heavily in the overall economy and other aspects of
agricultural production, the emir did not attempt to suppress the drug economy.
Sensitivity to political costs, especially in the context of the British external threat,
crucially contributed to the emir's decision not to interfere with the opium economy.
Even so at the turn of the century, Afghanistan's opium production remained fairly
limited. In 1908, opium was being produced in four districts in Afghanistan: Herat,
Kabul, Kandahar, and Jalabad (from which it was being imported to the north-west
provinces of toady's Pakistan), but "not to any great extent."9
However, even this:successful source-country counternarcotics policy did not
solve Britain's insurgency problems in the region. The rebellious frontier tribes found
6 Report on the Administration of the Punjab and Its Dependencies for the Year 1870-1871 (Lahore:
Government Civil Secretariat Press, 1871): cxxxiii.
7 Imperial Gazetteer ofIndia: Provincial Series, North-West Frontier Province (Calcutta: Superintendent
of Government Printing, 1908): 25, 65-6.
8 Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990): 15.
9 Imperial Gazetteer oflndia: 30.
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other sources of financing and avoided dependency on the opium economy. Far from
bankrupting and severely weakening the belligerents through its counternarcotics
suppression policies, Britain finally adopted a policy of conciliation and arms
interdiction. Through naval patrols in the Persian Gulf, Britain tried to control the arms
supply to rebellious Pashtun tribes while it allowed loyal tribes to trade in arms without
restraint. Britain also paid tribal warriors for patrolling caravan routes through the
Khyber Pass, formed them into local militias, such as the Khyber Rifles and the Tochi
Scouts, and by 1915 had recruited some 7,500 Pashtun into the regular Indian army. In
effect, Britain adopted a policy of cooptation toward the martial Pashtun tribes.
In sum, Britain was clearly aware that the belligerents' positive involvement in
the opium economy would increase the their strength and hence attempted to suppress the
opium economy. But although through interdiction Britain did manage to keep opium
production in the region limited, it did not succeed in bankrupting and severely
weakening the Pashtun belligerents. The Pashtun marauders found other sources of
financing and carried on with their insurgency and raids. The prediction of the
conventional view thus failed to materialize. Moreover, local Afghan elites were sensitive
to the costs of destroying the drug economy. The behaviors of both ruling elites and the
effects of counternarcotics policies on the strength of belligerents are thus consistent with
the theory of political capital of illicit economies and contradict the conventional view.
HI. The Rise of Opium and Heroin Production in Afghanistan in the 20 th Century
Despite the early liberal drug policies of Afghanistan rulers, opium production did
not increase in Afghanistan until 1950s. Major structural changes in the international
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opium and heroin supply market drove the initial expansion of drug production and trade
in Afghanistan. The first structural. change allowing for the shift of production to
Afghanistan was the change in Iran's policies toward drugs. Although opium had been
cultivated in Iran since the eleventh century, its usage became a major problem in the
1950s when the country had an estimated one million addicts. This rapid increase in
addiction led the Shah's government to ban poppy cultivation in 1955. As Iranian
supplies of opium disappeared, entrepreneurial Afghans stepped in, exploiting traditional
smuggling routes.'0 Despite the reversal of the Iranian policy in 1969 that allowed limited
cultivation, Afghan opium production continued to grow in the early 1970s, with Iran as
the major market. Afghanistan's experience with modern global drug commerce
commenced in the 1970s, when large number of Westerners arrived in the country to
"drop out and turn on" inexpensively. Before the 1973 coup in Afghanistan, it was
estimated that some 5,000 to 6,000 hippies lived in Kabul.'"
Yet it was the tremendous increase in external demand that drove Afghanistan's
integration into the big league of producers and traffickers of illicit narcotics. Until the
1980s, the two major international markets for opiates, North America and Western
Europe, were supplied by the Golden Triangle countries of Southeast Asia. The situation
changed in mid-1970s when the governments of Vietnam and Laos fell, thus disrupting
the link between the Golden Triangle supply of Burma, Thailand, and Laos and the
Western demand countries. Moreover, a prolonged drought in the late 1970s and early
1980s.also reduced the ability of the Golden Triangle to supply the world heroin demand.
10 Scott B. MacDonald, "Afghanistan," in Scott B. MacDonald and Bruce Zagaris, eds., International
Handbook on Drug Control (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1992): 317.
" Linette Albert, "Afghanistan: A Perspective," in Louis Dupree and Linette Albert, eds. Afghanistan in the
1970s (New York: Praeger, 1974): 257. Cultivation was illegal during the 1970s, but the prohibition was
scarcely enforced.
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The disruption of the traditional supply thus created an opportunity for the Golden
Crescent countries, mainly Pakistan and Afghanistan. Moreover, the Iranian market for
Afghan opium was also disrupted by the fall of the Shah and the Islamic revolution in
1979. The Iranian market for Afghan opium shrunk at roughly the same time that the
traditional smuggling routes to Iran were blocked by Soviet forces occupying
Afghanistan.
The nature of the Soviet occupation, moreover, significantly contributed to the
explosion of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. The Soviet occupation forces in
Afghanistan adopted a policy of starving the mujahideen by applying a scorched earth
policy and destroying food crops. This policy of systematic agricultural destruction was
located within a larger policy of "depopulation through firepower" and the desire to
weaken the infrastructure support of the mujahideen through indiscriminate village
destruction. The Soviet destruction of cultivable land was compounded by the resisting
mujahideens' own policies: opposing factions would mine each other's aqueducts, and
further destroy irrigation systems. Cultivation of crops demanding more than a minimum
amount of water became infeasible. As Afghan agronomist Mohammad Qasim Yusufi
observed in 1988, "[b]ecause of war conditions, agricultural production factors such as
labour force, fertilizers, irrigation water, improved seed varieties, agricultural machinery,
proper farming and management, maintenance of land have been greatly disrupted on the
one hand, and the government pays very little or no attention to the agricultural sector of
the country on the other hand."' 2 By 1987, the agricultural output was only a third of
what it had been in 1978 (not much to start with). Large segments of the population were
12 Mohammad Qasim Yusufi, "Effects of the War on Agriculture," in Bo Huldt and Erland Jansson, eds.
The Tragedy ofAfghanistan: The Social, Cultural and Political Impact of the Soviet Invasion (London:
Croom Helm, 1988): 212.
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thus left with no option but to turn to the cultivation of poppy (which could grow in the
poorest agricultural conditions) and the production of opium for livelihood. 3" Suddenly,
not only was there an opportunity to penetrate the international heroin and opium market,
but such an agricultural switch became a matter of survival.
IV. The Mujahideen of the 1980s and Drugs: Testing the Effect of Belligerents'
Positive Involvement in the Illicit Narcotics Economy
This period is one where various mujahideen commanders gradually become
positively involved in the illicit opium.economy. The state of the overall economy is
poor; the character of the illicit economies - both opium poppy cultivation and mining for
gems with Afghan technology - are labor-intensive; traffickers are present; and
government response to the illicit economy is a mixture of tacit acquiescence and
eradication. The reasons for this "mixed government" policy were the collapse of
Afghan government authority across the country and the policy of Soviet occupation
forces. As Afghan government authority had collapsed, the mujahideen commanders
became the governing authority in their territories. As they did not try to eradicate the
spreading poppy cultivation, a policy of local tacit acquiescence emerged. At the same
time, the Soviet occupation .forces practiced a policy of "eradicating" the entire
agricultural production, although they did not specifically target poppy cultivation. 14
13 J. Bruce Amstutz, Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation (Washington, DC: National
Defense University, 1986): 133; and David Isby, Russia's War in Afghanistan (London: Osprey, 1986): 8.
4 :The interaction of the Soviet military with the illicit narcotics economy, however, was more complex
than eradication through the scorched earth policy and interdiction through the control of roads that were
used for traffic. As the war dragged on, heroin addiction rates among Soviet soldiers grew progressively
high. By the mid-1980s, the addiction problem became so acute that the Soviet high command had to limit
the service of some units and personnel in Afghanistan to nine months. But even this rapid turnover policy
did not stop addiction rates from spreading. For details, see, for example, John Cooley, Unholy Wars:
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Given this combination of structural and policy factors, the conventional view predicts
that the mujahideen positively involved in the drug trade will derive financial profits, but
the level of those profits will be limited by the Soviet policy of agricultural -- hence also
poppy -- destruction. The theory of political capital of illicit economies, on the other
hand, predicts that belligerents will derive not only financial profits, but also freedom of
action and political capital.
Throughout the 1980s, the Afghan military resistance to the Soviet invasion in
1979 remained hopelessly divided and politically disorganized. Unable to overcome
ethnic rifts, the various resistance groups engaged in constant bickering and even in
vicious infighting. Even though the Peshawar political parties described below did finally
form a political alliance against the Soviets in 1985 and consequently began to jell into a
more cohesive military force and their combat operations improved, the mujahideen
remained essentially disunited until the Soviet withdrawal in 1989.
Seven Sunni and four Shia parties formed the basis of the military resistance
along ethnic and tribal lines. Burhanuddin Rabbani's Jamiat-i-Islami (Islamic Society)
and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-Islami (Islamic Party) became the largest of the
resistance organizations. Hezb-i-Islamic was 75 percent Pashtun, primarily from the
Ghilzai and smaller tribes (Hekmatyar himself is a Kharruti Pashtun). Its strongest bases
of support were in northeastern Afghanistan and among the refugee population in
Pakistan."5 Until the emergence of the Taliban in 1994, Hekmatyar received the largest
share of aid from Pakistan and the CIA. Jamiat became the main resistance organization
Afghanistan, America, and International Terrorism (London: Pluto Press, 2002): 109. Moreover, the Soviet
army personnel began trafficking Afghan opiates into Russia.
" For a detailed description of the resistance groups, see Barnett Rubin, Fragmentation of Afghanistan
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995): 215-6.
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for the northern minority groups, dominated by Tajiks (Rabbani was a Badakhshani
Tajik), but also including Uzbeks and some Pashtuns. Much less ideologically rigid than
Hekmatyar's Hezb, Jamiat allowed its regional commanders much greater autonomy, and
several of them, namely Ahmed Shah Massoud - the Lion of Panjshir - and Ismail Khan
of Herat rose to prominence.
In 1979, Maulavi Yunus Khalis left Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-Islami, and with
affiliated leaders such as Pashtun tribal leader Maulavi Jallaluddin Haqqani and the
Arsala brothers, created his own Hezb-i-Islami. Khalis's small, but militarily effective
party, was composed overwhelmingly of Ghilzai and other eastern Pashtun tribesmen.
The last major fundamentalist party, Ittehad-I-Silami Bara-yi Azadi Afghanistan (Islamic
Union for the Freedom of Afghanistan) was formed by Abdur Rasoul Sayyaf with the
help of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) in early 1980. A Kharruti
Pashtun, Sayyaf had strong ties to the Arab sponsors of the mujahideen, but only to a few
Afghan fighters or commanders.
Three traditional political parties also appeared as separate groups of resistance by
1980. Professor Sibghatullah Mojaddidi's Jeba-i-Milli Nejat (National Liberation Front)
was the weakest of these parties, drawing support from pockets of Pashtun tribes, mainly
Durrani Pashtuns in Kandahar. Pir Sayed Ahmed Gailani's Mahaz-i-Milli Islami-yi
Afghanistan (National Islamic Front of Afghanistan) was based on Gailani's family ties
and his Qadiriyya Sufi followers. The largest of three traditional parties was the Hakarat-i
Inqilab-i Islami (Movement of the Islamic Revolution). Based strongly on "inward-
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looking, traditionalist, provincial ulama," this party was by all accounts the strongest of
the armed opposition groups early in the war. 16
In addition to the Sunni parties based in Pakistan, a number of smaller, Shia'
parties, based primarily inthe West and supported by Iran, emerged. Headed by Hazara
religious leader, Sheikh Sayed Ali Beheshti, the Shura-i-Inqilab-i Ittefaq-i Afghanistan
(the Revolutionary Council of the Islamic Front of Afghanistan) controlled the Hazarajat
region between 1979 and 1982, and due to the rugged topography remained largely
isolated from the war against the Soviets. The other three Shia parties were: Sheikh Asif
Mohseni's Harakat-i Islami (Islamic Movement), drawing support from both the Hazara
and the Qizilibash populations; Sazman-i Nasr-i Islam-yi Afghanistan (Islamic Victory of
Organization of Afghanistan), a strongly Khomeinist Hazara group; and Pazdaran-i
Jihad-i Islami (Protectors of the Islamic Holy War), another Khomeinist Hazara group.
The rugged terrain of Afghanistan was ideal for the resistance. High mountains
and barren desserts limited opportunities for conventional military encounters. Only
certain routes through the mountains were possible, creating an ideal setting for
ambushes, sniping, and hit-and-run tactics, all favoring the insurgents. Early on, a tactical
pattern emerged. The mujahideen mounted attacks from the mountains; the Soviets
responded with combined offensives up the valleys to relieve pressure on the cities and
the major roads. Nonetheless, few of the combat mujahideen were adept at anything other
than these limited guerrilla tactics, and all were poorly armed and trained.
Perhaps surprisingly, given the conditions in the country and the state of the
resistance, only four major resistance leaders -- Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Mullah Nassim
16 Ibid.: 212. See also Roy Olivier, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1990).
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Akhundaza, Pir Sayad Ahmed Gaylani, and Ismat Muslim -- systematically exploited the
drug production for military purposes from early on. As the mujahideen captured the
prime agricultural areas of Afghanistan's south, they encouraged the local population to
grow poppy, doubling the country's opium harvest to 575 tons between 1982 and 1983.17
The mujahideen then transported the opium across the border to Pakistan where they sold
it to Pakistan heroin refiners operating under the protection of General Fazle Haq,
governor of the North West Frontier.province. By 1988, there were an estimated 100 to
200 heroin refineries in the province's Khyber district alone. "
With the drug profits, Hekmatyar was able to maintain a hierarchically organized
party and conventional army. In the summer of 1988, expecting that the Soviet
withdrawal would lead to the decrease of foreign support, he instructed his men to search
for precious stones and to cultivate poppy. 19 After the Soviet withdrawal, Hekmatyar also
used the income from drugs to make a transition from guerrilla warfare to building up a
more conventional army.
In the Helmand Valley, Mullah Nasim Akhundaza emerged as a major sponsor of
the opium economy and as one of Afghanistan's main traffickers, Nasim set production
quotas, decreeing in 1989, for example, that 50 percent of the land be sowed with poppy
and providing cash advances to peasants on poppy cultivation and opium production.
Any landlord who failed to fulfill the production quotas had to pay the difference, a
policy that drove many into debt. Those who did not comply with these provisions were
subject to harsh penalties, and reportedly including torture and execution. Mullah Nasim
17 United States Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1984): 4.
18 McCoy: 478.
19 Barnett Rubin, The Search for Peace in Afghanistan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995): 118.
384
also sought to control as much of the trafficking component of the trade as possible,
including by maintaining an office in Zahidan, Iran to handle the trade once it left
Afghanistan.20 Nasim thus effectively cut out the traffickers from the production business
in the areas under his control, regulating the farmers' economy very directly and heavy-
handedly. "We must grow and sell opium to fight our holy war against the Russian
nonbelievers," expained Nasim's elder brother, Mohammed Rasul.21
Sayad Ahmed Gaylani was another major mujahideen warlord who effectively
used the illicit economy to strengthen his resistance group. Called "Effendi Juan,"
Gaylani was high on the Russian suspect list in drug operations. The Soviet intelligence
report on Gaylani's National Islamic Front of Afghanistan found that it "had significant
financial resources. Besides the aid from various foundations in the USA, Western
Europe and Arab countries, it makes profits on selling drugs and exacting taxes from the
population."22
Finally, Ismat Muslim also took early advantage of the drug economy to build up
his power base. Engaged in smuggling since his days of training in the USSR, Ismat
Muslim was conducting military and smuggling operations, including heroin trade,
between Kandahar and Quetta as early as 1979. Following a dispute with the ISI in 1984
over his smuggling activities and his refusal to join one of the Peshawar parties that the
ISI insisted were to be the sole beneficiaries of Pakistani aid, Ismat Muslim defected to
20 Rubin (1995a): 263.
21 Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics ofHeroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade Revised Edition,(New York: Lawrence Hill Books, 2003): 484-85.
22 Lt. Col. Yury Shvedov and team, War in Afghanistan, trans. by Natalie Kovalenko (Moscow:- Ministry of
Defense, Institute of Military History, 1991): 131-2.
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the regime. His principal role for the regime was to control transit points and roads
between Pakistan's Baluchistan.and Kandahar. 23
The positive involvement of the mujahideen in the illicit economy brought the
expected improvements in procurement and logistics, predicted by both theories. For
example, the mujahideen went from carrying single-shot rifles to automatic weapons and
light artillery.24 Moreover, prior to fully tapping into the drug trade and in areas where
the mujadideen forces did not have a. ready access to the drug trade, the mujahideen had
to rely on costly and time-consuming ambushes for weapons, ammunition, food, clothing,
and other military supplies. Such ambushes had to be conducted by large forces who had
to maintain their position for up to an hour.25 Amassing a large number of fighters for a
prolonged period, however, critically exposed the mujahideen to detection and possible
destruction by the Soviets.
Nonetheless, prior to solving the logistics and procurement problems by tapping
into the drug trade and prior to massive influxes of U.S. military aid to the mujahideen,
these highly risky ambushes for spoils were essential for maintaining the fighters in the
field. Mujahideen were unpaid volunteers, with responsibilities for supporting their
families. In the absence of such ambushes, they could neither gather enough weapons,
especially heavy weapons, to fight, nor could they feed their families. In fact, it was a
standard practice to sell some of the captured weapons in Pakistan and then give the
money to the mujahideen's families to live on.26
23 For details, see Rubin (1995a): 159.
24 MacDonald: 319.
25 Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau, Afghan Guerrilla Warfare: In the Words of the Mujahideen
Fighters (St. Paul: MBI Publishing Company, 2001): 65-6.
26 Ibid.
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Furthermore, the mujahideen had to mass captured weapons and those supplied
from Pakistan in large supply depots. Such depots, however, were a prime target for
Soviet forces. In contested areas, the mujahideen tried to move the depots around to avoid
capture. But the major supply depots, especially those that held heavy weapons of critical
defense against tanks, airpower, and artillery, were stationary and vulnerable. 27 A classic
dictum of guerrilla warfare is mobility: not to have to hold ground and to be able to
retreat. But logistics demands nonetheless forced the mujahideen who had not become
positively involved in the drug trade to hold ground.
On the other hand, the mujahideen who were positively-involved in the drug
traffic were able to establish some form of local administration in areas over which they
held sway, and their freedom of action increased. These local administrations were
responsible for logistics, local security, crop cultivation, and the provision of other social
services.28 Especially poppy cultivation was deemed to be important since it brought
subsistence to the population overall as well as generated monetary profits for financing
the war effort. Poppies were planted, irrigated, pruned, and harvested, not only by the
peasants and criminal organizations, but also by the mujahideen groups themselves. With
the opium profits, the mujahideen could buy weapons from various arm-smuggling
groups, and they were not constrained to the same extent by the need to conduct
ambushes for weapons acquisition and protect weapons depots. As predicted by the
theory of political capital of illicit economies, the belligerents' positive involvement in
the illicit economy brought improvements in freedom of action.
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27 Ibid.
28 MacDonald: 319.
In some areas, the poppy profits allowed commanders to become powerful
warlords, increasingly independent of external sponsors.29 In fact, control over the drug
economy became an important source of legitimacy for the mujahideen commanders,
who by the late 1980 emerged as a new elite and claimed power in their areas of control.
Traditionally, the source of legitimacy was tribal elites in Afghanistan was their ability to
provide security and distribute goods to their communities. In order to achieve and
maintain this position of leadership, the khan "must provide food for others, arbitrate in
their disputes and be unflinching in his defense of the qawm [communal group]. a30
Positive involvement in the illicit drug trade allowed the mujahideen commanders
to deliver such distributable goods to their communities. As Olivier Roy argues, the "new
notables" established their power as redistributors: "The new notable creates a network of
clients, strengthened by matrimonial bonds, thanks to the goods he is.able to distribute.
These goods do not come from extorting peasants, but from international sources.
... [M]ore recently, profits [come] from marketing weapons and drugs (opium)."3'
Meanwhile, as the traditional (non-poppy) agricultural production and overall economic
activity was destroyed, the traditional elites had nothing to distribute, and their power
was undermined. Positive involvement in the illicit economy thus bestowed legitimacy on
the mujahideen commanders. Although all mujahideen fighting the Soviets had some
nationalist legitimacy with the local population, those who embraced the illicit economy
and used it to distribute goods and provide administration, acquired much greater
legitimacy and achieved positions of leadership and power. The mujahideen leaders thus
progressively learned how to exploit the drug economy to build up institutions of
29 Rubin (1995b): 117.
30 Roy (1990): 23.
31 Oliver Roy, Afghanistan: From Holy War to Civil War (Princeton: Darwin Press, 1995): 107.
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resistance and an independent power base. In short, positive involvement in the illicit
economy brought not only financial rewards and freedom of action to the mujahideen
commanders, but also political capital.
Mullah Nasim Akhundaza, for example, used the multiple benefits from the drug
trade to establish a firm and stable control over the Helmand Valley. In an interview in
1987, he claimed to have established hospitals, clinics, and forty madrasas. 32 His power
became so extensive that in 1988 he was singled out by the Communist President of
Afghanistan Najibullah in Najibullah's appeal to seven major commanders as the only
Sunni traditionalist.33
Typically, the mujahideen commanders used the profits from drugs more for
personal enrichment than for systematically building political power, as Hekmatyar did.
Only Ahmed Massoud, a latecomer to the drug trade in 1980s, used the profits from
drugs to develop an integrated political-military-financial system and to build the only
truly modern Islamist politico-military organization in Afghanistan.34 At first, Massoud
had ignored the poppy cultivation because he considered it anti-Islamic. However then,
while not actively participating in the drug economy and disapproving of it, Massoud
nonetheless did not engage in eradication because the political repercussions were.too
large.
Despite the assured nationalist legitimacy of the mujahideen and the population's
resentment against the occupying forces, negative involvement in the illicit economy on
32 Quoted in Rubin (1995a): 245.
33 Nasim Akhundaza was assassinated in Peshawar in 1990. Before his death, Akhundaza greatly curbed
the opium production in Helmand as a part of a deal with U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Robert Oakley.
The State Department later revoked the deal, citing U.S. laws against negotiating with drug traffickers, and
Akhundaza's brother who took over Helmand again supported drug production.
34 For details, Rubin (1995a): 243-5.
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the part of the mujahideen would have been very costly for them and would have
compromised intelligence gathering. The mujahideen relied on local inhabitants to
provide adequate warning about advancing Soviet forces to such an extent that they often
failed to post their own security guards. In areas where the population had fled or were
tired of the war, the mujahideen were had essentially no intelligence on Soviet
movements. 35 Where the drug economy was not present, the rural population was unable
to obtain basic subsistence and had leave: either for cities or for Pakistan. Thus, if the
mujahideen had tried to eradicate the poppy fields, they would have further compounded
the intelligence gathering problem by effectively pushing out the local population. On the
other hand, the belligerents' positive involvement in or noninvolvement in the drug
economy allowed the population to stay in the regions.and facilitated intelligence-
gathering. In short, as predicted by the theory of political capital of illicit economies,
positive involvement in the illicit economy thus generated not only financial and weapons
gains, but also freedom of action, and, crucially, political capital, including intelligence
provision.
Explaining the Non-involvement of Some Mujahideen Commanders
Given the widespread benefits and the relative increase in power that positive
involvement with the illicit narcotics economy brought to some commanders, a question
arises of why only so few of the mujahideen resistance groups exploited the drug
economy in the early 1980s and why it took a number of years for the other mujahideen
to become positively involved in the drug economy. Several factors account for this
situation. The first reason, as described in the section on Afghanistan's integration into
35 Jalali and Grau: 225.
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the global illicit narcotics market, is that it was only in mid-1980s that Afghanistan
started playing a really prominent role in the global drug trade. For several years, some
resistance groups could not exploit the illicit production and trade because of the illicit
narcotics economy limited size. As the economy grew, many more could participate and
eventually did. Moreover, during most of the 1980s, drug production centered
predominantly in the southern part of Afghanistan, mainly the Helmand region, thus
making it difficult for non-Southerners to access the illicit economy.
The second reason is that the belligerent group's interaction with the illicit
economy followed a learning curve. Although the narcotics economy grew in
Afghanistan, many of the mujahideen leaders were simply not accustomed to exploiting
it, and, in fact, condemned on religious grounds as anti-Islamic. It took the groups several
years to learn how to effectively exploit the illicit narcotics economy. But by 1989 and
from then onward, many more mujahideen commanders shed their religious inhibitions,
obtained the knowledge necessary to exploit the illicit economy, and, in fact, seized the
opportunity to become positively involved in it. In doing so, they provided others with an
example to emulate. A modus operandi contagion effect clearly took place.
This learning curve in the late 1980s was also facilitated by the deterrent effect of
the Stinger missiles provided to the mujahideen by the United States and by the softening
of Soviet counterinsurgency policy. As improved air defense allowed the mujahideen to
prevent the further destruction of the agricultural fields and as the Soviet motivation to
further degrade the countryside weakened, agricultural production again picked up, but
centered mainly on opium poppy cultivation. By then, the mujahideen participated in the
illicit economy at full speed. In 1989, a Russian report attributed to the big "[s]even
391
major mujahideen groups an annual production of opium ... of over 800 tons, or more
than twice the annual national production of Pakistan and Iran combined."3 6 Whether or
not the Russian data are exaggerated, there is no doubt that the various mujahideen
groups became progressively enmeshed in Afghanistan's drug economy as they learned
how to exploit it for their purposes.
Moreover, not only did Hekmatyar, Gaylani, Nasim, and Muslim provide a
successful modus operandi for others to emulate, the learning of curve of how to exploit
the drug economy also took place within the various groups. Hekmatyar, for example,
initially only taxed the cultivation of poppy. However, by the end of the 1980s, unlike
other commanders who were satisfied to sell raw opium at bazaars in Afghanistan and
Baluchistan, Hekmatyar, in partnership with Pakistani heroin syndicates, invested in
building processing plants.37 By the late 1980s, he controlled at least six heroin refineries
at Koh-I-Soltan that processed opium from the Helmand province.38
The third factor explaining the initially limited involvement of the mujahideen in
the 1980s with the drug economy was the supply of foreign aid. United States, Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, and Iran all provided aid money and weapons to the mujahideen. U.S. aid,
which via Pakistan's ISI went only to Islamist commanders and predominantly to Ghilzai
Pashtuns, combined with Saudi aid, amounted to an estimated $6 billion in guns and
money during the 1980s. From 1987, when Washington stepped up its covert aid
program, annual shipments of arms amounted to 65,000 tons. 39 The arms included mainly
assault weapons, machine guns, 82-mm mortars, SAM-7 missiles, and finally after 1985,
36 Shvedov: 139-40.
37 Rubin (1995a): 199.
3 Ibid.: 183.
39 Michael Griffin, Reaping the Whirlwind (London: Pluto Press, 2001): 147.
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Stinger missiles that ultimately ended Soviet air superiority. The Soviets supplied the
Communist government's national army with jets, helicopters, gunships, tanks, and
rocket launchers. 40 As the level of foreign aid picked up, some mujahideen did not feel an
acute need to search for alternative sources of funding and procurement and ignored the
opium economy. But the anticipation of a drying up of foreign aid in the late 1980s led
Hekmatyar to greatly increase his group's participation in the illicit economy and
motivated other mujahideen leaders to follow suit.
The fourth factor accounting for the gradual learning on the part of the
mujahideen about how to take advantage of the narcotics economy was the availability of
other lucrative commodities. In the northern areas controlled by Massoud's Supervisory
Council of the North, mining of precious gems brought substantial resources as well as
employed large segments of the population. Once agricultural production picked up in the
late 1980s, the Council also taxed various agricultural products, and eventually this
taxation included the collection of rents from opium poppy growing.
Finally, what many of the other mujahideen groups lacked compared to
Hekmatyar were the very close relations to the Pashtun refugee community in Pakistan
and Pakistan's ISI. Although all of the mujahideen had contacts and support groups in
Pakistan, Hekmatyar's connections across the border were especially tight. The brutal
nature of the Soviet occupation forced large numbers of Afghans to flee to Pakistan. As
argued by Edward R. Girardet, "the refugees have infiltrated two vital areas of the
economy in the frontier region - the arms business and the profligate smuggling of
consumer goods and opium." 41 Trucks from the Pakistan's army National Logistics Cell
40 Ibid.
41 Edward R. Girardet, Afghanistan: The Soviet War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985): 207.
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(NLC), arriving with CIA arms from Karachi, frequently returned loaded with heroin,
protected from police search by ISI papers.42 Hekmatyar was the ISI's favorite recipient
of aid. Whether or not the ISI (and as some analysts argue, the CIA itself)43 actively
encouraged the mujahideen, and Hekmatyar specifically, to exploit the illicit economy to
shore up their resistance, it is clear that Hekmatyar learned how to exploit the arms
smuggling channels from Pakistan also for the smuggling of heroin.
In sum, not only did drug production in Afghanistan during the 1980s increase
dramatically and become progressively well-integrated into the global trade in opiates,
but the various mujahideen groups also progressively learned how to exploit the illicit
economy to improve their resistance. After the Soviet withdrawal, they also used the
illicit economy to transform themselves from anti-Soviet guerrilla leaders into powerful
regional warlords. Positive involvement in the illicit economy generated not only
physical resources for the mujahideen, but also freedom of action and political capital. It
also greatly facilitated information gathering. The period of the 1980s resistance thus
supports the theory of political capital of illicit economies.
42 Haq: 954; and Griffin: 145. High officials of the Pakistani government were involved in the drug trade.
By the mid-1980s, the drug trade created an illicit economy in Pakistan of, by some accounts, as much as
$8 billion, or half the size of the official one. See, for example, Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin:
The CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 2003). Among high-
ranking officials directly incriminated in the drug trade were Lieutenant-General Fazle Haq, governor of
North West Frontier Province and a confidant of General Zia; Hamid Hasnain, another personal friend of
Zia's and vice-president of the state-owned Habib Bankp; and Haji Ayub Afridi, the National Assembly
member for Khyber agency, an important coordinator of Pakistan's Afghanistan policy, and according to
many reports, Pakistan's largest drug baron. For details, see, Sumita Kumar, Drug Trafficking in Pakistan
(New Dehli Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, 1995).
43 See, for example, McCoy, and Haq.
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IV. Warlords and the Illicit Economy in the Early 1990s: Testing the Effects of
Change from Non-involvement to Positive Involvement and of the Amplifying Factors
Character of the Illicit Economy and "Government" Response
During the early 1990s, all major belligerent groups embraced the illicit opium
economy, including those who previously were not involved. The combination of
structural and policy factors remained: poor state of the overall economy, the presence of
traffickers, and overall tacit acquiescence to the illicit economy. During limited periods,
certain warlords also undertook eradication. Various warlords were also involved in both
labor-intensive and labor-non-intensive illicit economies. Given the context of the
constant infighting among the warlords, the conventional view predicts that warlords
should try to eradicate the crops of their opponents to limit their resources and if they do
so, they will severely weaken their opponents. The theory of political capital of illicit
economies conversely predicts that warlords will not try to eradicate the poppy fields of
their opponents for fear of alienating the local population in the contested area, or if they
do adopt eradication that they will decrease their relative strength vis-a-vis their
opponents. The second prediction of the political capital of illicit economies is that given
the overall tacit acquiescence policy in the country and the presence of many competing
belligerent actors, local warlords who adopt eradication in their own territories will either
be defeated or will not be able to sustain eradication. Finally, the theory also predicts that
warlords exploiting labor-intensive illicit economies will have greater political capital
than warlords exploiting labor non-intensive illicit economies.
The early 1990s were characterized by shifting and fluid alliances and constant
infighting among the warlords who emerged out of the various 1980s mujahideen
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factions. After the withdrawal of the. Soviets in 1989, a.three-year, struggle ensued pitting
the mujahideen against the regime of President Najibullah. A coalition of Tajik forces,
under the military leadership of Ahmed Shah Massoud and the political leadership of
Burhanuddin Rabbani, and of Uzbek forces under the leadership of a formerly pro-
communist general; Rashid Dostum, seized KabuL The Pashtuns lost control of their
capital, and an internal war began almost immediately. with Hekmatyar laying siege to
the capital and shelling it mercilessly.44 But Hekmatyar never succeeded in.mobilizing
the Pashtun tribal shuras behind him. The tribes were really not interested in the struggle
over Kabul, they were happy tending to their poppy fields in the south. Although
Hekmatyar controlled several refining facilities in the south, he did not control large
swaths of land there. While he continued receiving aid from Arab and Pakistani radicals
and making money on drug trafficking and money counterfeiting in Pakistan, he did not
have much to offer to the Pasthun peasants and the tribal leadership. Hekmatyar thus
lacked a consolidated regional base. As predicted by the political capital of illicit
economies theory, warlords sponsoring labor-intensive illicit economies obtained greater
political capital.
Clearly aware of this problem, Hekmatyar spent much of his military effort on
acquiring control over the opium-rich Pahstun Helmand valley. But Helmand already had
its master and one who was a dutiful sponsor of opium poppy cultivation for years: none
other than Mullah Nasim Akhundaza. Already in the late 1980s, Hekmatyar's
commanders started challenging Nasim over the poppy fields in Helmand. After months
of savage fighting, Nasim won and consolidated control over the valley. Both Nasim and
44 For details, see Larry Goodson, Afghanistan's Endless War (Seattle: University of Washington Press,
2001): 73-6; and Ahmed Rashid, Taliban (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001): 21.
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Hekmatyar were Pashtuns, thus neither had a greater ethnic legitimacy with the Helmand.
Both were roughly equal in their brutality. And both were roughly equally matched in
their militarily strength, being two of the strongest and most successful mujahideen
commanders. What Nassim had and Hekmatyar lacked was the sponsorship of a labor-
intensive aspect of the illicit drug economy. Nassim controlled the poppy fields and thus
provided large segments of the local population with livelihood. Hekmatyar controlled
several heroin-refining plants in Pakistan, but this labor non-intensive aspect of the drug
trade allowed him to employ only a tiny fraction of the number of the people whom
Nassim provided with livelihood. During the fight over the Helmand, the population thus
sided with Nasim. The support of the peasants for Nasim is consistent with the prediction
of the political capital of illicit economies theory.
Fortunes changed for Nasim in 1990. Having struck a deal with the United States
via U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Robert Oakley, Mullah Nasim agreed to radically
curtail drug production in Helmand in exchange for $2 million in the form of USAID's
development programs. Nasim kept up his promise, cutting production and forcing the
peasants to forgo cultivation. Later that year he invited U.S. embassy officials for an
inspection of the valley. The American delegation apparently found the eradication
effective, noting that opium prices in the nearby Baluchistan province tripled.45 The
increase in opium prices, however, angered Hekmatyar whose refineries relied on
Helmand's opium, and he ordered Mullah Nasim and five of his commanders gunned
down. Moreover, the United States government, invoking U.S. laws against negotiating
with drug traffickers, revoked the deal and did not deliver any aid to the Helmand region.
Hit hard by Nasim' s suppression of opium poppy cultivation and production, the
45 McCoy: 485.
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population became restive. Nasim's brother, Mohammed Rasul, who inherited control of
the Helmand valley, annulled the prohibition policy toward cultivation. Given
Hekmatyar's (and others') continuing challenge to take over control of the region, Rasul
clearly calculated he could not afford the political and financial losses resulting from
eradication and had to pacify the population. Maintaining control over the territory
necessitated a positive involvement in the illicit economy or a provision of alternative
livelihoods.
In a similar way, warlord Abdul Qadir of the Arsala clan in Nangarhar, the second
largest opium region in Afghanistan at that time, accepted an offer of international aid in
exchange for cutting opium production by half. Haji Abdul Qadir and his brothers had
sponsored Nangarhar province's skyrocketing expansion of opium production for several
years. They were also positively involved in another illicit economy: the tax-free illicit
smuggling of legal goods from Dubai onto Pakistan. Their control of the Jalabalad airport
ideally positioned them to participate in this illicit economy and strike up an alliance with
Afghan and Pakistani Pashtun truckers. Thus although the prohibition on opium poppy
curtailed their income to some extent, they had another assured stream of revenue. But
the labor-non-intensive smuggling with: licit goods could not provide employment
opportunities for the large Nangarhar population. Thus, after the crop-substitution funds
ran out and were not renewed, the population became restive, and the Arsalas recalled the
prohibition on opium poppy cultivation.46 Thus, in the cases of both the Akhundazas and
the Arsalas, the prediction of the theory of political capital of illicit economies
materialized. Negative involvement in the illicit economy without adequate compensation
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46 Ibid.
for the population jeopardized the warlords' hold on power and ultimately was
unsustainable.
In the Ghor province of the South, the illicit economy consisted mainly of
trafficking in drugs. The central provincial authorities imposed a 10 percent tax on all
transshipment of drugs through their territory. In. one year, the governor was believed to
have accumulated two tons of opium through taxation.47 Of course, the non-labor
intensive traffic did not translate into many job opportunities for the local population, and
Ghor remained one of the most isolated and poorest regions of Afghanistan.
In the northwest, Dostum received support primarily from Uzbekistan, and
possibly also from Russia. As new drug trafficking routes developed through Uzbekistan
to Russia and onward to Europe, Dostum too became progressively enmeshed in the
illicit narcotic traffic.48 In the west, Ismael Khan in Herat maintained close relations with
Iran and taxed all traffic going to Iran, whether with licit goods or not. He too used his
revenues to build up strong and functioning institutions in Herat. He also controlled the
overland traffic to Dubai.
In the northeast, Massoud's and Rabbani's base consisted mainly of the Tajiks,
but also included some other northeastern ethnic groups. Massoud and Rabbani drew on
resources from their regional base in the northeastern province, including the mining of
precious gems, such as lapis lazuli and emeralds, and drug production and traffic. By then
any Massoud's inhibitions on participating in the drug trade were pushed aside. Instead
his people taxed various aspect of the illicit opium economy. Paid directly to the local
commanders, the tax on opium started at around 2.5 percent, but throughout the 1990s
47 Adam Pain, Opium Trading Systems in Helmand and Ghor, Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit, Issue
Paper Series, January 2006, http://www.areu.org.aflpublications/Opium%20Trading%20Systems.pdf
48 Cooley: 130.
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continued to climb until reaching 20 percent.49 Captured samples of raw opium from the
region under Massoud's and Rabbani's control - Badakhshan -- showed a morphine
content twice as high as elsewhere in the country, despite the fact that local farmers did
not use either irrigation or fertilizers. 50 Moreover, new trafficking routes via Tajikistan to
Russia and to Europe were also firmly under Massoud's and Rabanni's control. The
Northern Alliance's financing and procurement were further improved after the group
secured cooperation from a major Iranian drug baron, Hadj Gulyam. Gulyam ensured that
the Northern Alliance trucks coming, from Afghanistan:loaded with opium would return
with money and weapons.5 ' Massoud and Rabbani used the revenues not only to finance
their militias, but also to build up regionally based institutions, independent of Kabul. In
fact, it was the entanglement of Massoud in the drug trade that scared off the Clinton
Administration from embracing him against the Taliban during the 1990s.52
Massoud, a northerner and a Tajik, also resolved not to interfere with drug
production in the Pashtun south. His decision was driven by a desire to avoid
undermining already weak ties to a rival ethnic group and further alienating the local
population there that was already negatively disposed toward the Northerners..Massoud
undertook this decision despite the fact that from a financial perspective it would have
been more profitable for the Northerners to. eliminate production in the south and thus
push up prices in the north. In fact, overall the warlords did not try to destroy the fields of
their opponents. Instead, they: tried to seize them and control them. The prediction of the
49 Jonathan Goodhand, "From holy war to opium war? A case study of the opium economy in North East
Afghanistan," Central Asian Survey, 19 (2), June 2000: 265-280; Martin Cooke, "Afghanistan: Drugs and
Jewels Help Pay for War," The Daily Telegraph (Australia), July 31, 1999.
50 Griffin: 150.
5s Kanai Manayev, Drug-Fuelled Crime in Central Asia," The Times of Central Asia, January 4, 2001.
5s2 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004): 458, 519, 536.
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conventional view that competing warlords would try to eradicate each others' poppy
fields to increase their own relative balance of material power thus did not materialize.
The political situation in the country was characterized by the warlords' positively
involvement in various illicit economies, or as Barnett Rubin put it, by "regional-ethnic
war economies embedded in transnational networks.""5 These illicit economies not only
provided the regional commanders with income available to support their armies, but to
various degrees, depending on the character of the illicit economy, also with political
capital. The multiple benefits derived from these illicit economies thus vastly increased
the strength of the different warlords along many dimensions of power and greatly
enhanced the commanders' staying power despite their frequent infighting.
V. The Taliban and Drugs: Testing the Effects of Change from Negative Involvement
to Positive Involvement and of the Amplifying Factors Character of the Illicit Economy
and "Government" Response
The extent of the political capital that positive involvement in labor-intensive
illicit economies brings to belligerent groups is especially salient in the case of the
Taliban. The Taliban did not exploit the drug economy originally out of a need for
financial profits nor did it use these financial benefits to expand its military capabilities
and intensify the conflict. In the initial phase of conflict expansion, its financial resources
and the increase and improvement in its physical capabilities came from other sources;
namely from an external sponsor and from the successful exploitation of the illicit traffic
with legal goods, a labor-non-intensive illicit economy. Moreover, the Taliban's
" Barnett R. Rubin, "The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan," World Development, 28(10), 2000: 1789-1803, http://institute-for-afghan-
studies.org/ECONOMY/political_economy_of war_peace.htm, downloaded August 11, 2004.
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expansion through Afghanistan's territory also came mainly prior to its exploitation of
the narcotics economy. It was the need to consolidate its political capital once its military
expansion was largely accomplished that drove the Taliban to become positively
involved in the illicit economy.
A religious fundamentalist movement that became notorious for its unrestrained
brutality religious fanaticism, and ruthless oppression, the Taliban emerged on the
political and military scene of Afghanistan in 1994. Although led by Afghans,
specifically Mullah Omar, the Taliban was formed as a transnational network,
organizationally present both in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In Pakistan it drew primarily
on a sectarian network of madrasas educating Afghan refugees in Pakistan and on
political parties belonging to the Deobandi movement. Although Kandahari Pashtuns
dominated its leadership and also most of the rank-and-file, the movement did not simply
represent a particular ethnicity. Rather, as Barnett Rubin argues, it represented "a social
group, the privately educated, rural ulama and their students affiliated to the Deobandi
movement."5 4 Highly centralized, secretive, and dictatorial, the movement presented
itself as motivated by Islam and desiring to pacify and purify Afghanistan.
Fundamentally anti-modernist, the religious students of the Taliban sought to reconstruct
the Afghan state and society by imposing a very strict and almost backward interpretation
of Islam on the country.55 They emerged both within the context and as a reaction to the
inability of the various commanders to stop their bickering and prevent the disintegration
of Afghanistan into predatory warlordism at a time when both the Communist power
54 Barnett Rubin, "The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan," World Development, 28 (10),
2000: 1789-1803, http://institute-for-afghan-
studies.org/ECONOMY/political economy_of warpeace.htm.
55 William Maley, The Afghanistan Wars (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002): 223-6, 232.
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structure and the traditional tribal leaderships were either completely eliminated or
severely discredited. Meanwhile, the war-exhausted population was ready to accept peace
at any price. The Taliban's declared agenda consisted of restoring peace in Afghanistan,
disarming the population, enforcing Sharia, and defending the integrity and Islamic
character of Afghanistan.
Phase I: Taliban's Positive Involvement in a Labor Non-intensive ilicit Economy:
Testing the Effect of the Amplifying Factor Character of the Illicit Economy
In the first phase, the Taliban became positively engaged in the labor non-
intensive illicit economy: illicit smuggling with legal goods. The state of the overall
economy was desperately poor and traffickers were present, with local warlords imposing
high taxes on the traffickers. Although the warlords were not purposefully trying to
destroy the illicit smuggling economy, their capriciousness and greed severely hampered
the functioning of the illicit economy, de facto amounting to the warlords' negative
involvement. The theory of political capital of illicit economies thus predicts that the
belligerent group that is positively involved in the illicit economy - the Taliban -- will be
able to derive large benefits in terms of improved military capabilities and also political
capital. But the increase in the political capital will be limited by the labor non-intensive
aspect of the illicit economy.
Within a year and half of fall 1994, a group of originally perhaps as few as thirty
Talebs armed with only light rifles managed to expand militarily to such a degree that it
could take over large swaths of Afghanistan's territory. It managed to defeat most of the
many warlords present in the country, conquer Kabul, and relegate Ahmed Massoud to a
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small region in the north where he and his Northern Alliance hung on for dear life until
the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Two factors crucially contributed to the ability
of the Taliban guerrillas to strengthen their physical capabilities and expand militarily:
the aid of Pakistan and the ability to exploit a lucrative illicit economy. However, the
economy that the Taliban exploited in the early, key phases of its expansion was not the
narcotics economy, but rather the labor-non-intensive illicit traffic in undeclared legal
goods under the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement (ATTA).
At the beginning of their military operations in the fall of 1994, the Taliban were
poorly armed, had poor logistics, frequently ran out of ammunition, and numbered in the
hundreds. Over the course of the next few months, their numbers swelled to 15,000 as the
influx of the madrasas' religious students continued to pour into Afghanistan with the
active encouragement of Pakistan. Pakistan also provided direct aid in terms of money
and weapons. Early in the fall of 1994, by bombing the Taliban's opponents with artillery
fire, Pakistan allowed the Taliban to seize Spin Boldak and the arms depot at Pasha, a
major weapons cache with rockets, artillery ammunition, tank ammunition, and small
arms.56 Further seizures of weapons arsenals, such.as at the Kandahar airport where they
acquired six MIG-21 fighters (of which only one was operational) and four MIG-17
transport helicopters and at Sarkateb's base where they gained 20 tanks and two
additional MIG-17s, supplemented the considerable logistical and infrastructural support
the Taliban was receiving from Pakistan.57 Money also continued coming in from groups
in Saudi Arabia, and thus by October 1996 the Taliban had fielded at least 25,000 men,
56 Anthony Davis, "How the Taliban Became a Fighting Force," in William Maley, ed., Fundamentalism
Reborn: Afghanistan and the Taliban (New York: New York University Press, 1998): 46.
57 For details on the extent of Pakistan's involvement, see ibid, pp. 43-71; and Ahmed Rashid, "Pakistan
and the Taliban," William Maley, ed., Fundamentalism Reborn: Afghanistan and the Taliban (New York:
New York University Press, 1998): 85-6.
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complete with tanks, armored vehicles, helicopters, and fighter aircraft. Through
Pakistan's ISI, the Taliban was also able to recruit former Afghan personnel in Pakistan
refugee camps who were veteran pilots, tank drivers, and technicians to operate the
equipment by offering high salaries paid in U.S. dollars.5 8 Pakistan's interests behind its
support for the Taliban were twofold: A) A desire have Afghanistan under the control of
a force that was pro-Pakistani and not close to either Russia, India, or Iran B) A desire to
have secure access over Afghanistan's territory to Central Asia to conduct trade, badly
needed for Pakistan's depressed economy. And to have this trade assured without the
constant harassment of the marauding Afghan warlords who were charging exorbitant
tolls on routes and sometimes taking hostages.5 9
Apart from Pakistan's aid, the second source of the Taliban's military capabilities
was its positive involvement in the illicit traffic with legal goods that existed between
Pakistan and Afghanistan. Under the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement, negotiated in the
1950s, landlocked Afghanistan secured a deal from Islamabad that allowed-goods to pass
from the port of Karachi through Pakistan and over the border to Afghanistan duty-free.
Yet, the subsequent U-turn scheme that emerged benefited the smugglers above all and
worked like this: a buyer in Afghanistan issued a letter of credit to import some goods,
such as refrigerators, through the port of Karachi. The appliances were then driven
through Pakistan into Afghanistan duty-free. The trucks unloaded on the Afghan side and
returned to Pakistan empty. Meanwhile, the tax-free goods were carried back to Pakistan
illegally, for example, by camels and donkeys. The goods, which sold for far less than the
goods imported into Pakistan legally, were then distributed via a trucking industry to a
58 Jobin Goodarzi, "Wahington and the Taliban, Strange Bedfellows," Middle East International, October
25, 1996.
59 For details, see Rashid (1998) and Davis.
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large extent controlled by Afghan refugees in Pakistan. According to the World Bank, in
1997 this illicit traffic amounted to $2.5 billion.60
Naturally, however, other actors stepped into this highly lucrative lacuna of state
power and complicated the life of the smuggling mafia. Local warlords charged tolls for
the smugglers' (and anyone else's for that matter) use of the roads and.passes under their
control, a practice that dated back to:the British. As a result of the progressive chaos of
the early 1990s, and the increasingly higher and higher tolls and taxes charged by the
local warlords, the interests of the transport mafia were severely threatened. For example,
Ismail Khan of Herat went from charging 5000 rupees ($125) custom duty on his part of
the highway to charging 10,000 rupees ($250) per truck for onward. movement. On any
route a transport could have been stopped as many as twenty times and forced to pay
tolls. Sometimes local warlords stole the goods. Although the warlords were not
consciously trying to destroy the smuggling economy, their capriciousness and greed
made it increasingly .difficult for the smugglers to conduct business even within
Afghanistan and Pakistan and exceedingly difficult to expand their operations also into
Iran and Central Asia. The traffickers came to feel that the warlords were de facto
suppressing the illicit smuggling.
The emergence of the Taliban presented the traffickers with a force that could
assure that transaction costs were significantly lowered and business was carried out in a
much more predictable fashion. Purported to be long incensed with the excesses of the
predatory warlords on the highways and by their arbitrary taxation and extortion, Mullah
Omar in fact willingly provided protection to the illicit smuggling enterprise. Already in
60 Frederik Balfour, "Dark Days for a Black Market: Afghanistan and Pakistan Rely Heavily on
Smuggling," Business Week, October 15, 2001,
http://businessweek.com/magazine/content/01 42/b3753016.htm.
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the fall of 1994, just as the Taliban first emerged around Kandahar, it cleared the chains
from the roads, set up a one-toll system for trucks entering Afghanistan at Spin Baldak,
and patrolled and protected the highways against the warlords. Crucially, the Taliban also
declared that it would not allow goods bound for Afghanistan to be carried by Pakistani
trucks, thus satisfying a key demand of the Afghan transport mafia.61 The transport mafia
was ecstatic, and from the beginning the traffickers and the Taliban struck up very good
relations. As a result, the Taliban got paid handsomely by the traffickers and the
traffickers did not interfere with the Taliban's military expansion. In March 1995, for
example, the Taliban was reported to collect 6 million rupees ($150,000) from
transporters in Chaman in a single day and twice that amount the next day in Quetta.62
Overall, the Taliban's annual income from the illegal smuggling with licit goods was
estimated at about $75 million.63
Apart from facilitating procurement, logistics, and salaries, the money obtained
from the illicit traffic also increased the Taliban's freedom of action by allowing the
group to buy off some of its opponents. Underwritten with the profits from the illicit
smuggling, this bribe approach became a key feature of the Taliban's military tactics. 64
Apart from generating military capabilities for the Taliban, its positive
involvement in the illicit economy also provided the group with some increase in its
political capital. The traffickers whom the Taliban pleased were important regional
powerbrokers who frequently exercised substantial political power. Their benevolence
toward the Taliban and their disenchantment with the warlords turned out very
6' Rashid (2001): 29.
62 Ahmed Rashid, "Nothing to Declare," Far Eastern Economic Review, May 11, 1995.
63 Balfour.
64 Griffin: 41.
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convenient for the Taliban. Moreover, the byproduct of the vibrant smuggling economy
was a revitalization of some aspects of the licit economy, such as the emergence of
teahouses and rest stops for the truckers, which pleased those living close to the
smuggling routes. Still, the overall number of people who benefited from this economy
remained limited. Once its initial wider legitimacy resulting.from its provision of security
and its promise of pacifying a country exhausted by:fifteen years of war and rampant
banditry worn off, there was little the Taliban had to provide to the larger population in
order to obtain some level of popular support. Writing prior to the Taliban's sponsorship
of the opium economy, Olivier Roy remarked that the Taliban's legitimacy came
essentially from the weapons they controlled.65
Overall, as predicted by my theory of political capital of illicit economy, the
positive engagement in the labor non-intensive smuggling increased the movement's
military capabilities - both in terms of physical resources and freedom of action. It also
increased the movement's political capital, by securing the cooperation of a set of
important regional powerbrokers. But the illicit economy did not generate substantial
political capital for the Taliban with the overall population that was largely left out of the
smuggling business. That said, the positive involvement in the illicit smuggling economy
crucially facilitated the Taliban's expansion throughout Afghanistan.
Testing the Effect ofAmplifying Factor Presence/Absence of Traffickers and Taliban's
Non-involvement in Drug
The Taliban's expansion from Kandahar to Helmand in early 1995 illustrates
another aspect of the political capital of illicit economies theory - namely, the effect of
65 Idy (1995).
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the presence or absence of traffickers on the extent of the belligerents' increase in
strength resulting from their positive involvement in the illicit economy. In the Helmand
region, the Taliban encountered a new illicit economy - the labor-intensive narcotics
cultivation. During the initial two-month period of fighting, the Taliban remained
uninvolved in the illicit economy. The local warlords who were positively involved in the
economy had, however, eliminated traffickers in their region and took over their
functions. The theory of political capital of illicit economies thus predicts that the
political capital of the local warlords will be limited and their staying power undermined.
In late 1994 and early 1995, the Taliban spread from Kandahar through the south
in a blitz campaign, taking everyone by surprise. What seems at first surprising about the
Taliban experience in the Helmand is the fact that the Taliban was able to take over a
major drug-producing region where the local warlord, by then Ghaffar Akhudzada, the
brother of the late and above-mentioned Mullah Nasim Akhudzada, was a sponsor of the
illicit economy and put up a rather substantial fight. The fighting was bitter, with
casualties for the Taliban running into the hundreds for the first time. As Anthony Davis
argued, "neither [the Taliban's] moral authority nor cash accounted for much" in
Helmand.66 Finally, however, the Taliban did succeed in taking over the region after a
two-month long military campaign.
What accounts for the limited staying power of the Ghaffar, despite his positive
involvement in the illicit economy and the Taliban's non-involvement, is absence of
traffickers and the Akhundazas' taking over their role. As described earlier, wanting to
dominate the illicit economy to the fullest extent possible, the Akhudzadas took it upon
themselves to directly regulate cultivation, set prices, and punish (frequently brutally)
66 Davis: 51.
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those who failed to deliver the quotas. The Akhudzadas thus limited the scope of their
political capital by putting themselves in the position of the brutal monopolists. Instead of
offering themselves as security providers and benevolent economic regulators by
moderating the traffickers' abuse of the peasants, the Akhudzadas pushed the traffickers
out of the areas they controlled and behaved even worse. Under Ghaffar, the population
became more and more squeezed, and opium rents increased.
Moreover, the effect of traffickers' absence in limiting the political gains of the
belligerents from their positive involvement in the illicit economy was compounded by
the Akhundazas' not too distant eradication, or negative involvement in the illicit
economy. The eradication campaign had generated considerable and lasting hardship for
the population.
Although simply the relative balance of power between Ghaffar and the Taliban
could
be an alternative explanation for why Helmand fell to the Taliban so rapidly, it does not
seem a particularly compelling explanation. First of all, the Taliban took over the
Akhundazas' area early in their campaign, when their numbers were still small, their
military equipment very limited, and their military tactics poor. Second, the Akhundazas
were experienced warriors, having fought against the Soviets during the 1980s and
coming out of the 1990s civil war as some of the most prominent commanders and in
charge of one of the most desirable provinces. Third, what was surprising about the way
Helmand fell was the limited level of popular resistance to the Taliban. Although the in
the late 1980s, the population may have preferred the Akhundazas to Hekmatyar, by the
mid-1994, it lost much of its affinity for them. As predicted: by the theory of political
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capital of illicit economies, elimination of independent traffickers and the lingering
resentment at eradication decreased the political capital of local warlords and undermined
their staying power.
Phase II: Taliban's Negative Involvement in Two Labor-intensive Economies - Drugs
and Timber: Testing the Effect of the Amplifying Factor "Government Response"
As has been shown, the increase in Taliban's capabilities and its military
expansion through Afghan territory took place without its exploitation of the illicit
narcotics economy and was not dependent on it. Moreover, after the Taliban secured
control over the poppy-growing Helmand province, its original impulse was to prohibit
drug cultivation and trade. Given the context of a poor state of the overall economy and a
labor-intensive illicit economy, my theory of political capital of illicit economy predicts,
that this switch toward suppression policies on the part of the governing actor - the
Taliban - will result in a critical weakening of its political capital and a decrease in its
strength. The prediction regarding the Taliban's suppression of another labor-intensive
illicit economy, illicit logging, is the same. On the other hand, the conventional view
predicts no serious weakening of the Taliban's strength, given that the group continued to
have large assured financial profits from the illegal traffic with licit goods.
Considering opium as anti-Islamic, the Taliban denounced the drug trade and
burned down the poppy fields in Helmand as it won control over the region in early 1995.
In a series of communiques about the Taliban goals, its leaders made a commitment to
eradication of opium poppy. They also prohibited the cultivation of cannabis. In fact,
poppy cultivation in the regions under the Taliban controlled halved for the following
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growing season, a trend that farmers attributed to the fear of reprisals from the Taliban.
But wheat prices were also booming that year and there was a significant carry-over of
opium from 1994's bumper harvest.67 Whether the 8 per cent reduction of the 1995
opium crop was simply due to Taliban's eradication policy or was primarily due to
external economic factors is perhaps less important than the fact that the Taliban, for
religious and ideological reasons, attempted to suppress the illicit narcotics economy. In
fact, both the United Nations and the United States were hopeful that should the Taliban
succeed in taking over the country, it would stem Afghanistan's opium and heroin
production. In 1996,: after the Taliban expanded its control of Afghanistan, Giovanni
Quaglia, then director of the United Nations Drug Control Policy office in Pakistan
declared, rather cavalierly as it turned out, that, "In these circumstances, the [drug]
problem [in Afghanistan] can be dealt with in ten years."68 The Taliban also cracked
down harshly on hashish addicts, imprisoning them, beating them, and submerging them
in cold water for several hours at a time.69
Immediately after the implementation of drug eradication, the Taliban's control of
the Helmand became destabilized. This weakening of the Taliban's control took place
despite.the fact that the Taliban operated in the region to which it had many close ties,
including family networks, and where the dominant ethnicity of the population was the
same as the ethnicity of the Taliban fighters, i.e. Pashtun. Moreover, ethnicity, not
religion or social class, has been the dominant cleavage in Afghanistan.70 Still, after its
eradication policy, the Taliban lost control of the region in 1995. The Taliban's political
67 Ibid.: 152-3.
68 Geopolitical Drug Dispatch, No. 63, January 1997.
69 Rashid (2001), p. 119.
70 Roy (1995): 105.
412
capital was seriously undermined, and popular resistance to the Taliban emerged.
Subsequently, throughout 1995, control over the region shifted back and forth between
the Taliban and local warlords.
Similarly, the Taliban encountered large-scale political resistance in 1997 when it
attempted to proscribe the illegal traffic in timber. Hundreds of acres of high-quality
hardwood, pine and cedar, from the provinces of Paktya and Kunar were chopped down
and hauled off to Pakistan to be processed into cheap furniture and window frames and
sold in the Gulf states. After taking over the two provinces and expelling the local
warlord, Haji Qadir, the Taliban first attempted to levy a tax of $750 per truck, before
altogether banning the trade.71 The Taliban's effort to prohibit this fairly lucrative and
labor-intensive economy, which in the conditions of tremendous poverty brought an
assured livelihood to a large segment of Paktya's and Kunar's residents, generated
widespread resistance. In fact, Haji Qadir, exiled in Peshawar, Pakistan at the time, was
able to capitalize on the popular resentment and with the help of two local warlords
launched a military attack to reclaim Kunar. Although the Taliban ultimately won, the
scale of the unrest in the province seriously rattled the Taliban leadership.
As predicted by my theory of political capital, eradication of narcotics cultivation
and suppression of the illegal logging economy - both labor-intensive enterprises - in
both cases undermined the Taliban's political capital and weakened its strength. Despite
the Taliban's continuing profits from positive involvement in illicit smuggling with licit
goods, it lost control of Helmand and its control over Kunar and Paktya was seriously
shaken up. This phase of the Taliban's involvement in the illicit economy thus once again
supports the theory of political capital of illicit economies. In the case of both illicit
71 Griffin: 147.
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economies, the predictions of the conventional view did not materialize, and the validity
of that theory is thus weakened.
Phase III: From Laissez-Faire to De Facto Legalization: Testing the Effect of the
Amplifying Factor "Government Response"
But the Taliban's prohibition policy toward narcotics did not last. The need to
secure the Helmand Valley, the Taliban's vital base, resulted in the Taliban rapidly
adopting a different policy toward narcotics - namely, positive involvement in the opium
economy. In the context of a poor state of the overall economy and a labor-intensive
illicit economy, the government response toward the illicit economy is a crucial
determinant of the increase or decrease of the belligerents' political capital and their
overall strength. My theory of political capital thus predicts that the Taliban will register
a large increase in its political power and its overall strength, in addition to an increase in
its military capabilities. The conventional view predicts no such increase in political
capital.
By 1996, the Taliban ended eradication and lifted the ban on cultivation. At first it
adopted a laissez-faire approach to drug cultivation, but progressively it became positive
involved in various aspects of the opium economy, taxing the farmers as well as
providing security for and taxing the traffickers. Once the Taliban reversed its policy
toward poppy eradication, it was able to consolidate its control over the region. In fact,
Helmand became its key stronghold.
The new edicts the Taliban issued now read: "The cultivation of, and trading in
chers (cannabis, used for hashish) is forbidden absolutely. The consumption of opiates is
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forbidden, as is the manufacture of heroin, but the production and trading. in opium is not
forbidden." 72 In practice, however, heroin labs were not destroyed and heroin traffic was
not interdicted. The 10% zakat on opium, formerly paid to the village mullahs, was now
directed to the Taliban's treasury, earning an estimated $9 million in 1996-7, from the
south's regular output of 1,500 tons of-opium.73 A 10% zakat was also. levied on the
traffickers. As the 1990s progressed, these taxes were increased to 20%, -bringing in
between $45 million to $200 million a year. 74 By 1999, the Taliban also taxed heroin
labs." As in the case of the trucking mafia in Afghanistan, the drug traffickers benefited
from the Taliban's sponsorship of the illicit narcotics economy, once the Taliban reversed
its prohibitionist policy. Compared to the greedy and unpredictable local mujahideen who
had controlled and taxed the trafficking routes prior to the Taliban, the Taliban
significantly lowered many transaction costs for the traffickers, preventing constant
power shifts among the warlords, bringing stability to the industry, and helping to
streamline it.
Since 1996, poppy cultivation continued increasing. In 1980, the total production
of opium in Afghanistan consisted of 200 metric tons. By 1994, cultivation had grown to
2,300. As a result of the Taliban's temporary eradication policy, combined with bad
weather, the production fell to 2,300 metric tons in 1995, but by 1999 it climbed to 3,300
72 Quoted in Griffin: 153.
73 Geopolitical Drug Dispatch, No. 63, January 1997.
74 The TNI's Briefing Series give a much lower estimate, between $30-45 million a year, thanBarnett
Rubin, for example, who puts the Taliban's yearly earnings from drugs to $100-200 million. See,
Transnational Institute, "Afghanistan, Drugs and Terrorism: Merging Wars," TNI Briefing Series, Drugs
and Conflict, No. 3, December 2001; and Rubin (2000). As explained in the theory chapter, estimating the
size and profits of illicit economies is more magic than science, and despite the large discrepancy both
numbers are plausible. However, given the World Bank and UNODC estimates of the size of the illicit
economy and traffickers' profits after the fall of the Taliban under much greater transparency, Rubin's
estimates seem more likely.
75 Jeffrey Bartholet and Steve LeVine, "The Holy Men of Heroin," Newsweek, 134 (23), December 6, 1999:
40-43.
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in 2000.76 With the exception of a few months early in its ascendancy and its 2000
eradication campaign, described in detail below, the Taliban thus supervised a steady
augmentation of the drug economy in Afghanistan. The table below summarizes the
trend.
In addition to the profits from other smuggling, the profits from the drugs now
also funded the Taliban's weapons, ammunition, fuel, food, and clothes. The profits also
paid for salaries, transport, and other perks that the Taliban leadership allowed its
fighters. Unlike many of the former mujahideen and Afghan and Pakistani traffickers, the
Taliban leaders continued to live extremely frugal lives.
However, despite the increase in the Taliban's military capabilities that the profits
from drugs brought, the Taliban's change in its approach to the drug economy was not
drivenby any acute financial need or logistical problems. According to World Bank
estimates, the profits from the illicit traffic with legal goods were $75 million, a number
large enough to comfortably: sustain the Taliban's military effort.77 Whatever the
methodology and accuracy of these estimates, there were no indications that prior to the
reversal of eradication, the Taliban was hurting financially. Having access to income
from drugs was not a matter of life or death for the Taliban. In fact, as detailed above, the
76 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "Presentation to the International Crisis Group on
Afghanistan," Brussels, July 5, 2004, author's copy.
77 Zareen Naqvi, Afghanistan-Pakistan Trade Relations, (Islamabad: World Bank, 1999).
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Taliban's major territorial conquest took place prior to its exploitation of the illicit
narcotics economy.
The Taliban changed its policy toward the illicit narcotics economy to
compensate for what its positive involvement in the illicit smuggling with legal goods
could not provide: widespread popular legitimacy, even if a thin popular legitimacy. The
illicit narcotics industry provided a reliable source of livelihood to a vast segment of the
population. Not only was this livelihood fairly lucrative as compared with other crops and
employment opportunities, it was frequently the only source of livelihood available to the
population in an otherwise devastated economy.78 Ruined by the war against the USSR in
the 1980s, Afghanistan's economy remained in a critical condition throughout the 1.990s.
All economic activity, short of subsistence production and the microeconomic spillover
from illicit activities came to a halt.
Despite the rather high price elasticity of farmgate prices for opium, the prices
were frequently, though not always, considerably higher than prices for legal products,
such as wheat and fruit. 79 Opium revenues totaled $102 million in 1994, $54 million in
1995, $183 in 1999 million, and $1,200 million in 2002.80 Typically, the yearly net
earnings for small sharecroppers amounted to several hundred dollars, rising to over
$1,000 for landowners.
78 Needless to say, the peasants growing poppy make only very small profits from the drug industry (about
2 percent of the total profits), compared to the traffickers and those who profit from the drug industry
higher up the chain.
79 In Thailand, for example, the substitution of flowers for opium poppy has led to a profit increase by
much as 50 times per square meter. In Pakistan, onion has proven more profitable than opium poppy. See,
Michael Smith et al, Why People Grow Drugs: Narcotics and Development in the Third World (London:
Panos, 1989), and David Mansfield, "The Economic Superiority of Illicit Drug Production: Myth and
Reality - Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan," Paper prepared for the International Conference on
Alternative Development in drug control and cooperation, Feldafing, September 7-12, 2002, August 2001.
so UNODC (2004a).
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Two other factors were at least as important for the peasants' decision to grow
opium and welcome the Taliban's embrace of poppy cultivation as the relative prices of
opium to other crops. One was the very low transaction costs for the peasants for the
production of opium. As irrigation systems were ruined in most of the country,
cultivation of wheat and fruit became exceedingly difficult. Transportation networks
around the country collapsed, thus making it impossible for the peasants to deliver the
crops to market. Light, easy to transport, and not perishable, opium was either picked up
by traders at the farm gate or had to be transported over much shorter distances.
The third key driver of the peasants' decision to grow drugs was access to
advance credit under a system known as salaam. Over time, creditors in Afghanistan
came to lend money against a guaranteed amount of opium to be delivered by the farmer
at the time of the harvest. No other microfinance opportunities existed for the majority of
the rural population. Without access to microcredit, the farmers were not able to secure
any income for the winter months, hence could not provide food, clothes, and medicine
for their families during the winter period. Moreover, if the farmers for whatever reason
failed to pay the loan back, their only chance to get another loan was to cultivate opium.l8
Thus, unlike the cultivation of other crops, only the cultivation of opium could guarantee
food security to the farmers.
On the micro-foundation level, religious piety, although no doubt an inhibitor of
pro-opium policies, frequently did not seem to determine the individuals' decision
whether or not to grow poppy. Many madrasa students and teachers and even local
mullahs were involved with opium cultivation and trafficking. Some of the madrasa
teachers and students left their schools (frequently in Pakistan) and traveled to regions
81 For details, see Mansfield (2001).
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where harvest was taking place to lance the poppy capsules and collect opium as a way of
generating economic resources.82
Moreover, as in the case of illicit smuggling in legal goods, the flourishing illicit
narcotics economy also allowed for other forms of microeconomic activity to develop in
areas where there previously was only limited agricultural production. Services, such as
rest stops, teashops, and fuel stations sprung up in connection with the smuggling of
narcotics.83 In areas with poppy cultivation, much more reconstruction than elsewhere in
the country took place. 84 Many people thus developed a stake in the illicit narcotics
economy and appreciated the Taliban's positive involvement in it: the traders, the
smugglers, the shopkeepers, the moneylenders, and the local warlords and religious elites
whom the Taliban tolerated and allowed a cut in the narcotics economy. But unlike the
smuggling of legal goods under ATTA, the highly labor intensive illicit narcotics
economy also provided a reliable livelihood to the vast segments of the rural population.
Approximately 350 person days are required to cultivate one hectare of opium in
Afghanistan, compared to approximately 41 person days per hectare for wheat and 135
person days per hectare for black cumin. Harvesting alone requires as much as 200
person days per hectare.8 5 Thus even those who did not have access to land could be
hired as itinerant laborers during various parts of the growing season.
In the limited interviews conducted in Afghanistan during that period, the
peasants emphasized the Taliban's sponsorship of the illicit economy as a crucial source
82 UNODC (1999).83 Goodhand.
84 Rashid (2001): 118.
85 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "Access to Labour: The Role of Opium in the Livelihood
Strategies of Itinerant Harvesters Working in Helmand Province, Afghanistan," Strategic Study #4, June
1999, http://www.undcp.org/pakistan/report 1999-06-30.
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of the group's legitimacy. Ahmed Rashid's 1997 interview with Wali Jan, an elderly
farmer near Kandahar, illustrates the reaction of the peasants: "We cannot be more
grateful to the Taliban. The Taliban have brought us security so we can grow our poppy
in peace. I need to grow poppy crop to support my 14 family members."8 6 He earned
around $1,300 a year, a small fortune by the standards of Afghan farmers. The security
the Taliban provided for the illicit narcotics economy assured the peasants that they
would be able. to make ends meet and obtain profits from their investments.
The Taliban's statements themselves, even if only partially genuine, also attest to
the political salience of the illicit narcotics economy and to the significant political costs
the group learned eradication generated. In 1997, for example, Abdul Rashid, the head of
the Taliban's anti-drug control force in Kandahar (quoted by N.C. Aizenman) explained:
"We let people cultivate poppies because farmers get good prices. We cannot push the
people to grow wheat as there would be an uprising.against the Taliban if we forced them
to stop poppy cultivation. So we grow.opium and get our wheat from Pakistan."87
Similarly, elsewhere, the director maintained: "Everyone is growing poppy. If we try to
stop this immediately, the people will be against us."88 As predicted by my theory of
political capital of illicit economies, the Taliban's embrace of the narcotics economy
generated a large increase in the group's political capital.
The critical political consequences of the suppression or toleration of the illicit
economy and the Taliban's acquired sensitivity to these consequences is also revealed by
the fact that the Taliban did not yield on any other doctrinal issue nor did it reverse any
other of its extremely unpopular repressive policies. As the Taliban expanded its control
86 Quoted in Rashid (2001): 117.
97 Rashid: 118. See also, Ahmed Rashid, "Drug the Infidels," Far Eastern Economic Review, May 1997.
88 The Washington Post, May 11, 1997.
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through the country, it instituted a reign of terror and a highly restrictive form of Sharia.
The Taliban forbade women to attend school, work outside of the home, or get access to
medical care, and imposed purdah, the mandatory veiling of women from head to toe
with a burqa and only a slit for the eyes. Playing sports or music, flying kites, dancing, or
reading anything published outside of Afghanistan became illegal to ensure that the
population was not distracted from prayer. Religious police from the Ministry for
Promoting Virtue and Preventing Vice patrolled the streets, looking for offenders, such as
men who failed to grow sufficiently long beards. Women who were walking on the
streets without a male relative or whose ankles were showing were lashed on the spot,
frequently by boys or men wielding car antennas or electrical cords. Punishments for
offenses were exceedingly brutal. The Taliban frequently packed the stadiums with
crowds of tens of thousands to witness amputations, floggings, and executions. Thieves
had theirs right hand and left foot amputated, murderers were killed, sometimes by.
members of the victim's family, and adulterers were stoned to death with the children of
the offenders watching from the front of the crowd. The Taliban also destroyed almost.all
vineyards, insisting that grapes were used to make alcohol, a substance prohibited by the
Koran.8 9 But although it never relented on any of its other prohibitions and draconian
measures, the Taliban did reverse its drug prohibition and eradication.
Moreover, the Taliban conceded to women participation in opium cultivation.
Even though it proscribed all other economic employment opportunities and many social
activities for women, the political costs of interfering with the opium economy were too
high for the Taliban to prevent women's participation in the opium economy. As far the
89 Nigel J. R. Allan, "Opium Production in Afghanistan and Pakistan," in Dangerous Harvest: Drug Plants
and the Transformation of Indigenous Landscapes, Michael K. Steinberg, Joseph J. Hobbs, and Kent
Mathewson, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004): 138.
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illicit drug economy was concerned, women were allowed to be employed in various
stages of poppy cultivation and opium production -- from planting, weeding, thinning,
lancing the capsules and collecting the resin, clearing the seeds, and processing by-
products such as oil and soap. 90 Nor can pecuniary motives on the part of the Taliban
explain the decision to allow women to participate in opium cultivation and production.
Although the participation of females frequently made a crucial difference for the
family's ability to achieve food security for the coming year, the actual increase in tax
income obtained by the Taliban was negligible. The Taliban's decision permitting
women's participation in the opium.economy once again supports the validity of the
theory of political capital of illicit economies.
Not only did the Taliban refuse to yield on any other social, political, or economic
issue except for opium cultivation, in power it proved fundamentally uninterested in
state-building or economic development. Its goal was to purge any sign of modernity
from the country and enforced its fundamentalist cultural norms. The Taliban essentially
abdicated all, but the bare minimum of its governing responsibilities, such as providing
security. The Taliban never set up social services or a functioning bureaucracy.
Furthermore, it allowed the existing social services and state administration to completely
disintegrate. But once again, it made an exception for the opium economy. In this
domain, it provided a variety of extension services to the farmers, such as issuing licenses
for cultivation, providing fertilizers, and setting up model poppy farms to teach the
90 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "The Role of Women in Opium Poppy Cultivation in
Afghanistan," June 2000, http://www.unodc.org/unod/alternativedevelopment studies_6.html.
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peasants how to improve' poppy productivity. 9' Despite its dogmatic radical agenda, its
religious zealousness, and its total abdication of state-making responsibility, the Taliban
nonetheless considered the political consequences of drug production suppression
policies too high to maintain and rapidly adapted itself to the rentier economy based on
drugs.
In areas where the Taliban was not able to buy political legitimacy by distributing
gains from the illicit narcotics economy, it had to resort to much greater brutality, thus
further decreasing its legitimacy. Consistently, the Taliban was much harsher in its
treatment of cities, perhaps with the exception of Kandahar, than in its treatment of
villages. Although drug and other illicit traffic no doubt went through the major cities, the
number of people who could benefit from it (and consequently did not critically resent
the Taliban) was much smaller than in the rural areas.
In short, ideology nor religion did not override the need to eliminate the large
political costs resulting for the Taliban for its narcotics eradication policy. As predicted
by the theory of political capital of illicit economies, in the context of a poor overall
economy and a labor-intensive illicit economy, the political costs of eradication for the
Taliban were very large and severely undermined their strength. But once the Taliban
became positively involved in the illicit economy, its political capital greatly increased,
providing it frequently with its sole source of legitimacy.
91 "Heroin," Jane's Intelligence Review, June 1, 1998; Andrew Meier, "Afghanistan's Drug Trade," Muslim
Politics Report, No. 11, 1997: 3-4; and Ahmed Rashid, "The Taliban: Exporting Extremism," Foreign
Affairs, 78 (6), November/ December 1999: 22-36.
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Phase IV: .The Taliban's 2000 Eradication and the Subsequent Return to Laissez-
Faire: Testing the Effect of the Amplifying Factor "Government Response"
Given the above analysis, the Taliban's vast and effective eradication campaign in
2000 seems both puzzling and contradictory to what has been argued previously. Yet a
detailed examination of the event once again underscores the salience of the political
benefits belligerent groups derive from adopting a tolerant policy toward labor-intensive
illicit economies and of the political costs drug-suppression policies.entail for them.
Given that the other amplifying factors remain the same, and only the value of
"government response" changes to suppression, my theory of political capital of illicit
economies predicts a large decrease in the Taliban's political capital. The predictions
based on the conventional view's are: no effect on the political capital of the Taliban and
a weakening of the Taliban's military capabilities.
The Taliban's 2000 opium ban on poppy cultivation in Afghanistan resulted in the
largest reduction of opium poppy cultivation in a country in any single year. Cultivation
fell from an estimated 82,172 hectares in 2000 to less than 8,000 in 2001. Globally, this
reduction contributed to a 75% fall in the global, supply of heroin for that year,92 a truly
impressive number.
Needless to say, the ban severely affected the economic prospects of vast
segments of Afghanistan's rural population. In the words of one DEA official, the ban
was "bringing their country -- or certain regions of their country-- to economic ruin."93
The ban drove the majority of landowners and sharecroppers heavily into debt. Unable to
92 David Mansfield, "Coping Strategies, Accumulated Wealth and Shifting Markets: The Story of Opium
Poppy Cultivation in Badakhshan 2000-2003," A Report for the Agha Khan Development Network,
January 2004: 4.
93 Barbara Crossette,. "The Taliban's Ban on Growing Opium Poppies is Called a Success," The New York
Times, May 18, 2001.
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repay their debts, the farmers were driven to borrow even further or abscond into
Pakistan. The experience of a 70-year old sharecropper from Nad e Ali (recounted by
David Mansfield) illustrates the destructive micro-effects of the Taliban's eradication
program: The sharecropper planted two to four jeribs (about one fifth of a hectare) of
poppy to support a ten-member family. After the Taliban's eradication campaign, he was
unable to pay his outstanding debt of $1,800 to his landlord, granted against his promise
to deliver a certain amount of raw opium to the landlord after the growing season. The
landlord whose land he tilled agreed to extend him a further loan on the condition that he
would accept a reduced share of the profit, receiving only a sixth of the final opium crop,
compared to the traditional one third, and agreeing not to leave the. area even if only to
visit his extended family. The peasant was thus de facto consigned to bonded labor. The
sharecropper felt he had no option but to accept the terms if he were to feed his family.
He believed that if his crop of opium were not destroyed in the upcoming growing
season, he could repay his outstanding debts. However, were the crop to be destroyed by
the Taliban again, he would have to run away into Pakistan, leaving his family to ruin.94
Three key questions about the 2000 eradication campaign emerge: Why, given the
previously encountered political costs, did the Taliban undertake such a
counterproductive policy? Did the 2000 eradication campaign generate new large
political costs for the Taliban? And, if so, how could the Taliban sustain such a policy?
With respect to the first question, it is important to note that while banning opium
cultivation in 2000, the Taliban did not ban or otherwise attempt to interfere with the sale
and trafficking of opium and poppy during that period. In choosing to curb the
94 One among many similar stories in David Mansfield, "What Is Driving Opium Poppy Cultivation?
Decision Making Amongst Opium Poppy Cultivators in Afghanistan in the 2003/4 Growing Season," Paper
for the UNODC/ONDCP Second Technical Conference on Drug Control Research, July 19-21, 2004.
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production, the Taliban was balancing its domestic legitimacy with its international
legitimacy as well as its political gains from the illicit economy with its financial profits.
As the UN, the United States, and other governments caught onto the fact that despite its
religious fervor, the Taliban was not curbing the drug trade in Afghanistan, in addition to
grossly violating human rights, they started treating the regime as a pariah. By 2000, still
only a few countries around the world, including Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, recognized
the Taliban regime as a valid ruler of Afghanistan and were willing to engage with it.
Having consolidated power throughout the. vast majority of the territory, the Taliban
apparently became determined to finally secure also international recognition. It thus
decided to respond to the UNDCP's repeated appeals to curb opium if it would bring the
regime international recognition. The 2000 eradication campaign meant to accomplish
this goal. But despite the impressive eradication, no additional country recognized the
regime. In other words, the Taliban probably gambled its domestic legitimacy for
obtaining international legitimacy, calculating that its control of the territory was firm
enough to weather any domestic resistance.
The second motivation that likely drove the Taliban's decision to impose the ban
on cultivation was the desire to boost the price of opium and consolidate control of the
drug trade. As cultivation exploded during the 1990s, the farmgate prices for opium
plummeted. The 2000 ban by the Taliban and the resulting supply contraction of 75% did
in fact substantially increases prices for opium. The total farmgate value of opium went
from $56 million in 2001 to $1,200 million in 2002.95 Meanwhile, when the poppy
95 UNODC (2004a). Farmgate opium prices jumped from $28 per kilogram in 2000 to $301 per kilogram
in 2001. See, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Summary Findings of Opium Trends in
Afghanistan, September 12, 2005, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afghanistan_2005/annexopium-
afghanistan-2005-09-09.pdf: 16, downloaded September: 18, 2005.
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cultivation ban went into force, it was estimated that there were hundreds to thousands of
metric tons of opium and heroin stockpiled in Afghanistan. According to one estimate,
220 tons of heroin were stockpiled in Afghanistan, many under the Taliban control. This
amount would have been sufficient to supply the needs of the Western European market
for at least two years without any new production.96 Other estimates put the level of
stockpiles even higher, at about 3,000 tons of opium. According to the Drug Enforcement
Administration spokesman, Will Glaspy, for example, the Taliban regime was believed to
be stockpiling as much as 65 percent of previous years' harvests.97 Captain Saif Riaz, a
veteran of Pakistan's drug enforcement efforts, estimated that "They have sufficient
stockpiles to last at least 10 years.""98 The UNDCP also pointed to Taliban's vast
stockpiles as indicators of the Taliban's lack of sincerity with respect to the eradication
campaign.
The financial profits the Taliban expected to reap as a result of the temporary
eradication thus were great. What is crucially significant about the financial outcome of
the Taliban's eradication campaign is that it contradicts the key tenet of the conventional
view that eradication will bankrupt belligerent groups. As argued by the theory of
political capital of illicit economies, eradication has highly unpredictable effects on the
financial resources of belligerents and can in fact increase their profits. The case of the
Taliban's eradication is a manifest example of how eradication increased the financial
96 International Crisis Group, Central Asia: Drugs and Conflict, Report No. 26, November 26, 2001,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report_archive/A400495_26112001 
-2.pdf, downloaded
August 16, 2004.
97 Quoted in Mary Jacoby, "War's New Target: Drugs," St. Petersburg Times, February 11, 2002. See also,
LaVerle Berry, Glenn E. Curtis, Rex A, Hudson, and Nina A. Kollars, A Global Overview ofNarcotics-
Funded Terrorist and Other Extremist Groups, A Report Prepared by the Federal Research Division,
Library of Congress, May 2002, http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/NarcsFundedTerrs_Extrems.pdf: 6,
downloaded August 05, 2004.
98 Caryl: 27. Other sources put the level of stockpiles considerably lower, at about two years worth. The
fact that the Taliban had stockpiles, however, did not mean that the population had any stockpiles.
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profits of the belligerents. In this case once again, the prediction of the conventional view
failed to materialize.
But the political costs of eradication for the Taliban were substantial. Although
the movement carried out eradication in regions where by then it had firm control and
where there was no immediate organized armed opposition, it nonetheless encountered
widespread popular resistance. This resistance was neither assuaged by the Taliban's
negotiations and hefty subsidies to tribes affected by eradication, such as the Shinwari
tribe,99 nor deterred by the Taliban's brutal punishment of violators. The Taliban's
control over Afghanistan was seriously rattled. Throughout the territory, the loss of the
Taliban's political capital was large.
The answer to the third question, regarding sustainability of the drug suppression
policy, is that the Taliban probably could not and certainly did not try to sustain the
policy for more than one year. By the summer of 2001, with the ban still in place, some
peasants started seeding poppy once again.'0 0 The Taliban rescinded the ban on poppy
cultivation in September 2001. Some analysts have attempted to explain the reversal of
the Taliban's policy by arguing that the Taliban needed greater financial resources in
order to fight against the United States after 9-11.101 This explanation, however, does not
seem accurate for several reasons. First of all, as already mentioned above, the temporary
ban on poppy cultivation vastly increased the price of heroin, thus significantly
increasing the Taliban's financial profits. Second, the Taliban had large stockpiles. In
99 Barnett R. Rubin, "Road to Ruin: Afghanistan's Booming Opium Industry," October 7, 2004,
http://www.cic.nyu.edu.
100 Caryl, Christian. " The New Silk Road of Death." Newsweek, Vol. 113, No. 12, September 17, 2001: 24-
28.
0o1 See, for example, Bertil Lintner, "Taliban Turns to Drugs," Far Eastern Economic Review, October 11,
2001.
428
short, financial need does not appear to be a compellingexplanation of what drove the
reversal of the Taliban's ban on opium production.
The Taliban's sensitivity to the political costs associated with eradication,
especially in anticipation of the upcoming war with the United States, is much more
likely what drove the Taliban's decision to rescind the cultivation ban and stop
eradication. As mentioned above, even before the war with the United States,.the Taliban
was already facing widespread resistance as a result of its prohibition. Moreover, the
Northern Alliance still opposing the Taliban from a northern corner of the country
continued producing opium at full speed during the 1990s and during the Taliban's 2000
ban. Its taxes were similar to those of the Taliban, between 10 and 20 percent on
production and traffic; and opium production in Badakhshan, controlled by the Northern
Alliance, vastly increased during the 1990s. It is very likely that the Taliban feared that if
it continued with its ban on opium poppy, the Northern Alliance, with U.S. support,
would have been able to exploit the popular discontent with eradication to effectively
challenge the Taliban. In fact, as will be described in detail below, many farmers charged
that part of their support for the anti-Taliban forces during the U.S. invasion was the
promise by the anti-Taliban forces that the farmers could go back to growing poppy after
the Taliban was defeated.
VI. Drugs After the Fall of the Taliban: Testing the Effect of Government Response
to the Illicit Economy
The military and narcotics situation in Afghanistan since the U.S. invasion in
2001 offers an important test of the effect of government policy toward narcotics on the
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strength of belligerents and the intensity of military conflict. During the military
campaign to overthrow the Taliban regime and the subsequent and steadily worsening
insurgency, the government policy toward narcotics changed from a policy of tacit
acquiescence to interdiction and finally to eradication (combined with interdiction).
Government response to the illicit economy thus kept changing within a short span while
the other amplifying factors and other conditions remained the same, thus minimizing the
interference of other possible variables. Since 2001 through the present, the country ýhas
remained desperately poor, the character of the illicit economy in which the Taliban and
various other warlords have been involved is labor-intensive (although both the warlords
and the Taliban) have also been involved in labor-non-intensive aspects of the narcotics
economy), and traffickers have been. present. Although still evolving and difficult to
research because much information about intelligence-gathering, counterinsurgency, and
counterterrorism policies remains classified, this period nonetheless contains much
evidence to illuminate the validity of the two competing theories. As will be shown, the
shift toward eradication, driven by an exogenous factor - U.S. domestic politics - as well
as by the evaluation that other counternarcotics policies had failed, not only resulted in
the increase in the Taliban's strength and intensification of the insurgency but in fact
allowed the Taliban to reinsert itself into the narcotics economy from which it had been
largely cut off by the U.S. invasion.
The 9-11 al Qaeda.terrorist attack against the United States.homeland and the
subsequent refusal of the Taliban leadership to hand over Osama bin Laden and the rest
of al Qaeda operatives using Afghanistan's territory as a recruitment and training safe-
haven precipitated a war by the United States against the Taliban. Operation Enduring
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Freedom sought to capture al Qaeda and depose the Taliban leadership from power in
Afghanistan. Despite warnings and reminders of Soviet failure against the mujahideen in
the 1980s, Operation Enduring Freedom rapidly succeeded in toppling the Taliban
regime. Within a few months, most of Afghanistan was no longer under the control of the
Taliban. The top al Qaeda leadership as well as the Taliban's Mullah Omar and several
other officials, however, managed to escape, despite major offensives, such as Operation
Anaconda in the Tora Bora region.
What was highly surprising about the military campaign was the speed of the
Taliban's fall in the south of Afghanistan, its traditional stronghold. Obviously, U.S.
military superiority and the withdrawal of Pakistani support for the Taliban determined
the movement's fall from power, but the surprising element was the immediate lack of
pro-Taliban insurgency in the fall and the fact that many southern Pashtuns actually rose
up and actively fought against the Taliban.'0 2
There can of course be several possible explanations for the sources of the
popular resentment against the Taliban, including social oppression. But even five years
since the fall of the Taliban, many social values imposed by the Taliban still persist
today. It is likely that the Taliban's eradication in the previous year greatly undermined
its support. The eradication did not affect only the poor peasants, but also Pashtun tribal
chiefs, who faced a imminent loss of not only material resources, but also legitimacy. In
fact, at least some peasants in the Helmand province, disgruntled with the new post-
Taliban government's ban on poppy in 2002, alleged with chagrin that during the U.S.
military invasion, Hamid Karzai had promised to let them grow poppy in exchange for
102 Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History From Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban
(Cambridge: De Capo Press, 2002): 308-09.
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their help in toppling the Taliban regime, and that they now felt betrayed. The Karzai
government denied these allegations.' 03
From the beginning, Operation Enduring Freedom was conducted with a
minimalist approach toward the size of U.S. forces in the theater, both during the actual
military campaign and during post-war occupation. Hailed by Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld as a prime exhibit of his transformation of U.S. armed forces and the
incorporation of the revolution of military affairs into military strategy and campaigns,
the operation relied on a small number of U.S. forces cooperating with local anti-Taliban
resistance, namely the Northern Alliance. At their peak, U.S. forces involved in the war
numbered no more than 60,000 (about half of which were off-shore in the Persian
Gulf).' °4 A dominant image of the war was one of a few U.S. special operations forces on
horses and with GPS and laser pointers directing U.S. precision air strikes and
coordinating the anti-Taliban local forces in their attacks against the Taliban held
cities. 1o°
A direct consequence of the minimalist approach to the military campaign and to
the subsequent stabilization efforts, which left Afghanistan with one of the lowest density
of international troops per territory and population in stabilization efforts, 06 was the need
to rely on local warlords to capture al Qaeda and the top leadership of the Taliban. In
'03 Indira R. A. Lakshmanan, "Afghan Announce Victories in a New War against Opium," Boston Globe,
April 21, 2002.
104 Michael O'Hanlon, "A Flawed Masterpiece," Foreign Affairs, 81 (3),.May/June 2002: 48.
105 316 special operation forces personnel and 110 CIA operatives were deployed on the ground in
Afghanistan during the military effort to depose the Taliban.
106 The density of international troops in Afghanistan per kilometer was one soldier per 25 km, and per
population 1 soldier per 1,115 inhabitants, thus ranking in both counts behind Kosovo, Bosnia, East Timor,
Iraq, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Haiti. See, Michael Bhatia, Kevin Lanigan, and Philip Wilkinson,
"Minimal Investments, Minimal Results: The Failure of Security Policy in Afghanistan," Afghanistan
Research and Evaluation Unit, June 2004. See also, James Dobbins, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G.
Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel M. Swanger, and Anga Timilsina, America's Role in Nation-
Building: From Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica: RAND, 2004).
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what President George Bush called one of the biggest bargains of all time, CIA and
special forces officers handed out $70 million in $100 bills to local warlords, such as
Ismail Khan in the west, General Abdul Rashid Dostum, General Mohammed Fahim, and
Ustad Atta Mohammed in the north, and Harzat Ali in the east.'0 7 Many of these
warlords, including numerous smaller ones, were also deeply connected to a variety of
illicit economies, including the drug trade.
The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) adopted a
similar minimalist approach, seeking to limit its involvement, avoid waste and
duplication problems, and to encourage Afghans themselves to assume responsibility for
their own reconciliation and reconstruction. An underlying rationale for this so-called
"light footprint" approach was to force donor nations to accept responsibility for assisting
Afghanistan, and not simply hand the burden over to the U.N.'08 Under the light-footprint
UNAMA approach, a country was designated to be in charge of critical governance-
building roles: the United States was thus designated to be in charge of training
Afghanistan's new army, Germany in establishing Afghanistan's police, Japan in
disarming and reintegration militias, Italy in establishing rule of law and carrying out a
reform of the judiciary, and the United Kingdom in carrying out counternarcotics policy.
After the presidential elections in the fall of 2004 that elected the previously appointed
Hamid Karzai as the president of the country and the parliamentary elections of the fall of
2005, the Afghan government itself has also increasingly been involved with these
processes. By September 2006, the Afghanistan national army fielded about 35,000
107 See, for example, Pankaj Mishra, "The Real Afghanistan," New York Review of Books, 52 (4), March
10, 2005: 46.
'08 See, for example, United States Institute of Peace, Establishing the Rule of Law in Afghanistan, Special
Report No. 117, March 2004.
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soldiers while the police had about 50,000 officers, although both have greatly varying
quality. Around 60,000 official militia of the warlords were disarmed and the majority of
heavy weapons confiscated, but a vast amount of small arms continues floating among
the population.109 Former warlords have become members of the national and local
governments, police chiefs, and members of the new parliament.
Meanwhile, several critical security threats have remained and created the context
of counternarcotics policies: powerful warlords cum government officials divided along
ethnic and tribal lines; anti-Coalition-forces and anti-Karzai-government insurgency; and
the critical weakness of the Afghan national government. The mixture of these belligerent
actors and the revival of the illicit narcotics economy has led to an emergence of yet
another phase of the drug-conflict nexus in Afghanistan.
Approach I: Tacit Acquiescence
Originally, the mission of the coalition forces during Operation Enduring
Freedom was limited to anti-al-Qaeda and anti-Taliban efforts and did not include
peacekeeping (taken over by NATO forces) or the post-conflict disarmament of the
warlords. Nor did it include any counternarcotics operations. The United States adopted a
tacit acquiescence policy. As described by James Dobbins, U.S. special envoy to :
Afghanistan during and immediately after the invasion, the Bush administration treated
Afghanistan only as the opening campaign in a larger war on terrorism and did not want
109 International Crisis Group, Afghanistan Elections: Endgame or New Beginning, Asia Report No. 101,
July 21, 2005,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/southasia/10l afghanistanelections endgameor-ne
w_beginning.pdf.
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to get bogged down there."o Given the poor state of the overall economy, the labor-
intensive character of the illicit economy, and the presence of traffickers, the prediction
of the theory of political capital is that in such a situation the local population and local
warlords will cooperate with the U.S. military and provide it with support and
intelligence and that belligerent actors will also grow stronger in terms of military
capabilities. Positive involvement on the part of other belligerents, such as local warlords,
will also increase their military resources and political capital.
The commitment of minimal U.S. military forces to Afghanistan during and after
the invasion necessitated an extensive reliance on local proxies. Afghan warlords,
frequently with sizable militias numbering in over 10,000 each,. were used not only for
intelligence gathering, but also directly for military operations against al Qaeda and the
Taliban. There was a definite sense among the U.S. military was that the need to rely on
the warlords and local population also prevented the military from interfering with the
drug trade. In October 2002, General Tommy R. Franks affirmed that the U.S. military
would stay clear of drug interdiction. "' Similarly, when asked about counternarcotics
operations, the U.S. military spokesman at the Bagram military base, Sergeant Major
Harrison Sarles, commented: "We're not a drug task force. That's not part of our
mission.""' 12 Privately, U.S. officials acknowledged that early drug-suppression efforts
would compromise the anti-Taliban effort. Western diplomats admitted that the U.S.
military relied on local warlords for intelligence and for troops regardless of their
connection to the drug trade: "Without money from drugs, our friendly warlords can't
t10 Quoted in Anne Barnard, "Afghan Projects Slow to Reach Rural Areas," Boston Globe, October 17,
2004. Much of the following information is based on my interviews with U.S. and U.K. government
officials.
1' Eric Schmitt, "U.S. to Add to Forces in Horn of Africa," New York Times, October 30, 2002.
112 Tim McGirk, "Drugs? What Drugs?" Time, August 18, 2003.
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pay their militias. It's as simple as that."" 3 Thus, the U.S. military did not interfere with
drug convoys or bust drug labs and storage depots that it encountered.
The U.S. military believed that interdiction would strongly alienate local warlords
who were believed to provide vital information and other military assets. Thus, the
military not only avoided to directly participate in counternarcotics efforts, but it also was
very reluctant to even share intelligence on drug depots and processing plants with other
actors, including the United Kingdom, the lead nation for counternarcotics. The presence
of the Drug Enforcement Administration personnel was limited to two.agents who rarely
left Kabul.114 The arrest in late 2001and subsequent release of Bashir Noorzai, one of
Afghanistan's and Asia's major drug traffickers, epitomized the tacit acquiescence
approach. Although Bashir was known to be a major player in the illicit trade and closely
linked to the Taliban leaders at the time, he was nonetheless released in exchanging for
collaborating with the United States and providing intelligence."' 5 Intelligence-gathering
objectives were clearly driven priority over drug suppression efforts.
Among the warlord favorites of the U.S. military was Hazrat Ali, a powerful
commander from eastern Afghanistan backed by 18,000 militias and deeply involved in
the drug traffic. Ali rose to prominence after he was hired by the U.S. military to hunt
down Osama bin Laden in the Tora Bora region. The failure at Tora Bora aside, Ali's
cooperation greatly facilitated information gathering and U.S. troop operations in the area
under his control. As Major James Hawver, a reservist in Jalalabad in 2002, commented,
13 Ibid.
4 Ron- Moreau and Sami Yousafzai, "Flowers of Destruction," Newsweek, 142 (2), July 14, 2003: 33.
1" Transnational Institute, Downward Spiral: Banning Opium in Afghanistan and Burma, TNI Briefing
Paper Series, No. 12, June 2005, http://www.tni.org/reports/drugs/debatel2.pdf: 11, downloaded June 29,
2005. In a much publicized event, Noorzai was later arrested again in 2005 and extradited to the United
States.
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"He [Ali] was sort of our benefactor. He let it be known that if anybody messed with us,
he'd deal with them."" 16 Similarly, in Kandahar Gul Agha Shirzai supplied militia help to
the United States anti-Taliban efforts while taxing the opium trade." 7 The overall sense
among the U.S. military was that it was necessary to postpone dealing with the narcotics
economy to gather vital support from the locals, vital all the more since the numbers of
U.S. soldiers deployed to Afghanistan were small." Tacit acquiescence thus greatly
facilitated intelligence gathering and other operations of the U.S. military in Afghanistan.
Yet with powerful structural economic drivers pushing toward poppy cultivation
and without a systematic effort to address those structural drivers, poppy cultivation
inevitably swung back to the very high pre-2000 levels, irrespective of President Karzai's
2002 ban on cultivating opium poppy. The following description features the structural
economic conditions of the Taliban era. Yet it is important to recount them since the
widespread view is that the structural economic conditions in Afghanistan today are
fundamentally different than during the Taliban era and that counternarcotics policy in
Afghanistan is not only cognizant of these structural conditions but designed to change
them. In fact, however, counternarcotics policies in Afghanistan are frequently
unresponsive to and unaware of the structural drivers, focusing narrowly on crop
profitability and the deterrent effect of government punishment of opium peasants and
traders. A detailed description of these conditions is also necessary for the understanding
of the mechanisms by which the over time more intense drug suppression policies have
strengthened the Taliban insurgency.
116 Quoted in Anne Barnard and Farah Stockman, "U.S. Weighs Role in Heroin War in Afghanistan,"
Boston Globe, October 20, 2004.
I17 Rubin (2004).
"• Author's interviews with U.S. and U.K. government officials.
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First of all, poverty and lack of economic alternatives have remained endemic
since the fall of the Taliban, with Afghanistan ranking as of one the world's three lowest
per-capita GDP countries.' 19 Around 6.4 million people out of estimated 30 million
people do not have enough to eat on a yearly basis, and 37% of the population are not
able to meet basic needs (including non-food items).' 20 Until 2005, a large and
devastating seven-year drought caused most crops to fail. At least one third of farmers
surveyed by the United Nations Drug and Crime Office reported alleviation of poverty as
a principal driver in their decision to. grow drugs.' 21
The second key driver for the renewed large-scale cultivation of opium poppy has
been the persistence of the credit system based on opium and the abject lack of
availability of an alternative microcredit system, described above. Moreover, the Taliban
ban on opium poppy cultivation drove many peasants further into debt, only perpetuating
dependency on opium cultivation. This problem of indebtness is compounded by the
relatively high price volatility of farmgate opium prices in the short term, especially as a
result of external shocks such as eradication. In the first instance, eradication prevents
farmers from repaying their debt, driving them deeper into debt. At the same time, it
again pushes up prices that have been declining as a result of relatively unmitigated
production, and hence makes growing opium poppy a possible and frequently the only
way to get out of debt. Moreover, since the fall of the Taliban, the financial structure
based on opium has also deepened to include the calculation of rent, sharecropping, and
119 Christopher Ward and William Byrd, Afghanistan's Opium Drug Economy, World Bank Report No.
SASPR-5, December 2004.
120 Carlotta Gall, "Seven-Year Drought Puts Afghanistan on the Brink," New York Times, December 12,
2004.
121 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan: Farmers' Intentions Survey 2003/2004,
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/afg_fis report 2003-2004.pdf, downloaded August 08, 2005.
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land tenure on the basis of opium. Increasingly, it is difficult to obtain access to land
without a delivery of opium payments, and hence without the willingness to cultivate
poppy. 122 Growing opium poppy thus provides not only access to on-farm income, but
because of the typical mixed cropping system practiced in Afghanistan, it also provides
the means of producing food crops for household consumption. 123
High transaction costs have also continued to make it difficult for farmers to
participate in licit economic activities. The continuing lack of infrastructure makes it
extremely difficult to deliver products to local markets. Especially in the case of
perishable goods, such as many agricultural products, this lack of infrastructure can make
such economic activity completely unviable. Moreover, even if goods do not spoil on the
way to the local markets, they frequently require that at least one member of a household
be away from the family for a considerable amount of time. Opium continues to be
picked up by traffickers in the village. The persisting lack of irrigation and fertilizers
further compounds the unviability of legal crops, unlike opium. The nonperishable opium
can also be stored easily and thus allows peasants to maintain access to income even
during the winter months. In fact, many farmers store about 20% of their opium
harvest. 124 Pakistani traffickers also facilitate opium cultivation by sending
comprehensive extension teams to new growing areas and offering financial incentives
and technical assistance to farmers growing poppy.125
122 Mansfield (2004b).
123 For details, see Mansfield and Pain: 3.
124 UNODC (2003-04): 35.
125 Rubin (2004): 8.
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Price profitability is another important factor driving the decision to grow drugs,
though frequently not the prime one.126 Although the farmers capture only a tiny fraction
of the overall profits from the drug trade (3-4%),127 and although they frequently earn
enough only to make ends meet, they nonetheless earn a better income than from many
economic activities. For example, in the 2004 growing season, an Afghan farmer could
expect a gross income of $12,700 per hectare under poppy cultivation. Given the average
size of land under poppy cultivation of slightly more than 0.3 hectare, the average gross
income of an poppy farmer was around $3,900 for his family ($594 per capita) if he sold
all of his opium production immediately after harvest time, and more if he sold some
later 128 - a fortune in a country where many people live on less than one dollar a day. Of
course, opium debt and other expenditures would substantially reduce the net income. At
those price levels, for wheat to become competitive with opium, opium prices would
126 Mansfield (2001).
127 United Nations Drug and Crime Office, The Opium Situation in Afghanistan, August 29, 2005,
http://www.unodc.org/pdflafghanistan_2005/opium-afghanistan_2005-08-26.pdf, downloaded September
06, 2005. For example, in 2000, a kilogram of dried opium sold in Afghanistan for $30- an all time low
from the normal price of several hundred dollars per kilogram. Ten kilograms of opium thus generated
$300. In Moscow, a major transshipment point for heroin heading to Western Europe, a kilogram of heroin
(processed from 10 kg of opium) then sold for $30,000, and the same kilogram of heroin sold at retail
levels in gram units brought as much as $150,000. See, Nancy Lubin, Alex Klaits, and Igor Barsegian,
Narcotics Interdiction in Afghanistan and Central Asia, 2002,
http://www.eurasianet.org/policy_forum/lubinO12902a.pdf, downloaded August 03, 3004. Opium is
smuggled out of Afghanistan to Western Europe by several routes: a) through Central Asia and Russia; b)
through Iran, Turkey, and Eastern and Southern Europe; and c) through Pakistan and then Central Asia and
Russia. Increasingly, the Pakistani route also feeds markets in Asia, including traditional consuming
countries, namely Iran and Pakistan. New information also indicates that Afghan heroin appears to be
reaching the United States as well (author's interviews with U.S. and Afghan government officials,
December 2005), although United States continues to be predominantly supplied by opiates from Latin
America.
128 UNODC (2003-04): 35 and UNODC (2004a). The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime estimates
an average yield of 30 kg of dried opium from a hectare of land.
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have to fall to levels of $10 per kg or less from the current $200 per kg'2 9 -- rather
difficult to achieve even with vast overproduction of poppy.
A factor perhaps even more important than price profitability appears to be price
stability. In surveys conducted in the opium-growing villages, peasants highlighted risk
management as a crucial consideration in their decision what crops to plant each year.
Although daily opium prices fluctuate by up to 30 percent, long-term price data and
farmers' assessment indicate a fairly stable market.130 Legal products, especially those
with intense external competition, tend to be much more volatile even over the long term,
and hence considerably more risky.
Earnings from opium poppy cultivation also make it hard for other economic
activities to compete with growing poppy. During 2003, for example, although farmers
could earn as much as $12 a day cultivating opium, the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) only offered between $3 and $6 a day to its Afghan employees.' 31
Similarly, being a tailor generates a daily wage of 30 cents. 132 Greater earnings from
poppy allow for acquisition of property beyond immediate subsistence needs. Those who
grow opium can afford to buy TVs, electric generators, motorcycles, and even cars as
well afford medical care in Pakistan and large dowries for their daughters. Growing
poppies is thus not simply survival in the face of grinding poverty, but also about upward
mobility.
129 UNODC (2003-04): 35. When farmgate opium prices fell in Afghanistan before the Taliban ban to $30
per kilogram as a result of overproduction and costs of hiring itinerant workers for harvest increased, even
wheat temporarily sold at higher prices than opium.
"30 Pain: 1, 19.
131 Jim Lobe, "Afghanistan: Concerns Grow Over Taliban Resurgence, Opium," Global Information
Network, January 29, 2004,
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=533932931 &sid=8&Fmt-=3&clientId=5482&RQT=309&VName=p
QD, downloaded August 03, 2004.
132 Stephane Allix, La Petite Cuillbre De Schdhdrazade (Paris: Ramsay, 1998): 48-52.
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Finally, growing opium poppy is extremely labor-intensive, thus allowing for a
large segment of the rural population to be employed in the illicit economy. The high
labor-intensivity of opium poppy cultivation and harvesting thus provides employment
for itinerant labor to weed and harvest.'33 For example, the 2003-04 crop from 131,000
hectares sown with poppy would have generated approximately 46 million labor days of
which potentially one third would have been hired labor.134 As David Mansfield and
Adam Pain estimate, "where a household has more than one male able to follow the
staggered -weeding and harvesting season [there is a several week difference in weeding
and harvesting between the south and the north of Afghanistan], the off-farm income
generated from opium poppy can last up to five months, and it is usually higher than the
on-farm income generated as a sharecropper."' 35 In short, given the structural conditions
after the fall of the Taliban, cultivation of opium poppy continues to be economically.
superior to other economic activities for vast portions of the rural population.
It should thus be hardly surprising that despite Karzai's ban on poppy cultivation,
the removal of the Taliban by U.S. forces led to a vast expansion of opium poppy
cultivation, back to the pre-2000 levels. The following table lists the cultivation levels.
'33 The need to hire itinerant labor both contributes to the spread of opium poppy cultivation and limits the
size of the spread. It contributes to the spread of cultivation because itinerant workers learn not only how to
grow and harvest opium, but also personally experience the economic advantages of the activity and bring
this knowledge back to their communities. At the same time, however, costs of itinerant labor are
substantial, and the need to hire itinerant labor to collect the opium resin limits the size of the plot a farmer
can sow with poppy, since, if he sowed too much, he and his family would not be able to collect the resin
nor afford a large number of itinerant workers.
"34 David Mansfield, Diversity and Dilemma: Understanding Rural Livelihoods and Addressing the Causes
of Opium Poppy Cultivation in Nangarhar and Laghman, Eastern Afghanistan, GTZ Project for Alternative
Livelihoods in Eastern Afghanistan, PAL Internal Document No. 2, December 2004,
http://www.gtz.de/de/dokumente/en-LIVELIHOODS_STUDYPALID_NO 2.pdf, downloaded January
08, 2005.
135 Mansfield and Pain: 3.
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In 2006, opium poppy was cultivated on 165,000 hectares of land in Afghanistan.
Although this number represents only about 3.65% of arable land in Afghanistan, drug
cultivation and traffic generates over 50% of Afghanistan's GDP. The number of villages
growing opium poppy increased dramatically since the fall of the Taliban. The
production in the north of the country, in provinces such as Badakshan, also expanded
dramatically. Although the north produced drugs during the era of the Northern Alliance
hunkering there from the expanding Taliban, its production frequently amounted only to
six percent of total production. After 2002, Badakshan emerged as one of the major
producing provinces. 137 Moreover, unlike in other drug producing countries, poppy
cultivation in Afghanistan is not limited to remote areas inaccessible to the government:
it is everywhere.
The United Nations thus estimates that 2.9 million Afghans or 12.6% of the
population are involved in opium cultivation.1 38 Yet this number fails to capture the true
size, scope, and economic importance of the drug economy. It does not include the
itinerant laborers hired during harvest times and their families; those who live off of
imports purchased with drug profits, such as durable consumer goods, fuel, and
'36 UNODC (2005) and UNODC (2004a). Global opium production has remained stable over many years,
hovering at around 4,400 metric tons. Since the mid-1990s, however, Afghanistan has captured a
progressively greater and greater share of the market, and production is significantly concentrated there.
See, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Executive Summary: Global Illicit Drug Trends 2003,
http://www.unode.org/pdf/report_2003-06-26_1 
_executive_summary.pdf, downloaded August 08, 2004;
and UNODC (September 2006).
137 Mansfield (2004a): 1.
138 UNODC (September 2006).
443
medicines; those who profit from the development of local production and sales
underwritten by drug profits; or those who benefit from the development of local
services, such as teashops and resthouses, for traffickers. Even as U.S. officials point to
the real estate boom and business activity visible in many Afghan cities as a sign of
progress, the reality is that such progress is in large part financed by profits from the drug
industry. 139
Apart from facilitating U.S. military operations and coinciding with the expansion
of poppy cultivation, tacit acquiescence toward narcotics on the part of the U.S. military
also resulted in the entrenchment of powerful warlords in the drug trade since the
warlords were given free run. 140 As indicated earlier, the most notorious of these was
Hazrat Ali. Although bin Laden escaped from Tora Bora, All managed to maintain his
power and prominence. Backed by General Mohammad Fahim, he threatened his rivals
with American air strikes, as he appointed himself the security chief of Nangarhar
province. In this position, he consolidated his control over the drug trade. Poppy farmers
from Nangarhar described how Ali had encouraged and closely supervised the cultivation
and trafficking of opium: Ali's men came to the villages in pickup trucks, bought raw
'39 Rubin (2004). It also needs to be mentioned that such as large-scale unmitigated illicit economic activity
carries some serious negative economic effects. So far, in Afghanistan, it has been contributing to inflation,
pushing up prices of food, consumer goods, and real estate. It has also led to real estate speculation and
currency destabilization. Furthermore, the size of the illicit economy dwarfs government revenues, which
in 2005 were only 4.5 percent of GDP, one of the lowest rates in the world. See, "Creeping towards the
Marketplace," Economist, 378 (8463), February 4, 2006: 38. Large cultivation of illicit crops, easy access
to drugs, and the return of refugees from Pakistan, a country that has a major drug addiction problem, also
contributed to a major rise in the number of opiate addicts in Afghanistan, totaling perhaps as much as four
percent of the population. "Asia: Demand-Driven - Drug Addiction in Afghanistan," Economist, 370
(8358), January 17, 2004: 53.
140 1 am not arguing that the U.S. military actively encouraged the participation and/or entrenchment of the
warlords in the drug trade, but the direct consequence of the minimalist and light-foot-print approaches was
the inability and early unwillingness to prevent the warlords from consolidating their power vis-k-vis the
Kabul government, including by becoming entrenched in the drug trade. See, also Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy,
"Narco-Terrorism in Afghanistan," Terrorism Monitor, 2 (6), March 25, 2004.
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opium, and at first transported it across the border to Pakistan for processing, but later
processed it into heroin in labs that sprung up in Nangarhar itself.141
Sponsorship of the illicit economy generated political capital for Ali. A 2003
interview by Ron Moreau and Sami Yousafzai with a 35-year-old farmer from
Nangarhar, Ghulam Shah, illustrates the attitudes of the local population toward Ali and
poppy cultivation in Nangarhar at the time. During the Taliban ban on opium cultivation,
Shah was barely able to feed his family and became heavily indebted. However, after the
removal of the Taliban and the sponsorship of poppy cultivation by Ali, Shah went back
to poppy cultivation, succeeded in breaking out of debt, and expecting to make about
$9000 from 25 kilograms of opium - an immense fortune for him. With this money, he
could afford to take his teenage daughter to Pakistan for a kidney transplant. He praised
god and Ali for his good fortune: "We are all Hazrat Ali's soldiers. We all work for
him." 142 Ali was even reputed to be handing out AK-47s among the villagers for
protection.
In addition to Hazrat Ali, other commanders also took advantage of U.S. hands-
off approach not only to narcotics, but crucially to the warlords themselves, and solidified
their power positions and their control over the drug trade. Wielding large amounts of
firepower and manpower, the warlords acquired positions of official political power by
becoming governors and police chiefs. From the position of official power, they further
consolidated their control over the drug trade. The slow disarmament process frequently
allowed them to find ways around the disarmament requirements by hiding weapons or
complying with the militia disarmament agreements only after they had secured control
141 Mishra: 47. See also, Phillippe Grangereau, "Afghanistan: Dans le Nangarhar, la mafia de l'opium regne
en maitre," Liberation, October 9, 2004.
142 Moreau and Yousafzai: 29.
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and loyalty of the military and police in their region. Allowing their police and military to
participate in the drug trade, such as by taxing farmers and traffickers, helped the ex-
warlords-now-government-officials to secure the necessary loyalty.
In Kandahar, Gul Agha Sherzai, a prominent warlord, who with the help of U.S.
air strikes captured the city of Kandahar from the Taliban in 2001 and was governor of
the province until 2004, was known to be deeply involved with the drug traffic, providing
his military and police officials to ride along with and protect the 50-to-70 vehicle drug
convoys heading to Iran. Commanders in Sherzai's militias were also buying opium
poppy from the farmers.' 43 Under Sherzai's supervision of the province, opium
cultivation increased by 140 percent between 2004-2005 growing season.
Another prominent warlord-cum-governor. deeply involved in the drug trade was
Mohammad Atta. While giving out interviews from his governor's mansion in Mazar-I-
Sharif in the Balkh province near Uzbekistan about his extensive eradication efforts and
disarmament measures, Mohammad stashed away large amounts of weapons and
protected the smuggling of drugs into Uzbekistan. When the Karzai-appointed police
chief seized a large shipment of opium, Mohammad arrested him and kept him locked up
in his house for several days.144 Mohammad Atta also engaged in large-scale fighting
with the Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum, himself deeply involved with the drug
trade; over the control of opium poppy fields and smuggling into Uzbekistan. Similarly,
143 Ibid. Gul Agha Sherazai was replaced.by Haji Assadulah Khalid as the governor of Kandarhar in 2005
while Sherazai was moved to Nangarhar.
144 Mishra: 47.
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in the south, the governor of Helmand, Sher Mohammad Akhund, was deeply involved in
the drug trade..145
At the most basic level, the warlords-cum-government officials tax the poppy
peasants. The farmers reported having to pay on average one tenth of their opium harvest
to local commanders/government officials, either in kind or in cash. 146 The actual size of
the rent paid to the local commander depends on the personal relationship between the
commander and the farmer. The closer the relationship, the smaller the tax. By lowering
the taxes, local warlords thus buy loyalty from the population and increase their political
capital. 147 Thus, in north-west Afghanistan, some peasants from a different ethnic group
than that of the commander have to pay up to 40% of their harvest earnings.
Overall, the trade is very ethnically divided, with local ethnic-based cultivation
and smuggling networks emerging and little cross-ethnic integration taking place. As in
many consuming countries, there appear to be multiple segmented drug markets in
Afghanistan, rather than one large national market.' 48 The direct consequence of the
existence of the ethnically segmented markets and the reinforcement of the ethnically-
based segmentation by the warlords is the reinforcement of the power of the warlords-
cum-governors. By giving their own ethnic group preferential access to the drug market -
lower taxes, better protection, and greater marketing opportunities - the warlords can
145 In 2005, Akhund was appointed by President Karzai to the upper chamber of Afghanistan's parliament,
the House of Elders. It is also important to note that individuals sponsoring or more directly participating in
the drug trade occupy positions of power not simply in regional and local governments, but at every level in
the country's political and economic governing structures. Other warlords, many of them with various ties
to the drug trade, include Pashtun warlord Pasha Khan Zadran in Khowst province; Shia Karim Khalili in
the Bamiyan province and the central Hazarajat region; Haji Abdul Qadir in Nangarhar; Amanullah Khan
in Ghor province; and Abdul Salam and Zaher Naibzada in Herat.
146 UNODC (2003-04): 36.
147 In some villages in the north, no taxes were levied on the peasants, but the peasants were not allowed to
sell at local bazaars and could only sell their opium to traders approved by the local commander who in
turn demanded a facilitation fee for allowing the traders to enter the village. Ibid.
141 Pain (2006): 23.
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obtain large political capital from their ethnic/tribal group. Although the ex-warlords now
government officials are currently not involved in fighting - a situation that may possibly
change given Karzai's decision to arm the ex-warlords to fight against the Taliban
insurgency - the ability of the regional powerbrokers to obtain political capital from
sponsorship of the illicit economy contributes to centrifugal forces in Afghanistan. The
significance of the political capital and the ability of the warlords to extract such political
capital from ethnically-based drug networks and its impact on the insurgency will
become even more prominent in the later discussion of the post-Taliban eradication.
Moreover, like the mujahideen commanders in the 1980s, the post-Taliban
warlords also have progressively learned how to most effectively exploit the illicit
economy. They tax not only cultivation, but also labs at the rate of 12-15%, and also
charge a 15-18% transportation fee for providing secure transportation routes.' 49 Like Ali
in Nangarhar, General Mohammad Daud, a senior commander in northern Afghanistan,
not only protected and facilitated smuggling of opium into Tajikistan, but also invested in
operating several heroin refineries in the area under his control, and over time moved
toward exporting refined heroin (a much more valuable commodity) instead of raw
opium. Overall, the warlords/ government officials provide credit, extension services,
cash income, and security guarantees to local poppy farmers, thus generating important
political capital.
The warlords continue to pose important security and political threats to the Kabul
government. They continue to pose these threats despite the fact that several prominent
warlords, such as Ismail Khan from Herat, were removed by President Karzai from their
regional government positions and given positions in the national government and even
149 UNODC (2004a).
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though there is a sense in Kabul that the warlords are simply paper tigers. First of all,
occasional infighting among the warlords over drug smuggling and other power base
sources erupts, such as among Dostum and Mohammad in 2003, or among Ismail Khan,
Amanullah Khan, Abdul Salam, and Zaher Naibzada in 2004. The Kabul government is
frequently unable to put down such outbreaks of violence. Second, while accumulating
vast personal resources and a large power base, the governors refuse to turn over income
from the province taxes to the national government. Third, the warlords accumulate large
political capital fi-om sponsoring the drug economy. Fourth, because of their political and
material strength, Karzai is also forced to compromise with the warlords on major policy
issues, a situation that results in policy paralysis in key areas. 150 The commanders are not
in a position to fundamentally physically challenge the Kabul regime as long as foreign
forces remain in the country and protect the regime. However, their local power - greatly
enhanced by their positive involvement in the illicit narcotics economy -- prevents Kabul
from exercising control over the regions and thus hampers national governance.
In sum, tacit acquiescence to counternarcotics thus resulted in several outcomes:
It greatly facilitated information-gathering and other military operations of the U.S.
forces in Afghanistan. However, in the absence of a policy to disempower the warlords
challenging the Kabul regime, it also resulted in the entrenchment of the warlords and
government officials in the drug trade and the consolidation of their relative power vis-a-
vis the government in Kabul.
'50 See, for example, Mishra (2005); Larry Goodson, "Afghanistan's Long Road to Reconstruction,"
Journal of Democracy, 14 (1), January 2003: 82-99; and Kathy Gannon, "Afghanistan Unbound," Foreign
Affairs, 83 (3), May/June 2004: 35-46.
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Approach II: Compensated Eradication
While the U.S. military maintained a tacit acquiescence approach to drugs,
Britain, the lead nation for counternarcotics, adopted a two-pronged counternarcotics
approach: compensated eradication and interdiction. In 2002 the British government
pledged to reduce opium cultivation by 70 percent in five years, and Karzai reaffirmed
his prohibition against growing poppy."' As one drug policy expert put it, Karzai's ban
resulted in "a gradual shift from what was seen to be an open and legitimate market to
one that was illegal but in the eyes of many still legitimate." 152 The prediction of the
conventional wisdom is that under compensated eradication, the physical resources of the
warlords will be significantly diminished while there will not be a change in the
government's and intervention forces' political capital. The theory of political capital,
however, predicts the change from tacit acquiescence to compensate eradication will fail
to bankrupt the warlords involved in the illicit economy. And if the compensation aspect
of the policy fails to offset the hardship on the local population resulting from
eradication, compensated eradication will also decrease the political capital of the
government and the international community operating in Afghanistan and alienate and
radicalize the local population.
Under the compensated eradication program in place during the 2002-03 growing
season, Britain promised to pay $350 to the farmers for onejerib of poppy eradicated to
mitigate the serious negative repercussions of eradication on the livelihood of the
peasants. Altogether it committed approximately $36.75 million of British aid money and
15 Peter Oborne and Lucy Morgan Edwards, "A Victory for Drug-Pushers," Spectator, 292 (9121), May
31, 2003: 26-7.
152 Pain: 20.
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another $35 million of international aid money to the program. 153 Although Britain was
seriously committed to reducing opium production in Afghanistan, the compensation
program failed not to reduce the extent of poppy cultivation (in fact, opium production
kept steadily increasing) and improve the livelihood of the rural population.
Several major problems emerged. First of all, money was not distributed to
farmers directly, but given to local authorities who were then to compensate the farmers.
More frequently than not, the commanders and governors simply pocketed the money,
not distributing any to the farmers. Many farmers who actually eradicated their fields did
not get any compensation and quickly soured on the scheme, alleging betrayal by Karzai
and the international community. The following comments from a Nangarhar farmer
(quoted by John Burns) expressed the sense of alienation of the rural population due to
compensated eradication: "When the Taliban fell, we were happy, because they took
away our freedom, they forced us to go to mosques, they made us grow long beards. But
now we are not happy, because the governments that control Karzai, the American and
the British, are cruel. They freed us from one evil, and now they have delivered us into
another one." 1s4 The next growing season, poppy cultivation increased dramatically.
Local commanders in charge of the compensated eradication also demanded that
farmers pay them bribes if they wanted to avoid having their fields eradicated. As a
result, the 2002-03 eradication campaign generally targeted only the poorest and most
vulnerable farmers, while the poppy plantations of the wealthy and influential were not
'5s Ibid.
154 John F. Bums, "Afghan Warlords Squeeze Profits from the War on Drugs, Critics Say," New York
Times, May 5, 2002.
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destroyed.'55 By being highly selective in whom they targeted, the local commanders
were able to obtain important political IOUs from influential elites, thus accumulating
greater political capital. Many government officials responsible for implementing the
compensated eradication policy also owned poppy farms themselves, but invariably
failed to eradicate their own holdings, even though they kept the compensation money.
Second, fraud became a major problem. Local commanders declared much larger
areas of land cultivated with poppy than was actually the case, and hence collected very
large sums of money. Since the poor security situation did not allow for independent
surveyors to assess the extent of cultivation in individual districts or ascertain to whom
the poppy field belonged, there was no independent verification procedure in place, and
the British authorities simply relied on the input of the local authorities to determine the
amount of money to be disbursed. Thus, even though the warlords collected vast some of
money, they failed to supervise or enforce eradication, thus obtaining triple amount of
financial resources (from their own drug holdings, from bribes of those whose poppy they
did not eradication, and from compensation funds for committing to destroy drug
cultivation). Crucially, they also obtained political capital for not eradicating.
Third, the money quickly ran out since much it was overpaid to or confiscated by
local commanders. As a result, the compensation per jerib kept steadily shrinking from
the promised $350 per jerib to $40 per jerib.'5 6 At that level, even the actually disbursed
compensation did not allow peasants to make ends meet without continuing to grow
poppy. Moreover, the level of compensation and the entire compensated eradication
scheme did not take into account the structural drivers of poppy cultivation, including the
is5 Anthony Fitzherbert, "The Impact of Afghan Transition Authority's Poppy Eradication Programme on
Rural Farmers," Mercy Corps Mission Report, September/October 2003.
156 Oborne and Edwards.
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level of indebtness of the farmers and microcredit access. The scheme did little to figure
out what the farmers could grow after the scheme was carried out and how alternative
livelihood programs could overcome the structural drivers. The compensated eradication
scheme actually threatened to drive farmers who participated in it further into debt. The
case of a thirty-three year old farmer in Nangarhar typified how the scheme ignored the
structural drivers of production. The farmer was expected to obtain $5000 from his poppy
harvest. If he participated in the compensated eradication scheme, he would receive less
than $1000, a considerable loss. But he also owed $1,160 to a local trader and faced ruin
and punishment if he failed to repay. Obviously, had he participated in the compensated
eradication scheme, he would not have been able to repay.' 57
Fourth, moral hazard also emerged as a major problem. Not only did local
authorities overdeclare the area cultivated with poppy, farmers apparently also started
growing more than would have otherwise been the case. Because collecting opium milk
from poppy capsules is very labor-intensive, the number of acres individual peasants can
seed with poppy is limited by the number of people in their family who can be employed
during the harvest time and by the financial resources available to hire itinerant laborers.
Although small peasants frequently own only few "jeribs" of land, they usually plant only
a portion of the their total land with poppy. If they sowed poppy their entire land, they
would not have enough manpower to collect all opium resin and would waste part of their
harvest. However, when they were paid by the government to destroy their poppy plants,
they were relieved of the need to collect all of the opium resin, and therefore could seed
larger acreage with poppy in order to extract greater compensation from the government.
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Moral hazard also became a regional issue. Because of different climactic
conditions, cultivation in Nangarhar takes places several months earlier than in
Badakhshan in the north where poppy is a spring crop. Farmers in Badakhshan witnessed
the compensation scheme in the east, and substantially increased production in the north,
expecting to be compensated at the same rate. Paying compensation for eradication thus
increased cultivation.
Finally, the eradication proposal generated violent protest and civil unrest.
Peasants in the Helmand province, disgruntled with the Karzai government's effort to
eradicate, alleged with chagrin that during the U.S. military invasion, Hamid Karzai had
promised to let them grow poppy in exchange for their help in toppling the Taliban
regime, and that they now felt betrayed. The Karzai government denied these
allegations. s58 In the subsequent peasant protests trying to prevent eradication, the police
killed eight farmers and wounded dozens of others, generating widespread resentment.
Similarly, in Nangarhar, up to 10,000 farmers blocked roads and attacked police.and
eradication teams with stones. The spontaneous protests in Nangarhar congealed into
more systematic organized violence against the fragile state as several tribes joined forces
to stop eradication. 159The assassination of Vice President Abdul Qadir Arsala and
attempted murder of then Minister of Defense Mohammad Fahim were also blamed on
the opponents of eradication.160
In short, paradoxically, compensated eradication vastly increased both the
financial resources of local commanders and alienated the peasants from the Karzai
'58 Lakshmanan.
159 "Asia: Poppies Bloom Again; Drugs in Afghanistan," Economist, 363 (8269), April 22, 2002: 66.
160 Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Farmers Enraged by Poppy Crackdown, April 11, 2002,
http://www.iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o= 176816&apc_state=henirca200204.
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government and international community. It thus accomplished exactly the opposite of
what it, consistent with the conventional view of narcoinsurgency, it had promised-
namely, to limit the resources of the warlords and reduce opium poppy production. In
fact, opium cultivation dramatically expanded while the compensated eradication scheme
was in place. Furthermore, the eradication scheme also generated a large negative
externality: the destabilization of key regions in Afghanistan and alienation of a large
segment of the population from the Kabul government and its external sponsors. The
predictions of the theory of political capital of illicit economies thus materialized,
whereas the prediction of the conventional view failed.
Meanwhile, interdiction was not making any serious progress in limiting the
extent of cultivation or the power of the warlords involved with the drug trade either.
British interdiction efforts were clearly at odds with U.S. tacit acquiescence policy, and
the U.S. maintained the upper hand. As domestic and international criticism of British
ineffectiveness in stamping out drug production kept mounting, Britain was getting
increasingly frustrated with the unwillingness of the U.S. military to cooperate in any
way with counternarcotics operations, including not sharing intelligence on prominent
traffickers. Prime Minister Tony Blair was even prompted to raise the counternarcotics
cooperation issue, at least in intelligence sharing, with President Bush. To improve
effectiveness, in early 2004 Britain established an elite interdiction unit, the Afghan
Narcotics Special Force (ANSF), nominally responding directly to Karzai's cabinet, but
operating under the control of British Special Forces. In its first year, the unit seized 75
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tons of opiates, destroyed 80 labs, and dismantled two opium bazaars.' 61 But despite the
interdiction efforts, there was no significant impact on Afghanistan's drug trade.
Approach III: Forced Eradication and Beefed-Up Interdiction
As a result of both exogenous factors - U.S. domestic politics - and the
evaluation of existing counternarcotics policies as having failed to significantly decrease
production, the counternarcotics policy. changed further in the direction of more intense
suppression measures in 2004. Instead of compensated eradication, forced eradication
and beefed up interdiction were now undertaken. Given the new government response to
the illicit economy, the conventional view thus predicts that belligerent actors - be they
ex-warlords and the resurgent Taliban - will be deprived of physical resources; the
legitimacy of the national government and international actors in the country will
remained unchanged; and the support of the local population for the government and the
belligerents will remained unchanged. The theory of political capital of illicit economies,
by contrast, predicts that forced eradication will fail to significantly decrease the physical
resources. of the belligerents while it will undermine the political capital of the
government and the counterinsurgency forces and other international actors. It will also
increase the political capital of the belligerents, including of the Taliban.
Sources of Policv Change toward Eradication
Ironically, by the spring 2004, criticism of the failure to eliminate narcotics from
Afghanistan started coming strongly from the United States. Amidst a host of U.S.
newspaper articles reporting on the "explosion" of opium poppy cultivation in
161 TNI (2005): 10.
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Afghanistan and editorials urging strong action, pressure to make more resolute progress
toward eliminating poppy in Afghanistan also mounted from Republicans in U.S.
Congress, including prominent members of the House International Relations Committee
and the Appropriations Committee. 162 The criticism was compounded by the presidential
election campaign, with Democratic nominee Senator John Kerry castigating the Bush
Administration for failing to stamp out drugs in Afghanistan. Statements about
Afghanistan becoming a narcostate and the drug cancer consuming all that had been
achieved in Afghanistan became commonplace. The Executive Director of the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Antonio Maria Costa, for example, declared that
"opium cultivation, which has spread like wildfire throughout the country, could
ultimately incinerate everything - democracy, reconstruction, and stability. ... The fear
that Afghanistan might degenerate into a narco-state is slowly becoming a reality."' 63
In the summer of 2004, the Pentagon thus undertook a major revision of its
Afghanistan policy, expanding the mission of the U.S. military to include help for
President Karzai to uproot drugs and drug lords. Written by Robert Andrews, a retired
CIA and Defense Department official for the Pentagon's Afghanistan groups, the revision
concluded that "[t]he narcotics problem has become a major impediment for ridding
Afghanistan of warlords, the Taliban, and al Qaeda."' 164 The decision followed an earlier
revision of U.S. policy to beef up reconstruction and stabilization efforts by establishing
the so-called Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) which were designed to provide
162 See, for example, Christopher Blanchard, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, Congressional
Research Service, CRS Report for Congress, December 7, 2004.
163 Antonio Maria Costa, Executive Director, UNODC, "Letter of 11 November 2004,"
http://www.colombo-plan.org/www/images/pubs/pdf/unodcnov2004.pdf
164 Jim Hoagland, "A New Afghan Policy," Washington Post, August 8, 2004. Author's interviews with
U.S. government officials, summer 2004.
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assistance in rebuilding local infrastructure and ensuring local security, but not to
perform police functions. 165 Under the new guidelines which were officially announced
in March 2005, U.S. military forces in Afghanistan were to provide support for
counternarcotics operations, including "transportation, planning assistance, intelligence,
[and] targeting packages," as-well as in extremis support for Drug Enforcement
Administration and Afghan officers who come under attack.'" Already in December
2004, Lt. Gen. David W. Barno, then the top American commander in Afghanistan,
announced that the U.S military was conducting three wars in Afghanistan: 1) a hunt for
al Qaeda and the Taliban leaders; 2) a campaign against Taliban and Qaeda networks;
and 3) a campaign against provincial warlords, drug traffickers, and other centrifugal
forces.167 Although the U.S. military's mission was expanded to include some
counternarcotics interdiction support, there was nonetheless a strong sense in the
Pentagon that participating in eradication. efforts (until then conducted by the British and
Afghan government) would severely jeopardize U.S. military operations. If American
troops were seen to be eradicating the population's only livelihood, the American forces
overall mission would be unhinged. Thus, a senior Pentagon official commented: "But
this is not about burning crops or destroying labs. Eventually it is.all about finding a
better option for Afghans who -have to feed their .families."'68 .The sentiment of many
British soldiers operating in Afghanistan under NATO command was also that
counternarcotics operations would jeopardize their counterinsurgency mission. As a
165 As of January 2006, there were 9 ISAF (International Security Assistance Force deployed to
Afghanistan for peacekeeping and stabilization purposes in 2002) PRTs and 14. Coalition PRTs.
166 Thoem Shanker, "Pentagon Sees Antidrug Effort in Afghanistan," New York Times, March 25, 2005.
Author's interviews with U.S. government officials, Spring 2006.
167 Eric Schmitt, "Afghans' Gains Face Big-Threat in Drug Traffic," New York Times, December 11, 2004.
168 Shanker.
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British counterinsurgency soldier returning from Afghanistan commented after the
British government announced that British soldiers would now also be employed in
interdiction: "The guys have been out there, building relationships with local people that
brings in crucial intelligence and keeps us safe. If the same guys start kicking down doors
and reporting on ordinary people who are just trying to earn a living in difficult
circumstances, then they are not going to see us as friends anymore."' 69 Participation in
eradication and interdiction was thus believed by the militaries to undermine the relation
between the counterinsurgency forces and the local population in two ways: 1) It
destroyed the people's means of survival. 2) It threatened to further alienate the locals by
increasing the extent and frequency of the highly unpopular door-to-door searches that
tremendously antagonized the local population, especially in the vital and unstable
Pashtun regions, but which would be necessitated by the envisioned eradication and
interdiction campaigns.' 70 The need to win the hearts and minds of the population was
clearly seen by the militaries and incompatible with the participation of the
counterinsurgency forces in eradication.
Uncompensated and "resolute" eradication, however, was seen as the primary tool
to eliminate narcotics from Afghanistan by the U.S. Department of State's Bureau for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. In an April 2004 testimony titled:
"Are British Counternarcotics Efforts Going Wobbly?" before the U.S. Congress, then
Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
169 Jason Burke, "British Troops Wage War on Afghan Drugs," Observer, December 5, 2004.
170 Author's interviews with Afghan government officials, Winter 2005. See, Christian Parenti,
"Afghanistan: The Other War," Nation, 282 (12), March 27, 2006: 11-17. Several observers have criticized
American methods in Afghanistan as heavy-handed, overly focused on military means, failing to win the
hearts and minds by not delivering economic progress to the population, culturally. insensitive, and tainted
with allegations of torture and murder at the U.S. Bagram prison.
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Robert B. Charles testified that the opium economy was "a cancer that spreads and
undermines all we are otherwise achieving in the areas of democracy, stability,
antiterrorism, and rule of law." 171 In a later statement, he insisted that the British-led
eradication effort used
targeting criteria [that], while designed with the best of intentions, may be overly
restrictive. Criteria such as requiring alternative development to be in place and a
preoccupation with avoiding any possibility of resistance may restrict our ability
to collectively reach key eradication goals. ... [I]fthere is heroin poppy there
which needs, to be eradicated, we shouldn't be delaying, we shouldn't be making
it conditional upon providing an instant and available additional income stream.
[For some farmers] it is just survival, but what we have to do is to make it crystal
clear there is such a thing as a rule of law. ... [T]he point being that our priority
should not be, it seems to me, some kind of misplaced sympathy.' 72
Thus, in November 2004, Assistant Secretary Charles announced that there would
now be a Plan Afghanistan, tantamount to Plan Colombia.'73 He also made sure that
UNODC was on board with aggressive eradication, flying to meet with Costa and
suggesting that U.S. funding, the UNODC largest contribution, would be jeopardized
unless UNODC expressed a clear support for eradication. Responding in a letter on
November 11, 2004, Costa stated: "I am happy that large! scale eradication is under
consideration." 174
The United States also put a major pressure on President Hamid Karzai, who had
just won the country's first free presidential elections, to resolutely tackle narcotics. At a
171 Robert B. Charles, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs, "Are British Counternarcotics Efforts Going Wobbly?" Testimony before Testimony Before the
House Committee on Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
Resources, April 1, 2004, http:// http://www.useu.be/Article.asp?ID=90CBBA80-50B2-4939-8E76-
FC I C3CO41D2B, downloaded August 08, 2004.
172 Robert B. Charles, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs, "Counternarcotics Initiatives for Afghanistan," On-The-Record Briefing, Washington, DC,
November 17, 2004, http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/prsrl/spbr/38352.htm, downloaded November 28, 2004.
173 Transnational Institute, "Plan Afghanistan," Policy Briefing, No. 10, January 2005,
http://www.tni.org/policybriefings/briefl O.pdf, downloaded June 13, 2005.
174 Costa.
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major counternarcotics policy conference in Kabul in December 2004, attended by U.S.
Vice-President Richard Cheney, Karzai declared a jihad against poppies, describing the
Afghan opium trade as a worse "cancer" than terrorism or the Soviet invasion of 1979
and promising to eradicate all poppy in Afghanistan in two years."' Not everyone in
Karzai's government was comfortable with the new anti-drug jihad. The Afghanistan's
finance minister at the time, Ashraf Ghani, announced a multi-pronged approach to
counternarcotics including interdiction, economic growth, an agricultural strategy, and
judicial reform, but warned against premature eradication, arguing that "[D]estroying that
trade without offering our farmers a genuine alternative livelihood has the potential to
undo the embryonic gains of the past three years. The likely results would be widespread
impoverishment, inflation, currency fluctuations and capital flight."" 7 Karzai nonetheless
reaffirmed the prohibition against growing poppy, while Afghanistan's National Council
of Ulemas issued afatwa against opium cultivation and trade.' 77 The Karzai government
also undertook a bureaucratic restructuring, upgrading the Counter-Narcotics Directorate
to a Ministry, and designating the Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan as the main
narcotics law enforcement agency.
Despite the flurry of proclamations by the Afghan government, the United States
nonetheless considered the Afghan counternarcotics agencies as too unreliable and the
British as too squeamish about the political fallout to entrust them with executing "Plan
Afghanistan." Instead, the U.S. turned to private contractors. Several months earlier, the
'75 John Lancaster, "Karzai Vows to Combat Flourishing Afghan Opium Trade," Boston Globe, December
10, 2004.
176 Ashraf Ghani, "Where Democracy's Greatest Enemy Is a Flower," New York Times, December 11,
2004.
177 A U.S. public-relations company, the Rendon Group, was hired to help Karzai with the propaganda
against growing drugs, with a contract of $1.4 million that was renewed in 2005 by another $3.9 million
funded through the U.S. Department of Defense.
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United States had provided Dyncorp with a $50 million contract to train an Afghan
eradication team, consisting of four units of 150 men each. This eradication team, the
Central Poppy Eradication Force (CPEF), was to be responsive to the United Stated
directly through Afghanistan's Ministry of Interior, sidelining the Afghan
Counternarcotics Ministry and the British. Under U.S. supervision, CPEF and to be used
for eradication. The major ally of the U.S. in the Ministry of Interior became Lt. Gen.
Mohammad Daoud, an ex-warlord from the north with major connections to the drug
trade, and now Deputy Minister of Interior for Counternarcotics. 178 The United States
also set up a similar parallel interdiction unit, a covert squad of special trained agents,
known as Task Force 333. Yet London and.Kabul did not want to simply witness the
evisceration of their influence over counternarcotics and established the Central
Eradication Planning Cell under the Ministry of Interior (not under the Ministry of
Counternarcotics) in an effort to regain some control over decision-making on when and
where to deploy the Central Poppy Eradication Force in order to "ensure that eradication
by CPEF is targeted in a way which takes account of alternative livelihoods."' 79 The
momentum was nonetheless on the side of eradication.
For a while, aerial spraying was under major consideration in the U.S.
government. In December 2004, reports of a mysterious spraying plane eradicating crops
in Nangarhar appeared. Villagers from Nimla claimed that their poppy fields were ruined
178 As mentioned earlier, Karzai's government included many prominent politicians and warlords with ties
to the drug trade. They had accumulated so much military power and political capital that Karzai did not
feel he could avoid making deals with them. Apart from giving them positions of power, Karzai announced
in January 2005 an amnesty for drug traffickers who come clean, end their participation in the drug trade,
and invest their illicit earnings in local development. As Deputy Minister Lt. Gen. Daoud explained, under
the amnesty program, "[w]e would ask them [politicians prominently connected to the drug trade] to join
the government and use their influence and capital to help eliminate poppy and to support the economy."
See, Stephen Graham, "Afghanistan May Pardon Drug Dealers," Associated Press, January 10, 2005.
'79 Bill Rammell, "Afghanistan Counter Narcotics Implementation Plan," Ministerial Statement,
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs," London, March 10, 2005.
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by a plane spraying herbicide. Angry protests broke out. The Governor of Nangarhar, Din
Mohammad, claimed that only the Americans could have sent the plane. Both the Karzai
government and the United States denied involvement or authorization. According to
Western officials in Kabul, "very senior" members of the Bush administration resolved to
eradicate by aerial spraying, much to the consternation of President Karzai who feared
that major protests and instability would follow. But in late 2004, spraying was at least
temporarily called off, apparently opposed by then U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan,
Zalmay Khalilzad who believed that it would significantly antagonize the population and
undermine stabilization efforts. 180
Effects of Eradication and Interdiction on Counterinsurgency
The pressure to undertake forceful and extensive eradication and intensified
interdiction took place amidst a worsening security situation and a strong increase in the
anti-coalition/anti-Karzai insurgency. The insurgency (or insurgencies), located mainly in
the south and east of the country along the border with Pakistan, is composed of Taliban
and al Qaeda forces, of the forces of warlord Jalaluddin Haqqani, and of Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar's Hezb-I-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG). Since 2004, the number of foreign
jihadists operating in Afghanistan both independently and as part of the Taliban has also
been increasing. The extent of coordination between the Taliban, Haqqani, and
Hekmatyar appears to vary over time. As of September 2006, the number of Taliban's
insurgents is estimated at 2,000 to 5,000. Haqqani's forces and HIG are estimated at 200-
300 each. Since 2004, the insurgent forces have managed to keep continually increasing
is0 Author's interviews with U.S. government officials, summer 2004 and spring 2006. See, also Mishra
(2005), and Sonni Efron, "US Backs Away from Afghan Aerial Spraying," Los Angeles Times, January 22,2005.
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the level of insecurity, especially in the rural Pashtun belt in provinces, such as Helmand,
Kandahar, Khost, Nangarhar, Kunar, Paktya, Zabul, and Uruzgan. Afghanistan's capital
Kabul has also seen a major surge of instability, especially in terms of suicide attacks.
The daily attacks on pro-Karzai government officials, NGO workers, and coalition forces
have been increasing both in scope and intensity.'"' The insurgents use Pakistan's North-
West Frontier and Baluchistan provinces as a safe-haven where they have an extensive
ethnic support network among Pakistan's Pashtun population, including refugees from
Afghanistan, and the radical madrasas of the Deobandi movement. 182
The anti-coalition forces oppose the core developments in Afghanistan. Their
declared goals are to rescue Afghanistan from being dominated by American infidels and
their stooges,'83 reclaim the supreme role of the Pashtuns from the Northern Tajiks who
they allege dominate the post-Taliban government, and reconstitute a strict interpretation
of Islam as the law of the land. 184 The insurgents have been tapping into the popular
resentment with Karzai over slow progress of economic reconstruction. In the fall of
2005, such protests paralyzed Kabul for several weeks. Commented a Kandahari
landowner and tribal leader, quoted by N.C. Aizenman: "We don't want any more
'81 See, Larry P. Goodson, Security in Afghanistan: The Continuing Challenge, Center for American
Progress, October 7, 2004, and Bhatia, Lanigan, and Wilkinson.
182 Seth G. Jones, "Averting Failure in Afghanistan," Survival, 18 (1), Spring 2006: 111-128.
'83 The Taliban forces have. exploited both actual and alleged actions by the U.S. military that are
inconsistent with Islam, such as the alleged desecration of the Koran at Guantanamo, human rights abuses
at the U.S. prison at Bagram, and the heavy-handed search by U.S. military personnel in Afghan villages,
including barging into women's quarters and searching women. The distribution of leaflets by the U.S.
military threatening to cut of humanitarian aid if the population failed to provide information on the
Taliban and al Qaeda was also met with widespread popular resentment (as well as being condemned by
many NGOs that believed that their ability to operate as neutral humanitarian agencies was severely
compromised). Many NGOs have become seen by Afghans as corrupt and usurping the money that was to
be distributed among the population while living the high life in Kabul.
184 See, for example, Larry P. Goodson, "Bullets, Ballots, and Poppies in Afghanistan," Journal of
Democracy, January 2005, 16 (1): 25-38.
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promises on paper. We want Mr. Karzai to keep his word."'85 The popular expectations
of economic progress have greatly exceeded the actually ability of the national
government to deliver economic, and even security, improvements to the population,
especially in the rural areas; and the insurgents are increasingly able to exploit the
frustration.'s 6
The intensity of the insurgency has not been lessened by an announcement of
amnesty for rank-and-file Taliban in January 2005. Although the terms of the amnesty
were rather extensive, with only a core of about 150 Taliban. leaders not being able to
qualify for amnesty, the program has apparently not made much of a difference in
quenching the insurgency.' 8 7 Moreover, the insurgency has been adapting to coalition
countermeasures. Instead of massing in large bands of up to several hundred to attack
coalition forces, the insurgents have shifted their strategy to attacking vulnerable targets,
such as NGOs and local government officials, in smaller units, an approach that allows
them to blend in among the population and avoid detection. They also continue to
threaten and intimidate the local population, such as by burning down co-ed schools.'88
Several times, they have managed to take over and hold several towns. Furthermore, the
insurgents have adopted Iraqijihadist methods, including roadside remotely-detonated
bombs and especially suicide bombings. The insurgents have managed to seed effective
fear among the rural population while the government or the coalition forces have not
been able to provide adequate levels of security in vast segments of the territory. The
185 N.C. Aizenman, "Afghans Look Back to the Taliban," Washington Post, March 20, 2005.186 Barnard.
187 Under the Afghan electoral law, former Taliban who had given up their links to armed groups and did
not have a criminal record could even participate in the parliamentary elections. However, according to
Afghan officials, only a few fighters took advantage of the amnesty while many fighters did not trust the
terms and feared being sent to Guantanamo or Bagram. Author's interviews with Afghan officials who had
interrogated some of the captured Taliban fighters, Winter 2005.
'88 So far, the Taliban has managed to close down 200 schools.
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U.S. has reacted quickly with overwhelming levels of airpower when it encounters a
Taliban group, but has not been able to field sufficient troops to patrol the situation on the
ground and provide basic security in the rural villages and increasingly even in cities in
the Pashtun belt.' 89 NATO, which under British leadership had taken over the
counterinsurgency mission in the south of Afghanistan in summer 2006 and is supposed
to transition into take over the counterinsurgency and stabilization operations through the
entire country, has been trying to redress this problem, and bring security to greater parts
of the south. But, despite several' large-scale operations and large numbers of the Taliban
killed, it continues to face a serious and extensive challenge from the Taliban.
Crucially, the insurgency has also managed to capitalize on drug eradication.
Forceful eradication and interdiction not only alienated the rural population from.the
Kabul government and resulted in instability, but it also led to a reintegration of the
Taliban into the drug trade. During the 2004-05, a major forced eradication campaign
was undertaken again by regional governors and officials and also by the Afghan police
and the Central Poppy Eradication Force. The Central Poppy Eradication Force, trained
by Dyncorp and preferred by the U.S. as the main eradication instrument, eradicated 217
hectares, retreating from Kandahar after it faced armed opposition by angry peasants. 190
In the Maiwand and Panjwayi districts of Kandahar province, protesters blocked roads
and opened fire on the eradication teams. In fact, the attempt at eradication generated
almost a provincial revolt, and the eradication teams did not.dare to come back.
1s9 Despite the increasing insecurity, the United States is planning to reduce its presence in Afghanistan by
4,000 to 6,000 during 2006 as NATO takes over counterinsurgency operations in the south and increases
the number of its forces.
190 The Central Poppy Eradication Force efforts ended up costing at least $100,000 per every hectare
eradicated. See, "After Victory, Defeat," Economist, 376 (8435), July 16, 2005.
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The U.S. Embassy in Kabul blamed the Karzai government. In a memo sent from
the United States Embassy in Kabul in advance of Karzai's visit to Washington and
leaked to the New York Times, the U.S. Embassy officials criticized Karzai for being
"unwilling to assert strong leadership" in eradication and doing little to overcome the
resistance of "provincial officials and village elders [who] had impeded destruction of
significant poppy acreage." The memo went on to criticize Karzai for being unwilling to
insist on eradication "even in his own province of Kandahar."' 91 Western diplomats
admitted that Karzai did not want to generate further instability before the September
2005 parliamentary elections. Meanwhile, the local Kandahari leaders who opposed
eradication acquired large political capital with the local population, even if antagonizing
Kabul and the international community. After Karzai placed a new governor in the
Kandahar province, the governor-led eradication in 2005-06 appeared to increase, and the
total area of cultivation decreased by 3 percent.' 92
Deployed in safer areas, the Afghan National Police eradicated 888 hectares in
2004-05, while the provincial government eradication efforts, especially in Nangarhar,
resulted in 4,007 hectares of poppy eradicated during the 2004-05 season.'93 In 2004-05,
eradication in the Helmand suppressed the area of cultivation by 30-40 percent. In the
way it was conducted, it followed the pattern of compensated eradication. Local Helmand
officials in charge of counternarcotics used eradication to eliminate competition while
boosting their opium profits, by pushing prices up. Provincial government authorities
would also impose a "double" tax on cultivation: first, a tax not to eradicate early in the
191 David S. Cloud and Carlotta Gall, "U.S. Memo Faults Afghan Leader on Heroin Fight," New York
Times, May 22, 2005.
192 UNODC (September 2006).
'93 United Nations Drug and Crime Office, The Opium Situation in Afghanistan, August 29, 2005, UNODC(2005).
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season, and then a second tax at the time of crop harvest.'94 The selective enforcement of
eradication has also resulted in a significant vertical integration of opium production in
the hands of a few large traders with good connections to (if not outright positions in)
provincial government. The ability to selectively impose eradication increases not only
the financial profits of the local authorities, but also their political capital. Local
authorities obtain political capital by choosing not to eradicate the poppy fields of their
fellow tribesmen, thus reinforcing their legitimacy based on tribal affinity while
undermining other tribal drug competition. They also choose not to eradicate the poppy
field of those who support them or whom they seek to coopt, including local influentials.
Carried out by local authorities also, the intensified interdiction is similarly
manipulated to acquire control over the industry, displace intermediaries, and buy
specific political allegiance. Local authorities tax both bazaars and traffic. One protection
fee is paid to government authorities to avoid seizures by government authorities, and
another protection fee is paid to government authorities to secure their protection from
drug trafficking rivals who try to rob the drug cargo. 195 Local officials are also widely
reputed to capture trading convoys, take half of the opium, sell it to other traders, and
release the remaining opium and the captured traders for a fee. In one reported case, a ton
of opium was seized and then appeared to be publicly burned while in fact, the burnt
product was a substitute and the genuine opium was sold to traders. 196 The targeting of
smaller traders and collection of protection fees and political IOUs from bigger
traffickers who frequently come from politically influential and economically powerful
elites with tribal followings once again leads to the displacement of local intermediaries,
194 Pain.
'95 Ibid.: 19-21.
196 Ibid.: 21. See also Bums.
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the vertical integration of the opium economy, and the concentration of power in the
hands of provincial elites. Like eradication, interdiction carried out by such provincial
elites thus allows them to acquire not only increased profits, but also increased political
capital. At the same time, the elites blame the need to carry out eradication on the
national government in Kabul, channelling peasant anger toward the capital.
Although interdiction conducted by national government forces - whether Task
Force 333 or Afghan Narcotics Police -- also takes place, it suffers from a similar
selectivity problem. Rather than targeting a specific ethnic group or specific political
opponents or economic rivals, it frequently targets smaller traffickers and local bazaars,
while ignoring powerful ex-warlords cum important government figures. The latter are
still too powerful military and politically -- not incidentally as a result of their deep and
frequently long connection to the drug trade - to be frontally confronted and arrested."97
Furthermore, involvement with the narcotics trade is massively pervasive at all levels of
the state - village, provincial, and national. Karzai's amnesty scheme to traffickers who
come clean and invest their profits -in local development was driven by the inability to
take on the drug traffickers in any systematic way.' 9g Consequently, national interdiction
efforts target mainly lower level traffickers and small local bazaars or key traffickers with
links to the Taliban and without a major current political and military base. Hence the
arrests and extradition to the United States of Haji Bashir Noorzai, Haji Baz Mohammad,
and Bashir Ahmad Rahmany. The effect of national interdiction operations is thus once
again the displacement of small level-local traffickers and the concentration of control
over the trade in the hands of powerful political elites.
'97 Moreover, because of the slow rebuilding of the judiciary, it is not clear whether even if indicted, such
prominent traffickers could in fact be tried and sentenced. See, for example, Goodson (2005).
98 Author's interviews with U.S. and Afghan officials, Summer 2004 and Fall 2005.
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The selective attacks on the drug business competition through the subversion.of
eradication and interdiction have resulted in a new alliance between the attacked opium
traders and the Taliban. This alliance is especially prominent in Helmand, but
increasingly emerging in the greater Pashtun belt. The Taliban has built new inroads to
local elites affected by selective eradication and interdiction. These local elites are
frequently important regional power-brokers with substantial clout among the local
population whom they can encourage to help the Taliban insurgency. At least some elders
in the area have openly declared themselves sympathetic to the Taliban, accusing the
provincial government of being corrupt, exploitative, and robbing them of their
livelihood. Elders in the Sangin regions even admitted to joining the Taliban, angry at the
local government for preying on them and robbing thern.' 99 The Taliban has also been
hired by the drug traffickers to provide protection for drug convoys and poppy farms.
Prior to eradication and extensive interdiction, these elites-cum-opium traders did not
need the Taliban for protection since the playing field was largely level. But eradication
has driven them to embrace and hire the Taliban. Thus, the first mechanism by which the
Taliban has been able exploit eradication to obtain.political capital is to obtain political
support from local elites - traditional, elected, or criminal. Needless to say, by providing
its protection to these elites, the Taliban is once again reaping large financial revenues
from the drug trade.
The Taliban has capitalized on widespread resentment toward, eradication and
offered itself as a protector not simply to the opium traders, but also to poor opium :
farmers. The group has sought to capture and transform the large uncoordinated and
spontaneous protests against eradication into organized activity under its leadership. In
99 Carlotta Gall, "Taliban Rebels Still Menacing Afghan South," New York Times, March 2, 2006.
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southern Afghanistan, the Taliban has hammered posters on walls offering to protect the
poppy fields and warning eradication forces against destroying the crops.200 The Taliban
has killed several members of the eradication teams. The Taliban have been most active
in major poppy-growing regions, such as the Helmand, and in major trading areas subject
to interdiction, such as Sangin. As a result of the Taliban's increased military activity,
opium poppy cultivation in the Helmand increased from 26,500 in 2005 ha to 69,324 ha
in 2006 or by 162%, despite the fact that eradication efforts in the. province also increased
(from 1046 ha eradication in 2005 to 4973 eradicated in 2006). The Taliban's protection
for the traders and the farmers and the overall increase in its military activity overall
significantly hampered eradication efforts in Helmand. The Taliban has thus been able to
demonstrate not only its desire to protect the population against eradication, but also its
potency.
The awareness of the Taliban to the political costs of interfering with the opium
economy and the political capital to be generated by positive engagement in the illicit
economy is demonstrated by the following episode. In the spring of 2006, the Taliban
came to a village near Kandahar and informed the villagers to pack up and leave since
there was going to be fighting.201 The villagers approached the Taliban fighters and asked
them to postpone the operation for a few weeks so the fighting did not prevent them from
harvesting their opium crop. Amazingly, the Taliban agreed, retreated, and came back to
the village only after the crop was harvested. The second mechanism by which the
200 "5 Afghan Officers Die in Opium Area Attacks," Boston Globe, March 12, 2006. The other component
of the insurgent forces in the south, HIG, has also actively attacked counternarcotics officials.201 I am grateful to Sarah Chayes for this information, Because of the possible threats-to local Afghans, both
the names of the village and its inhabitants are not used.
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Taliban acquires political capital as a result of the government eradication is to obtain
legitimacy with and support from the local population.
But blanket, nonselective eradication has equally generated political capital for
the Taliban. The dramatic eradication in Nangarhar, which has been hailed as a major
success, generated the third way in which the Taliban can once again derive political
capital and physical resources from the illicit economy. Under the supervision of
governor Mohammad Din and police chief Hazrat Ali, cultivation of opium poppy fell by
an impressive 95 percent during the 2004-05. With the promises of international aid, the
threat of poppy field destruction, and imprisonment of violators, the local authorities
managed to persuade many farmers not to cultivate opium poppy and destroyed the fields
of those that did not comply. 202 Yet the economic consequences for the population in
Nangarhar were devastating. The Cash-for-Work designed to meet some of the economic
consequences failed to reach the poorest and most vulnerable farmers.203 The loss of on-
farm and off-farm income for the rural population resulted in household income losses of
as much as $3,400, equivalent of 90 percent of their total cash income.204
Overall, alternative livelihoods programs have been slow to reach the population,
especially the ones most dependent on the opium poppy economy. 20 5 Only small progress
has been achieved on providing alternative microcredit system to the population and on
202 All, a major trafficker himself, was cutting profits on traffic in the north of Afghanistan while
eradicating in the east. Author's interviews in Afghanistan, September 2005.
203 Mansfield (2005).
204 Ibid.
205 Furthermore, like in Latin America, the United States is once again devoting only a small portion of the
overall counternarcotics aid to Afghanistan to alternative development. For 2005, for example, out of the
$780 million for counternarcotics, $660 million were for eradication and interdiction, and only $120
million for alternative development. See, Aizenman (2005). Finally, because of the scale of the devastation
of the Afghan economy, alternative development will inevitably take a long time and major investments.
See, Vanda Felbab-Brown, "Afghanistan: When Counternarcotics Undermine Counterterrorism,"
Washington Quarterly, Fall 2005: 55-72.
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rebuilding infrastructure and irrigation. Work of agencies tasked with alternative
development, such as USAID and Chemonics, have been complicated by attacks by the
Taliban and HIG. In regions with the Taliban's intense military activity, namely
Helmand, alternative livelihoods programs have been altogether halted because of the
insecurity in the region and threats to Westerners and Afghan employees of international
and foreign organizations.20 6
The suppression of the opium base of the overall economy in Nangarhar also
resulted in downturns in overall trade in various sectors, including transport, construction,
and retail. 207 The pauperization of the rural population was significant. The peasants were
profoundly alienated from the local authorities and the Kabul government and intended to
go back to growing poppy in the following season. The ban and eradication also
undermined the authority of local pro-Kabul leaders. Shah Mahnoud, an influential tribal
leader in Nangarhar, explained: "I made the decision this season that it would be
forbidden to plant poppy. So none of us did. Now I'm not so happy about that.
[Disappointed with lack of government aid], farmers will grab my collar and say, You
said that we could get aid for not growing poppy and we got nothing!" 208 The
undermining of the pro-Kabul provincial leaders and the widespread resentment directly
play into the hands of the Taliban. In 2006, cultivation in Nangarhar increased by 346%,
the largest increase in the country.
The fate of Hazrat Ali himself is a demonstration of the very large political costs
of sponsoring eradication. While supervising eradication, Ali ran for national parliament
206 See, for example, Joel Hafvenstein, "Afghanistan's Drug Habit," New York Times, September 13, 2006.
207 Mansfield and Pain: 5-7.
208 N.C. Aizenman, "Afghan Report Decline of Poppy Crop, Officials Credit Karzai's Appeals, but Warn
Aid Is Needed to Ensure Success," Washington Post, February 6, 2005.
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from Nangarhar. Despite having a strong tribal base in Nangarhar, spending lavishly on
the campaign and, as shown before, having previously accumulated considerable political
capital from sponsoring the illicit economy in the region, Ali barely eked out a victory in
the election. Unlike other traditional warlords and prominent provincial figures, such as
Mohammad Muhaqeq and Burhannudin Rabbani, who won with 10-15% of the vote, Ali
won only 3.44 percent. Moreover, he performed barely better than several female
candidates in Nangarhar despite the fact that Nangarhar is a very conservative province
and powerful prominent men such as Ali were expected to perform considerably better
than any female candidate. 20 9 Ali's poor performance amidst his supervision of the
extensive eradication reveals the acute political costs of eradication. Thus the third way
that eradication generates political capital for the Taliban is by discrediting local pro-
Kabul elites that embrace eradication.
Despite intensified counterinsurgency efforts, including on-foot patrols in local
villages, the local population has not provided intelligence on the Taliban insurgents. In
the majority of cases, U.S. troops have returned from local information-gathering
missions only with vague promises of cooperation and staunch denials of having any
information on the Taliban. In fact, the U.S. military has even resorted to threatening to
cut off aid to local areas if information was not provided.210
209 For election results analysis, see, Andrew Wilder, A House Divided? Analyzing the 2005 Afghan
Elections, AREU Research Paper, December 2005,
http://www.areu.org.af/publications/A%20House%20Divided.pdf, downloaded January 08, 2006; and
Ockenden International, Parliamentary and Provincial Council Results in Afghanistan: An Analysis,
http://www.ockenden.org.uk/index.asp?id=1648, downloaded May 18, 2005.
210 See, for example, Pareti; Pamela Constable, "Afghan Villagers Greet US Hunt for Insurgents with Polite
Silence," Boston Globe, April 20, 2006; Declan Walsh, "Afghan Civilians Accuse US-led Soldiers of
Abuse," Boston Globe, June 25, 2006.
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On the other hand, the Taliban has been successfully using its opposition to
counternarcotics operations to build up a local information network and boost its
legitimacy. In a village near Kandahar, 211 the Taliban handed out its phone number to the
local people to contact them if they faced problems with U.S. or Afghan soldiers or the
Afghan government. About a week later, the villagers caught on to a counternarcotics
sting operation in which a prospective opium trader made several visits to the village to
buy opium only to be followed with a raid on the villagers' opium crops. So the villagers
phoned the Taliban. The Taliban instructed them to invite the suspected informant back
and pretend they were interested in selling him more opium. The Taliban then caught him
and made him call in the police. When the police came, the Taliban attacked them and
killed several policeman, including the police chief. The Taliban has clearly offered itself
as a security provider to the local population, while using the relationship to gather
intelligence against government officials. The fourth way the Taliban is thus capitalizing
on its opposition to eradication is by obtaining intelligence from the local population. At
the same time, intelligence-gathering of the counterinsurgency forces are severely
hampered by eradication.
The final way in which the Taliban derives political capital and increased military
capabilities from eradication is from migration to Pakistan caused eradication. Nangarhar
in 2005 once again provides an illustration. The widespread impoverishment of the rural
population as a result of the 2005 eradication in Nangarhar led to a large-scale migration
into Pakistan. As the peasants were unable to repay their debts because of the suppression
efforts, they faced three possibilities: death from the hands of the local trader; liquidation
211 I am grateful to Sarah Chayes for this information. Because of the possible threats to local Afghans, both
the names of the village and its inhabitants are not used.
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of their productive assets and sales of livestock and daughters (as young as three) to
generate income to cover the debt; or absconding into Pakistan. Having to give daughters
away of course generates further resentment.212 Even more significant for the Taliban
insurgency is the migration to Pakistan. The shelters most easily available to the new
economic refugees are the Deobandi madrasas that swelled the ranks of the Taliban in the
early 1990s. The Taliban is easily capable of agitating against the Kabul government and
its foreign sponsors among the already-alienated people.213 Once again, these networks in
Pakistan are replenishing the Taliban ranks today.
To recap, eradication and the selective interdiction have resulted in the ability of
the Taliban to once again inject itself into the drug trade, consistentwith the predictions
of my theory of political capital of illicit economies. Eradication has antagonized the
local population, increased instability and civic unrest, undermined the national
government in Kabul, and allowed the Taliban to derive political capital from protecting
the drug trade. Selective eradication and interdiction also pushed the traffickers targeted
by local law enforcement into an alliance with the Taliban, thus allowing the Taliban to
once again collect large financial revenues from protecting the drug trade. The chosen
counternarcotics policies have also allowed local ex-warlords cum local government
officials to derive both political capital and financial resources from the drug trade, thus
consolidating their political power as well as their control over the drug industry - further
supporting the theory of political capital of illicit economies. On the other hand, the
prediction of the conventional view that eradication will severely limit the belligerents'
212 See, for example, Farah Stockman, "Women Pay A Price in War on Afghan Drug Trade," Boston Globe,
September 28, 2005.
213 Vanda Felbab-Brown, "Hasty Eradication Can Sow More Problems," Christian Science Monitor, March
23, 2006. See, also, Carlotta Gall, "Another Year ofDrug War, and the Poppy Crop Flourishes," New. York
Times, February 17, 2006.
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physical resources without effecting the political capital of the belligerents, the national
government, and the counterinsurgency forces have failed to materialize.
Al Qaeda and Afghan Drugs
Despite frequent claims by U.S. officials that al Qaeda is immensely financial
profiting from drug cultivation in Afghanistan, 214 the connection between al Qaeda and
the dug cultivation in Afghanistan is actually rather murky. Belligerent groups such as
warlords, local terrorists, and insurgents generally profit in one of three ways: by either
taxing production or processing, providing protection for traffickers and taxing them for
this service, or engaging in money laundering. Taxing production and processing
requires at least partial control of the territory engaging in cultivation, which Al Qaeda
does not have in Afghanistan today. Similarly, direct trafficking and providing security
for traffickers within the source country require an intimate and up-to-date knowledge of
territory and of the location of counternarcotics forces and ease in moving through the
territory. Some analysts maintain that al Qaeda is making money off of this aspect of the
drug trade by supplying gunmen to protect drug labs and convoys.215 Although some al
Qaeda members no doubt have knowledge of Afghanistan's territory, given U.S. anti-al-
Qaeda efforts in Afghanistan, it is much easier for non-al-Qaeda actors to provide such
services and a much riskier investment for regional drug barons to hire these actors for
traffic within Afghanistan. Moreover, as the Taliban has been providing such services, it
214 See, for example, Karen Tandy, Drug Enforcement Administrator, "United States Policy Towards
Narco-Terrorism in Afghanistan," Testimony to the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of
Representatives, February 12, 2004; Ehrenfeld (2005).
215 Mirwais Yasini, head of the Afghan government's Counternarcotics Directorate, quoted in McGirk(2004), p. 41. Author's interviews with U.S. and Afghan government officials did not generate any
concrete indication of such al Qaeda involvement in the drug economy in Afghanistan.
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is not clear how much space al Qaeda has to provide such services, unless one assumes
that there is no longer any meaningful distinction between the Taliban and al Qaeda.
Although the Taliban is learning from jihadists returning from Iraq, such as in the use of
improvised explosive devices and suicide bombing and although leadership structures of
both al Qaeda and the Taliban are in hiding in Pakistan and in contact, the focus of the
Taliban continues to be solely on Afghanistan and is not fundamentally part of al Qaeda's
global operations. Thus, although the Taliban's leadership may coordinate or receive
advice from al Qaeda's leadership, there is no evidence that the Taliban participates in al
Qaeda's international terrorist operations beyond Afghanistan. It is not clear why the
Taliban should be transferring a part of its profits to al Qaeda, instead of keeping it for its
own operations.
The best available evidence, however, does seem to indicate that al Qaeda may
have penetrated some transit segments of the drug routes outside of.Afghanistan. A
Baluchistan trafficker linked to al Qaeda's financing, Haji Juma Khan, is believed to be
employing a fleet of cargo ships to move Afghan heroin out of the Pakistani port of
Karachi. The arrest of Afghanistan's number one drug dealer, Haji Bashir Noorzai, in
New York at the end of April 2005 was surrounded by reports that Noorzai had hired al
Qaeda operatives to transport heroin out of Afghanistan and Pakistan.216 It is also
possible that al Qaeda could profit from drug-related money laundering, such as through
the hawala channels. Combating money-laundering from the Afghan opium economy
remains the weakest, most underemphasized, and also hardest issue in counternarcotics
efforts in the region. In fact, it has not been the mode of al Qaeda's core to collect rents
216 Julia Preston, "Afghan Arrested in New York Said to be a Heroin King," New York Times, April 26,
2005.
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from affiliated or friendly terrorist groups. If anything, al Qaeda has encouraged self-
financing.
VII. Conclusions
As in the previous two Latin American cases, in the case of Afghanistan, my
theory of political capital of illicit economies performed overwhelmingly better than the
conventional view of narcoterrorism and narcoinsurgency. A detailed analysis of over a
hundred years of the interaction of military conflict and illicit economies in Afghanistan
examined the phenomenon in the context of three major illicit economies - illicit
narcotics economy, illicit smuggling with illicit goods, and illicit logging - and various
armed groups with different ideologies, goals, and organizations. The analysis found only
a few data points that were consistent with the predictions of the conventional view. All
of these data points were also consistent with my theory of the political capital of illicit
economies. In addition, however, my theory was supported by additional data that clearly
contradicted the conventional view. Thus, my theory passed several critical tests that the
conventional view failed.
The first data point supporting the conventional view is the desire of British
colonial forces to prevent the access of Pashtun belligerents to the drug trade in the 19th
and early 20th century, expecting that the belligerents would increase their strength if
benefiting from the economy. This evidence is equally consistent with my theory of
political capital of illicit economies. In fact, through the use of interdiction, Britain
succeeded in greatly limiting the opium economy in the contested Pashtun areas. But this
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did not bankrupt the Pashtun belligerents as the conventional view predicts. Instead,
consistent, with my theory the belligerents found other ways of financing and carried on
with their insurgency and attacks.
During the 1980s and 1990s, the various mujahideen who became positively
involved in the illicit economy obtained not only financial resources, as predicted by the
conventional view, but also freedom of action and political capital. Through their positive
involvement, in the. illicit economy, the mujahideen commanders were able to present
themselves as new distributors and patrons of the tribes and regions under their
command, displacing traditional elites and transforming themselves from warriors to also
governing elites. The distribution of the gains from the illicit economy allowed them to
obtain legitimacy. They invested a portion of their profits from the illicit narcotics
economy into the provision of social services, such as schools, clinics, and local
administration. Clearly, such actions were not motivated by a desire to increase financial
profits as argued by the conventional view, but by a desire to obtain political capital.
Nor can conventional view easily explain why even warlords who did not need
money from the illicit economy because they had income from the trade with gems and in
fact objected to drugs on moral grounds, such as Massoud, did not eradicate the illicit
narcotics economy in their region or in the region of their opponents. Clearly, pecuniary
motives could not have been their motivation, but rather the sensitivity to the political
costs of eradicating. In fact, warlords who attempted to eradicate, Nasim Akhundaza and
Abdul Qadir, lost large political capital and had to reversed their policy, once again
supporting my theory.
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As predicted by my theory, positive involvement in the illicit economy also
facilitated information gathering of the mujahideen. The mujahideen relied on local
inhabitants to provide adequate warning about advancing Soviet forces to such an extent
that they often failed to post their own security guards. In areas where the population had
fled or were tired of the war, the mujahideen were had essentially no intelligence on
Soviet movements. Thus, had the mujahideen eradicated, the population would have been
unable to make ends meet, leave the area, and the mujahideen would have been left
without intelligence.
Also as predicted by my theory, mujahideen commanders and warlords who were
involved in labor-intensive aspects of the illicit economy, such as Nasim Akhundaza,
obtained greater popular support than commanders who were only involved in labor-non-
intensive aspects of the drug trade, such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.
The conventional view cannot account for the Taliban's original impulse to
eradicate the illicit drug economy in 1994. More importantly, it cannot account for the
reversal of the policy on the part of the Taliban. The only way the conventional view
could account for such a reversal is for the Taliban to call off eradication for pecuniary
reasons, a motivation that the conventional view singles out as the only reason why
belligerents groups embrace illicit economies. Yet, the Taliban clearly did not need the
financial income from drugs in 1994 and 1995. It already accessed the illicit smuggling
with legal goods, an illicit activity that generated a vast financial income for the Taliban.
Instead, as predicted by my theory, the Taliban reversed its policy because of the large
political costs: a loss of legitimacy, and, in fact, a physical loss of control over the
territory where it carried out eradication. Only after the Taliban abandoned eradication,
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was its control over the most naturally pro-Taliban Pashtun south consolidated. As
predicted by my theory, the rural population vastly praised the Taliban for sponsoring the
illicit economy.
This episode also confirms another argument of my theory - namely, about the
effect of the character of the illicit economy on the size and scope of political benefits.
Even though the Taliban sponsored the illicit smuggling with legal goods under ATTA
while eradicating, this labor-non-intensive illicit economy did not generate the sufficient
employment opportunities for the population and political capital for the Taliban to offset
the political costs of eradication.
Neither my theory nor the conventional view predicted the 2000 eradication by
the Taliban. What is consistent with my theory, however, is the fact that the Taliban was
only eradicating in regions where it had firm control, but that elsewhere, such as with the
Shinwari tribe, it used bribes; that its prohibition of cultivation started breaking down
within a year; and, crucially, that it called off eradication and prohibition on cultivation in
September 2001 as the U.S. invasion loomed imminent. Clearly, financial profits were
not the reason for calling off eradication, since the Taliban's heroin stockpiles would
have allowed it to maintain very large financial income while maintaining eradication.
The speed with which the Pashtun south fell during the U.S. military invasion - possibly
driven by the alienation of the peasants due to eradication - is also consistent with my
theory. However, this evidence is only circumstantial, and sufficient detail for confirming
it is lacking. Nonetheless, what is more clearly supportive of my theory are reports of
peasants being deeply antagonized by the Taliban's eradication and cooperating with the
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anti-Taliban forces on the premise that they would be allowed to grow poppy in exchange
for helping to topple the Taliban regime.
.In the post-Taliban period, the evidence once again decisively supports my
theory. First, the counterinsurgency forces - the U.S. military - adopted tacit
acquiescence to the illicit economy. U.S. and British military leaders argued that such a
policy was necessary for information gathering, the facilitation of military operations
against the Taliban, and for winning the hearts and minds of the local population. In fact,
tacit acquiescence did generate such provision of intelligence and other cooperation from
various warlords. Even as large political pressures for eradication have built up in other
U.S. agencies and institutions, the U.S. military has refused to directly participate in
eradication.
SLocal warlords who have been positively involved in the illicit economy have
derived not only large financial benefits from it, but also substantial political capital. The
population has praised them for their sponsorship of the illicit economy. On the other
hand, the population has condemned eradication. Eradication has led to protests, riots,
and social instability. Local elites who have embraced eradication, such as Hazrat Ali in
Nangarhar, have suffered severe losses of legitimacy and support, and barely managed to
hold on to their traditional power base.
Contrary to the predictions of the conventional view, eradication has failed to
bankrupt warlords who benefit from the drug economy. In fact eradication has enhanced
not only the warlords' financial profits, but because of its selective nature, also their
political capital. Local elites in charge of eradication learned how to manipulate
eradication and interdiction to their advantage. They have destroyed only the poppy fields
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of their opponents - political competitors or rival tribes - while protecting the illicit
economy of their loyalists and tribal supporters, thereby cementing their -power base and
consolidating their political capital. Moreover, the selective eradication also enhanced
their financial profits by allowing them to sell their opium stocks at hire prices. They
manipulated the counternarcotics operations to remove local traders from the. opium
economy, thus: consolidating their control over the economy and facilitating its vertical
integration. Their behavior and the popular reaction to their selective eradication once
again supports my theory and disconfirms the. conventional view.
Eradication also has failed to bankrupt the Taliban insurgency. The frequency and
scale of Taliban attacks have increased while eradication has also intensified. In fact,
eradication and the way interdiction have been carried out have had the opposite effect
than predicted by the conventional view. During 2001-2003, the military pressure on the
Taliban resulted in the Taliban's loss of control over the drug economy, while allowing
individual traffickers and local political elites to rise. However, the subsequent
eradication has allowed the Taliban to reinsert itself into the illicit economy because local
traders as well as the larger population are in need of the Taliban's protection against the
eradication teams. As these policies increased the demand for belligerents' protection
services for local elites participating in the illicit economy, the traffickers, as well as the
broader rural population, they allowed the Taliban to inject itself back in the illicit
economy after 2002. The Taliban is thus once again collecting large rents from its
protection of the illicit economy. As predicted by my theory, enhanced suppression
measures have thus strengthened the previously loose connections between the Taliban
and the traffickers and also between the Taliban and the population. More importantly,
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eradication has pushed the rural population into the hands of the Taliban. Local elites
affected by eradication have come out in support of the Taliban.
The Taliban has been able to translate its protection against eradication into
acquiring intelligence. On the other hand, the intelligence provision by the population on
the Taliban to U.S. and NATO forces is poor. Eradication also has directly strengthened
the Taliban insurgency by causing economic outmigration from Afghanistan to Pakistan,
with many of the new refugees refilling Deobandi madrasas and the ranks of the Taliban.
Providing financial compensation for eradication did not redress the
counterproductive effects of eradication. Although some of the problems of compensated
eradication efforts in Afghanistan were specific to their flawed design - namely, a lack of
funds, inappropriate assessment and disbursal procedures, and fraud - and could
potentially be overcome by a smarter design, other problems were more permanent and
more difficult to eliminate. These include moral hazard - inadvertently motivating
peasants to grow more poppy in order to collect greater compensation - and, crucially,
the ability of traffickers to outbid the financial compensation offered by the government.
Compensation frequently failed to reach those who eradicated, being stolen by local
officials in charge of disbursing it, and if it did, the disbursed amount was too small to
offset the financial losses of eradication. Like uncompensated eradication, the
compensated eradication scheme thus generated widespread protests.
In sum, regardless of their ideology, ethnicity, and internal organization, the
various belligerent groups discovered that sponsorship of illicit economies, especially
labor-intensive one such as opium poppy cultivation, brings them great political benefits,
in addition to financial profits. Thus, since the 1980s various mujahadeen commanders,
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warlords, and the Taliban embraced the illicit narcotics economy. Their involvement in
the illicit economy followed a learning curve, with individual warlords, mujahideen, and
the Taliban becoming progressively more enmeshed in the economy while at the same
time providing an example to other belligerent groups to emulate and attracting new
entrants into the opium economy.
Belligerent actors also quickly learned that the suppression of the illicit economy
is extremely costly politically and very hard to sustain. In the absence of alternative
livelihoods in place, eradication alienated, antagonized, and radicalized local populations,
making it difficult for local elites to retain control without engaging in extensive
repression.
Invariably, eradication failed to bankrupt the belligerent groups participating in
the illicit economy. Either they adapted by obtaining funding from other sources, or
eradication, paradoxically, increased their financial profits from the illicit economy.
The following chapter provides a summary conclusion. It reviews the central
tenets of the two theories - the conventional view of narcoterrorism and narcoinsurgency
and the political capital of illicit economies. It summarizes the cumulative evidence from
the three cases and evaluates the validity of the two theories. It also highlights other
lessons of the study. Finally, the chapter also discusses the contribution of the study to
security studies, political economy, and the study of failed states.
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CHAPTER SEVEN - Conclusions
I. Introduction
The study explored the nexus between illicit economies and military conflicts. It
investigated when and how access by belligerents to the production and trafficking of
illicit substances affects the strength of belligerents and governments. It showed:
* through which processes access to illicit economies affect the strength of
belligerent groups;
* what conditions influence the size and scope of the benefits (and costs)
belligerent groups derive (and incur) from their interaction will illicit economies;
and
* how government policies toward the illicit economies affect the strength of
belligerents and, ultimately, limit, contain, or exacerbate military conflicts.
The study presented a general theory of the relationship between illicit markets
and military conflict - the political capital of illicit economies -- and contrasted it with
the conventional view of the connections between drug trafficking and military conflict.
Although the narcotics trade was the predominant focus of the study because it is the
most profitable illicit economy and has received from attention from both policymakers
and academics, the drug trade was situated in the study within the larger class of markets
for illicit products and services. The study explored the validity of the two competing
theories - the conventional wisdom and the political capital of illicit economies theory -
through a case-study analyses of Peru, Colombia, and Afghanistan. In these cases, the
study examined a variety of belligerent actors covering the ideological spectrum as well
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as several illicit economies -- namely, the cultivation of illicit crops, the smuggling with
illicit narcotics, illicit smuggling with legal goods, and illicit logging.
In this chapter, I first briefly recapitulate the two competing theories. Second, I
summarize the empirical evidence from the three principal cases studies, showing that in
each case, the theory of political capital of illicit economies performs considerably better
than the conventional view of narcoguerrilla/narcoterrorism. Third, I present additional
lessons of the study. Fourth, I discuss the contribution of the study to academic discourse.
II. The Conventional View versus the Political Capital of Illicit Economies: The
Theories and the Empirical Evidence from the Cases
The Two Competing Theories
The conventional view of the relationship between illicit economies and military
conflict focuses on the belligerents' physical resources. Informed by both U.S.
government analyses' and academic literature on narcoterrorism, "greed versus
grievance,"3 the French view of counterinsurgency and its U.S. equivalent "the cost-
' See, for example, Rand Beers, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs, "Narco-Terror: The Worldwide Connection Between Drugs and Terrorism," a hearing before the
U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government
Information," March 13, 2002; http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=196, downloaded April 10, 2003;
and Robert Charles, U.S. Policy and Colombia, Testimony before the House Committee on
Government Reform, June 17, 2004, http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/State%20-
%20Charles%20Testimony.pdf, downloaded June 20, 2004.
2 For example, James Adams, The Financing of Terror (London: New English Library, 1986); Rachel
Ehrenfeld, How Terrorism Is Financed and How to Stop It (Chicago: Bonus Books, 2005); Douglas J.
Davids, Narco-terrorism (Ardsley: Transnational Publishers, 2002).
3 For example, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "On the Economic Causes of War," Oxford Economic
Papers, 50 (4), October 1998: 563-573; Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil
Wars," October 21,
2001, http://econ.worldbank.org/files/12205_greedgrievance 23oct.pdf, downloaded May 18, 2003; David
Keen, The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars, Adelphi Paper No. 320 (Oxford: IISS/Oxford
University Press, 1998); War (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000); Mats Berdal and David Keen, "Violence
and Economic Agendas in Civil Wars: Some Policy Implications," Millennium: Journal ofInternational
Studies, 26 (3), 1997: 795-818; and Ross, Michael L. "Oil, Drugs, and Diamonds: The Varying Roles of
Natural Resources in Civil Wars," in Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, The Political Economy of
Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003): 47-72.
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benefit school of counterinsurgency,"4 and the "eradication school of counterterrorisrn," 5
the conventional view argues that belligerent groups derive large financial profits from
illicit economies. With these large financial profits, terrorists, warlords, and insurgents
buy weapons and hence expand conflict, while the government's relative capabilities vis-
a-vis the belligerents shrink. Consequently, the government needs to focus on redressing
this change in relative power by eliminating the physical resources of the belligerents
through the elimination of the illicit economy.
Moreover, the conventional view frequently maintains that whether or not the
belligerent groups ever had any ideological goals, once they interact with the illicit
economy, they lose all but pecuniary motivations. Profiting immensely from the illicit
economy, they have no motivation to achieve a negotiated settlement with the
government.6 Thus, the appropriate government strategy for defeating the belligerents is
to destroy the illicit economy and defeat the then-weakened belligerents.
The conventional view argues that if the government eradicates the illicit
economy - sprays the coca plants, burns down the poppy fields - the resources of the
insurgents and the warlords will dry up. The belligerent groups will go bankrupt and will
be significantly weakened if not altogether defeated. An additional claimed benefit of
eradication is that with the drugs no longer entering the global market, consumption will
fall dramatically in consumer countries, such as the United States.
4 For example, Georges Bonnet, Les guerres insurrectionnelles et revoluionnaires (Paris: Payot, 1958);
Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964); and Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf
Jr., Rebellion and Authority: An Analytical Essay on Insurgent Conflicts (Chicago: Markham Publishing
Company, 1970).
5 Walter Laquer, The Age of Terrorism (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987); Neil C. Livingstone, "Death
Squads," Journal of World Affairs, 4 (3), Winter 1983/84: 239-248.
6 Collier and Hoeffler (1998); Collier and Hoeffler (2001).
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The conventional view also holds that the interaction of belligerents with the
illicit economy transforms their identities and goals to such an extent that they are no
longer distinguishable from pure criminals. Since they both operate in a global
deregulated environment, it makes no sense to treat the terrorist groups and trafficking
criminal organizations as two separate and distinct phenomena. Despite some variations,
the prevailing conventional view is one of a new conglomerate actor that has emerged out
of two once separates types of actors, belligerents and criminals, with virtually identical
and unified set of goals and interests. Consequently, it is argued that these actors also
need to be fought together and that belligerent groups cannot be defeated in the absence
of eliminating the criminal organizations with whom they have merged and/or the illicit
economies from which they profit. 7 And aggressive law enforcement against the
criminals and the illicit economy will undermine the alliance between the traffickers and
the belligerents and turn them against each other.8
My theory, the political capital of illicit economies, offers an alternative view of
the nexus between illicit economies and military conflict and of the strategic interactions
between belligerents, traffickers, the population, and the government and explains the
dynamics ignored by the conventional view. Informed by various academic critiques of
counterdrug policies,9 literature on transnational crime and criminology,' o the British
7 Rollie Lal, "South Asian Organized Crime and Terrorist Networks, " Orbis, 49 (2), Spring 2005: 293-304.
S M6nica Serrano and Maria Celia Toro. "From Drug Trafficking to Transnational Organized Crime in
Latin America," in Transnational Organized Crime and International Security: Business as Usual? Mats
Berdal and Monica Serrano, eds. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002): 141-154.
9 For example, Peter Reuter "The Limits of Drug Control," Foreign Service Journal, 79 (1), January 2002:
18-23; Robert J. MacCoun and Peter Reuter, Drug War Heresies: Learningfrom Other Vices,
Times, and Places (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Francisco E. Thoumi, Illegal Drugs,
Economy, and Society in the Andes (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2003); C. Peter Rydell, C.
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school of counterinsurgency and the "hearts and minds" literature," literature on peasant
rebellions, 12 and "the legitimacy school of counterterrorism,"' 3 the political capital of
illicit economies theory argues that belligerent groups exploiting illicit economies do in
fact derive large financial benefits from these illicit economies, and hence increase their
strength. However, my theory also, and crucially, maintains that belligerents obtain much
more than simply financial profits from exploiting illicit economies and that the resulting
increase in the strength of belligerents is much larger and more multifaceted than
Peter and Susan S. Everingham, Controlling Cocaine: Supply Versus Demand Programs (Santa Monica:
RAND, 1994); Coletta A. Youngers, and Eileen Rosin, eds. Drugs and Democracy in Latin America
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005); Ted Galen Carpenter, BadNeighbor Policy (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2003); Cynthia McClintock, "The War on Drugs: The Peruvian Case," Journal of
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 30 (2 and 3), Summer/ Fall 1988: 127-142; Richard Clutterbuck,
Drugs, Crime and Corruption (New York: New York University Press, 1995); "Was Failure Avoidable?
Learning From Colombia's 1998-2002 Peace Process," The Dante B. Fascell North-South Center Working
Paper Series, Paper No. 14, March 2003,
http://www.miami.edu/nsc/publications/NSCPublicationslndex.html#WP, downloaded August 20, 2004;
Rensselaer W. Lee, III, The White Labyrinth: Cocaine and Political Power (New Brunswick: Transaction
Publishers, 1989); and Patrick L. Clawson and Rensselaer W. Lee, II. The Andean Cocaine Industry
(NewYork: St. Martin's, 1996).
10 For example, Peter Reuter, Disorganized Crime: The Economics of the Visible Hand (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1983); Phil Williams, "Transnational Criminal Organizations: Strategic Alliances," The Washington
Quarterly, 18 (1), Winter 1994: 57-72; Louise Shelley, "The Nexus of Organized International Criminals
and Terrorism," International Annals of Criminology, 1 (2), 2002: 85-93; Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian
Mafia: The Business of Private Protection (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993); and Emilio C.
Viano, Jose Magallanes, and Laurent Bridel, eds., Transnational Organized Crime: Myth, Power, and
Profit (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2003).
" For example, Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (London: Chatto & Windus, 1966);
Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations (London: Faber & Faber, 1971); John J. McCuen, The Art of
Revolutionary Warfare (London: Faber & Faber, 1966); Riley Sutherland, Winning the Hearts and Minds
of the People: Malaya, 1948-1960, RAND Document No. RM-4174-ISA (Santa Monica: RAND, 1964);
Guy Parker, Notes on Non-Military Measures in Control of Insurgency, RAND Document No, P-2642
(Santa Monica: RAND, 1962); O'Neill, Bard E. Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to
Apocalypse (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005).
12 For example, James C. Scott, The Moral Economy Peasant (New Haven: Yale University, 1976); Samuel
Popkin, The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1979); Mark I. Lichbach, "What Makes Rational Peasants Revolutionary? Dilemma,
Paradox, and Irony in Peasant Collective Action," World Politics, 46 (2), April 1994: 383-418; Elisabeth
Jean Wood, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2003); Roger Petersen, Understanding of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in
Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), and Roy Licklider,
"Peasants, Choice, and Civil War," International Studies Review 7 (2), June 2005: 311-313.
13 Martha Crenshaw, "Introduction," in Martha Crenshaw, ed., Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power: The
Consequences of Political Violence (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1983): 1-37; Christopher
Hewitt,. The Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorist Policies (Landham: University Press of America, 1984); and
Richard E. Rubenstein, "The Noncauses of Modern Terrorism," in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., ed. International
Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, and Controls (New York: St. Martin's 1990): 127-34.
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assumed in the conventional view. By providing a variety of protection and regulation
services for the population involved in the illicit economy, belligerent groups also obtain
political capital, which consists of legitimacy with local populations and support from
local populations. These security and regulation services include: protecting the
population against the government efforts to destroy the illicit economy and against the
brutality of the traffickers, negotiating better prices on behalf of the peasants, and with
the rents from the illicit economy providing otherwise absent social services to the
population.
The belligerents' ability to derive these material and political benefits from illicit
economies is not uniform and is crucially influenced by a set of structural and policy
factors. I do not assume any particular motivation on the part of the actors, beyond the
elemental goals of the government to suppress the violent opposition,14 of the belligerents
not to be defeated, and of the traffickers to profit from the illicit economy. I offer a set of
general rules that causally relate structural and policy variables to outcomes.
The political capital of illicit economies theory holds that belligerents'
involvement in illicit economies affects the strength of belligerents, in both its military
and political components. The type of involvement can be positive involvement, negative
involvement, and no involvement. Positive involvement' 5 means that the belligerents
sponsor the illicit economy. This sponsorship includes simple protection of the illicit
economy against other actors who are attempting to destroy it as well as direct forms of
belligerents' participation in the illicit economy, such as direct trafficking. Negative
14 I am thus assuming that the local government is not only motivated to suppress the illicit economy, but is
also and primarily interested in eliminating the violent opposition.
" By using the terms positive and negative involvement, I am not making any judgment regarding the
moral desirability or policy appropriateness of the behavior. I only use the terms as descriptors of whether
the belligerents are embracing and exploiting the illicit economy or attempting to destroy it.
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involvement means efforts by the belligerent group to destroy the illicit economy, such as
prohibition or eradication. Non-involvement, or neutrality, means that the belligerent
group has a laissez-faire policy toward the illicit economy. It does not sponsor the illicit
economy in any way, including not providing protection for it, nor does it attempt to
destroy it.
The dependent variable "strength of belligerents" comprises two main
components: I. military capabilities and II. political capital, each of which comprises two
subcomponents. The subcomponents of belligerents' military capabilities are: IA)
physical resources (money, weapons, and numbers of belligerents) and IB) freedom of
action (the ability to optimize tactics with strategy and the available scope of tactical and
strategic options). The subcomponents of political capital are: IIA) legitimacy (perception
in the population that the actions of the belligerents are beneficial to the population and
thus justified) and IIB) support from the population, crucially manifested in a willingness
to deny intelligence on belligerents to the government.' 6
Belligerents' positive involvement in the illicit economy increases the strength of
belligerents. In fact, it increases all four elements of strength: physical resources, freedom
of action, legitimacy, and support. Belligerents' negative involvement in the illicit
economy decreases the strength of belligerents along these dimensions. Non-involvement
in the illicit economy on the part of the belligerents leaves their strength unaffected.
16 1 recognize that there are interaction effects among the various components of strength. Greater political
capital derived from positive involvement in the illicit economy, with a larger segment of the population
more intensely supporting the belligerents, will of course also further increase the belligerents' freedom of
action since the belligerents need not fear that the population will provide intelligence on them to the
government. Similarly, greater military capabilities allow belligerents to protect a larger area with the illicit
economy and to protect it more effectively, thus further increasing their political capital.
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The magnitude and scope of the increase in strength of the belligerents resulting
from their positive involvement in the illicit economy frequently allow the belligerent
group to become entrenched. The group becomes difficult to defeat and gains the
potential to expand conflict. Exploitation of illicit economies thus vastly increases the
staying power of belligerent groups.
Four factors crucially influence the extent and scope of the change in belligerents'
strength as a result of their involvement in the illicit economy. These factors apply both
to belligerents' increase in strength resulting from their positive involvement in the illicit
economy, as well as to the decrease in their strength resulting from their negative
involvement in the illicit economy. These factors are: a) the state of the overall economy
in the region; b) character of the illicit economy; c) the presence of thuggish traffickers;
and d) government response to the illicit economy. These factors function as amplifiers of
the overarching causal relationship, i.e. they determine the magnitude of increase (or
decrease) in the strength of belligerents. These factors are not on-and-off switches: the
posited relationship takes place no matter what value the factors take on, even though
under certain combinations of the factors, the increase or decrease in strength is very
small.
The state of the overall economy in the region is a structural condition outside of
the immediate control of the government or the belligerents. This factor captures the level
of poverty in the region, the availability of alternative means of subsistence for the
population outside of the illicit economy, and the extent to which the local population is
dependent on the illicit economy for basic survival. If the economy is poor and a large
segment of the population is vitally dependent on the illicit economy, the belligerents
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derive large political capital from their sponsorship of the illicit economy. If the economy
is rich, the population has plentiful alternative means of subsistence, and the belligerents
derive only small political capital. Conversely, if the overall economy is poor and
belligerents attempt to destroy the illicit economy, their loss of political capital is large.
The second factor, the character of the illicit economy, indicates the extent to
which the illicit economy is or is not labor-intensive. This factor thus captures the extent
to which the illicit economy generates reliable livelihood for the local population. If the
illicit economy is labor-intensive and hence satisfies the livelihood needs of a large
segment of the population, it generates large political capital for the belligerents. If the
illicit economy is not labor-intensive and hence provides livelihood for only a small
segment of the population, it generates only small political capital for the belligerents.
Conversely, if the belligerents attempt to destroy a labor-intensive illicit economy, they
suffer large loses of political capital, while their negative involvement in labor-non-
intensive illicit economies will generate only small loses of political capital.
This factor is one over which the belligerents have a degree of control. Although
they cannot dictate whether a particular illicit economy is labor-intensive or not (a
structural condition), they can and will choose whether or not to participate in a particular
illicit economy. Thus, in deciding whether to sponsor (or destroy) a labor-intensive or a
labor-non-intensive illicit economy, the belligerents have some influence over the
political capital they will obtain.
The third factor, the presence of thuggish traffickers, influences the extent to
which the local population needs the protection of the belligerents against the traffickers.
If thuggish traffickers are present, belligerents can protect the population against the
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abusive traffickers and thus increase their political capital. If thuggish traffickers are
absent, belligerents cannot function as an agent improving the conditions of the peasants,
and hence their political capital is relatively smaller. Similarly, if traffickers are present,
but are not thuggish, that is, they care about the peasants' well-being, do not abuse them,
and pay large compensation to the peasants, the belligerents cannot perform the
regulatory role and their political capital is relatively smaller.
Traffickers' presence or absence also partially influences the size of the
belligerents' financial benefits. If traffickers are absent, the belligerents take over the
lucrative role of the traffickers. If the belligerents perform the trafficking function well,
their financial profits increase substantially. If belligerents fail to perform the trafficking
tasks well, the illicit economy in the region could substantially decrease, and hence the
belligerents' financial profits will substantially plummet.
Belligerents thus face a strategic choice of whether or not to eliminate the
traffickers from the regional illicit economy. This strategic choice involves a tradeoff
between the belligerents' political capital and financial profits. The elimination of
traffickers and the belligerents' subsequent takeover of the trafficking function may
increase the belligerents' financial profits, but will relatively decrease their political
capital because, obviously, they cannot provide regulatory services against themselves.
The fourth factor, government response to the illicit economy, represents a
strategic choice for the government. Actions by the government, both in deciding whether
an economy is licit or illicit and in adopting a particular policy toward the illicit
economy, determine how crucial a role the belligerent group plays in the illicit economy.
In other words, the government response to the illicit economy influences how critically
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dependent the two other main actors in the illicit economy - the overall population and
the traffickers - are on the belligerent group for the preservation of the illicit economy.
Government actions thus increase or decrease the demand for belligerents' services to the
illicit economy and the value belligerents' services have for the population and the
traffickers.
If the government engages in suppression policies that threaten the illicit economy
(such as eradication or interdiction), both the population and the traffickers become more
dependent on the belligerents for the preservation and protection of the illicit economy,
and thus the belligerents' political capital increases. Meanwhile, suppression policies
have only limited effects on the physical resources of the belligerents since in the absence
of reduction in demand for the illicit commodity (an exogenous variable), the belligerents
(and the traffickers and the population) can adapt in a variety of ways to counteract the
impact of the suppression policies. Thus, although suppression policies are highly
unlikely to make a significant dent in the finances of the belligerents, they definitely
alienate the population from the government and push it more firmly into the hands of the
belligerents. Suppression policies that target and negatively affect the population thus
result in a decline of support for the government (including denial of intelligence on the
belligerents) and in increased support for the belligerents. Interdiction, which does not
directly target the peasants' crops, results in a significantly less pronounced effect of
strengthening the bond between the population and the belligerents than eradication does,
even though interdiction tightens the bond between the traffickers and the belligerents.
If the government response to the illicit economy is one of laissez-faire or
legalization (tacit acquiescence, licensing, or full legalization), the traffickers' and
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population's need for the belligerents' services decreases, and hence the political capital
of the belligerents is reduced. Tacit acquiescence decreases the bond between the
population and the belligerents to such an extent that the population is willing to provide
intelligence on the belligerents to the government and otherwise weakens support for the
belligerents. However, the physical resources of the belligerents are unaffected or even
increased, depending on the level of international demand saturation. Licensing of
production for legitimate purposes not only greatly decreases the political capital of the
belligerents and increases both the political capital and the physical resources of the state
that taxes the legitimate production, but it can also significantly diminish the financial
resources of the belligerents if diversion of licensed production into illicit uses is
prevented.
Among the four factors that have a significant effect on the magnitude of increase
or decrease in belligerents' strength as a result of their involvement in the illicit economy,
the most important factor is the state of the overall economy since it determines how
many people are dependent on the illicit economy for basic livelihood and hence how
they view government response to the illicit economy. The second most important factor
is the character of the illicit economy since it determines the extent of the population's
positive or negative view of the government on the basis of its response to the illicit
economy. The presence/absence of traffickers is the weakest factor influencing the
belligerents' political capital since it affects the producers' (farmers') profits and work
conditions, but not the importance of the illicit economy to the population. Although the
government response to the illicit economy is only the third most important overall, from
the point of view of the government, it is, of course, the most important factor since this
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is the only factor over which the government has an immediate and direct control. In the
cases of large labor-intensive illicit economies in poor countries, those most dramatically
associated with prominent military conflict, the government response to the illicit
economy is an essential and weighty determinant of the belligerents' political capital and
the course of the conflict.
Empirical Evidence from the Cases
In all three principal cases, my theory of political capital of illicit economies
performed considerably better than the conventional wisdom. In all three cases,
belligerents obtained not only financial resources, but also political capital from their
sponsorship of the illicit economy. The increases in the belligerents' political capital were
especially pronounced if they were involved in labor-intensive illicit economies in poor
regions. In all three cases, belligerents who became negatively involved in the illicit
economy attempting to suppress it failed to build up political capital and frequently also
increase their military capabilities (unless they could exploit another illicit economy).
Across the cases, crop eradication failed to bankrupt the belligerent groups and
weaken them sufficiently to lead to the victory of the government. At the same time,
eradication always strengthened the political capital of the belligerents. During periods
and in places where interdiction was undertaken without eradication, and especially
during periods and locales where tacit acquiescence and de jure legalization were
undertaken, the belligerents' political capital declined, the population's cooperation with
the government (or governing force in the case of Afghanistan) increased and resulted
even in intelligence provision to the government by the population (and even the
traffickers) on the belligerents.
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These effects -- posited by my theory and contradicting the conventional view --
took place even though the illicit economy had very different impact on power relations
in each of the countries. In Peru, traffickers were mostly small and medium
intermediaries in the jungles, who never rose to the prominence of the Colombian capos
nor exercised comparable power. Consequently, they never really threatened the Peruvian
elite. What threatened the Peruvian elite was the Shining Path, and especially its urban
campaign. When large traffickers emerged in Peru, such as Montesinos, they were
already members of the elite.
In Colombia, the new illicit drug elite was both ostentatious and threatening to the
traditional landowning elite since it used land expropriation from the traditional elite (as
well as from the rural lower classes) as a way to launder its illicit profits. Moreover, the
drug elite became very visibly desirous of acquiring legitimation and coercing its way
into the established political system. This dual threat to the traditional elite led to an
internalization of the international anti-narcotics norms promoted by the United States
and the acceptance of eradication as the appropriate response to a much greater degree
than either in Peru or Afghanistan. Moreover, this internalization was enhanced by U.S.
financial inducements for implementing eradication.
In Afghanistan, since the mid-1980s, there have been only a few power structures
and elite individuals who did not have ties to the drug trade. Since legitimacy and
prominence have traditionally been based on patronage, and since the Soviet
counterinsurgency policy of destroying the countryside virtually eliminated the ability of
traditional tribal elites to distribute goods among the population, the traditional elite
became discredited. The only available source of patronage became various illicit
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economies. Therefore those who wanted to remain or become members of the elite had to
participate in one or another of the illicit economies - most often and easily in the drug
economy.
Peru
The case of Peru supports the validity of my theory of political capital of illicit
economies and critically undermines the validity of the conventional view. In addition to
obtaining large financial profits from the illicit narcotics trade on the order of tens to
hundreds of millions of dollars a year, the Shining Path (a.k.a. Sendero), the most
prominent leftist guerrilla group in Peru, also derived considerable freedom of action and
large-scale political capital from its positive involvement in the illicit economy. Contrary
to the conventional view, the defeat of the Shining Path took place without eliminating
the group's income source.
Until the Shining Path obtained access to the illicit narcotics economy in the mid-
1980s, its operations were confined to isolated attacks against military and police
outposts to secure weapons, to robberies to secure immediate finances, and to selective
killings and political assassinations. But it was only after it tapped into the drug economy
in the mid- 1980s that the guerrilla group was able to expand the scope of its belligerency.
The Shining Path could then undertake large engagements with military units.
Crucially, the Shining Path derived large political benefits from sponsoring the
illicit economy. Consistently, the peasants condemned the government for eradication
and praised Sendero for protecting them against eradication. The Shining Path actively
exploited such sentiments by portraying the government as impoverishing the population
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and carrying out economic genocide against the population. Sendero also obtained
nationalist legitimacy by stressing the role of the United States in demanding eradication.
The Shining Path was consistently more popular and had greater support in the drug
regions than elsewhere in the country. In the drug regions, Sendero also had to resort to
less brutality to control the population than elsewhere in the country, thus avoiding
antagonizing the population.
The unsustainable political costs of prohibiting the illicit economy - Sendero's
first ideologically-driven impulse - was what motivated the group to reverse its earlier
decision to prohibit the illicit economy. When Sendero prohibited the illicit economy in
the early 1980s while the military adopted a tacit acquiescence policy toward
counternarcotics, the population stopped supporting the belligerents, and Sendero was
driven out of its stronghold in the Upper Huallaga Valley. It was only after Sendero
reversed its policy toward drugs and embraced the illicit economy that it was able to
recapture the coca-growing regions.
Eradication and the failure of alternative livelihood programs radicalized the
population, but cocaleros' representation by non-guerrilla groups proved ineffective in
protecting the peasants' interests. As the legitimacy of cocaleros' self-defense
organizations and traditional politicians faded, Sendero was able to step in and offer itself
as an effective defender of the peasants' interests. When eradication was at its most
intense, such as during the trial use of the herbicide Spike, Sendero's political capital was
at its greatest. It was also at that time - the only time - that the peasants actively fought
alongside the Shining Path.
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The relationship between the peasants, the traffickers, and Sendero also
contradicts the conventional wisdom. Although Sendero protected the traffickers from
government interdiction and the coca fields from eradication, Sendero never morphed
into a unified entity with the traffickers nor did the two actors develop identical goals. In
fact, since Sendero also protected the peasants against the traffickers and attempted to
displace the traffickers from aspects of the illicit drug trade, the two groups had highly
competitive interests and even fought each other. Crucially, when eradication and
interdiction lessened, such as under the leadership of generals Carbajal and Arciniega,
and early in Alberto Fujimori's administration in the Campanilla area prior to the Air
Bridge Denial interdiction operation, the traffickers were willing to provide key
intelligence on Sendero to government units. Similarly, the traffickers fought against the
MRTA, the other main guerrilla group, when it attempted to penetrate the drug trade.
The large and multidimensional increase in the strength of the Shining Path,
derived from its positive involvement in the illicit economy, crucially contributed to
Sendero's ability to expand conflict, both in terms of the scale of attacks and in terms of
the area and theater of operation.
The case of Peru also reveals the importance of government counternarcotics
policies for the overall effectiveness of the counterinsurgency policy. Again, the evidence
clearly supports my theory while disconfirming the conventional view. When eradication
was undertaken, during the early 1980s and again mid-1980s, the military lost ground to
Sendero. The belligerents were able to capture the peasants' allegiance and make major
inroads in the countryside, fundamentally destabilizing the rural areas. When, as under
generals Carbajal and Arciniega, eradication was halted and the military did not allow the
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police to interfere with the peasants' illicit livelihood, both the peasants and the
traffickers were willing to provide vital intelligence to the military and the military
scored key successes against the Shining Path. The importance of tacit acquiescence by
the government in winning the hearts and minds of the rural population and the resulting
improvements in military effectiveness against the insurgents is further underscored by
the fact that General Carbajal was able to secure information and sufficient loyalty from
the population to expel Sendero from the Upper Huallaga Valley even during the height
of the military's brutality toward the peasants.
In fact, it was tacit acquiescence to the illicit economy that allowed the military to
win the countryside back. Since the peasants no longer needed Sendero for vital
protection of their basic livelihood, they were willing to provide the military with the
necessary information on Sendero's movements and the government was able to
effectively strike at Sendero. The role of peasants' self-defense units, rondas campesinas,
was also important in reclaiming the countryside back from Sendero, but many rondas in
the Upper Huallaga Valley directly overlapped with the cocaleros' previous anti-
eradication defense committees, and the strength and effectiveness of these units was
crucially dependent on the military's anti-eradication posture. Sendero was defeated in
the countryside as a result of a tacit acquiescence policy toward narcotics cultivation
being adopted by the military and the government (and later supplemented by
interdiction). Meanwhile, an intelligence operation n the urban theater where Sendero
moved led to the capture of Guzmun, the leader of the Shining Path, and the subsequent
collapse of the Shining Path. Only after Sendero was defeated, the illicit economy was
significantly diminished as a result of interdiction and the emergence of a fungus.
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To some extent, interdiction of the drug trade by the government also created
opportunities for Sendero to obtain important political capital, but to a considerably
smaller degree than did eradication. Between 1989 and 1990, interdiction was effective in
temporarily driving coca leaf prices down. As traffickers' activities were hampered, their
demand for coca leaf fell. Interdiction thus antagonized the population from the
government and allowed Sendero to step in and demand greater prices to be paid by the
traffickers to the peasants. But this level of political alienation was not sufficient to allow
Sendero to obtain necessary political capital to expand anew, and Sendero continued
losing ground in the countryside.
Since the mid-1990s, the remnants of Sendero have been financing their activities
through illicit logging. By its participation in the illicit logging economy, Sendero was
able to avoid bankruptcy even when the major illicit economy - drugs -- was declining
and when the group was no longer able to penetrate the drug economy to the same extent
as it did during the 1980s. Government laxity in enforcing prohibitions against illicit
logging, as well as the small numbers of the remaining Senderistas, have prevented the
Shining Path from rebuilding its political capital through the exploitation of the illicit
logging economy, even while keeping remnants of the group financially afloat.
After the suspension of aerial interdiction in 2002 and a renewed strong focus on
forced eradication, Sendero has once again offered itself as a defender of the cocaleros
against eradication and as a protector of traffic in drugs against land interdiction. Today,
eradication is again antagonizing and radicalizing the cocaleros. The case of Peru thus
clearly shows how, contrary to the conventional view, eradication is counterproductive in
the counterinsurgency effort.
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Colombia
Despite Colombia being the poster case of the conventional view, a detailed
examination of the case since the 1960s through the current period greatly undermines
the validity of the conventional view and supports the validity of my theory of political
capital of illicit economies. The belligerent groups examined- the FARC, the
paramilitaries, the M-19, and the ELN - obtained not only physical resources from their
positive involvement in various illicit economies, but the belligerents that participated in
labor-intensive illicit economies, such as the cultivation of illicit crops, also gained
substantial political capital.
The FARC, the largest guerrilla group, spent its first fifteen years not involved in
an illicit economy, relying on local banditry for food and supply acquisition and on
isolated attacks against the military to obtain weapons. Not only did the FARC fail to
grow during that period, it also alienated the local population. Then, when the FARC first
encountered drug cultivation, it sought to suppress the illicit narcotics economy. Its
negative involvement in the illicit narcotics economy, however, alienated the local
population and its control over the regions where it operated became threatened. Seeing
the substantial alienation of the local population and fearing the loss of control to the
drug traffickers and their own security forces, the FARC reversed its policy and came to
positively sponsor the illicit economy. The FARC subsequently grew from a band of a
few hundred guerrillas on the run in the southern jungles of the country into a 20,000
strong guerrilla group, largely controlling the southern and south-central parts of the
country, and present in at least 60 percent of the country.
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As a result of its positive involvement in the illicit economy, the FARC was able
to vastly enlarge the scope and magnitude of its operations. Most importantly, it
developed a secure base among the rural population dependent on the illicit economy.
The FARC protected the population against the abuses of the traffickers and the
eradication teams, provided a regulatory framework for the illicit economy, and used the
illicit economy to provide social services to the population. Contrary to the predictions of
the conventional view, but consistent with the predictions of my theory, the FARC's
strongest support has consistently been in the drug-cultivation regions.
The paramilitaries' positive involvement in the illicit narcotics economy supports
another aspect of my theory: the importance of the amplifying factor, "presence/absence
of traffickers" for the belligerent group's ability to obtain political capital. The
paramilitaries obtained large physical resources from the illicit economy, growing from a
few hundred in the mid-1980s to almost 30,000 in 2006, and they were also able to obtain
some political capital from the illicit economy. Nonetheless, their political capital
remained limited, because the paramilitaries were frequently identical to the traffickers
and hence did not provide a variety of regulatory services to the farmers, such as
bargaining for better prices for the farmers and ameliorating the violence exacted by
traffickers on the rural population.
Moreover, even when the paramilitaries were distinct and separate from the
traffickers and when traffickers were present in the territories they controlled, the
paramilitaries' political capital remained limited. This is because the paramilitaries'
primary audience was the traffickers, not the population. Consequently, the paramilitaries
failed to provide numerous regulatory and protection services to the population, with the
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exception of delivering social services. FARC's elimination of small and medium
traffickers from areas under their control by the late 1990s also supports the prediction of
my theory regarding the absence of the traffickers. When the FARC eliminated the
cartels' intermediaries and itself began buying coca paste from farmers and selling it to
the trafficking organizations and even the paramilitaries, it stopped providing a host of
regulatory services to the peasants and became more brutal. Its political capital decreased
substantially, and the population became largely indifferent in its support between the
paramilitaries and the FARC.
The relationship between the belligerents and the traffickers also clearly supports
my theory and weakens the validity of the conventional view. The relationship between
the FARC and traffickers deteriorated very rapidly in the early 1980s. The traffickers
soon became fed up with the FARC's interference in the management of the drug trade
and hired the paramilitaries to displace the traffickers. Subsequently, even the
relationship between the traffickers and the paramilitaries has deteriorated, as predicted
by my theory, and internal infighting, violence, and competing interests among the
groups and their various factions became endemic. Infighting also characterized the state
of relations among the major traffickers and cartels of the early era of the Colombian
drug trade in the early 1980s. The Medellin and Cali cartels sought to eliminate each
other and frequently fought each other. Far from there being a great crime alliance to
battle the state, there was business as usual among the cartels and the traffickers:
competition and violence.
The examination of the cartels also undermines another claim of the conventional
view - namely, that when groups lose ideology, they lose legitimacy and support. The
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cartels never had any real ideology; but despite that, through their provision of a variety
of social services, they did build up political capital. Hence, even though Pablo Escobar,
the head of the Medellin cartel, was a brutal thug who had scores of people murdered, the
local population from Medellin did not provide intelligence on him to law enforcement
officials. He was ultimately captured by intelligence provided by the Cali cartel.
The positive involvement of two other belligerent groups, the M-19 and the ELN,
in Colombia's illicit economies, supports the arguments of my theory regarding the
importance of the character of illicit economies in determining the scope and magnitude
of belligerents' gains. The M-19 was involved in the illicit narcotics economy, but not in
the labor-intensive cultivation aspects of the economy. At first, the group became
involved in extorting payoffs from the drug traffickers by kidnapping their family
members. Not only did this activity fail to generate any political capital for the group, it
also failed to generate physical resources, and the group suffered large physical losses at
the hands of the traffickers and their security forces, the MAS. Later, the M-19 switched
to providing protection services to the traffickers, such as opposing extradition and
destroying judicial evidence against the traffickers. Since the group operated in relatively
wealthy Bogotai, its positive involvement in the labor-non-intensive aspects of the illicit
economy not only failed to generate political capital for the group, but widely
antagonized the urban audience of the group that previously constituted its support base.
Moreover, since the M-19 did not have access to the labor-intensive aspects of the drug
trade, it never managed to capture or build connections to the rural population.
The ELN, on the other hand, operated in the rural areas of Colombia where the
state of the overall economy was poor. Even so, its participation in a labor-non-intensive
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illicit economy - namely, the extortion of payoffs from landowners and major businesses,
especially oil companies - failed to generate much political capital for the group. The
ELN did obtain vast financial resources from its extortion business, at the rate of $150
million a year, and did invest some of these profits in the provision of social services. But
since its involvement in kidnapping and extortion did not generate many employment
opportunities for the rural population, the group nonetheless failed to build up substantial
political capital. Moreover, the group lost political capital by its negative involvement in
the illicit narcotics economy, which it tried to suppress for religious reasons.
Finally, the case of Colombia also illuminates the role of government response to
the illicit economy. Despite eradication being conducted for almost thirty years, with the
last six featuring the most intensive aerial fumigation in history, the policy has failed so
far to accomplish either of its two promised goals: Although the area under cultivation
has decreased, there has not yet been a substantial decline in the supply of Colombian
cocaine or heroin. Nor has eradication - even at the scale that it has been undertaken -
managed to bankrupt the FARC or the demobilizing paramilitaries. There is no indication
that either group is hurting financially. The FARC has been under serious military
pressure from the Colombian government, but the successes against it cannot be
attributed to eradication. Despite eradication, the demobilizing paramilitaries, now deeply
penetrated by drug traffickers, have managed to preserve, if not consolidate, their
involvement in the narcotics economy.
Meanwhile, as predicted by my theory, eradication has generated new political
capital for the belligerents. Although the FARC has lost most of its legitimacy, it still
remains strongest in the drug regions. The local population's cooperation with the
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government is minimal if not altogether non-existent. Information-provision by the
population to the government continues to be poor, and the military is lacking
intelligence on the FARC. Eradication has deeply antagonized the local population from
the government.
Afghanistan
The analysis of over a hundred years of the interaction of military conflict and
illicit economies in Afghanistan also supports the theory of political capital of illicit
economies and disconfirms the validity of the conventional view. Pashtun belligerents
first interacted with the illicit drug economy in the 19t and early 20' century. Fearing the
increase in the strength of the belligerents, Britain used interdiction to weaken the
belligerents. Although the policy succeeded in substantially limiting the drug economy, it
failed to bankrupt and weaken the belligerents, and Britain was not able to defeat them,
an outcome directly contradictory to the central claim of the conventional view but
consistent with the political capital of illicit economies.
The mujahideen's involvement in the drug trade in the 1980s provides further
evidence for my theory. Even warlords, such as Ahmed Shah Massoud, who did not need
money from the illicit economy because they had income from the trade with gems and
objected to drugs on moral grounds, did not eradicate the illicit narcotics economy. Nor
did they tax it. Clearly, pecuniary motives could not have been their motivation, but
rather the sensitivity to the political costs of eradicating and the desire to enhance
information gathering. Access to the illicit economy not only facilitated information
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gathering by the mujahideen, but also improved their freedom of operation, once again,
supporting my theory.
Nor can the conventional view account for the Taliban's original impulse to
eradicate the illicit drug economy in 1994 and the reversal of its policy. The Taliban
clearly did not need the financial income from drugs in 1994 and 1995. It was already
profiting from lucrative illicit smuggling with licit goods. But this labor-non-intensive
illicit economy could not generate the same level of political capital that the very labor-
intensive cultivation of poppy provided. Instead, the Taliban reversed its policy because
of the large political costs: a loss of legitimacy, and, in fact, a physical loss of control
over the territory where it carried out eradication. Only after the Taliban abandoned
eradication, was its control over the most naturally pro-Taliban Pashtun south
consolidated, not to mention the non-Pashtun regions.
Neither my theory nor the conventional view predicted the 2000 eradication
policy of the Taliban. Several crucial facts about the conduct and outcome of the
eradication campaign, however, clearly support my theory: The Taliban was only
eradicating drug crops in regions where it had firm control, but that elsewhere, such as in
the area of the Shinwari tribe, it used bribes. Although imposed through the use of high
levels of brutality, its prohibition of cultivation started breaking down within a year.
Crucially, the Taliban called off eradication and prohibition on cultivation in September
2001 as the U.S. invasion loomed imminent. Financial profits were not the reason for
calling off eradication, since the Taliban's heroin stockpiles would have allowed it to
maintain very large financial income while maintaining eradication. The speed with
which the Pashtun south fell during the U.S. military invasion - possibly driven by the
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alienation of the peasants due to eradication - is also consistent with my theory.
However, this evidence is only circumstantial, and sufficient detail for confirming it is
lacking.
In the post-Taliban period, the evidence once again decisively supports my
theory. First, the counterinsurgency forces - the U.S. military - adopted tacit
acquiescence to the illicit economy. They argued that such a policy was necessary for
information gathering, the facilitation of their military operations, and winning the hearts
and minds of the local population. Even as large political pressures have built up in other
U.S. agencies and international institutions, the U.S. military has refused to directly
participate in eradication.
Second, local warlords who participate in the illicit economy have derived not
only large financial benefits, but also political capital. The population has praised them
for their sponsorship of the illicit economy. On the other hand, the population has
condemned eradication. Eradication has led to protests, riots, and social instability. Local
elites who have embraced eradication, such as in Nangarhar, have suffered severe losses
of legitimacy.
Eradication also has failed to bankrupt warlords who benefit from the drug
economy. Contrary to the predictions of the conventional view, eradication has enhanced
not only the warlords' financial profits, but because of its selective nature, also their
political capital. Local elites in charge of eradication have destroyed the poppy fields of
their opponents - political competitors or rival tribes - while protecting the illicit
economy of their loyalists, thereby cementing their power base and consolidating their
political capital.
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Finally, eradication has also failed to bankrupt the Taliban insurgency. Instead,
eradication allowed the Taliban to inject itself back in the illicit economy after 2002, and
has strengthened the previously loose connections between the Taliban and the
traffickers. Eradication also has resulted in economic outmigration from Afghanistan to
Pakistan. Most importantly, eradication has generated vital political capital for the
Taliban, allowing the group to offer itself as a protector of the population against
eradication and capitalize on the resentment generated by eradication.
The provision of financial compensation for eradication did not redress these
counterproductive effects of eradication. Although some of the problems of compensated
eradication efforts in Afghanistan were specific to their flawed design - namely, a lack of
funds, inappropriate assessment and disbursal procedures, and fraud - and could
potentially be overcome by a smarter design, other problems appear to be of a more
permanent nature. These includ moral hazard - inadvertently motivating peasants to grow
more poppy in order to collect greater compensation - and, crucially, the ability of
traffickers to outbid the financial compensation offered by the government.
In sum, in all three cases, the theory of political capital of illicit economies
performed considerably better than the conventional view of narcoinsurgency and
narcoterrorism. In each case, belligerents obtained not only financial resources, but also,
and crucially, political capital from their positive involvement in the illicit economies and
suffered large costs in terms of their political capital when their adopted negative
involvement in the illicit economy. These changes in political capital were especially
prominent if the belligerents became involved in labor-intensive illicit economies in poor
regions. In such contexts, government eradication policy greatly increased the
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belligerents' political capital, motivating the population to withhold intelligence on the
belligerents, while it failed in its objective of cutting the belligerents off from resources
and weakening them. When policies that threatened the rural population less were
adopted - interdiction and especially tacit acquiescence -- the bond between the
belligerents and the rural population was loosened, intelligence provision by the
population to the government forces improved, and belligerents were severely weakened.
III. Other Lessons of the Study
Learning Curve
In response to the government's policies and to the population's reactions,
belligerents go through a process of learning and adaptation. Their attitudes to the illicit
economy change over time as they learn how to most effectively exploit it. The first
impulse of many belligerent groups is to prohibit and attempt to eradicate the illicit
economy because they consider the existence of the illicit economy inconsistent with
their political ideology or religious beliefs. This was the case of the Shining Path in Peru,
the FARC and the ELN in Colombia, and the Taliban in Afghanistan. But as belligerents
whose ideology initially disposed them to attempt to destroy an illicit economy encounter
fierce resistance from the local population that relies on the illicit economy for its basic
livelihood, they learn that at minimum they need to tolerate it."7 A failure to respond to
17 My analysis of the learning curve and the costs of the failure to learn expands upon a seminal work on
terrorist movements by Martha Crenshaw. See, for example, Martha Crenshaw, "Introduction," in Martha
Crenshaw, ed., Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power: The Consequences of Political Violence (Middletown:
Wesleyan University Press, 1983): 29. Crenshaw argues that the terrorist group's relative capabilities and
its ideology greatly affect the choice of methods and targets: for example, revolutionary-socialist terrorists
will strike at capitalist and imperialist targets, but eschew attacking working-class victims. What the
interaction between the drug economy and the belligerents reveals, however, is that both the benefits of
participating in the illicit economy and the costs of failing to do so are so large and multifaceted that
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such resistance from the local population can severely undermine the efforts of the
belligerent group in a stage when both its military capabilities and its political capital are
very limited. Tolerating the illicit economy thus becomes a crucial component of the
belligerents' effort to ensconce themselves among the local population. The
consequences of the failure to at least tolerate the illicit economy become so severe that
belligerent groups eventually learn to embrace it regardless of their ideology, goals,
political persuasion, deeply-held or outright fanatical religious beliefs, and other
inhibitors. If they fail to learn, they become unable to compete with other belligerent
groups that adopt positive involvement in the illicit economy.
This frequent tension between the group's ideology and the practical necessity of
tolerating the illicit economy is especially acute in the case of drugs since the ideological
inhibitions toward tolerating the drug trade are frequently very substantial: drugs are
prohibited by Islam, considered anti-Marxist, and are universally seen as having
devastating effects on their users. Such ideological inhibitions are frequently much
smaller with respect to other illicit economies. Most belligerent groups, for example,
would have little problem with the moral and ideological dimensions of the illicit
manufacture of passports. The acuteness of the contradiction between the group's original
ideology and the large pressures to accommodate to the illicit economy are yet another
reason why concentrating on the drug economy among the variety of illicit economies is
especially illustrative of the complex dynamics in the interaction of illicit economies and
military conflict.
516
belligerent groups sacrifice their ideology or reformulate it in ways to accommodate the need to tolerate the
economy.
Summarizing the typical learning curve: First, belligerents learn that they must
tolerate the illicit economy. They abandon their own suppression efforts (negative
involvement) and become positively involved in the illicit economy. Once they are
tolerating the illicit economy, they may as well as tax it. The subsequent step is to further
penetrate and exploit the illicit economy by participating in other phases of processing
and illicit traffic and providing a host of services to the local population involved in the
illicit economy. As belligerents accumulate both financial and political capital, they
extend their services even to those not directly involved with illicit economies, such as by
providing otherwise absent social services, financed with profits from the illicit economy,
to the broader population. Finally, belligerent groups frequently branch out into a variety
of other illicit economies. Belligerent groups thus tend to exploit illicit economies
opportunistically rather than starting out with the exploitation of the illicit economy as a
central feature of their grand strategy, even though the illicit economy may eventually
become a prominent feature of the conflict.
Modus Operandi Contagion Effect
The multiple forms of gains belligerents derive from drugs and other illicit
economies are so large that they motivate other belligerent groups in the conflict to
emulate their competitors' policies toward the illicit economy. This contagion effect takes
place even if the belligerents had not originally sought to exploit the illicit economy and
had "stumbled on it by accident." This does not mean that new belligerent groups
necessarily emerge in the conflict. Rather, the existing belligerent groups will emulate the
successful practices of their competitors or will otherwise lose out to those that do. The
517
FARC's positive involvement in the drug economy motivated the M-19 and the ELN to
follow suit and also gave rise to the paramilitaries and their deep involvement in the illicit
economy. Similarly, Sendero's positive involvement in the illicit economy in Peru
provided an example for the MRTA. In Afghanistan, positive involvement in the illicit
drug economy spread throughout the 1980s and early 1990s onto the vast majority of the
mujahideen commanders and warlords, and ultimately was adopted even by the Taliban.
IV. Broader Fallacies of the Conventional View
The conventional view thus contains two larger fallacies that go beyond the
narrow interaction between drugs and conflict and, in fact, beyond the interaction
between illicit economies and military conflict in general.
Fallacy of Oversimplification
The first fallacy of the conventional view is the failure to understand the full
scope of what constitutes strength of belligerent groups. The strength of a belligerent
group lies not only its physical resources as is frequently assumed (namely, money and
weapons) - an assumption at the core of the conventional view's arguments and
prescriptions -- but also in its political capital. Whether or not belligerent groups interact
with illicit economies, they have the potential to build up such political capital through a
variety of tactics, such as the use or nonuse of brutality toward the population, the
provision of resources to satisfy the needs of the population, and the fulfillment of
various roles that the state is not fulfilling adequately.
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However, while belligerent groups can obtain political capital from a variety of
activities, a lesson too frequently forgotten, positive involvement in illicit economies
presents unique opportunities for belligerents to greatly enhance their political capital.
This is because illicit economies present the belligerents with a unique opportunity to
take on the roles of protectors and regulators. By definition, since the economy is illicit,
the state is absent from regulating it. To the extent that the state's official presence exists
at all, it is frequently limited to state efforts to suppress the illicit economy. At minimum,
belligerents encounter a lacuna of regulation and protection of the illicit economy and
hence can offer their regulatory and protection services to the population and the
traffickers. Or they encounter government efforts to destroy the illicit economy, a
situation that only enhances the value of the belligerents' protection to the population and
the traffickers, and hence the belligerents' political capital.
Unofficial state presence, in the form of corrupt government officials who collect
protection rents for not suppressing the illicit economy, paradoxically limits to some
extent the ability of belligerents to penetrate the illicit economy. Since because of
corruption suppression efforts are sporadic and limited, the need for the belligerents'
protection services is reduced. However, apart from reducing the authority of the state
with the international community and also with the domestic population, this unofficial
presence is frequently arbitrary, capricious, unreliable, and limited to selective
suspension of suppression measures for hefty bribes. Belligerents can still offer their
services by offering greater stability and consistency of protection, lower protection rents,
and an expanded menu of regulatory and protection services, including against the
criminal traffickers and the corrupt government officials themselves.
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In short, access by belligerents to illicit commodities and economies strengthens
both the military capabilities of the belligerents and their political capital. Illicit
economies present a unique opportunity for belligerents to offer protection and regulation
services to the population and the traffickers. From this positive involvement they derive
large political capital, especially as they can offer such services to extensive labor-
intensive economies in poor countries. Moreover, the conventional view has even a too
narrow conception of military capabilities, focusing simply on physical resources (money
and weapons), and ignoring the freedom of action. Such freedom of action is also
enhanced by the belligerents' positive involvement in illicit economies as well as through
other means. However, it is the political capital of the belligerents that is especially
significant for state efforts to suppress the belligerent group as it crucially influences the
extent to which local population supports the belligerents and withholds intelligence on
the belligerents from the government. A key fallacy of the conventional view is thus to
doggedly support suppression efforts toward illicit economies regardless of the
belligerents' political capital and the conditions that influence the extent of this political
capital.
Fallacy of Unity
A second key fallacy of the conventional view is to assume a unity of purpose if
not a unity of identity between the belligerents and the criminal trafficking organizations
or individuals. But the fact that belligerent groups profit from illicit economies and
interact with criminal organizations also participating in the illicit economies does not by
itself mean that they become merged into a unified actor. Mutual interaction, including
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temporary cooperation, does not inevitably imply that the various actors involved have
managed to form a strong alliance or have merged into one unified group. Just because
the belligerents and the criminals know each other and establish some connections
between them does not mean that they have become soul brothers and comrades in arms.
In fact, as the analysis of the cases shows, belligerents and criminals exhibit at
least as much conflict in their relations as cooperation. They face different audiences and
have frequently directly contradictory interests. Regardless of their ideological
inclinations, belligerents at minimum attempt to extract as high protection rents as
possible from the traffickers while the traffickers want to pay as low protection rents as
possible. As belligerents also face a different audience -- namely, the local population --
they infringe upon the interests of the traffickers also in bargaining on behalf of the
population for better prices and otherwise in limiting the traffickers' control of the
population. It is thus not unusual for trafficking groups to end a cooperative relationship
with one belligerent group and hire another one to rid them of the presence of the first
group.
The assumption that belligerents and criminal organizations have merged into a
unified actor and can no longer be dealt with separately is analogous to the fallacies that
Communism was monolithic during the Cold War or that Islamism/ jihadism is
monolithic today. This assumption deprives policymakers, militaries involved in
operations against belligerents, and law enforcement officials involved in efforts against
criminal organizations of opportunities to pit the various actors against each other and
obtain intelligence from one actor on the other. Unnecessarily, the two actors are forced
into a more united posture against the government than would naturally be the case.
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When eradication and interdiction efforts lessened up in Peru, the traffickers provided
important intelligence on the Shining Path. Similarly, the bond between Afghanistan's
traffickers and the Taliban became strengthened only after interdiction and eradication
measures were undertaken in 2003.
It is, of course, possible that under some specific circumstances the criminal
organization and the belligerent group are so intermeshed that the defeat or negotiations
with one inevitably involves the same approach to the other. Or in the course of a
prolonged conflict, terrorists may abandon their political cause and become simply drug
traffickers-the FARC in Colombia is frequently pointed to as an example of such a
transformation. The reverse is also not unheard of-i.e., traffickers who were originally
not driven by any political motivations, but purely by financial profits come to embrace a
political cause in order to elevate their status and gain political legitimacy. Colombia,
once again, provides an example: some members of the AUC paramilitaries were
originally simply drug barons who, fearing extradition to the United States under drug
trafficking charges, bought themselves commander position in the AUC in order to
advantageously negotiate with the Colombian government and avoid extradition.
Moreover, the need to preserve and protect the continuation of one's economic
profits may require the acquisition of political power. Pablo Escobar's systematic attack
on the Colombia state and his effort to get people loyal to him elected to the legislature in
the 1980s -- i.e., his acquisition of political power -- were meant to secure his immunity
from prosecution and prevent a disruption of his economic activities. As Rensselaer Lee
puts it, "narco-elites ..., in fact, behave politically very much like traditional economic
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elites."'" In the case of belligerent groups, profit is the means to political power, in the
case of economic elites - illegal or not -- political power is the means to profit.
That said, the study shows that the default state of relations between the
traffickers and the belligerents is competition and conflict. This natural lack of unity and
the propensity to fight one another exist not only among belligerents and criminal
organizations, but also among the criminal organizations themselves. Although criminal
organizations sometimes cooperate with each other, they at least as frequently fight each
other, seeking to eliminate their opponents, to gain great control of the illicit economy,
and to reap larger financial profits. Because of the multiple audiences of belligerent
groups, alliances and tactical cooperation between belligerent groups and criminal
organizations are even more fraught with conflict, and hence are even more fragile.
V. Contribution to the Academic Discourse
The study addressed key and emerging questions in several areas of international
relations and comparative politics: the role of drugs and resources in conflict; the effects
of international markets and regulation on conflict; the efficacy of various
counterinsurgency/ counterterrorism strategies; and the impact of state failure and ways
to mitigate against it.
The academic literature is still in an initial phase of developing an understanding
of the relationships between illicit economies and military conflict. The overwhelming
~8 Rensselaer W. Lee III, "Transnational Organized Crime: An Overview," in Tom Farer, ed. Transnational
Crime in the Americas (New York: Routledge, 1999): 4.
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focus is on how drugs, and other resources, fund military conflict.' 9 Little distinction is
made between licit or illicit exploitable resources. The dominant recommendation is thus
that governments should suppress the illicit economies, such as to eradicate illicit crops,
in order to deprive the belligerents of resources. The political effects of belligerents'
exploitation of illicit economies are mentioned rarely, mainly as country-specific
critiques of the war on drugs.20 Although the nexus between illicit economies and
military conflict has become an important feature of conflict in the post-Cold War era,
there is a glaring lack of systematic general theory regarding the scope, size, and
character of gains belligerent groups derive from their participation in illicit economies.
The study fills the analytical void by showing how positive involvement by
belligerents in illicit economies earns them not only financial gains that enhance their
physical capabilities, as most of the literature stresses, but also freedom of action, an
important component of military capabilities, and, crucially, political capital. The study
identifies specific mechanisms by which belligerents obtain these benefits. Moreover, the
study specifies a set of structural and policy variables that influence the size and scope of
the belligerents' gains - both military and political - from their involvement in illicit
economies. The study revealed the unique properties of the illicitness of the discussed
economies in generating both political capital and high profits for the belligerent groups
19 Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano, with John B. Reuter, Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1990); Davids; Adams; Collier and
Hoeffler (2001).
20 McClintock (1988); Clutterbuck; Isacson (2003); Nazih Richani, Systems of Violence: The Political
Economy of War and Peace in Colombia (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002); Gustavo
Gorriti, The Shining Path A History of the Millenarian War in Peru, Robin Kirk, trans. (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1999); Josd E. Gonzales, Josd E. "Guerrillas and Coca in the Upper
Huallaga Valley," in Shining Path of Peru, David Scott Palmer, ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994):
123-144; Romfin D. Ortiz, "Insurgent Strategies in the Post-Cold War: The Case of theRevolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 25, 2002: 127-143; Guti6rrez Sanin,
Francisco. "Criminal Rebels? A Discussion of Civil War and Criminality from the Colombian Experience,"
Politics and Society, 32 (2), June 2004: 257-285; Lee (1989); and Clawson and Lee.
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that exploit such economies. It thus contributes a new dimension to the analysis of the
role of markets in violence and the costs and benefits of specific regulation for conflict
limitation.
The study also analyzes the role of criminal organizations (and traffickers) and
their relationship to belligerent groups. It shows that the common assumption of a unity
of purpose, if not a unity of identity,21 between the traffickers and the belligerents is
frequently misguided. Furthermore, the study reaffirms the need for a broader concept of
power,22 moving beyond the belligerents' physical resources to encompass also their
political capital, not only in the case of states, but also in the case of substate and
transstate actors.
The study also contributes new insights on the role of illicit economies and
criminal actors in the field of security studies, joining the lasting debate in the
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency literature between those who advocate a hearts
and minds approach and those who argue for cutting off the belligerents' resources. 23
The study elucidates both the extraordinary difficulty in attempting to cut the belligerents
off resources by suppressing the illicit economy and the likely futility of such an effort as
well as its counterproductive nature in terms of increasing the belligerents' political
capital and alienating the population. The study shows that when military and political
decision-makers are aware of the political gains belligerents obtain from their positive
involvement in illicit economies and adopt strategies that do not threaten the population's
21 Shelley (2002); Lal (2005); H. Richard Friman and Peter Andreas, "Introduction," in H. Richard Friman
and Peter Andreas, eds., The Illicit Global Economy and State Power (Lanham: Rowman
and Littlefield, 1999): 1- 23.
22 Seyom Brown, The Faces of Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); and Joseph S. Nye,
Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs Press, 2004).23 Bonnet; Trinquier; Laquer; Leites and Wolf Jr.; McCuen; Thompson; and Crenshaw.
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livelihood, they are able to score important success against the belligerents. On the other
hand, when they ignore the political aspects of the nexus between illicit economies and
military conflict, they push the population into the hands of the belligerents and deprive
themselves of intelligence. The study thus provides a test of competing schools of
counterinsurgency: the French view of counterinsurgency (on occasion combined with
applying conventional warfare methods to counterinsurgency operations) versus the
British or hearts and minds school of counterinsurgency, showing the greater
effectiveness of the latter approach. The study further distinguishes between various
suppression methods and their differing impact on the belligerents' political capital and
specifies under what set of structural factors the trade-off between the desire to limit the
resources of the belligerents and the desire to win support of the population for the
government's to suppress the conflict is starkest and when it is weakest.
The study also informs the literature on failed states,24 showing how the
misallocation of resources by weak states in their counterdrug/ counterinsurgency efforts
leads to a further deterioration of their governance capacity. It affirms the negative effect
of state absence in a territory in fostering the emergence of both illicit economies and
military conflict. But it also highlights the counterproductive effects of establishing the
first state presence in such a region by destroying the illicit economy on which the local
population is dependent for basic livelihood. The population then develops a negative
view of state presence and rejects the state.
24 Robert I. Rotberg, ed., State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror (Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution Press, 2003); I. William Zartman, ed. Collapsed States: The Disintegration and
Restoration of Legitimate Authority (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), Rice, Susan.
"Strengthening Weak States: A 21" Century Imperative," http://www.securitypeace.org/pdf/rice.pdf,
downloaded September 10, 2005; and Stephen D. Krasner and Carlos Pascual, "Addressing State Failure,"
Foreign Affairs, 84 (4), July/August 2005: 153-163.
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The last chapter draws on the theoretical and empirical lessons of the study to
tease out implications for government policies toward illicit economies when a primary
purpose is the limitation of military conflict. It also shows the implications for military
policy when a corollary or primary objective is the suppression of illicit economies. The
chapter identifies conditions and strategies under which the suppression of illicit
economies, such as the eradication of illicit crops, will be most effective and lasting. It
also extends the analysis to several other cases, not covered in the study in detail, but
which nonetheless further confirm the validity of the theory of political capital of illicit
economies and provide important lessons for policy implications. The study concludes by
providing a set of policy recommendations for governments and international
organizations.
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CHAPTER EIGHT - Evidence from Other Cases &.Policy Implications
I. Introduction
The dissertation has explored the connection between illicit economies and
military conflict primarily in the context of poor regions. In such a context, the local
governments face the starkest trade-off between the desire to limit the belligerents'
resources (and also to please the United States and comply with the international regime
against narcotics) by suppressing the illicit economy and the desire to win the heats and
minds of the population by tolerating the illicit economy. To fully evaluate the
importance of the structural factor, the state of the overall economy, the dissertation also
explored the case of Colombia's M-19, which was involved in the drug trade in the
context of the relatively rich Bogotai and other Colombian cities. As predicted by my
theory of political capital of illicit economies, the M-I9's participation did not lead to a
significant increase in its political capital.
in this last chapter, I extend the analysis briefly to several other cases to offer
further elaboration on the impact of two of the amplifying factors -- state of the overall
economy and government response toward the illicit economy -- on the basic relationship
posited in the dissertation. I also use these cases to draw further policy implications and
recommendations. First, I explore the effect of the state of the overall economy in the
context of military conflict in a rich developed Western country, Northern Ireland.
Second, I use the case of Burma to further show how tacit acquiescence to the cultivation
of illicit crops can be exploited by governments to end conflict. The case of Burma is also
useful to further illustrate why eradication is extremely unlikely to bankrupt belligerents
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even when successful in drastically reducing the cultivation of illicit crops. Third, I recap
why belligerents profiting from the drug trade will not likely be bankrupted by
eradication and outline when eradication is successful in limiting the cultivation of illicit
crops in a particular locale, if not in bankrupting belligerents. Fourth, I explain why not
all belligerent groups are running drugs, even though the illicit narcotics economy is by
far the most lucrative illicit economy and one that frequently brings large political capital
to belligerents who are positively involved in it. Fifth, I draw policy implications of the
study and offer policy recommendations.
II. Belligerents and Drugs in Rich Developed Countries - the Case of Northern
Ireland
The nexus between drugs and military conflict is most prominent in the case of
underdeveloped countries, frequently on the borderline of state failure, that contain
regions without state presence, with extensive poverty, extensive illicit economies, such
as drug cultivation and trafficking, and intense military conflict. But there are examples
of belligerent groups participating in the drug economy in developed Western countries
where the state of the overall economy is rich. Belligerents in these countries, such as
various republican and loyalist groups in Northern Ireland and Euskadi Ta Askatasuna
(ETA or Basque Homeland and Freedom) in Spain, have not participated in the labor-
intensive extensive cultivation of illicit crops. Rather, they are positively involved in the
final aspect of the drug traffic within their countries and in the distribution of illicit drugs.
In these cases, the belligerents have not been able to obtain significant political capital
from their positive involvement in the drug trade.
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As the dissertation has argued, in countries:where the state of the overall economy
is rich and there are plentiful means of subsistence, -the segment of the population that is
dependent on the illicit economy for basic livelihood is very small, and consequently the
population overall has no- interest in preserving the illicit economy. Frequently the few
individuals who are dependent on the illicit economy for basic. livelihood (as opposed to
enrichment beyond immediate necessity) are poor illegal immigrants or denizens of urban
ghettos. Moreover, moral inhibitions on the part of the wider population toward the illicit
economy play a greater role in developed countries. For a poor peasant in the hill regions
of an underdeveloped country, such as Laos, forgoing growing opium poppy may well
result in his inability to provide for himself and his family, if not outright starvation.
Hence, choosing not to participate in the cultivation of opium for moral reasons, because
somewhere downstream his opium will cause a devastating heroin addiction of someone
or because there is an international prohibition against growing poppy, is a luxury that he
frequently cannot afford and which he needs to balance against the moral implications of
his failing to provide for his family.
On the other hand, the moral choice of participating in the illicit economy is
considerably different for an individual in a developed country with plentiful alternative
means of subsistence. The choice the overall population faces is not drugs and food
versus no drugs and starvation, but rather making more. money from the illicit economy
than from legal activities. The moral restraints that arise from feeling a personal
responsibility for the suffering of the addicts and the destructive impact of drug addiction
on society as well as the reprobation of the community will play a much larger role.
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These personal moral restraints and community reprobation may be amplified by other
ideological factors, such as religious prohibitions.
Furthermore, the penalty for acting against the law, such as imprisonment, is also
likely to play a greater role in developed countries than in poor regions. First of all,
enforcement is likely to be considerably more effective since the state is stronger, thus
increasing the chances of the individual getting caught. Second, the deterrent effect of
law enforcement is also likely to be stronger in rich countries since the alternative
(eschewing participating in an illicit economy and obeying the law) nonetheless leads to a
reasonably comfortable lifestyle, not to mention not being in jail. On the other hand,
imprisonment in an unpleasant Third World jail may not be radically more uncomfortable
for the poor peasant in Laos than his and his families' starvation in the hills, a fact that
decreases the deterrent effect of law enforcement in the poor regions. Thus, in addition to
the simple relationship posited in the dissertation between the material needs of the
population, the significance of the illicit economy for the population's subsistence, and
consequently the exploitability of the illicit economy by belligerents for political capital,
moral and law-enforcement inhibitors are likely to further diminish the ability of
belligerents in rich countries to obtain political capital from illicit economies, especially
the drug trade.
The case of Northern Ireland serves as an illustration. Both the Irish Republican
Army groups -- the Provisional IRA (PIRA) and its post-1997 splinter the Real IRA
(RIRA) - and various loyalist paramilitary groups, such as the loyalist Ulster Defense
Association (UDA) and Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), faced the question of whether or
not to participate in the drug trade to raise finances. As these various groups dabbled in
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the drug trade, obtaining large financial resources, they not only failed to increase their
political capital, but, in fact, suffered substantial losses of political capital. The groups
that wanted to avoid these losses of political capital subsequently significantly curtailed
their participation in the drug trade.
The Provisional IRA became temporarily involved in the drug trade in the late
1970s and 1980s. But although the narcotics economy was extremely lucrative, in the
context of a rich state of the overall economy, the participation failed to generate any
political capital. In fact, PIRA faced serious loss of political capital with the local
Catholic communities who were deeply opposed to drug consumption. Seeking to avoid
this loss of political capital, PIRA subsequently decided to abort its participation in the
drug trade. A former PIRA member, Eamon Collins, commented on the PIRA decision:
The IRA - regardless of their public utterances dismissing condemnations of their
behavior from church and community leaders - tried to act in a way that would
avoid severe censure from within the ... community; they knew they were
operating within a sophisticated set of informal restrictions on their behaviour, no
less powerful for being largely unspoken.2
The IRA thus never officially sanctioned or tolerated the drug trade. In fact, it
significantly curtailed its participation in the drug trade, systematically repressing splinter
groups, such as the Irish People's Liberation Organization (IPLO) that failed to respect its
prohibition and continued to jeopardize the PIRA' s political capital. By the.mid-1990s,
PIRA even moved against criminal, nonpolitical drug dealers in Northern Ireland, waging
' Author's interview with Cindy Fazey, Professor of International Drug Policy, University of Liverpool,
December 2005.
2 Eamon Collins with Mick McGovern, Killing Rage (London: Granta, 1997): 29.
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an intimidation campaign against them. 3 Instead of drug trafficking, PIRA used armed
robberies as its means of financing.4
The Real IRA, a republican group that rejected the PIRA's 1997 ceasefire and
splintered off from PIRA, appears to be involved with drug trafficking and distribution.
Numbering perhaps less than 100, the group has much weaker ties to the Irish Catholic
communities than PIRA, a relationship further weakened by its explicit rejection of the
ceasefire and its effort to disrupt it. Largely unconcerned with its political capital --
minimal to start with -- the Real IRA has thus not been deterred from participating in the
drug trade to raise money. Even so, it has gone to considerable lengths to hide and deny
its participation.
The loyalist groups have obtained their finances from a variety of illicit (and
semi-licit) activities, such as robberies, tax fraud, smuggling, counterfeiting, collecting
rents from criminal gangs, drinking clubs, and drug dealing. As in the.case of the
republican groups, in the context of a country with a rich overall economy, participation
in the drug trade failed to generate political capital for the loyalist belligerents. Straddling
the boundary of licit and illicit activities, drinking clubs were the loyalists' biggest
sources of finances until about the early 1990s. The clubs themselves were legal;
however, paramilitaries siphoned off large amount of undisclosed and untaxed money.
By the time the authorities began to shut down these clubs in the 1990s, the paramilitaries
had earned tens of millions of dollars from this illicit activity.5 However, this successful
3 Andrew Silke, "Drink, Drugs, and Rock 'n' Roll: Financing Loyalist Terrorism in Northern Ireland - Part
Two," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 23 (2), April-June 2000: 112.
4John Horgan and Max Taylor, "Playing The Green Card: Financing Provisional IRA - Part 1," Terrorism
and Political Violence 11 (2), Summerl999: 1-38.
5 Silke: 108.
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elimination of the semi-licit economic activity did not dry up the loyalists' resources for
long. In fact, it pushed the loyalists into the drug trade.
As the 1990s progressed, various sources claimed that the loyalists, especially, the
UDA and UVF, controlled up to 60% of North Ireland's drug trade.6 Whether their drug
operations were so extensive and effective is a matter of debate. Nonetheless, the
loyalists progressively not only taxed the local drug dealers operating in their territories,
but ultimately took over traffic from Britain, forcing the drug dealers in their territories to
buy supplies from them. 7 But once again, such activity did not generate political capital
for the belligerents, and despite its high profitability, the majority of the loyalists opposed
the activity and the trade remained largely a domain of individual groups, such as Billy
Wright's Mid-Ulster UVF, rather than an officially sanctioned policy of the umbrella
organizations. As Andrew Silke points out, the loyalist "leadership and the connected
political parties are painfully aware that the practice carries the heavies political cost of
all of the various fund-raising activities." 8 In fact, the political costs have been so large
that the loyalists have sought to curtail the participation of their various groups in the
drug trade since the mid/late 1990s, stepping up instead their loan sharking activities and
moving into counterfeiting, fuel rackets, and other frauds.
Several important conclusions can thus be drawn from the case of the Northern
Ireland belligerent groups interacting with the drug trade. First, the case affirms the
critical importance of the state of the overall economy. Although in this rich region, the
drug trade still generated vast financial resources for the belligerents, it not only failed to
6 See, for example, Anna-Marie McFaul, "Godfathers 'now control illegal drug trade,"' Irish News, August
30, 1995.
7 Ibid.
8 Silke: 117.
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increase the groups' political capital, but in fact resulted in direct losses of political
capital. The population was not dependent on the illicit economy for livelihood, and the
illicit economy did not bring any benefits to the community, but rather generated costs in
terms of addiction and crime. Thus, the population sympathizing with both the republican
groups and the loyalist paramilitaries condemned and censured the groups' drug
trafficking activities, ultimately resulting in the groups' curtailing their drug activities.
Only groups that were not concerned with their political capital, such as the Real IRA,
continued with traffic, and even they at least attempted to hide it.
Second, the case once again underscores the difficulty of trying to cut belligerents
off from resources, even if rich developed countries where state presence and law
enforcement are extensive and where the state has a myriad of surveillance and
enforcement mechanisms at its disposal. As the authorities successfully turned off the
loyalists' financing from the drinking clubs, the loyalists turned to drugs. When the
loyalists abandoned drugs, they turned to other illicit economic activities for their
financing - loan sharking, counterfeiting, and various frauds.
The difficulties facing governments in poor countries attempting to turn off the
flow of cash to the belligerents from various illicit activities are immeasurably greater.
State presence and law enforcement are weaker, the myriad of possible evasion activities
on the part of the belligerents to preserve the resource flow increases, and the scope of
available illicit economies and activities remains large.
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III. Eluding Bankruptcy by Switching to Other Illicit Activities and a Twist on Tacit
Acquiescence - The Case of Burma/Myanmar
The case of Burma shows how even in the rare circumstance where eradication
does actually succeed in significantly limiting the extent of illicit crop cultivation in a
particular locale, belligerents do not go bankrupt but simply switch to other illicit
economic activities. Moreover, it shows that effective eradication comes only after the
military conflict has ended. Once again, in the case of Burma, as in the cases of Peru and
Afghanistan, a key to government success in ending military conflict was a tacit
acquiescence to illicit crop cultivation on the part of the government. But the Burma case
reveals a new twist on tacit acquiescence where tacit acquiescence is not designed
primarily to win the hearts and minds of the population, but rather to buy off the
belligerents themselves.
Grown in Burma, a part of the Golden Triangle, for centuries, opium poppy
cultivation increased greatly after Burma's independence in 1948. Almost
instantaneously several insurgencies broke out. These included ethnonationalist
insurgencies, such as the Shan, Karen, and Kachin, seeking autonomy, independence, and
the reconfiguration of the administrative boundaries; a communist insurgency supported
until the 1980s by China and led by Communist Party of Burma (CPB); and an invasion
of the Chinese nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) driven into the Shan State from the
Yunnan Province in China.9 Overall, more than forty belligerent groups emerged during
the course of the fifty years of conflict, some, such as the CPB and the Mong Tai Army
(MTA) of the notorious opium warlord Khun Sa, numbering around 15,000 men, while
9 For the most comprehensive accounts, see Martin Smith, Burma and the Politics of Insurgency (New
York: Zed Books, 1999) and Bertil Lintner, Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency Since 1948 (Bangkok:
Silkworm Press, 1999).
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others, such as the Kayan Newland Party (KNLP), numbering just barely over hundred.
All of the insurgencies, as well as the government-sponsored paramilitaries Ka Kwe Ye
(KKY), became positively involved in a variety of illicit economies, such as drugs, illicit
logging, illicit mining and smuggling with gems, illicit smuggling with licit luxury goods
as well basic food products. Drugs deeply permeated all aspects of politics and conflict in
Burma and the Golden Triangle, with various insurgency groups deriving both physical
resources and political capital from positive involvement in the illicit economy and
growing in strength and with various druglords buying themselves armies to control land
and narcotics production.
The military government adopted a counterinsurgency policy designed to cut the
belligerents off from resources. Introduced in the late 1960s, this so-called "Four Cuts"
policy was meant to cut off the rebels' supplies of food, funding, recruits, and
intelligence. It included both forced relocation of the population and eradication of
opium, carried out by government and by the United States via aerial spraying. But this
counterinsurgency policy systematically failed to limit the resources available to the
belligerents. In fact, the main insurgencies kept steadily growing.
It is important to note that all along, the Burmese military government
manipulated eradication to selectively hurt its opponents and pay off supporters. Thus, at
times, the government did not eradicate the crops of rebels who were at that time aligned
with the government and who agreed to battle the government's opponents. Nonetheless,
for over forty years, the government was unable to put down the insurgencies and
establish control throughout the territory.
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In the late 1980s, two crucial changes took place. First in 1988, anti-government
protests fueled by a collapsing economy and desire for democracy broke out throughout
the country, including, and crucially, in the central part of Burma and in Rangoon. As a
result, the military government of Ne Win was replaced by a new junta, the State Law
and Order Restoration Council (SLORC)' 0 that brutally put down the demonstrations.
Second, the Communist Party of Burma, since 1981 no longer receiving support from
China, splintered in 1989 along ethnic lines into five major factions: the 12,000-strong
United Wa State Army (USWA), the 2-000-strong (Kokang) Myanmar National
Democratic Alliance (MNDAA), and three smaller groups in the Kachin and Shan states.
Fearing that the new insurgencies would join forces with the pro-democratic
movement and protesters in the center, the junta proceeded to negotiate cease-fires with
the various insurgencies. It did so by de facto giving licenses to the various insurgent
groups to trade with whatever they wanted as an incentive to agree to the ceasefire and,
despite U.S. protests, drug decertification and economic sanctions, suspending
eradication of illicit crops." In the background of the ceasefire negotiations was a major
push for the modernization of the armed forces and for improvements in their
counterinsurgency skills and force structure. This push did result in improved logistics
and mobility and in greater government presence throughout the territory. Overall, it
enhanced the efficacy of the government's counterinsurgency operations.12
'1 To improve its image, SLORC was renamed in the mid-1990s to the State Peace and Development
Council (SPDC).
" Robert S. Gelbard, "Burma: The Booming Drug Trade," in Robert I. Rotberg, ed., Burma: Prospects for
a Democratic Future (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998): 185-197.
12 Frank S. Jannuzi, "The New Burma Road (Paved by Polytechnologies?)" in Robert I. Rotberg, ed.
Burma: Prospects for a Democratic Future (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998): 197-208.
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However, the centerpiece of the ceasefires was the junta's acquiescence to the
belligerents' continued trade with any goods in their territories. In the Kachin state, the
various rebel groups - Kachin Defense Army (KDA), New Democratic Army, Kachin
(NDAK), and Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) -- were allowed to harvest
timber and opium poppy and mine gems and gold. In the Karen state, the Democratic
Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) also taxed opium poppy cultivation and trafficked with
opium and timber. In the Shan state, the UWSA, the Shan State National Army (SSNA),
the MNDAA, and the MTA were given similar tacit acquiescence toward the trade with
drugs.'3 Moreover, in the cease-fire areas, the junta legalized cross-border trade with
China, Thailand, and India on condition that government checkpoints were established
and taxes collected on trade. (Drugs were officially not taxed, but also not interdicted.
Various local government officials nonetheless cut profits on the drug trade.) In some
cases, such as in the case of insurgent leader and drug trafficker Sai Lin and his special
region No. 3, these harvesting and trading licenses were complemented by various
degrees of autonomy. The junta also struck a similar bargain with the most prominent
druglords, including Khun Sa and Lo Hsing-han, allowing them to invest their profits into
legitimate businesses, such as construction, paper mills, beer factories, banking, and food
supermarkets. 14 The traffickers-turned-businessmen also provided repairs of ports and
construction of major roads, such as between Lashio and Muse.'"
13 Jake Sherman, "Burma: Lessons from the Cease-fires," in Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, eds., The
Political Economy ofArmed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003): 225-
255.
14For example, Khun Sa thus came'to operate a major company, Good Shan Brothers; Lo Asia World, Asia
Wealth, and Kokang Import Export Co. As the country's economy continued to crumble as a result of
decades of mismanagement and the economic sanctions imposed on Burma by the United States and
Europe, the significance of these illicit profits for the overall economy continued to grow and became more
and more officially sanctioned. The government de facto agreed to absorb the illicit money to keep the
overall economy afloat. For details, see, Robert S. Gelbard, "SLOCR's Drug Links," Far Eastern
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The case of Burma thus represents a twist on tacit acquiescence. The junta did not
use tacit acquiescence to win the hearts and minds of the population, to stop their support
fbr the rebels, and to provide the government units with intelligence. Rather, the junta
used tacit acquiescence to the illicit economies to buy off the insurgents themselves and
make it materially advantageous for them to stop their fight. These ceasefires have held
fbr over ten years, in some cases for almost fifteen, essentially ending five decades of
conflict. Today only few rebels engaged in active fighting remain in the Mon state in the
south of the country and in the remote regions along the border. Various rebel groups and
leaders, however, continue to exercise autonomy in parts of the country. Moreover, as
ceasefires went on, the government progressively successfully pressured major
belligerent groups into disarming and handing over their weapons, making it less and less
viable for them to return to conflict.
The tacit acquiescence policy surprisingly did not result a massive increase in
cultivation. Between 1991 and 1996, cultivation and production levels stayed at about the
same level (160,000 hectares or 2,350 tons in 1991 and 163,100 hectares or 2,560 tons in
1996).16 Under pressure from the United States -- and also China that began to experience
not only growing addiction rates but also a growing threat to the Chinese Communist
Party authority in the border regions from the increasingly powerful Chinese drug
traffickers -- the junta finally undertook large-scale eradication efforts in the late 1990s
and early 2000s. It also forced the disarmed rebels in their autonomous territories, such as
Economic Review, November 21, 1996; Anthony Davis and Bruce Hawke, "Burma - the country that won't
kick the habit," Jane 's Intelligence Review, March 1998; and Bertil Linter, "Drugs and Economic Growth:
Ethnicity andExports," in Robert I. Rotberg, ed., Burma: Prospects for a Democratic Future (Washington,
DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998): 165-183.
S" These roads not only facilitated the spread of state presence and the increase of overall economic
activities, but also the efficiency of the drug traffic.
6 U.S. Department of State, International Control Strategy Reports, 1984-2006, (Washington, DC: U.S.
Department of State, various years).
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Sai Lin in his Special Region No. 3 and the United Wa State Army in its area, to carry
out similar eradication. Facing local populations tired of war and happy with the peace
that the ceasefires brought, dependent on wider trade with China, and having disarmed,
the belligerents agreed and carried out extensive eradication. Under DEA supervision,
Special Region No. 3 was essentially cleared off poppy.'7 Overall, production fell to
30,800 hectares or 312 metric tons in 2005."' The rural population was hit hard by
eradication, having food security for only eight months a year. Many people left the
regions, and even basic social services collapsed. As a result of the eradication causing
tremendous economic and social hardship for the population dependent on opium poppy
cultivation, the political capital of the belligerents greatly decreased. 19 But since the
central government was no longer in competition for the hearts and minds of the
population at the time when the belligerents themselves undertook eradication, the
population has been forced to put up with eradication, either leaving the regions or
surviving four months a year only on foreign food aid distribution.20
Meanwhile, the belligerents-cum-leaders of their autonomous regions have not
gone bankrupt. Although the population is starving, and increasingly turning to
'7 With a good sense of humor, U Sai Lin, one of the world's biggest drug traffickers, even opened a large
drug eradication museum in the "capital" of his autonomous region, in Mong La.
IS United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Myanmar - Opium Survey 2005,
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/Myanmar_opium-survey-2005.pdf, downloaded September 10, 2006.
"9 This only compounded the decline of the belligerents' political capital as the belligerents became
synonymous with the traffickers, thus resulting in the condition, "absence of traffickers," and failing to
perform regulatory functions on behalf of the population. For details on the eradication policy and the
resulting effects on the population, see Transnational Institute, Drugs and Conflict in Burma (Myanmar):
Dilemmas for Policy Responses, TNI Briefing Series, No. 9, December 2003,
http://www.tni.org/reports/drugs/debate9.pdf, downloaded, November 13, 2005. See also, International
Crisis Group, Myanmar: Aid to Border Areas, Asia Report No. 82, September 9, 2004,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/burma_myanmar/082_myanmar aid_to_theborder_are
as.pdf, downloaded, February 2, 2005.
20 The leadership of these regions, such as the UWSA, is itself engaged in forcible relocation of the
population from the unproductive hill regions into more agriculturally productive lower-altitude regions
within the territory it controls to maintain eradication. See, for example, Transnational Institute (June
2005).
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unrestrained logging and illicit trade with wildlife for livelihood, the former belligerents
have managed to maintain their income by switching to the production of synthetic drugs,
mainly methamphetamines. Sai Lin, Khun Sa, the United Wa State Army, MNDAA, and
others have become fully involved in the production and traffic with meth, locally known
as yaa baa. In the Shan state alone, over 50 meth factories have been discovered.21
Unlike opium poppy fields, such factories are exceedingly easy to hide, and
consequently, difficult to destroy. But since the production of synthetic drugs is not-labor
intensive, this illicit economy is providing no relief to the economic destitution of the
population. The political capital of the belligerents is further diminishing. Possibly over
time, this lack of political capital will threaten the belligerents' very hold on power even
in their autonomous regions without the presence of the central state.
The case of Burma is thus yet another case where tacit acquiescence to the
existence of a variety of the illicit economies, including the cultivation of opium poppy,
was central to the government's ability to end military conflict. However, the case of
Burma provides a new twist on tacit acquiescence: tacit acquiescence was not used by the
government to win the hearts and minds of the population, but rather to buy off and coopt
the belligerents and the traffickers themselves. Eradication which resulted in a very large
decrease in crop cultivation was effectively carried out after the ceasefires were in place
for several years (even though eradication caused major hardship to the rural population).
Moreover, in addition to the central government, the belligerents themselves carried out
eradication, and hence greatly diminished their political capital. However, the final
important lesson of the case of Burma is that even then, despite the very effective
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21 Sherman: 251.
eradication, the former belligerents have not gone bankrupt. They simply switched to
other illicit economies, including the production and traffic of synthetic drugs.
IV. Limits of Eradication: Why It Won't Bankrupt Belligerents and When It Is
Effective in Limiting Illicit Crop Cultivation in Particular Locales
Effectiveness of Eradication in Weakening Belligerents
The cases explored in the dissertation have shown that efforts.to suppress illicit
economies, such as illicit crop eradication, in order to bankrupt the belligerents and
defeat them have not succeeded. The following discussion recaps why: Suppression
efforts raise the price of illicit commodities, thus, in the cases of only partial suppression
of production, frequently resulting in little change in the belligerents' income. Given
stable international demand for an illicit commodity, full and permanent suppression is
extraordinarily hard to achieve. The extent of the belligerents' financial losses from
suppression of illicit economies depends on the adaptability of-the belligerents,
traffickers, and peasants. Adaptation methods available are plentiful, especially in the
case of illicit drugs, but more broadly as well. Belligerents can store drugs, which even in
their semi-finished state are essentially nonperishable. Belligerents can put some money
away, saving it for times when fresh income is limited.22 Peasants can replant after
eradication. They can increase number of plants per acre to offset losses from areas
eradicated. Peasants, traffickers, and belligerents have the ability to shift production to
areas that are not being eradicated and where detection is difficult, such as deeper into the
22 Paradoxically, unless laundered off into a bank or business, money can be more perishable than the
actual drug. The 1980s Colombian drug traffickers, for example, made so much money that they were
unable to rapidly launder it through the Colombian economy and resorted to even burying barrels of dollars
in the ground in the jungle. As they had so much income coming in, they would rarely have to dig up the
barrels, and on occasion, the money would simply rot, eaten away by tropical fungi.
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jungles under tree cover, or into higher elevation under cloud cover. Traffickers can
provide peasants with genetically-altered high-yield, high-resistance crops that do not die
after being sprayed. Traffickers can switch their trafficking routes to other areas and other
their means of transportation to other methods, to name just a few of the evasion
adaptions.
The history of drug control policies is a history of extraordinary adaptiveness on
the part of traffickers and peasants both toward eradication policies and toward
interdiction. What temporarily seems like great successes of law-enforcement and
counternarcotics policies frequently lasts for only a brief period, resulting in production
popping up somewhere else, the so-called "balloon effect." Coca and opium processing
are archetypal footloose industries: They require little capital, few labor skills, and the
needed technologies are simple and well-known. Source-country suppression policies,
eradication and interdiction, have at most succeeded in generating a two-year lag before
production and supply recovered.2 3
Thus, the destruction of the French connection and the interruption of heroin
smuggling from Asia through Turkey accompanied by the licensing of Turkish opium
cultivation for medical purposes in the late 1970s resulted in major heroin production
appearing in Mexico. The subsequent eradication campaign dried up heroin from Mexico
and allowed for the rise of the Golden Crescent and increase in production in the Golden
Triangle. Meanwhile, Mexican farmers shifted to cultivating marijuana. A subsequent
eradication campaign with the herbicide paraquat, which was believed to have
carcinogenic effects, scared off U.S. users from Mexican marijuana, thus allowing for a
major take off in marijuana production elsewhere in Latin America. This expansion in
23 Kevin Jack Riley, Snow Job? (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1996): 93.
545
marijuana cultivation, accompanied by a vast increase in demand for drugs in the United
States, also paved the way for a major increase coca cultivation and cocaine production in
the late 1970s and early 1980s.2 4 Since then, eradication and interdiction efforts in the
Andean region, for example, have been largely a shell game, with production being
suppressed in one of the producing countries while increasing elsewhere and the total
production being remarkably stable at around 200,000 hectares of coca cultivation for the
past twenty years.2' Although they are premised on the idea that effective suppression
will reduce consumption by increasing street prices, eradication efforts have failed in
both objectives. The consumption of cocaine and heroin has been stable in the West,
while consumption of marijuana and methamphetamines has increased. Many non-
Western countries have faced large increases in the consumption of a variety of
narcotics. 26 Prices have continued to fall in the West. In the United States, retail heroin
prices steadily fell from $1974.49 per gram in 1981 to $361.95 per gram in 2003 while
cocaine prices fell from $544.59 per 2 grams in 1981 to $106.54 per 2 grams in 2003,
while the purity of both has not declined.27 Similar decline in prices and stability in purity
is also seen in Europe. New sources of production have always managed to fill any
existing gap in supply.
Occasionally seemingly successful policies actually result in a more difficult law
enforcement problem: success in destroying the Medellin and Cali cartels led to the
emergence of numerous "boutique" cartels against which it is much more difficult to
24 Peter Reuter, "Eternal Hope: America's Quest for Narcotics Control," Public Interest, (79),
Spring 1985: 79-95.
21 U.S. Department of State, International Control Strategy Reports, 1996-2004, and Center for
International Policy, Andean Coca Cultivation, http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/cocagrowing.html.
26 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2006 World Drug Report,
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/WDR_2006/wdr2006 volumel.pdf, downloaded September 24, 2006.
27 ONDCP data obtained by WOLA under the Freedom of Information Act and available at
http://www.wola.org.ddhr/ddhr_data_measures2.htm.
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carry out effective interdiction and which are very hard even to detect. Of course, the
reduction of power of organized crime vis-d-vis the Colombian state was an important
benefit of the elimination of the cartels. Large and aggressive, the Medellin and Cali
cartels attempted to acquire significant political power. The Medellin cartel also engaged
in a terrorist campaign against the state. Their elimination no doubt benefited the
Colombian state and society, even though subsequent counternarcotics measures became
more difficult.
Yet even if counternarcotics policies broke with the historic record and
miraculously succeeding in permanently wiping out illicit crop cultivation in particular
regions, belligerents always have the possibility of switching to other illicit economies,
such as extortion, illegal logging, and other illegal traffic. Most easily and conveniently,
they can switch to cooking synthetic drugs, such as methamphetamines.
Finally, groups rarely rely on drugs to provide their entire income. Even the
prototypical groups obtaining large profits from drugs, such as the FARC and. the AUC in
Colombia, derived only 50% and 80% of their finances from drugs respectively.
Moreover, these large percentages are more of an exception than the rule. Even if
eradication were to permanently wipe out the entire cultivation of illicit crops in a
particular locale and the belligerent group failed to adapt, the group would still suffer
only a partial loss of income.
It is highly questionable whether the consequent loss of financial resources would
be enough to paralyze the belligerent group's military operations. Much would depend on
the group's subsequent budgeting and minimum necessary yearly outlay. The group
could, for example, choose cheaper military tactics, such as the use of primitive explosive
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devises. Although the belligerent group may face difficulties in procurement and
logistics, it is not inevitable that all equipment will need to be replaced on a yearly basis.
It is quite possible that even in the absence of new income, the belligerent group may
well be able to carry on with a destructive and deadly military campaign for a number of
years.
This problem becomes especially acute for governments when they attempt to use
the suppression of illicit economies not for defeating insurgent groups with large armies
numbering in the thousands and are trying to take over a territory, but for defeating
terrorist groups numbering in the hundreds or less and engaging in sporadic, albeit
spectacular and destructive attacks. Al Qaeda, to which policymakers and analysts
frequently point to justify the need for illicit crop suppression efforts in Afghanistan (and
worldwide), provides a pertinent example. 28 Al Qaeda's 9-11 attacks were estimated to
cost between $300,000 to $500,000.29 Eradication supposedly will deprive al Qaeda of
financial resources and hence severely downgrade its operational capacity. However, a
moderately competent terrorist group that taxes some processing plants or engages in
trafficking will be able to derive millions (if not tens of millions) of dollars from the drug
trade. Even if the group has access to the drug trade for only one year, and even if its
competence is very limited, it still will be able to earn enough money to carry out at
minimum several operations as costly as 9-11. For example, at the 2003 wholesale price
28 Al Qaeda here is used only as an illustration since it is frequently used as justification for eradication
efforts in specific countries or more broadly. There is no indication that al Qaeda has any distribution
networks in the United States or Europe. The best available evidence suggests that it has contacts with drug
traffickers operating in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
29 U.S. Department of Treasury, The National Money'Laundering Strategy for 2003 (Washington DC: U:S.
Department of Treasury, 2003), footnote 50, Peter Reuter and Edwin M. Truman, Chasing Dirty Money
(Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2004): 143.
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for heroin ($139.22 for less than ten grams),30 the terrorist group would have to sell about
36 kg of heroin to a major dealer in the consumer country to earn the necessary outlay.
Even at considerably smaller wholesale prices higher upstream in the production-
trafficking chain where the vast majority of insurgent and terrorist groups operate, a
terrorist group could easily acquire the necessary finances for an operation as costly as
9-11 from a very limited and short-term involvement in the illicit drug economy. 3'
In fact, there has not been one case when eradication bankrupted a belligerent
group to the point of eliminating it or even severely weakening it. Eradication and
broader suppression efforts toward illicit economies have failed to do so in the case of
large insurgent armies with yearly outlays in the millions, and they are even less likely to
succeed in the case of small, albeit lethal terrorist groups.
Effectiveness of Eradication in Suppressing Illicit Crop Cultivation in
Particular Locales
Although eradication has not been effective in bankrupting and paralyzing
belligerent groups or suppressing overall production of any major drug during the past
thirty years, it has nonetheless on occasion succeeded in suppressing production in a
particular locale. The previous section provided examples of eradication temporarily
curtailing production in specific countries. The cases discussed in the dissertation also
analyzed instances of eradication significantly reducing production in specific locales:
Afghanistan in 2000 and Burma during the past several years. (Interdiction in Peru
30 Ibid.
3 Of course, the operational requirements to carry out such attacks go considerably beyond the necessary
finances. The analysis here is meant only to show that attempting to suppress the illicit narcotics economy
to prevent even large (not to mention smaller) terrorist attacks is extremely unlikely to succeed.
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between 1995 and 1999 was also similarly effective in limiting production.) Another
example not discussed in the dissertation is Bolivia between 1995 and 2000.
For eradication to be effective in reducing cultivation in specific areas, several
conditions need to be met. First and foremost, if a government's goal is to suppress
production in the entire country, then its needs to have control over the entire country. It
must have a detailed knowledge of where production is shifting as a result of eradication
and be able to be counter this trend. It must also have a continuing presence on the
ground to prevent replanting. It cannot face an armed opposition able to exploit
eradication. The Taliban had such control over where it eradicated in 2000. The Burmese
junta had similar control over the territory where it eradicated, and the former belligerents
had control over their semi-autonomous regions where they agreed to eradicate. When
Peru undertook (along with the U.S.) its effective Air Bridge interdiction program,
Sendero was already defeated. The thicker the state presence on the ground, the greater
the chance of success.
In addition to firm government control throughout the country, one of two
conditions is required for eradication to be effective in reducing illicit crop cultivation in
underdeveloped countries where the vast majority of illicit crops (with the exception of
marijuana) is located: 1) The government needs the will and capacity to be very harsh to
the population -- ignoring their destitute economic plight that is worsened by eradication;
cracking down on protests and rebellions against eradication; and removing any
opposition leaders who embrace the counter-eradication cause and could effectively
mobilize against the government. And the government needs to be willing to carry out
such repression on a repeated basis for years to come. Needless to say, such a policy is
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blatantly inconsistent with democracy and human rights. Or 2) Comprehensive
alternative livelihoods programs, covering all major structural causes of production, need
to be in place, not simply promised.
The repression model has so far been successful only on a temporary basis, and,
inevitably has broken down within a few years. Poppy cultivation in Afghanistan picked
up within one year, despite the Taliban's prohibition. And despite a combination of
repression and localized alternative development programs in Bolivia,32 production has
been increasing since 2000. Forced eradication also contributed to instability in Bolivia
and the election of a cocalero leader Evo Morales in 2005. Morales then suspended
forced eradication. So far, forced eradication appears to be holding in Burma, despite the
tremendous hardship on the affected population, largely because Afghanistan's higher
yield opium has displaced Burma's in the international market.
The second model, based on alternative livelihoods programs, has been no more
successful nation-wide,.partially because alternative livelihood programs have been
neither sufficiently lasting nor well-funded nor well-managed.33 Thailand provides the
most significant example of success. There, three decades of comprehensive, well-
funded, and well-managed rural development since the 1970s -- significantly
accompanied by an overall very impressive economic growth of the country -- led to a
32 See, for example, Illegal Drugs, Economy, and Society in the Andes (Baltimore: John Hopkins University
Press, 2003); Kevin Healy, "The Coca-Cocaine Issue in Bolivia: A Political Resource for All Seasons," in
Madeline Barbara Lions and Harry Sanabria, eds., Coca, Cocaine, and the Bolivian Reality (Albany: State
University of New Press, 1997): 227-242; Eduardo A. Gamarra, "Fighting Drugs in Bolivia: United States
and Bolivian Perceptions at Odds," in ibid.,: 243-252; Madeline Barbara L6ons, "After the Boom: Income
Decline, Eradication and Alternative Development in the Yungas," in ibid,: 139-168; Kathryn Ledebur,
"Bolivia: Clear Consequences," in Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin, eds., Drugs and Democracy in
Latin America, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005): 143-182; and Michael Painter, Institutional Analysis of the
Chapare Regional Development Project (CRDP), Working Paper No.59. (Binghamton: Institute for
Development Anthropology).
3 See, for example, Thoumi (2003).
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major decrease in the cultivation of opiates. 34 In fact, the cultivation of opiates was just
about wiped out: falling from 17,920 hectares at its peak in 1965/66 to 330 hectares in
1999/2000. 35 It is important to point out that cultivation at its peak was only 17,920
hectares, well below the size of the problem in Afghanistan today or (in the case of coca)
in Latin America. Moreover, Thailand continues to have flourishing traffic in synthetic
drugs as well as in opiates from other countries.36
For alternative livelihoods programs to be effective in reducing the extent of illicit
crop cultivation in a lasting way, good security needs to be established in the rural
regions. In other words, military conflict needs to be ended. Moreover, alternative
livelihoods programs cannot be simply limited to crop substitution. Even if the
replacement crop is lucrative, price profitability is only one factor driving the cultivation
of illicit crops, with other structural economic conditions playing crucial roles. Moreover,
it is a common fallacy to assume that farmers will not participate in licit production
simply because the illicit production is more profitable. Even in rich Western countries,
cultivation of illicit marijuana (not to mention other more lucrative illicit economies) is
more profitable than the vast majority of legal jobs, yet the vast majority of the
population chooses to obtain legal employment. The key for alternative livelihoods
should not be to match the prices of the illicit commodity, a losing game, but rather to
create such economic conditions that allow the population to have a decent livelihood
without having to resort to the illicit economy. For alternative livelihoods to have any
chance to take off, they must encompass infrastructure building, distribution of new
34 For a good overview, see, Ronald D. Renard, Opium Reduction in Thailand, 1970-2000: A Thirty-Year
Journey (Bangkok: UNDCP Silkworm Books, 2001).
5 Ibid.: 36.
36 Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, "Drugs and War Destabilize Thai-Myanmar Border Region," Jane 's Intelligence
Review, April 01, 2002.
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technologies, such as fertilizers and better seeds, marketing help, the development of
local microcredit, and the establishment of access to land without the need to participate
in the illicit economy, to name a few of the most prominent components. As such
alternative livelihoods programs require a lot of time and resources as well as essential
stability in the area where they are undertaken.
V. Why Not Every Belligerent Group Is Running Drugs
Given that belligerent groups derive such large and multifaceted benefits from the
illicit economy and that they face significant losses of relative power compared to other
belligerent groups that are positively involved in the illicit economy, why would some
belligerent groups not become positively involved? Although since the end of World War
II, the number of belligerent groups that have tapped into the drug trade and other illicit
economy have greatly surpassed conventional expectations -- see Appendix I for a
comprehensive list of cases -- not all belligerent groups do. The obstacles and constraints
to participation are sometimes large.
In the case of illicit-crop cultivation, the most basic limitations and obstacles are
natural endowments and the level of law enforcement. Although cannabis and opium
poppy are plants that can grow in a variety of conditions, coca is more restricted to
specific temperature and humidity conditions, and in the absence of creating special
artificial conditions through the use of greenhouses, fertilizers, and other agronomic
technologies cannot be grown simply anywhere." Such specific natural resource
endowments are lacking in some regions. But even the cultivation of more flexible plants,
37 Although mainly associated with the Andean region, coca has also been grown in Asia, notably in Japan
and Taiwan. Parts of Africa would also be suitable for its cultivation.
553
such as cannabis and opium poppy, faces the issue of comparative advantage: differences
in climatic conditions in Burma/Myanmar and Afghanistan result in significantly greater
opium yields per capsule and greater potency for Afghan opium than for Burmese.
Consequently, traffickers and users prefer Afghan opium. As cultivation of opium in
Afghanistan has expanded, Burmese cultivation has steadily shrunk in response to the
reduced demand for Burmese opium. Even if the remaining belligerents in Burma wanted
to expand cultivation, they would run into the limiting market forces of weak demand for
their opium.
A second constraint is the level of law enforcement and government control over
territory. Strong states with effective and large military and law-enforcement capacity not
only make it hard for belligerent groups to emerge, but also inhibit the emergence and
spread of a large-scale illicit economy.
Third, at least in the initial stages, belligerent groups rarely have the resources and
know-how to set up a large illicit economy. In the case of drugs, they frequently lack
contacts with criminal trafficking networks for selling at least the basic raw materials to
the traffickers, let alone the knowledge and precursor agents to refine raw materials into
medium-stage products, such as coca paste. Although the labor-intensiveness of
producing synthetic drugs is very small, the know-how demands and the necessity of
start-up access to controlled precursor agents, such as pseudoephedrine required for the
production of methamphetamines, frequently make it very difficult for nascent belligerent
groups to establish such economies from scratch. Much more likely, belligerent groups
will first learn how to exploit an existing illicit economy and acquire the knowledge and
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contacts necessary for managing the existing economy before they attempt to set up a
new illicit economy.
A fourth crucial constraint on the belligerents' ability to participate in certain
illicit economies is the level of saturation of the international market for the illicit
commodity and the size of demand for it. Traffickers may not be interested in abandoning
their established ties to traditional producers for new inexperienced, untested ones, and
there may not be enough demand to allow the existence of both new and traditional
suppliers to produce the same commodity. Inevitably, the relative stability of the
international market for narcotics results in production shifting among various countries,
depending on their comparative advantage at a particular time, but not in new large
increases in total world's production. Thus, the cultivation of coca has been shifting
between Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, at various times allowing for increases in a
particular country while production decreases in a competing country. But there is not an
unconstrained simultaneous expansions of production in all three countries nor is there an
unconstrained entrance of new large-scale producers, such as Venezuela, Ecuador, or
Brazil. Only suppression of production in a particular locale due to bad weather
conditions or eradication, , for example, or.a major new expansion of demand for
narcotics, such as experienced in the West in the 1960s and 1970s, will allow new
entrants to penetrate the market while allowing traditional suppliers to continue the scale
of their production. For example, production of opiates in the Golden Crescent emerged
in the late 1970s as a result of a large increase in demand for opiates in the West and the
suppression of production in the Golden Triangle due to drought.38 In short, not only will
3 Scott B. MacDonald, "Afghanistan," In Scott B. MacDonald and Bruce Zagaris, eds. International
Handbook on Drug Control (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1992): 315-324.
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belligerents likely at first lack the skills and connections to set up a new illicit economy
in their locale, but with satiated demand, they will also lack the market opportunity.
The fifth constraint on belligerents' participation in a particular illicit economy is
the presence of other competing belligerent groups that may crowd out the participation
of new entrants. Large-scale cultivation of illicit crops may well allow for the
participation of several belligerent groups - in Colombia, for example, the leftist FARC
and ELN and the rightist paramilitaries, the AUC all participate in the illicit economy.
Similarly, in Burma, the majority of the seventeen major insurgency groups and many
minor ones managed to participate in the drug trade. However, in small illicit economies
or in economies strongly dominated by one belligerent group, other belligerent groups .
may not be able to participate. The Peruvian Shining Path, for example, largely pushed
out the MRTA from the drug trade.
Sixth, belligerent groups may also face ideological and religious restraints - both
internal to the group and coming from the larger community -- on participating in the
illicit economy. As the example of Northern Ireland shows, the pressure from the larger
community will be much more prominent in rich developed countries. In poor countries,
the fact that even -groups ideologically opposed to a particular illicit economy will learn
not to suppress it in order to avoid alienating the local population does not necessarily
mean that they will actively choose to participate in it and materially profit from it.
(Although that is what in fact takes place in the vast majority of cases). Especially if the
group has an assured income from other sources -- other illicit economies, some legal -
economic activity, or foreign sponsors -- and if it has other sources of political capital, it
may well forgo its participation in a particular form of illicit economy. In such a case,
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strong views regarding ideology, religion, and morality may well inhibit particular groups
from actively participating in the illicit economy even though the group, in order not to
antagonize the local population, does not attempt to suppress it. This will be especially
the case in countries with rich overall economies and labor-non-intensive illicit
economies.
Similarly, a group may well need to balance the need to satisfy its internal
constituents with the need to please a powerful external sponsor. If the external sponsor
for some reason disapproves of the group's participation in the illicit economy and the
belligerent group is dependent on the external sponsor for either financial resources
and/or safehavens, the belligerent group may well choose to minimize damage to its
ability to persist and expand by refraining from participating in the illicit economy.
Although the population's negative response to suppression will dissuade the belligerents
from attempting to destroy the illicit economy, they may well choose a hands-off
approach rather than positive involvement.
VI. Policy Implications and Recommendations
Implications
The study has shown that in responding to the nexus of belligerency and illicit
economies, governments face a trade-off between the desire to limit the belligerents'
resources by eliminating the illicit economy and the desire to win the hearts and minds of
the population that also participates in the illicit economy. The more the government
suppresses the illicit economy, the greater the alienation of the population from the
government and the weaker the cooperation of the population with the government in the
effort to defeat the belligerents. Furthermore, the analysis showed that it is extraordinarily
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hard to succeed in actually cutting the belligerents off from resources since they have a
host of adaptation measures easily available within a particular illicit economy and since
they can fairly easily switch to other illicit economies.
However, the extent of the tradeoff is crucially dependent on several factors that
the dissertation identifies. Thus when deciding how to respond to the nexus of illicit
economies and military conflict, it is first of all necessary to identify whether the state of
the overall economy is poor, with a large segment of the population unable to access licit
livelihoods necessary for basic livelihood, and whether the illicit economy in which the
belligerents are involved is labor-intensive or not. In poor countries with large labor-
intensive illicit economies, suppression efforts, such as eradication of illicit crops, will
fundamentally antagonize the population and severely hamper intelligence-gathering and
overall efforts to suppress the belligerents. However, in the case of a rich country with a
labor-non-intensive illicit economy, suppression of the illicit economy will alienate only
very few people, and hence the trade-off between limiting resources and winning hearts
and minds of the population will be minimal, if not altogether disappear. In that case,
efforts to suppress the illicit economy may in fact be an appropriate policy during
conflict.
In either case, efforts to suppress the illicit economy will very rarely, and only
under the most favorable circumstances, result in any significant limitation of the
belligerents' resources and their ability to operate. But the impact on the belligerents' and
the government's political capital will be fundamentally different. In the case of poor
countries with labor-intensive illicit economies, suppressing such illicit economies will
not only fail to bankrupt the belligerents, it will also generate large political costs for the
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government. In the case of rich countries with labor-non-intensive illicit economies,
suppressing the illicit economy will also be unlikely to bankrupt the belligerents, but
there are no significant political costs associated with the strategy.
What then are the policy alternatives for dealing with the starkest trade-off when a
large labor-intensive illicit economy in a poor country interacts with military conflict?
The dissertation shows in case after case that efforts to suppress the illicit economy in
such situations fail to accomplish the goal of severely weakening the belligerents (and
also the goal of curtailing the illicit economy), and only antagonize the population.
Temporary tacit acquiescence to the illicit economy, however, crucially contributes to the
government's ability to defeat the belligerents.
Alternative livelihood programs can accompany any policy toward illicit
economies, whether the policy is eradication, interdiction, or tacit acquiescence. The
dissertation, however, shows that when alternative livelihoods programs are combined
with eradication during military conflict, the population is nonetheless antagonized from
the government, even if less so than when eradication is adopted alone. When eradication
is the dominant policy, the population does not cooperate with the government, and the
relationship between the population and the belligerents is strengthened. Combining
alternative livelihoods with eradication is thus less harmful to the military effort against
the belligerents than undertaking eradication alone, but it is still more harmful than
adopting a policy of temporary tacit acquiescence. When alternative livelihoods programs
are combined with tacit acquiescence, the population is not antagonized and much more
willing to support the government against the belligerents.
559
Licensing of the illicit economy for legitimate purposes is another nonrepressive
policy alternative. Apart from the cases explored in the dissertation, licensing of opium
poppy cultivation for medical opiates in Turkey, for example, eliminated the illicit
economy. It did so after several years of eradication failed to limit production and
generated large political instability. More significantly, belligerents groups, such as the
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and terrorist groups, such as Dev Sol, never managed to
penetrate the licit cultivation and derive either financial profits or political capital from it.
They did, however, penetrate illicit traffic with opiates from Asia. Licensing is also being
contemplated for preventing the illicit logging of tropical forests.3
Yet, the study should not be read as a blanket endorsement of laissez-faire,
licensing or legalization of illicit economies. First, there are good reasons why some
economies and activities remain illegal. The fact that murder is illegal creates demand for
killers and establishes a highly lucrative market for professional hitmen. Belligerent
groups who provide such hitmen services to the buyers will consequently be able to reap
large financial profits (even though in this case, depending on the popularity of the
targets, will likely not obtain much political capital with the larger population). The
implication, of course, is not to legalize murder or outsource the protection of life to the
private sector. Similarly, trade with WMD materials needs to remain prohibited and
efforts need to be made to prevent smuggling with WMD materials since the
consequences of such materials falling into the hands of terrorists may have catastrophic
consequences.
39 For a discussion of a licensing system to limit illicit logging, see, "Down in the Woods," Economist, 378
(8470), March 25, 2006: 73-5.
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Second, licensing or blanket legalization may result in the depletion of a resource
that it is desirable and necessary to preserve. Illicit trade with wildlife is probably the
second most lucrative illicit economy, and belligerent groups, such as UNITA, have
profited from killing and selling wildlife, especially highly endangered species.
Removing restrictions on the killing of wildlife, such as rhinos, or tacit acquiescence to
poaching, may well reduce the belligerents' financial profits, but will also result in the
irretrievable loss of the species.
Third, the fact that some form of licensing is feasible and effective in one context
does not mean it would be equally effective in other contexts. Licensing of opium in
Turkey proved a resounding success, but there were several auspicious factors from both
an efficacy and legal standpoints: Turkey had a strong state that had a firm control over
the territory where licensing was undertaken, a fact that crucially contributed to Turkey's
ability to comply with the Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs, the cornerstone of the
international narcotics regime. Also, Turkey was able to use a particular technology, the
so-called poppy straw method, that makes diversion of morphine into the illicit trade very
difficult. India's licensing system proved considerably less effective in preventing
diversion of opium into illicit uses, as India never adopted the poppy-straw method.40 In
addition, Turkey had a guaranteed market for its opiates in the United States that under
the so-called "80/20" rule agreed to purchase eighty percent of its medical opiates from
traditional suppliers, Turkey and India. Nonetheless, both India and Turkey are being
displaced from the licit market by new industrial suppliers of medical opiates, such as
Australia. Trying to apply such a licensing scheme, say to Afghanistan today, would face
40 For analysis of licensing efficacy in India and Turkey, see, David Mansfield, "An Analysis of Licit
Opium Poppy Cultivation: India and Turkey," http://www.pa-
chouvy.org/Mansfield2001AnalysisLicitOpiumPoppyCultivation.pdf, downloaded, December 12, 2005.
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a host of legal, political, and efficacy obstacles, foremost among them the lack of security
and state presence, but also the lack of a guaranteed market, and a stiff international
competition.
Fourth, even when licensing is possible, the existence of a licit economy does not
translate necessarily into the elimination of the related illicit economy. Thus, a legal
market for cars in the United States has not prevented the existence of an illicit market for
cheaper stolen cars. Participating in such an illicit market with stolen cars remains a
popular form of financing for many inner city gangs. But the fact that any government
prohibition and regulation creates the potential for an illicit economy since someone will
benefit from not complying with the regulation does not mean that governments should
abdicate all regulation.
However, an important implication of the study is that when contemplating new
regulations and prohibitions, such as economic sanctions against particular countries,
governments and international organizations need to consider to what illicit economies
such regulation will give rise. They also need to consider how exploitable the resulting
illicit economy will be by terrorists and other belligerents and how difficult enforcement
of the regulation will be. Carrying out interdiction and enforcing prohibitions on a host of
illicit economies poses extraordinary physical difficulties. Preventing smuggling with
anything is just very, very hard, especially in the context of today's global economy.
When licensing is not feasible or desirable, frequently the only way to severely limit the
illicit economy is to address demand for the commodity or service.
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Recommendations
Governments should not simply rely on suppression of illicit economies to defeat
or even substantially weaken belligerents. Most likely, belligerents will find a host of
adaptations to escape from the resource-limitation trap, making the focus on limiting the
belligerents' resources a highly risky strategy for the government. If a government seeks
to achieve a preponderance of military power, it needs to do so through beefing up its
own military resources.
In the case of labor-intensive illicit economies in poor countries, governments
shouldpostpone suppression efforts toward the illicit economy, which target the wider
population, until and after belligerents have been defeated or negotiated an end to the
conflict. Premature suppression efforts, such as eradication of illicit crops, will alienate
the population and severely curtail the in-flow of intelligence on the belligerents from the
population. It will lose the competition for the hearts and minds of the population and
severely hamper the military effort against the belligerents. Governments should avoid
unnecessarily cementing the bond between the population and the belligerents.
Interdiction at borders and destruction of labs does not target the population directly.
Consequently, it does not alienate the population to the same extent as eradication and is
thus more easily compatible with the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism effort.
If belligerents have not yet penetrated an illicit economy in a country --for
example, narcotics cultivation in a particular region -- governments should make every
effort to prevent the belligerents from penetrating the economy, such as by establishing a
cordon sannitaire around the region.
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Efforts to limit the belligerents' resources should focus on mechanisms that do not
harm the wider population, at least not directly, such as efforts against money-
laundering. Such measures against money-laundering cannot remain localized at the
country level, but need to be strengthened on the global level.
Governments should avoid unnecessarily strengthening the bond between the
criminal traffickers and the belligerents by treating the two as a unified actor and should
explore ways to pit the two actors against each other. Far from being comrades in arms,
the two actors have naturally conflicting and competing interests, and governments
should avoid helping them to align their interests. One way may be to temporarily let up
on the group that represents a smaller threat to the state and to exploit that group
intelligence acquisition.
Governments should also explore the possibilities of licensing ofparticular illicit
economies. Such measures can include converting illicit crops into legal uses or
instituting a licensing system for the logging of forests. The licensing regime for the
mining and trade with diamonds in Africa provides an example of how a licensing system
can work in a particular economy.
Governments should attempt to entice the belligerents into suppressing the illicit
economy themselves, through promises, threats, or via a third actor that has influence
over the belligerents, but only if the governments can distance themselves in the eyes of
the population from the suppression of the illicit economy. Such suppression policy
would critically weaken the belligerents' political capital and facilitate the government's
efforts to win the hearts and minds of the population. When such suppression efforts are
undertaken by the belligerents, the belligerents are especially vulnerable, and the
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government should intensify its military effort against the belligerents. However, if the
government cannot guarantee that it will be able to distance itself from such a
suppression policy, it should not encourage it.
If the belligerents themselves undertake suppression of a labor-intensive illicit
economy - whether through enticement or on their own -- the government should
immediately step in and provide relief to the population. It should also intensify the
military effort against the belligerents.
If the government itself undertakes suppression efforts toward a labor-intensive
illicit economy, which target the wider population, it should at least complement such a
dangerous policy by providing immediate relief to the population by way of humanitarian
aid and alternative livelihoods programs. Alternative livelihoods programs will not have
a chance to really take off until conflict has ended and security has been established; but
the government needs to demonstrate right away to the population that it is not indifferent
to its plight. Otherwise it will push the population into the hands of the belligerents and
eliminate any stake that the population may have in the victory of the government.
Even after the conflict has ended, eradication of illicit crops should only be
undertaken once the population has access to alternative livelihoods that address the
entire scope of structural drivers of illicit crop cultivation. A failure to provide such
comprehensive alternative development will result in social instability, critically
destabilizing the government immediately after conflict. In that case, the government will
only be able to maintain eradication by resorting to very harsh measures toward the
population and will have to maintain such repression for many years.
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Crucially, it is vital for governments and the international community to address
the DEMAND for illicit commodities and contraband. Although this policy will not be
equally effective across the scope of illicit commodities, it is vital. Limitations to this
approach arise especially in the case of illicit markets with only a few, but highly
determined buyers, such as possibly in the case of terrorists seeking to obtain WMD
materials. However, it promises high payoffs in the case of other illicit economies,
especially in the case of narcotic drugs. Substantially addressing demand through
treatment and prevention would go a great way not only to reduce consumption, but also
to limit the resources and the political capital belligerents can obtain from this particular
illicit economy. Demand reduction efforts, however, cannot be focused only on the
traditional Western developed countries, but also must encompass developing countries,
many of which have emerged as large secondary markets. Western counternarcotics
efforts abroad are dominantly focused on eradication and interdiction and are critically
lacking in helping source countries and other developing countries address their own
demands for narcotics and other illicit commodities.
Governments and international organizations also need to consider thoroughly to
which areas suppression efforts toward the illicit economy, if successful, will shift
production. In the absence of a major change in global demand, suppression of
production of a particular commodity will only shift production elsewhere. This balloon-
effect becomes an acute problem especially in the case of footloose illicit economies,
such as the cultivation of illicit crops. Governments and international organizations
interested in suppressing an illicit economy in a particular locale need to consider
whether such an effort will shift production to a more dangerous place; for example,
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where a major terrorist group operates. Such a group would consequently have a major
windfall, both in terms of its military capabilities and in terms of its political capital.
Governments and international organizations need to consider what illicit
economy will replace the existing one. Even when suppression efforts toward a particular
illicit economy in a particular locale are successful, criminal activity rarely disappears.
Frequently, it is replaced with the production and smuggling of other illicit commodities.
Suppression of illicit crop cultivation in Burma was replaced by the production of
methamphetamines. Smuggling with licit goods in Colombia and Afghanistan mutated
into the production and smuggling of drugs. Thus, in suppressing a current illicit
economy, governments and international actors need to take maximum precautions to
prevent the emergence of another one that could be even more pernicious and against
which control efforts can be even more difficult.
Finally, when deciding upon particular regulations and prohibitions,
governments and international organizations need to seriously consider whether the
harm resulting from such a prohibition and its enforcement is, in fact, smaller than the
harm resulting from laissez-faire or licensing. Among other things, they need to consider
the nature and size of the illicit economy such a prohibition will generate; the ease with
which belligerents will be able to exploit the resulting illicit economy; and the difficulties
of enforcing the new regulation.
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APPENDIX I
DATABASE OF CASES OF KNOWN INVOLVEMENT OF BELLIGERENT
GROUPS WITH ILLICIT NARCOTICS
COUNTRY
Afghanistan
Armenia
Britain
Burma/
Myanmar
BELLIGERENT
GROUP
Mujahideen
Warlords
Taliban
Northern Alliance
Warlords
Al Qaeda?
Armenian Secret
Army for the
Liberation of
Armenia
(ASALA)
British
government &
traders
Communist Party
of Burma (CPB)
TYPE OF
NARCOTICS
Opium, heroin
Opium, heroin
Opium, heroin
Opium, heroin
Opium, heroin
Opiates
Heroin
Opium
Opiates
TYPE OF
INVOLVEMENT
Taxation of
cultivation; taxation
of traffic;
processing
Taxation of
cultivation; taxation
of traffic;
processing
Taxation of
cultivation; taxation
of traffic;
processing;
encouragement of
cultivation;
international traffic?
Taxation of
cultivation; taxation
of traffic;
processing
Taxation .of
cultivation; taxation
of traffic;
processing;
domestic traffic
Traffic
Traffic
Taxation of
cultivation; traffic
Taxation of
cultivation;
domestic traffic;
processing
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PERIOD
1980s
1990s
1995-
1999;
2001 - ?
1990s
2000s
2000s
1970s-
1980s
Colonial
era
1970s-
1980s
KMT
Kachin
Independence
Organization
Shan United
Army (SUA)
Unitec
Army
I Wa State
(UWSA)
Ka Kwe Ye
(KKY)
Mong Tai Army
Myanmar Nat'l
Democratic
Alliance Army
(MNDAA)
Democratic
Karen Buddhist
Army (DKBA)
Shan State
National Army
(SSNA)
Anti-Manchu
underground
groups
Chiang Kai Shek
Mao
FARC
Opiates
Opiates
Opiates;
methamphetamines
Opiates;
methamphetamines
Opiates
Opiates
Opiates
Synthetics
Opiates
Opiates
Opium
Opium
Opium
Cocaine,
marijuana, opium
Taxation of
cultivation; traffic
Taxation of
cultivation;
processing; traffic
Taxation of
cultivation;
processing; traffic
Production; traffic
Taxation of
cultivation and of
traffic
Taxation of
cultivation and of
traffic
Traffic; distribution
Taxation of
cultivation,
processing, sales
Tolerance, taxation
(?)
Taxation of
cultivation; taxation
of processing and
traffic; processing,
traffic
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1950s-
1980s
1980s-
1980s -
1960s-
1970s
1989 -
1990s
1989-
1990s
1990s
19th
Century
1920s -
1940s
1930s -
1940s
1980s -
China
Colombia
Taxation of
cultivation; traffic
Taxation of
cultivation
Taxation of
cultivation;
processing; traffic
Production; traffic
Taxation of
cultivation;
processing; traffic
Production; taxation
of traffic; traffic
1980s-
AUC
(paramilitaries)
ELN
M-19
Popular
Liberation Army
(EPL)
Omega 7
Real IRA
IPLO
Ulster Defense
Association
Ulster Volunteer
Force
British forces
Sikhs in Punjab
Kashmiri
insurgents
French
occupation forces
Hill tribes
Independence
movement
Occupation
forces in China
Palestinian,
Phalangist,
Druze, Shiite
factions during
civil war
Cocaine,
marijuana, opium
Marijuana, opium
Cocaine
Cocaine, marijuana
Cocaine, marijuana
Opium (licit
cultivation)
Opiates
Opiates
Opiates
Opium
Opium
Opium
Hashish
Taxation of
cultivation; taxation
of processing and
traffic; processing;
traffic; international
traffic
Taxation of
cultivation; lab
protection
Protection/
facilitation of traffic
Taxation of
cultivation
Protection of traffic
& distribution
Traffic; distribution
Traffic; distribution
Traffic; distribution
Traffic; distribution
Taxation; traffic;
distribution
Traffic
Traffic
Taxation of
cultivation
Cultivation
Trafficking
Taxation of
cultivation;
distribution
Protection of traffic;
traffic
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1980s -
1990s-
1980s
1980s
19 80s
1990s -
Early
1990s
1990s -
1990s -
Until
1940s
1980s
1980s -
Until
1950s
Until
1970s
1945-49
1930s-
1940s
1970s -
1980s
Cuba
Great
Britain
India
Indochina
Indochina
Japan
Lebanon
I
Hezbollah Hashish Taxation of 1980s
Heroin cultivation; traffic 1980s -
Cocaine Taxation of 1990s
Methamphetamines cultivation; traffic 1990s -
? Traffic from Latin 1990s -
America to Europe
Taxation of
distribution in
Canada & the US?
Nicaragua Contras Cocaine Protection & 1980s
taxation of traffic
Kashmiri Opiates. Traffic 1990s -
militants
Baloch militants Opiates Traffic 2000s -
Taliban Opiates Refining, traffic 2000s-
Palestinian HAMAS Opiates
Territory Cocaine Tri-Border Region 1990s -
taxation of traffic &
distribution
Shining Path Cocaine Taxation of 1980s-
cultivation; 1990s
protection of traffic;
Peru processing; money- 2000slaundering;
Protection of traffic
MRTA Cocaine. Taxation of 1980s
cultivation
Abu Sayyaf
Group
New People's Marijuana Taxation of 1980s -
Army cultivation; traffic;
distribution
Philippines Moro Nat'l Marijuana Taxation of 1990s
Liberation Front Methamphetamines cultivation
(MNLF) Production
Moro Islamic.
Liberation Front
(MILF)
Chechen Opiates Traffic 1990s -
mujahideen
Russia Renegade Opiates Traffic; distribution 1990s -
Russian armed (.)
forces
Spain Basque General Traffic, distribution; 1980s -
Fatherland and money-laundering
Liberty (ETA)
572
? - indicates widespread allegations without clear tangible evidence
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Sri Lanka Liberation Tigers Heroin, Traffic 1980s -
of Tamil Eelam methamphetamines
Kurdistan's Opiates Taxation of traffic; 1980s -
Workers Party processing; traffic;
(PKK) taxation of money-
Turkeylaundering
Dev-Sol Heroin Traffic 1970s -
1980s
Gray Wolves Heroin Traffic 1970s -
1980s
Uzbekistan Islamic Opiates Traffic 1990s -
Movement of
Uzbekistan
(IMU)
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